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Editorial on the Research Topic
Beyond Embodied Cognition: Intentionality, Affordance, and Environmental Adaptation
Considering that humans must use external tools to solve problems, any account of
human cognition should incorporate such intentional tool-using processes into its models of
environmental adaptation. In the traditional ecological paradigm and embodied cognitive science,
affordances (i.e., possibilities for action which are available for an agent to perceive directly and
act upon) are nested in environment (Gibson, 1979). Intentionality is defined as a power of
minds that simultaneously coordinates with multiple affordances (e.g., Kiverstein and Rietveld,
2015). Exploring potential mechanisms that are responsible for intentionality would open up new
avenues for developing alternative paradigms of psychology on differing assumptions regarding the
relationship among mind, body, and environment. This Research Topic is devoted to the particular
question; how embodied cognitive processes contribute to the adaptation to a given environment
with intentionality.
One of the interests of this Research Topic was to provide an explanation of the relationship
between the sensorimotor process and one’s interaction with the environment. Huang et al. aimed
at the exploring the potential dissociation between the sense of 1PP-location (i.e., first-person
perspective) and body-location. In doing so they approached a topic that is of great interest in
the field of self-consciousness and self-perception. Since the sense of self-location is crucial for
one’s interaction with the environment, recognizing the distinctive roles of 1PP-location and body-
location would contribute to a better picture of environmental adaptation. Their data showed that
under different manipulations of movement, the spatial unity between 1PP-location and body-
location could be temporarily interrupted. Interestingly, they also observed a “double-body effect”
and further suggested that it is better to consider body-location and 1PP-location as interrelated
but distinct factors that jointly support the sense of self-location. Their conclusion may help to
explain the tremendous flexibility of our bodily experiences in coping with novel environmental
challenges. By recruiting patients with schizophrenia, Sevos et al. examined whether the addition of
a more salient action context can promote the emergence of affordance effect during the perception
of everyday objects. Participants performed two Stimulus–Response-Compatibility tasks in which
they were presented with semantic primes related to sense of property or goal of action prior
to viewing each graspable object. Controls responded faster when their response hand and the
graspable part of the object were compatibly oriented, but only when the context was congruent
with the individual’s needs and goals. When the context operated as a constraint, the affordance-
effect was disrupted. These results support the understanding that object-affordance is flexible and
not just intrinsic to an object. The authors also noted that the lack of sensorimotor facilitation in
patients with schizophrenia would require extensive use of higher cognitive processes even for the
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simplest routine activities in their daily life. Their conclusion
was informative to understand the specific mechanisms behind
schizophrenia.
Another appealing questions in this topic is how affordances
are perceived. Human infants are not born understanding how
to perceive affordance. It takes two corequisite sets of control
processes to explain the manner of the affordances learning
(Iran-Nejad and Bordbar). For conceptual understanding (CU),
knowers have deliberate attention-allocation control over their
first-person “knowthat” and “knowhow” content combined as
mutually coherent corequisites. For biofunctional understanding
(BU), knowers have attention-allocation control only over their
knowthat content but knowhow control content is ordinarily
conspicuously absent. With a thematic focus on embodiment
science and an eye toward systematic consensus in systemic
cohesion, Iran-Nejad and Bordbar’s study explored the roles
of biofunctional and conceptual control processes in the
wholetheme spiral of biofunctional understanding. They tested
a hypothesis of the difference between CU and BU. Their
findings supported the notion that individuals are capable of
engaging in mind-body cohesion-sensing and consensus-seeking
practices. These findings are also discussed in terms of the
predicted differences between BU and CU control processes,
their roles in regulating the physically unobservable flow of
systemic cohesion in the wholetheme spiral, and a proposal
for systematic consensus in systemic cohesion to serve as the
second guiding principle in biofunctional embodiment science
next to physical science’s first guiding principle of systematic
observation. Ramstead et al. extended the notion of affordance to
encompass the sociocultural level and the scaffolding it provides
to cognition. They investigated the ways in which people perceive
and engage with cultural affordances. Aiming to account for the
relationship between cultural content and normative practices on
the one hand and immersive participation on the other hand, they
focused on the social practices that regulate joint attention and
shared intentionality.
We received a study from Schilhab noticing that the multi-
functional nature of smart technology leading to noticeable
changes in affordances and embodiment. She addressed the
question to how social interaction (e.g., deep conversations)
facilitates the development of offline-cognition (e.g., mental
imagery, stream of consciousness, etc.) that enables the (self-)
regulation of online cognition and interactions with technology.
This opinion article took us back to 2002, when one of Wilson’s
much-cited six claims were published (Wilson, 2002). To some
extent, this article, together with Lee et al. (2012)’s results, again
invites us to take more seriously the philosophical issue of the
“natural kind” (e.g., Millikan, 1999; Ellis, 2001) for which off-line
aspects of embodied cognition is a proxy in on-line interactions
with the environment. In traditionally view, Behavior is thought
to be a means to control the environment, which ignores the
fact that the target object can be perceived through activity. For
example, some people take their seat after confirming the space
between the table and the chair; others first sit down and then re-
evaluate or adjust the distance. Therefore, even though the initial
stimulus is always perception, the interaction continues back and
forth between perception and action. Cognition serves to guide
the behaviors that acquire perceptions needed for new behaviors.
The two behaviors, before or after reappraisal, communicate
information. Gibson (1979) conceptualized this information
as survival-related symbols given by the environment to an
organism. Shaw extended this definition with the concept of
intention (e.g., Shaw, 2001). In brief, to survive, organisms
coordinate with their environment, communicate information,
and realize intentions. The conceptualized living (or survival) is
similar to the Gih of oriental philosophy. In this Topic, Lee et al.
attempts to build a meta-theory and to demonstrate empirical
designs for Gih, discussing the problems of themind and body, or
the subject and object, compared with the concept of “affordance”
proposed by ecological approaches. They claimed that Gih should
not remain in the domain of mysticism; the concept may be
addressed by psychological science to make use of valuable
insights from Eastern philosophy through empirical research.
Three studies investigated whether and how one important
characteristic of the sensory, motor, and emotional system
is reflected in language processing. Marino et al. report
two experiments on the relationship between language and
affordances. Participants were presented with short sentences
composed by verbs referring to motor chains and nouns of tools,
and were required to decide whether the image following the
sentence was mentioned in it or not. The results showed that the
grasp verb motor chain activated volumetric information, while
the functional motor chain activated information related to tool
use. Overall the studies demonstrate the influence of the motor
system and of its chained organization on language processing.
Buccino et al. investigated the embodiment of second language
and evidenced that embodied cognitive processes appear to
be substantially the same in L2 as it is in L1. Starting from
the available evidence to the effect that language processing
relies on the same sensory, motor, and emotional structures
that are involved when individuals experience the contents of
language material, they found that the processing of English
nouns by native speakers of Italian who also speak English
recruits the same neural substrates as the Italian equivalents.
Baumeister et al. investigates whether the link between language
and emotion is reduced in L2. Late Spanish-English bilinguals
were required to categorize a set of English and Spanish words
into “associated to emotion” or “not associated to emotion,”
then they were submitted to a surprise recognition task (old/new
word). Electromyography (EMG) and skin conductance (SC)
were recorded; in particular, muscle activity for corrugator and
zygomaticus muscles in response to happy and angry emotional
words for both L1 and L2 was detected. Results indicate stronger
enhancement of memory for emotional over neutral stimuli in L1
than in L2; furthermore, results of the EMG and SC recordings
indicate a slightly reduction of facial motor resonance and SC
responses to emotional stimuli in L2. In line with embodied
cognition views, they suggest that the processing of emotional
L2 words is less grounded in the motor, sensory, and autonomic
nervous systems than the processing of L1 words.
In addition, one general original research and one
commentary article were concerned with the methodological
issues on embodied cognition research. Cantarero et al. focus
on the relationship between gestures and moral behavior and
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investigates whether body gestures commonly associated with
(dis)honesty influence white lies. Participants were asked to give
feedback about the work of an artist they did not like in his face,
facing the dilemma between telling him the truth or lying to him,
thus preserving him from feeling bad (other oriented lie). During
the conversation they had to hold the hand-over-heart gesture,
typically related to honesty, or the fingers crossed, and hand over
elbow gestures. In the first experiment they find that the hand-
over-heart gestures is less associated to other oriented lies. In the
pre-registered experiment 2 they did not replicate the previous
result: the hand-over-heart gesture did not impede participants
to use other-oriented white lies. The authors discuss their
results in the framework of research on embodied cognition,
arguing that high methodological standards are necessary, in
particular when effect sizes are small. Based on Sevos et al. data,
Faulkenberry and Tummolini’s commentary pointed out the
issues that are present when trying to interpret non-significant
results in the traditional null hypothesis statistical testing
framework, and offered a quick example of how to use a Bayesian
approach to quantify evidence for object-affordance effects and
other action-specific influences on perception in the study of
embodied cognition.
This topic also comprises articles from other distinctive
perspectives which speak to the multifaceted research in this
field. Einarsson and Ziemke’s contribute to this research topic,
is an illustration—using the case of interactive music—of how
seemingly highly abstract, disembodied and unsituated activities,
such as the composition of musical works, can in fact be
strongly grounded in concrete embodied and situated activity.
Their theoretical perspectives and concrete examples may help
to elucidate how situations—and with them affordances—are
dynamically constructed through the interactions of biological,
contextual, social, and cultural mechanisms as embodied and
situated activity unfolds. Martínez-Pernía et al. introduced a level
of treatment that precedes behavior and cognition in a case study.
This theoretical consideration allowed the discovery of a better
relation between affordance and the environmental adaptation
for the improvement behavioral and cognitive performance in
their case study.
The final collection of 13 articles provides an overview
of current trends and opinions, as well as perspectives on
theoretical and methodological questions. As pointed out by
our CFP, psychology has continued to formulate and refine a
variety of paradigms to provide solutions for the mind-body
problem. Although a number of contemporary psychologists
believe they have avoided dualism by noting the close relationship
between certain brain activities and certain cognitive events, it
appears likely that such a relationship will soon be discovered
for all mental events. Replacing the term mind-body with
the term mind-brain does little to solve the problem of
how the brain can cause something mental. The traditional
metaphysics founded in subject-object dichotomy is still at the
basis of the majority of paradigms in psychology. We hope
that the reader will find the collected articles both informative
and thought-provoking, and that this Research Topic will
stimulate the scientific debate contributing to overcome such a
dichotomy.
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The Sense of 1PP-Location
Contributes to Shaping the Perceived
Self-location Together with the Sense
of Body-Location
Hsu-Chia Huang 1, Yen-Tung Lee 2, Wen-Yeo Chen 1 and Caleb Liang 1, 2*
1Graduate Institute of Brain and Mind Sciences, National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan, 2Department of Philosophy,
National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan
Self-location—the sense of where I am in space—provides an experiential anchor
for one’s interaction with the environment. In the studies of full-body illusions, many
researchers have defined self-location solely in terms of body-location—the subjective
feeling of where my body is. Although this view is useful, there is an issue regarding
whether it can fully accommodate the role of 1PP-location—the sense of where my
first-person perspective is located in space. In this study, we investigate self-location
by comparing body-location and 1PP-location: using a head-mounted display (HMD)
and a stereo camera, the subjects watched their own body standing in front of them
and received tactile stimulations. We manipulated their senses of body-location and
1PP-location in three different conditions: the participants standing still (Basic condition),
asking them to move forward (Walking condition), and swiftly moving the stereo camera
away from their body (Visual condition). In theWalking condition, the participants watched
their body moving away from their 1PP. In the Visual condition, the scene seen via the
HMD was systematically receding. Our data show that, under different manipulations of
movement, the spatial unity between 1PP-location and body-location can be temporarily
interrupted. Interestingly, we also observed a “double-body effect.” We further suggest
that it is better to consider body-location and 1PP-location as interrelated but distinct
factors that jointly support the sense of self-location.
Keywords: self-location, body-location, first-person perspective, body ownership, double-body effect
INTRODUCTION
The sense of self-location has been regarded as a key component of bodily self-consciousness,
especially in the research of full-body illusions (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Blanke
andMetzinger, 2009; Serino et al., 2013; Maselli, 2015). How is self-location defined in this research
field? As a first approximation, the sense of self-location is the subjective feeling of where I am
in space (Ionta et al., 2011, p. 363; Blanke, 2012, p. 556; Pfeiffer et al., 2014, p. 4021). This
understanding is natural, but can only serve as a starting point for investigation. To step forward,
many researchers specify the sense of self-location in terms of the sense of body-location—the sense
of where my body is. In the study by Lenggenhager et al. (2007, p. 1096), participants watched their
virtual body in the front while receiving tactile stimulations on the back. Many of themmislocalized
themselves “toward the virtual body” during the synchronous condition (2007, p. 1096).
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Other studies confirmed the findings using different kind of
measures, from “the mental ball dropping test” in Lenggenhager
et al. (2009), the proprioceptive drift measurement by Aspell
et al. (2009), to the measures of peripersonal space by Noel et al.
(2015), etc. In the review by Serino et al. (2013), self-location was
defined as “the experience of being a body with a given location
within the environment” (2013, p. 1239). Applying virtual reality
techniques to study bodily illusions,Maselli and Slater (2014) also
depicted self-location as “the experience of the body occupying
a given portion of space in the environment” (2014, p. 1).
Finally, in the fMRI study by Guterstam et al. (2015), self-location
was characterized as “the experience that the body is located
somewhere in space” (2015, p. 1416). Overall, this definition
identifies self-location with body-location, or at least regards the
former as determined by the latter.
To be sure, it is very useful to specify self-location in terms of
body-location because it not only prevents the Cartesian chasm
between self and body, but also makes the notion of self-location
experimentally operational. Still, there is a concern: does this
way of understanding do justice to another key factor in the
sense of self-location, i.e., first-person perspective (1PP)? In this
study, we assume that the most relevant aspect of 1PP with
regard to self-location is its location. It is via its location that 1PP
makes contribution to the sense of self-location. So we will speak
about the sense of 1PP-location—the sense of where my first-
person perspective is located in space. Also, in this study both
body-location and 1PP-location refer to participants’ subjective
experiences rather than the physical locations of their real body
or eyes. Thus, during an out-of-body illusion, a subject could feel
his/her body-location to be in a place different from the location
of his/her real body (Lenggenhager et al., 2009). Similarly, under
experimental manipulations, one’s sense of 1PP-location could be
separated from where one’s eyes are physically located in space.
Most studies of self-location, including those just mentioned
above, recognize that 1PP plays an important role in the sense
of self-location. In the study by Ehrsson (2007), the participants
were stroked on the chest which was blocked from view, and
saw the stroking applied to a position slightly below the camera.
The participants felt as if they were sitting behind their physical
body and were looking at it from the location of their “illusory
body” (2007, p. 1048). Notice that, in this study the location of the
illusory body was determined by the location of the manipulated
1PP (i.e., the location of the camera; cf. also the chest-stroking
case in Lenggenhager et al., 2009). In the fMRI study by Ionta
et al. (2011), the participants used a cursor to indicate the
direction of their 1PP: they felt that they were either looking
upward or looking downwards. In our terms, Ionta et al. defined
the direction in terms of the location of 1PP (“From where do
I perceive the world,” cf. 2011, p. 363). The results showed that
“temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) activity reflected experimental
changes in self-location that also depended on the first-person
perspective” (2011, p. 363, cf. also p. 370, 371). Thus, Serino
et al. (2013) suggested that “perspective is not wholly distinct
from self-location” (2013, p. 1240, authors’ emphasis). Finally,
in studying judgments about self-location, Starmans and Bloom
(2012) found that “children and adults intuitively think of the
self as occupying a physical location within the body, close to
the eyes” (2012, p. 317). Bertossa et al. (2008) also suggested that
“Human volunteers generally seem to find it easy and natural to
locate their center of self, the place ‘I am’ or the I-that-perceives.
With considerable consistency, sighted or blind, Western or non-
Western, it is placed somewhere near the center of their head”
(2008, p. 333). Another study by Alsmith and Longo (2014) found
that most self-location judgments pointed to either upper face
or upper torso. All of these studies indicate a close connection
between self-location and the location of 1PP.
Now, if the role of 1PP-location can be incorporated into
the role of body-location, then there is probably no need to
include the notion of 1PP-location in the definition of self-
location. But, is this indeed the case? Before articulating this
issue, we will make a few remarks to clarify our terminology.
First, although 1PP often refers to one’s visual perspective,
there is more to it. Other types of information, such as tactile,
proprioceptive, vestibular signals, etc. also contribute to one’s
egocentric reference frame. On the other hand, in order to
make the notion of 1PP experimentally operational, many studies
consider 1PP as referring to visual perspective. This is reasonable
since vision often plays a dominant role relative to other sensory
modalities, which is important in the research of full-body
illusions. In this study we will operate with the visual notion of
1PP in our experiments, but will take non-visual information
into consideration as well. Second, in a recent review, Maselli
(2015) defined visual-perspective as “the point from which visual
information from the environment is gathered” (2015, p. S309).
She chose the term “visual-perspective” instead of “1PP” to avoid
confusion with “first-person visual perspective over the fake
body” (2015, p. S309). In this study, we will continue to use “1PP”
with this caution in mind.
Both body-location and 1PP-location are maintained and
influenced by vision, proprioception, somatosensation, and
vestibular information. Both are forms of subjective spatial
awareness that usually match and integrated with each other.
For example, while watching a live baseball game in a stadium,
as I move from the outfield to an infield seat, my sense of
body location becomes different and my sense of 1PP-location
changes accordingly as well. However, we think that there are
at least two reasons suggesting that 1PP-location plays a role
in self-location that is distinct from body-location, and that
a better characterization of self-location should include both
body-location and 1PP-location. First, out-of-body experiences
(OBE) have been described as a type of abnormal self-location,
characterized by a sense of disembodiment and an experience of
looking at one’s own body from an elevated and distanced 1PP
(Blanke and Mohr, 2005, p. 186; Serino et al., 2013, p. 1243).
For example, an OBE subject reported that “she saw her whole
body as if she were outside, from an external and superior point
of view” (Maillard et al., 2004). Another subject said that “she
felt she was floating above it and could view her body and its
surroundings from above” (Greyson et al., 2014). Blanke and
Mohr said that “During an OBE people seem to be awake and
feel that their ‘self,’ or center of awareness, is located outside of
the physical body and somewhat elevated. It is from this elevated
extrapersonal location that the subjects experience seeing their
body and the world” (2005, p. 186). These descriptions clearly
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suggest that, in the case of OBE, the sense of self-location is
dissociated from the sense of body-location and tied to the sense
of 1PP-location. If self-location is depicted only in terms of body-
location, how to characterize OBE would become a problem.
Hence, 1PP, more precisely, the location of 1PP, is important
for specifying self-location, and its role is not the same as body-
location.
To see the second reason, consider what Maselli (2015) calls
the front-stroking and the back-stroking paradigms in the studies
of full-body illusions. As mentioned earlier, participants in the
front-stroking paradigm felt themselves to be in the location of
the unseen illusory body (Ehrsson, 2007) and they experienced
ownership of that illusory body (Guterstam and Ehrsson, 2012).
Here, it is crucial to note that the location of the illusory body
was determined by the location of the manipulated 1PP (i.e., the
location of the camera), not the other way around. In the back-
stroking case, participants mislocalized themselves toward the
virtual body, and some (but not all) of them also experienced it as
their own (Lenggenhager et al., 2007). It is worth emphasizing
that the virtual body was seen as located 2m in front of the
subject precisely because the camera was positioned 2m behind
the subject. These observations suggest that the role of 1PP-
location cannot be replaced by body-location. A better picture
of self-location seems to be the following: in both the front-
stroking and the back-stroking paradigms, self-location requires
interaction between body-location and 1PP-location, and it is
likely that body-location and 1PP-location are different factors
in the sense of self-location.
If 1PP-location and body-location are not the same, will this
provide any support to the dualism between self and body? The
answer is negative. In everyday life, we experience ourselves as
being in the location from where we can perceive the world. Our
sense of self-location seems to lock into the 1PP-location given
by ordinary experience. Moreover, this ordinary 1PP-location is
not an abstract geometric point. There is a sense of embodiment
tied to it: we feel that we have a body in (or in line with) that
location, from where we can touch and act upon the world.
Hence, recognizing the role of 1PP-location in the sense of self-
location will not risk falling into Cartesian dualism. In addition,
in our previous study on the “self-touching illusion” (Liang et al.,
2015), we observed a double-body effect: we manipulated the
participant’s visual perspective while letting him/her interact with
the experimenter, such that the subject was touching someone
and being touched at the same time, as well as watching his/her
own body in front of him/herself. In the two synchronous full-
body conditions, many participants felt not only that “I was
brushing my own hand” but also that “It felt that I had two
bodies” (2015, p. 3–5, Supplementary Materials). If the double-
body effect is a solid phenomenon, it would support that 1PP-
location is embodied such that there is no tendency toward
dualism.
In this study, we investigate self-location by addressing the
following issues: first, can the spatial integration of body-location
and 1PP-location be temporarily modified? Second, is it possible
for healthy subjects to have the illusory experience of owning
two bodies? In most previous studies, including both the back-
stroking and the front-stroking paradigms, both body-location
and 1PP-location remained still throughout the experimental
procedures. In this study, we used a back-stroking set-up and
added in various forms of movement to study body-location and
1PP-location. We aim to propose a refinement of the current
picture that characterizes self-location solely in terms of body-
location.
Four experiments were conducted to address the above
issues: the participants wore an HMD connected with a stereo
camera behind them so that they watched their own body
standing in front of them while receiving tactile stimulations.
Depending on the experiments, the subjects either stood still
(Basic condition), or were instructed to walk straight ahead
such that they watched their body moving away from the
position of their visual perspective (Walking condition), or
the experimenter moved the stereo camera away from the
subjects’ body such that their visual content was systematically
receding (Visual condition). Experiment 1 performed the Basic
condition. The goal was to verify whether we could induce a
bodily illusion similar to the one reported by Lenggenhager
et al. (2007), and the results will provide a basis to compare
with the data collected in the other conditions. Experiment
2 carried out the Walking condition to see (1) whether a
variant of body-ownership illusion could be induced in this
condition, and (2) whether the walking movement may modify
the participant’s sense of body-location. Experiment 3 conducted
the Visual condition in order to test: (1) whether another
version of body-ownership illusion could be induced in this
set-up, (2) whether moving the stereo camera may influence
the participant’s sense of 1PP-location, and (3) whether it is
possible for healthy subjects to feel as if they have more
than one body. Finally, in Experiment 4 we performed the
synchronous conditions of all the above three experiments. This
would enable us to compare the three major conditions so as
to investigate the relationship between body-location and 1PP-
location.
By conducting these experiments, we intended to test the
following hypotheses: (1) the spatial unity between body-
location and 1PP-location can be temporarily interrupted in
some experimental conditions; and (2) the illusory experience
of owning two bodies can be induced. If both hypotheses were
verified, they would show that, first, body-location and 1PP-
location are two distinct factors in the sense of self-location,
and that a better characterization of self-location should include
both body-location and 1PP-location. Second, the double-body
effect would support the view that the sense of 1PP-location
is essentially embodied. Hence, in recognizing the role of 1PP-
location, the worry about dualism will not arise. We will discuss
the implications of our experimental results and address the
issues raised above.
METHODS
Participants
All four experiments in this study adopted within-subjects
designs. Totally, we recruited 86 healthy volunteers. See Table 1
below for the details of the participants. All participants gave
their written consent prior to the experiments. All experiments
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TABLE 1 | Overview of experiments.
Experiment Description Measures taken Participants
Experiment 1 Sync. condition Questionnaire 21 (♂ 10)
SCR M = 21.95 ± 2.12
Async. condition Questionnaire
SCR
Experiment 2 Sync. condition Questionnaire 20 (♂ 14)
SCR M = 23.40 ± 4.48
Async. condition Questionnaire
SCR
Experiment 3 Sync. condition Questionnaire 20 (♂ 8)
SCR M = 22.13 ± 1.89
Async. condition Questionnaire
SCR
Experiment 4 Basic condition Questionnaire 25 (♂ 15)
Walking condition Questionnaire M = 22.56 ± 3.44
Visual condition Questionnaire
were conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
This study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of
National Taiwan University (NTU-REC: 201501HS009).
Materials and Procedures
We used a head mounted display (HMD, Sony HMZ-T1) and a
stereo camera (Sony HDR-TD20V) to conduct four experiments.
The questionnaires were structured using a Likert scale from
“strongly disagree” (−3) to “strongly agree” (+3), and the
statements were distributed randomly; they can be divided
into the following categories: 1PP-location, body-location, body-
ownership, 1PP-location vs. body-location, double-body effect,
and positive control (Table 3). Since the purpose of Experiment
1 was to compare our results with those of Lenggenhager et al.
(2007), we adjusted the questionnaire in the following way:
Q5 was reformulated as “It felt as if the body in front of me
was mine.” We also removed Q2, Q4, Q6, and Q7 from the
questionnaire, and added in two statements about touch referral
(see Table 2). We also had a screen-switch machine (ATEN,
VM5808H, Taiwan) that can switch between the images taken by
the stereo camera and other computer images. It allowed us to
present questionnaires on the HMD.
The skin conductance responses (SCR) were recorded with a
Data Acquisition Unit-MP35 (Biopac Systems, Inc. USA). SCR
was measured in the synchronous and asynchronous conditions
of Experiments 1–3, in which a knife was shown on the
HMD scene, then cut toward the participant’s physical body.
To measure SCR, two single-use foam electrodes (Covidien,
Inc., Mansfield, USA) were attached to the lower edge of the
participant’s right palm on the volar surfaces of the medial
phalanges. Data were registered at a sample rate of 200 Hz,
and analyzed with the Biopac software AcqKnowledge v. 3.7.7.
We identified the amplitude of SCR as the difference between
the maximal and minimal values of the responses within 5 s
TABLE 2 | The questionnaire statements in Experiment 1.
1PP-location Q1. It felt as if the position of my first-person perspective
had changed.
Body-location Q3. It felt as if the location of my body had changed.
Body-ownership Q5. If felt as if the body in front of me was mine.
1PP-location vs.
Body-location
Q8. My first-person perspective seemed to be in the back
of my body.
Q9. It felt as if the position of my first-person perspective
and my body were not in the same location.
Double-body
effect
Q10. It felt as if I had a body here and also had another
body in front of me.
Positive control Q11. I was being brushed during the experiment.
Q12. It felt as if I were feeling the touch of the brush in the
location where I saw the virtual body touched.
Touch referral Q13. It felt as if I were feeling the touch caused by the
brush touching the virtual body.
The questionnaires were in Chinese when presented to the participants. Here and in
Table 3 we present the English translations.
TABLE 3 | The questionnaire statements in Experiments 2–4.
1PP-location Q1. It felt as if the position of my first-person perspective
had changed.
Q2. It felt as if the position of my first-person perspective
had not changed.
Body-location Q3. It felt as if the location of my body had changed.
Q4. It felt as if the location of my body had not changed.
Body-ownership Q5. It felt as if the body on the screen was mine.
1PP-location vs.
Body-location
Q6. It felt as if my body left the position of my first-person
perspective.
Q7. It felt as if the position of my first-person perspective left
my body.
Q8. My first-person perspective seemed to be located
behind my body.
Q9. It felt as if the position of my first-person perspective
and my body were not in the same location.
Double-body
effect
Q10. It felt as if I had a body here and had another body in
front of me.
Positive control Q11. I was being brushed during the experiment.
of the threat (Dawson et al., 2007). All subjects were informed
beforehand that after the experiment they would orally answer
a questionnaire presented on their HMD. They were advised
to give their answers spontaneously based on their subjective
feeling rather than on reasoning. Those subjects who did not
show any SCR amplitude and those who did not pass the positive
control (i.e., answered negatively to Q11) were excluded from
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental set-ups. (A) Experiment 1 and the Basic
condition of Experiment 4. The participant wore an HMD connected with a
stereo camera positioned 2m behind and received tactile stimulations for 70 s.
(B) Experiment 2 and the Walking condition of Experiment 4. The participant
wore an HMD connected with a stereo camera positioned 30 cm behind and
received tactile stimulations for 70 s. At the 20th s, the subject was instructed
to walk straight ahead for about 2 m. (C) Experiment 3 and the Visual
condition of Experiment 4. The participant wore an HMD connected with a
stereo camera positioned 30 cm behind and received tactile stimulations for
70 s. At the 20th s, the experimenter swiftly moved the stereo camera away
from the participant’s body for about 2 m.
the analyses. Totally, we excluded the data of three participants,
including their SCR and questionnaires. See below for the
procedures of each experiment.
Experiment 1: Basic Condition (Sync. vs.
Async.)
The participant put on an HMD connected with a stereo camera
positioned 2m behind him/her (Figure 1A). The participant also
wore mini-headphones in order to listen to white noise during
the experiment. Then the participant was asked to keep his/her
eyes closed and wait for the announcement to begin. When the
participant opened his/her eyes, he/she saw the back of his/her
full body standing in front of him/herself from below the neck.
This visual content of the HMD was real-time streaming of the
video recording from the stereo camera. The intrinsic delay of
the actual streaming was within 20–40 ms. The participant was
brushed on the back for 70 s. In the synchronous condition, the
visual content matched synchronously with respect to the tactile
stimulations. The frequency of the brushing was about once per
second. In the asynchronous condition, we played a pre-recorded
video on the HMD such that the subject watched his/her back
being brushed at a constant speed of about 2 s per stroke. At the
same time, the experimenter brushed the participant’s back and
varied the frequency randomly from 1 to 3 s per stroke, so that
the touch that the participant felt was not consistent with what
he/she saw. SCR was measured in both conditions at the 60th s: a
knife was first shown on the HMD scene for 1 s, then cut toward
the participant’s upper back (i.e., toward the participant’s adopted
3PP) for another 1 s. After the experiment, the participant orally
responded to a questionnaire presented on the HMD.
Experiment 2: Walking Condition (Sync. vs.
Async.)
The stereo camera was positioned only about 30 cm behind
the participant. In the synchronous condition, the participant
received synchronous tactile stimulations. At the 20th s, the
subject was instructed to walk straight ahead for about 2m and
then was asked to stop (Figure 1B). The average walking velocity
was about 0.67m/s. Since the stereo camera remained in the same
position, the walking movement caused changes in the subject’s
proprioception and visual content: the subject proprioceptively
felt that his/her body was moving ahead, while at the same time
watching his/her own body moving away from his/her visual
perspective. The procedure of the asynchronous condition was
the same, except that the brushing was asynchronous. In both
conditions, the participant received tactile stimulations on the
back for 70 s, followed by the same SCR measurement and
questionnaires.
Experiment 3: Visual Condition (Sync. vs.
Async.)
The stereo camera was again positioned about 30 cm behind the
participant, who was brushed on the back either synchronously
or asynchronously for 70 s. The new factor was that, at the
20th s, while the subject was standing still, the experimenter
swiftly moved the stereo camera away from the subject’s body
for about 2m (Figure 1C). The average velocity with which
the camera was moved back was about 1.33 m/s. This was
to change the location of the participant’s 1PP, such that the
scene that the subject saw via the HMD systematically receded.
The rest of the procedure was the same as in the above two
experiments.
Experiment 4: Basic, Walking, and Visual
Conditions (Sync.)
In this experiment, we conducted the Basic, Walking, and Visual
conditions (Figures 1A–C) with only synchronous brushing and
did not measure SCR. In each of these conditions, the participant
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saw via the HMD the back of his/her full body standing in front
of him/herself from below the neck, and was brushed on the back
for 70 s, followed by a questionnaire.
Data Analyses and Statistics
To analyze the questionnaire and SCR data collected in
Experiments 1–3, we found that they were not normally
distributed (using Shapiro–Wilk tests), so we used the non-
parametric Wilcoxon’s matched-pairs signed-rank tests to
compare the synchronous and asynchronous conditions. For
Experiment 4, we conducted Friedman’s analyses of variance by
ranks to determine whether there were significant differences
among the three conditions, followed by Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests with Bonferroni correction as post-hoc analyses.
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were also carried out to compare
Q6 in the Walking and the Basic conditions, and Q7 in the
Visual and the Basic conditions. We adopted relatively high
standards when interpreting the questionnaire data: in addition
to the requirement that differences in data must be statistically
significant (α = 0.05), the absolute value of the median of a
major factor (such as 1PP-location, body-location, or double-
body effect) must be at least one (cf. Kalckert and Ehrsson,
2012). More precisely, if there was an effect on 1PP-location,
the median of the positive statement Q1 must be at least
positive one (+1), and the median of the negative statement
Q2 must be at least negative one (−1). Likewise, if there
was an effect on body-location, then Q3 must be at least +1
and the negative statement Q4 must be at least −1. All the
other statements were formulated in positive terms, so their
median values should reach at least +1 before we claimed to
have observed genuine effects. The idea here is that if the
absolute value of a median was <1, the group of participants
would be considered to be uncertain about the questionnaire
statement.
RESULTS
Experiment 1
In this section, we report only the experimental results from
significant comparisons. The median values and interquartile
ranges (IQRs) of the questionnaire statements of Experiment 1
are shown in Table 4. Statistical significances were observed in
Q5 (z = −3.662, p < 0.001), Q8 (z = −2.695, p = 0.007), Q12
(z = −3.935, p < 0.001), and Q13 (z = −3.413, p = 0.001,
Figure 2A). The SCR value was significantly higher in the
synchronous than in the asynchronous condition (z = −1.964,
p = 0.050; sync. median = 2.750, async. median = 2.190,
Figure 2B). These results suggest that in the synchronous
condition the participants felt that their 1PP seemed to be in
the back of their body (Q8). More importantly, they felt that
the virtual body in front of them was theirs (Q5). The tactile
stimulations were felt to be where they saw the virtual body being
touched (Q12) and was caused by the brush touching the virtual
body (Q13).
TABLE 4 | Median values and interquartile ranges (IQRs) for each question in four experiments.
Quest. Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
Sync. Async. Sync. Async. Sync. Async. Basic Walking Visual
Q1 0 (−2, 1.5) 0 (−1, 1.5) 2 (1, 2) 1 (−1.5, 2) 1 (0, 2.75) 0.5 (−1, 2) 1 (−1.5, 1) 1 (−0.5, 2) 2 (1, 2.5)
Q2 −1 (−2, 0.75) 0 (−1, 2) 1 (−1, 2) 1.5 (−1.75, 2) 0 (−1, 2) 1 (−0.5, 2) −1 (−2, 0)
Q3 −1 (−2, 1) −2 (−2.5, 0) 2 (−0.75, 2) 1 (−2, 2) −1 (−2, 1) −1 (−2, 0) −2 (−3, 0) 3 (2, 3) 1 (−1, 2)
Q4 −0.5 (−2, 1) −1 (−1.75, 1.75) 2 (1.25, 3) 2 (2, 3) 2 (1, 3) −2 (−3, −1) 1 (−0.5, 3)
Q5 2 (1, 3) −2 (−2.5, 0) 3 (2, 3) 1.5 (−1.75, 3) 3 (2, 3) 0 (−2, 1) 3 (2.5, 3) 3 (2, 3) 3 (2, 3)
Q6 1 (0, 2) 1 (−1.75, 2) 0 (−1.5, 1) 1 (−0.5, 3)
Q7 0 (−1, 2) 0.5 (−1.75, 2) 0.5 (−2, 1) 2 (1, 3)
Q8 2 (1, 3) 1 (−1, 2) 1 (−0.75, 2) 1 (0, 2) 1 (−1, 2) 0 (−1.75, 2) 1 (0, 2.5) 2 (1, 3) 2 (1, 3)
Q9 1 (−0.5, 2) 0 (−1, 1.5) 1 (0, 2) 2 (−1, 2) 1 (−0.75, 2) 2 (−0.5, 2) 1 (−0.5, 2) 2 (1, 2.5) 2 (1, 3)
Q10 0 (−2, 2) 0 (−2, 2) 1 (−1, 2) 1 (−0.75, 2) 2 (−0.75, 2) 2 (1, 2) −1 (−2, 2) 1 (0, 2) 2 (1, 2.5)
Q11 3 (2, 3) 3 (1, 3) 3 (2, 3) 3 (3, 3) 3 (3, 3) 3 (2, 3) 3 (3, 3) 3 (3, 3) 3 (3, 3)
Q12 2 (1.5, 2.5) −2 (−3, 0.5)
Q13 2 (−1, 3) −2 (−3, −2)
The data marked in red color represent significant comparisons in the experiments.
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FIGURE 2 | Results of Experiment 1. (A) Questionnaire results. There were
significant differences between the synchronous and the asynchronous
conditions regarding body ownership (Q5), 1PP- location vs. body-location
(Q8), and touch referral (Q12 and Q13). (B) SCR results. The SCR values were
significantly higher in the synchronous than in the asynchronous condition
when the knife threats were applied to the participant’s physical body (which
was viewed via the HMD from the adopted 3PP). Significance levels:
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; and ***p ≤ 0.001.
Experiment 2
The median values and IQRs are presented in Table 4. The value
of Q5 was significantly higher in the synchronous than in the
asynchronous condition (z = −2.619, p = 0.009, Figure 3A),
as was also true for the SCR values (z = −3.621, p < 0.001;
sync. median = 3.061, async. median = 1.342, Figure 3B). The
results indicate that, compared with the asynchronous condition,
the participants in the synchronous condition experienced
ownership of the virtual body in front of them.
FIGURE 3 | Results of Experiment 2. (A) Questionnaire results. A significant
difference existed between the synchronous and the asynchronous conditions
regarding full-body ownership (Q5). (B) SCR results. When the knife threats
were applied to the participant’s physical body, the SCR values were
significantly higher in the synchronous than in the asynchronous condition.
Significance levels: *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; and ***p ≤ 0.001.
Experiment 3
See Table 4 for the median values and IQRs. The value of Q5 was
significantly higher in the synchronous than in the asynchronous
condition (z = −3.308, p = 0.001, Figure 4A), and the SCR
values also followed this pattern (z = −3.920, p < 0.001; sync.
median = 3.210, async. median = 1.175, Figure 4B). This also
indicates that illusory ownership of the virtual body was induced
in the synchronous condition.
Experiment 4
As for the previous experiments, median values and IQRs are
presented in Table 4. Using Friedman’s analyses, we found that
there were significant effects in Q1 (χ2 = 16.333, p < 0.001),
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FIGURE 4 | Results of Experiment 3. (A) Questionnaire results. A significant
difference existed between the synchronous and the asynchronous conditions
regarding full-body ownership (Q5). (B) SCR results. The SCR values were
also significantly higher in the synchronous than in the asynchronous condition
when the knife threats were applied to the participant’s physical body.
Significance levels: *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; and ***p ≤ 0.001.
Q2 (χ2 = 13.547, p = 0.001), Q3 (χ2 = 30.644, p < 0.001), Q4
(χ2 = 23.741, p < 0.001), and Q10 (χ2 = 6.206, p = 0.045).
Then we conducted Wilcoxon signed-rank tests with Bonferroni
correction (α = 0.05/3 = 0.017). The results are presented
in Table 5 (Figures 5A,C,E). Finally, paired Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests showed two other significant differences regarding Q6
(Walking vs. Basic: z = −2.049, p = 0.040, Figure 5B) and Q7
(Visual vs. Basic: z =−3.202, p= 0.001, Figure 5D).
DISCUSSION
In this study, we investigated self-location by a series of full-body
experiments. The findings of Experiment 1 were all consistent
with the results reported by Lenggenhager et al. (2007), indicating
that we successfully induced a version of out-of-body illusion
in the synchronous condition where the participants stood
still. In addition to synchronized visual-tactile stimulations,
Experiments 2 and 3 brought in different types of movement
to induce two different versions of full-body illusion. In the
Walking condition, the participants experienced illusory full-
body ownership during their walking movement. In the Visual
condition, ownership of the virtual body was induced while
the participants felt that their 1PP-location was systematically
receding. These three experiments provide a good basis for
the comparison between body-location and 1PP-location in
Experiment 4.
The results of Experiment 4 enable us to address the two issues
raised in the Introduction. First, can the spatial unity between
body-location and 1PP-location be temporarily modified? Our
results have shown that they can. They are different subjective
experiences. Compared with the Basic condition, the Walking
condition significantly changed the participants’ sense of body-
location without affecting their sense of 1PP-location, and they
felt as if their body left the position of their 1PP (Figures 5A,B).
Also, compared with the Basic condition, the Visual condition
modulated the sense of 1PP-location such that the participants
felt as if their 1PP had left their body (Figures 5C,D). Finally,
we observed significant differences between the sense of
1PP-location and the sense of body-location in the comparison
between the Visual and the Walking conditions (Figure 5E).
These results strongly suggest that the sense of where my 1PP is
positioned and the subjective feeling of where I feel my body is
located are not the same experiences.
Second, is it possible for healthy subjects to have the illusory
experience of owning two bodies? This can be addressed by the
data of Experiment 4 about the double-body effect. The score
of Q10 in the Visual condition was significantly higher than
the Basic condition (Figure 5C, Table 4), indicating that illusory
ownership of two bodies is indeed possible. This finding fits well
with the report by Lenggenhager et al. (2007) that “None of the
participants reported sensations of overt disembodiment” (2007,
1097). Although, the participants felt as if they were watching
themselves from a position separated from their body-location,
their sense of 1PP-location remained embodied. Hence, given the
data on the double-body effect, recognizing the distinct role of
1PP-location in the sense of self-location will not risk falling back
to the dualism between self and body.
We think that body-location and 1PP-location are interrelated
but distinct factors that jointly support the sense of self-location.
Based on our findings, we suggest that, instead of defining self-
location only in terms of body-location, the sense of self-location
can be better characterized as the subjective experience of where
I am in space that results from the interaction between body-
location and 1PP-location. Below we discuss the implications of
our experimental data and compare with other studies.
(1) Petkova et al. (2011) argued that viewing the virtual
body from 1PP was absolutely crucial for body-ownership
illusions to occur. They criticized the 3PP set-up that, since
watching the virtual body from 3PP was similar to recognizing
oneself on a monitor, the outcome could be just a visual
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TABLE 5 | Experiment 4: Paired comparisons of questionnaire scores.
Quest. Walking vs. Basic Visual vs. Basic Visual vs. Walking
z p Cohen’s r z p Cohen’s r z p Cohen’s r
Q1 −1.469 0.142 0.208 −3.580 <0.001 0.506 −3.225 0.001 0.456
Q2 −0.501 0.617 0.071 −2.875 0.004 0.407 −2.948 0.003 0.417
Q3 −4.135 <0.001 0.585 −3.514 <0.001 0.497 −3.468 0.001 0.490
Q4 −4.106 <0.001 0.581 −1.543 0.123 0.218 −3.582 <0.001 0.507
Q10 −2.026 0.043 0.287 −2.757 0.006 0.390 −1.662 0.096 0.235
All values were rounded off to the 3rd decimal place. The values in red color represent significant differences. Z-values and p-values are from matched pairs Wilcoxon tests, and effect
size is reported by Cohen’s r.
self-recognition “without necessarily experiencing a somatic
illusion of ownership” (Petkova et al., 2011, p. 5; cf. also Ehrsson,
2008). In both Lenggenhager et al. (2007) and in our experiments,
the subjects watched the virtual body from 3PP via an HMD;
hence, both studies would face the above criticism. However,
in our Experiments 1–3 we measured the participants’ SCR
to acquire psychological evidence. Since Lenggenhager et al.
(2007) did not do this, our SCR data can be considered as a
significant supplement to their pioneering work and can help
respond to the above criticism. The significant differences in
SCR values between the synchronous and the asynchronous
conditions in Experiments 1–3 suggest that the participants’
experiences went beyond mere visual self-recognition. Although,
there can be alternative interpretations and the issue remains
open, the SCR data reported here provide new support for the
view that it is possible for 3PP set-ups to induce body-ownership
illusions.
(2) Our findings about the double-body effect was consistent
with the study by Heydrich et al. (2013), where two different
methods (an HMD-camera set-up and virtual reality techniques)
were used to induce the experience of owning two bodies. Also, as
mentioned in the Introduction, our previous study on the “self-
touching illusion” also demonstrated that the double-body effect
is possible: the subject sat face to face with the experimenter, and
both used their right hand to touch each other’s left hand with
a paintbrush. Under synchronous visual-tactile manipulations,
many subjects felt as if they had two bodies (Liang et al., 2015,
p. 3–5, Supplementary Materials). So we think that it is possible
to induce the double-body effect in healthy subjects.
The set-up of our previous study was similar to the study
of body-swap illusion by Petkova and Ehrsson (2008). In
one of their experiments (Experiment 5), using visual-tactile
manipulations the participant and the experimenter faced each
other and squeezed each other’s hands synchronously (cf. their
Figure 6). Many subjects reported that “I was shaking hands
with myself!,” supported by SCR measurements. In another
experiment (their Experiment 1), the double-body effect was
measured by questionnaire, but no such effect was observed
(cf. their Figure 2). Petkova and Ehrsson interpreted these
results as showing that the participants felt that their body
swapped with someone else’s. On the face of it, the body-
swap illusion and the double-body effect seem to be different
phenomena. Do these experimental results count as against
our view? We do not think so. Although, their Experiment 5
involved a subject-experimenter interaction, no questionnaire
measurements were conducted and hence the double-body effect
was not really tested. In their Experiment 1, the participants
only passively received tactile stimulations while viewing a
mannequin, and the camera remained still throughout the
process (cf. also Petkova et al., 2011). This was very different
from the set-up of our current study: compared with the
Basic condition, the data of the Visual condition showed
that the movement of the camera significantly enhanced the
double-body effect. Hence, our view remains sustained that,
under the manipulation of moving the camera away from the
participants, the experience of owning two bodies could be
induced.
(3) We have suggested that there is a sense of embodiment
associated with the sense of 1PP-location. We would like to
further suggest that this sense of embodiment in the 1PP-
location is distinct from the sense of 3PP body-location. In
both the front-stroking and the back-stroking paradigms, while
the participants see their body in front of them via the HMD,
the sense of embodiment in the 1PP-location does not rely
on viewing the body. In our experiments, the virtual body
was seen from the adopted 3PP. The synchronized visual-
tactile manipulations caused vision to dominate over tactile
sensations and proprioception, such that the illusory sense of
self-location was induced. This was consistent with the study
by Lenggenhager et al. (2007), in which many participants
“mislocalized themselves toward the virtual body” (2007, p.
1096).
In contrast, the sense of embodiment in the 1PP-location is
part of everyday experience. We feel that we have a body in
(or in line with) the 1PP-location, from where we can perceive,
touch, and act upon the world. This sense of embodiment in
the 1PP-location is natural and does not depend on seeing one’s
own body. Moreover, in the Visual condition, the participants’
self-location was manipulated by the movement of the stereo
camera causing change in the optic flow registered from the
1PP, such that the 1PP-location was felt as if it was receding.
Although, the participant stood still, the change in optic flow
modified the vestibular sense and elicited an illusory sense of
oneself moving backward (illusory self-motion). Previous studies
have suggested that vestibular signals can contribute to the sense
of self-motion (MacNeilage et al., 2012; Lopez et al., 2013; Barry
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FIGURE 5 | Comparisons of Experiment 4. (A) Comparison of the Walking
and Basic conditions. The data values of Q3 and Q4 were significantly
different, indicating the change in the sense of body-location in the Walking
condition. (B) Comparison of the Walking and Basic conditions for Q6. The
significant difference for Q6 indicated the discrepancy between the sense of
body-location and the sense of 1PP-location in the Walking condition.
(C) Comparison of the Visual and Basic conditions. The significant differences
in Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q10 indicated that in the Visual condition there was
change in the sense of 1PP-location and the sense of body-location, and that
the double-body effect was induced. (D) Comparison of the Visual and Basic
conditions for Q7. The significant difference for Q7 indicated the discrepancy
between 1PP-location and body-location in the Visual condition.
(E) Comparison of the Visual and Walking conditions. There were significant
differences in 1PP-location (Q1 and Q2), and body-location (Q3 and Q4),
indicating that the senses of 1PP-location and body-location were distinct
between the Visual and the Walking conditions. Significance levels: *p ≤ 0.05;
**p ≤ 0.01; and ***p ≤ 0.001.
and Burgess, 2014), and that optic flow can elicit illusory self-
motion (DeAngelis and Angelaki, 2012). Also, Lenggenhager
and Lopez (2015) suggested that the vestibular system could
influence full-body ownership and self-location (2015, p. 17–
19). So we think that in the Visual condition the visual 1PP
dominated the vestibular signals, such that there is a sense of
embodiment tied to the participant’s 1PP-location. Therefore,
both daily experience and our experimental set-up suggest that
the sense of embodiment in the 1PP-location is different from the
sense of body-location experienced from the 3PP.
(4) In a review article, Blanke (2012) remarks that “In rare
instances, however, self-location and first-person perspective can
be experienced at different positions, suggesting that it may be
possible to experimentally induce similar dissociations in healthy
subjects.” Blanke cites the study of OBE by De Ridder et al.
(2007) for empirical support, in which a 63-year-old patient
was described as follows: “His perception of disembodiment
always involved a location about 50 cm behind his body and off
to the left... The environment was visually perceived from his
real-person perspective, not from the disembodied perspective”
(2007, p. 1830). As we see it, two different notions of 1PP were
involved in this rare case: the “real-person perspective” and the
“disembodied perspective.” The notion of 1PP in Blanke’s remark
refers to the “real-person perspective,” which was tied to the
patient’s body-location. What makes this case perplexing was
that the patient’s sense of self-location split and linked to both
the “real-person perspective” and the “disembodied perspective.”
Nonetheless, the patient’s self-location still involved both the
sense of body-location and the sense of 1PP-location in an
unusual way, which was compatible with our view.
(5) Finally, a very useful account of self-location was
recently proposed by Maselli (2015), in which she compared the
front-stroking and the back-stroking paradigms. In our terms,
this account proposes that in both paradigms self-location is
intrinsically connected with and influenced by an embodied
1PP-location, but in very different ways. In the front-stroking
paradigm, the experimental manipulation was designed to affect
the participant’s perceived self-location coded in an allocentric
framework. In some studies within this paradigm (Ehrsson,
2007; Guterstam and Ehrsson, 2012), the visual and tactile
sensations were both felt in the embodied 1PP-location, such
that “the illusory self-location corresponds to the position of the
visual-perspective” (Maselli, 2015, p. S310, author’s emphases).
In the back-stroking case, the multisensory conflicts can cause
a re-coding of the peripersonal space (touch referral) and
induce “a spatial dissociation between visual-perspective and
self-location” (Maselli, 2015, p. S310, author’s emphases). Thus,
Maselli suggests that the sense of self-location can be regarded
as “the blending of two parallel representations: the abstract
allocentric coding of the position occupied in the environment,
mainly associated with the visual-perspective, and the egocentric
mapping of somatosensory sensations into the external space,
mainly associated with peripersonal space” (2015, p. S310,
author’s emphases).
We fully agree with Maselli that both allocentric and
egocentric representations are required to account for self-
location. We also welcome the emphasis on the role of 1PP
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org March 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 37017
Huang et al. Self-location: Body-Location vs. 1PP-Location
in her account. However, there is a difference between her
view and ours. Maselli (2015) describes self-location as “the
experience of occupying a given position in the environment”
(2015, p. S309). This is the natural understanding mentioned in
the beginning of the Introduction. But she further characterizes
self-location as “the perceived position of the body in space”
(2015, p. S309). So she also understands self-location in terms of
body-location. As the case of OBE and our experimental results
indicated above, we think that it is insufficient to characterize
self-location only via body-location. In this regard, our view
is different from Maselli’s. We propose the following picture:
body-location and 1PP-location are two distinct factors that are
spatially integrated most of the time, but this integration can be
temporarily interrupted in a pathological case or an experimental
set-up. Even when the spatial unity of body-location and 1PP-
location is temporarily modified, as induced in the back-stroking
paradigm, both of these factors continue to interact with each
other tomaintain an illusory sense of self-location. In our picture,
the sense of body-location and the sense of 1PP-location are
interrelated factors that jointly support the sense of self-location.
On the one hand, both the “3PP body-location” in the back-
stroking paradigm and the “illusory body-location” in the front-
stroking paradigm are anchored in the subject’s 1PP-location. On
the other hand, 1PP-location is not an abstract geometric point.
Rather, it is a subjective experience essentially tied to a sense of
embodiment. Self-location results from the interaction between
body-location and 1PP-location. If fact, we do not consider our
picture to be fundamentally different from Maselli’s. However,
we do think that when Maselli specifies self-location in terms
of the blending of allocentric and egocentric representations, her
account is more congenial to our proposal here than construing
self-location exclusively in terms of body-location.
CONCLUSION
This study investigated self-location by manipulating 1PP-
location and body-location. The new methods introduced here—
participants’ walking movement vs. the displacement of the
stereo camera—generated different subjective experiences. Since
the sense of self-location is crucial for one’s interaction with
the environment, we believe that recognizing the distinctive
roles of 1PP-location and body-location would contribute to a
better picture of environmental adaptation. We would like to
make three concluding remarks. First, to situate our study in
a broad picture, consider the two different paradigms reviewed
by Rosch (2000). One is “analytic science”: according to Rosch,
“The analytic picture offered by the cognitive sciences is this:
the world consists of separate objects and states of affairs ...
it deals with isolated units” (2000, p. 189–190). The other
is “biofunctionalism”: as Rosch characterizes it, in daily life
there is “a powerful intuition of wholeness which goes beyond
conceptual analysis into isolated units” (2000, p. 190). As
Gibson suggested, “the words animal and environment make an
inseparable pair. Each term implies the other” (Gibson, 1979, p.
8). In our experiments, the visual perspective was manipulated
such that it felt as if the participant’s 1PP was separated from
his/her body. This was not an ordinary context. In this sense,
we agree that our experiments are within the paradigm of
analytic science. So what we have achieved is very modest:
we have only demonstrated that the sense of 1PP-location
and the sense of body-location can be manipulated selectively
in specific settings. We do not claim that our experimental
results may automatically apply to ordinary contexts. Second,
based on the findings about the double-body effect, we have
suggested that 1PP-location is essentially embodied. Hence,
both the sense of 1PP-location and the sense of body-location
are embodied experiences. We think that both 1PP-location
and body-location are inherent in the subjective experience
of self-location. The sense of 1PP-location and the sense of body-
location jointly contribute to shaping one’s experience of self-
location. Finally, we would like to suggest an issue for further
study. The double-body effect certainly requires further study,
and it would be significant to investigate the neural mechanisms
that are responsible for self-location as well as the double-
body effect. They may help to explain the tremendous flexibility
of our bodily experiences in coping with novel environmental
challenges. We think that our experiments, especially the
Walking and the Visual conditions, could contribute to this
endeavor.
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The simple perception of an object can potentiate an associated action. This affordance
effect depends heavily on the action context in which the object is presented. In recent
years, psychologists, psychiatrists, and phenomenologists have agreed that subjects
with schizophrenia may not perceive the affordances of people or objects that could
lead to a loss of ease in their actions. We examined whether the addition of contextually
congruent elements, during the perception of everyday objects, could promote the
emergence of object-affordance effects in subjects with schizophrenia and controls.
Participants performed two Stimulus–Response-Compatibility tasks in which they were
presented with semantic primes related to sense of property (Experiment 1) or goal
of action (Experiment 2) prior to viewing each graspable object. Controls responded
faster when their response hand and the graspable part of the object were compatibly
oriented, but only when the context was congruent with the individual’s needs and
goals. When the context operated as a constraint, the affordance-effect was disrupted.
These results support the understanding that object-affordance is flexible and not just
intrinsic to an object. However, the absence of this object-affordance effect in subjects
with schizophrenia suggests the possible impairment of their ability to experience the
internal simulation of motor action potentialities. In such case, all activities of daily
life would require the involvement of higher cognitive processes rather than lower
level sensorimotor processes. The study of schizophrenia requires the consideration of
concepts and methods that arise from the theories of embodied and situated cognition.
Keywords: context, embodiment, goals of action, object-affordance effect, schizophrenia, sense of property,
sensorimotor simulation, Stimulus–Response-Compatibility
INTRODUCTION
Embodied theories of cognition address the physical, motivational, and environmental dimensions
of an individual’s daily experience (Varela et al., 1992). Such a view posits that cognition emerges
from the cooperation and co-evolution of perceptual and motor systems that allow sensorimotor
patterns to be implemented. Perception is therefore more proactive toward than reactive to the
individual’s environment (Berthoz and Petit, 2003; Rizzolatti and Matelli, 2003; Gallese, 2007;
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Barsalou, 2008, 2009; Vandevoorde, 2011); it’s an internal
simulation of action, designed for understanding the meaning
of his environment (Berthoz, 2003). The subject builds the
world in which he lives and acts, in accordance with his
perception of that environment (Glenberg et al., 2013) and
the actions he performs within it. Consequently, he perceives
through active exploration and intentional activity according
to his goals, tempered by intrinsic constraints of perceptual
systems and context, and not simply by interpreting sensory
messages (Haggard, 2005). This binding of action and perception
allows the most economical solution to emerge from a set of
possible actions. Gibson (1977, 1979) described “affordance” as
the subject’s faculty to guide his or her behavior, according to the
perception of what the environment is offering in terms of action
potentialities.
In cognitive psychology, numerous studies have operationa-
lized this concept of affordance, (e.g., Tucker and Ellis, 1998,
2001, 2004; Ellis and Tucker, 2000; Borghi et al., 2012). In
their seminal study, Tucker and Ellis (1998) associated the
orientation of the typical graspable part of an object with the hand
used by a participant to respond to instructions regarding the
object, observing that this compatibility of orientations facilitates
response. They showed that perception of an object automatically
potentiates related actions (via simulation mechanisms) even in
the absence of instruction or explicit intention to act.
However, others describe an implicit motor intentionality to
act on an object as a basis of the affordance effect. Naming an
object automatically elicits action potentialities not elicited by
its passive viewing alone; its naming evokes gestural knowledge
of the object’s form and function (Bub and Masson, 2006). The
behavioral impact of perceived object affordance seems to depend
heavily on the action context in which the object is presented to
carry on the subject motor intentionality.
These action potentialities could match behavior or attitude
sketches (“covert behaviors”) that the individual reenacts as
he perceives environmental stimuli, and these simulations of
action (Berthoz and Petit, 2006) might represent a third
component that requires incorporation into the relation between
perception and action (Garbarini and Adenzato, 2004). At
the neuronal level, the brain employs similar neural resources
and dynamic representations to execute, imagine, and perceive
actions (Jeannerod, 2006; Barsalou, 2008). This ability to simulate
an action in the absence of its effective implementation, which is
underpinned by “canonical” and “mirror” neural networks, give
meaning to the surrounding world (subjects and objects). In this
case, knowledge is enacted and carries the implicit meaning of
perceived world.
Disembodiment in Schizophrenia
“This tacit or enacted knowledge is also the basis of “common
sense” (Blankenburg, 2001; Fuchs, 2001): it provides a fluid,
automatic, and context-sensitive pre-understanding of everyday
situations, thus connecting self and world through a basic
habituality and familiarity” (Fuchs, 2015, p. 199).
Embodied theories of cognition highlight the dependence
of cognition on the subject’s experience of the world without
addressing mental pathologies, especially schizophrenia.
However, some approaches to psychopathology that consider
the phenomenological dimension of embodiment (Sass
and Parnas, 2003; Fuchs, 2005) describe schizophrenia as a
disturbance of the individual’s relationship with the world and
others that constitutes a “lack of common sense” (Stanghellini,
2000).
From a clinical perspective, therapists report that their patients
with schizophrenia experience some perceptual or cognitive
fragmentation of the world accompanied by a certain loss of ease
in their actions. As a result, they may experience a disintegration
of habits or automatic practices. Due to an alteration of the
body-based involvement, patients have to “think” deliberately
about each action, before to perform it. Sass (2004, p. 136)
describes the failure of patients with schizophrenia to perceive
the affordances of people, things, or actions that give the objects
“practical significance that, for example, make a chair a thing-
to-sit-on, a hammer something-to-pound-with, or a human body
something to be approached, feared, or caressed.”
Until now, experimental studies have focused on the
impairment in the motor understanding of other’s behaviors in
schizophrenia, as revealed by a reduced activation of the mirror
neural network. Numerous studies in patients show an inherent
deficit that inactivates this neural network (Mehta et al., 2014a).
Using different paradigms, most studies showed reduced mirror
neuron activity (MNA) and greater deficits in theory of mind
(Mehta et al., 2014b), emotion recognition (Mehta et al., 2014b),
and expression (Varcin et al., 2010), action imitation (Park et al.,
2008; Thakkar et al., 2014), and observation (Enticott et al., 2008)
in patients. If this mirror neural network enables the internal
simulation of behaviors, it is not surprising that individuals
with schizophrenia have difficulties relating with the world in
interpersonal relationships (Mehta et al., 2014b).
However, to our knowledge, only few studies extend this line
of research to object’s perception. For example, Delerue and
Boucart (2012) noted the absence of a perception-action link
in schizophrenia when they measured eye-tracking during an
active visual scanning task to show the decoupling of an object’s
perception from the potential action. They demonstrated that
the visual exploration of control subjects varied according to
the instructions given, to name the object visually presented or
to name the action inferred by the object. When participants
had to name the object, they explored only the part useful for
its identification, focusing, for example, on the tines of a fork.
However, when they had to name the action, they explored
the whole object, extending their visual explorations, in this
case, to the handle, the graspable part of the fork. In contrast,
visual explorations of patients were similar for the two tasks; in
each case, they focused essentially on the useful part (tines) to
identify the object (fork). Though patients with schizophrenia
demonstrated no abnormalities in naming objects, the absence of
facilitation in naming the actions of objects could reflect impaired
perception of affordance.
Our team also studied the affordance in schizophrenia (Sevos
et al., 2013). Since some authors suggested that “[i]f sensory
and motor processes are basic to all other cognition, as much
research in embodied cognitive science posits, then disorders
that have traditionally been viewed as dysfunctions of higher
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cognitive processes could in fact be explained by lower level
sensorimotor processes.” (Drayson, 2009, p. 338), we proposed
to study a potential deficit of sensorimotor integration, instead
of higher cognitive dysfunction, in this pathology. We evaluated
whether perceived objects automatically evoke corresponding
action processes (sensorimotor integration) using a Stimulus–
Response-Compatibility (SRC) paradigm that provides for a
shorter response time when the stimulus and response share
the same properties (Sevos et al., 2013). In our first experiment
(Experiment 1), we observed faster response times when the
spatial localization of a stimulus and of the motor response
were compatible (Simon effect), and patients with schizophrenia
showed no impairment of visuo-spatial integration in this task. In
our second experiment (Experiment 2), we replicated the tasks of
Tucker and Ellis (1998) that measured the effect of compatibility
between the orientations of common graspable objects and the
hand with which the subject was to respond to instructions
(object-based affordance effect). The absence of this effect even
in patients with mild symptom severity suggested no automatic
binding of perception and action in this population.
If a relationship between the features of a motoric object and
the action to be carried out with it does not occur automatically,
is it possible that adding contextual elements, making the action
more relevant to the patient’s needs and wishes, could induce this
automatic link between perception and action?
Indeed, in controls, it is known that the context in which
an object is observed influences how the object is perceived.
The activation of action potentialities, such as grasp, is not
completely automatic but depends rather on how attention is
oriented toward the action-relevant features of an object. For
example, the perception of the same object (door handle) could
trigger different sensorimotor simulations (Tipper et al., 2006).
Affordance effects were obtained only when subjects had to
discriminate properties of an object linked to action (a shape);
they did not occur when they had to discriminate color.
The Influence of Variations in Context on
Object-Affordance Effects
An individual’s range of potentially available motor actions also
depends on his unique “history” of interactions between the
object perceived and actions carried out with it. Moreover,
the context acts as either a resource or constraint according
to the situation, the subject’s ability to exploit environmental
resources, and the subject’s goals of action (Creem and
Proffitt, 2001). Therefore, it is not surprising that there is
widespread interest in the modulation of affordance effects in
various experimental contexts (Borghi et al., 2012; Borghi and
Riggio, 2015). Researchers disagree regarding the degree of
automaticity of action potentiations versus task- and context-
dependent activations (Creem-Regehr and Lee, 2005; Buxbaum
and Kalenine, 2010; Borghi and Riggio, 2015). Nevertheless,
efforts have been made to clarify these questions by modifying
the context of experimental settings. Among such studies, we
will emphasize those that address goals of action and sense of
property.
Goals of Action
The context in which an object is observed has been shown
to influence how it is perceived. Some authors believe that
affordance effects are not immutable but may vary according to
the observer’s goals and intentions in a given environment: the
perception of one object might trigger different sensorimotor
simulations. The simultaneous automaticity of the activation of
affordance and the flexibility of its modulation according to
the task and the physical and social context has been recently
shown (Borghi and Riggio, 2015) as well as the same object
can evoke different affordances (manipulative or functional grip)
according to context (Kalénine et al., 2014). In the same idea,
some authors have demonstrated a motor facilitation when two
objects are congruent and disposed in a functional way to imply
a specific action (Yoon et al., 2010), and that presenting a
photo of a hand with prehensile posture congruent with that
of the hand with which the subject was to respond facilitated
the response to objects (Borghi et al., 2012). By implying the
individual’s underlying goal, the photo would more strongly
induce interaction between the object and action. A facilitation
effect in conditions of both functional congruency between two
objects (presenting together a bottle and glass rather than a
bottle and ball) and the status of the objects (presenting together
a bottle and empty glass rather than a bottle and full glass)
was also reported (De Stefani et al., 2012). The object’s state
also appears to influence affordances, since larger effects were
observed when the perceived object appeared active (a door
handle that was depressed) rather than passive (the door handle
in apparent inactivity) (Tipper et al., 2006). All these studies
showed the flexible experience of objects by individuals and the
modulation of their perception according to their use in a given
context.
Semantic material has also been used to investigate the
modulation of affordance effects according to goals of action.
Indeed, language, as memory or perception, implies sensorimotor
simulation mechanisms linked to objects or situations to which
these linguistic expressions refer (e.g., Glenberg and Kaschak,
2002; Zwaan and Taylor, 2006; Gallese, 2009; Borghi and
Pecher, 2011). In particular, words evoke object affordance
just as visual stimuli do (Gibson, 1979). This functional link
between language and motor systems results from the often
simultaneous occurrence of actions and their referents; neural
populations, recruited to process a word and the referent body
movement, frequently fire together and become strongly linked
(Pulvermüller, 1999, 2001).
Borghi and Riggio (2009) showed that reading a sentence
as a prime of an visual object automatically activate the goal
of the action but only when the sentence included a verb of
action compared with a verb of observation. They also observed
an interference effect when the action sentence and perceived
object were incongruent. Using a similar design, Costantini et al.
(2011) observed the triggering of a simulation effect by an action
sentence, but only when the proximity of objects permitted bodily
interaction (i.e., in the peripersonal space). Thus, specifying the
proper conventional use of an object encourages the simulation
of a particular pattern of motor response.
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On the other hand, some authors do not show that semantic
context leads to an automatic and invariant simulation of specific
motor programs (Van Dam et al., 2010). Indeed, in a functional
magnetic resonance imaging task that involved words with both
motor and visual characteristics, such as tennis ball and boxing
gloves, stronger activation of motor areas when subjects thought
about words with motor characteristics was reported (Van Dam
et al., 2012). These findings suggest that the activation of
motor-specific information during action-word comprehension
is flexible and contextually dependent.
Sense of Property
Affordance effects can depend on the actor’s sense of who owns
the objects with which he interacts. This sense of property as
consider as a basic mechanism that emerges automatically even
during tasks not directly related to ownership (Tummolini et al.,
2013). Using a SRC paradigm, Constable et al. (2011) showed
variation in action potentialities evoked during the perception
of objects according to the individual’s understanding of who
owned the object. They asked participants to decorate a cup and
use it at home to create the feeling that they owned the cup.
Fifteen days later, participants performed a task on computer that
used photos of different cups: their own, one decorated by the
investigator, and two others with no defined owner. Sensorimotor
compatibility effects were shown for all photos except those
of the investigator’s cup. The authors conclude that a sense of
ownership may be embodied in the visuomotor system that is
sensitive to the status of an object’s ownership and favors the
inhibition of action that involves another person’s objects rather
than the facilitation of action toward self-owned objects. These
data fit with the hypothesis of an early developmental sense of
property. Indeed, as early as age four, children understand that
inappropriate interaction with objects they do not own can result
in negative consequences (Neary et al., 2009).
The sense of property is partly determined by one’s
identity (Dittmar, 1992), and name and surname are essential
components of that identity. The repetition of an individual’s
names throughout daily life could automatically draw auditory
and visual attention to these words (Moray, 1959; Wood and
Cowan, 1995; Shapiro et al., 1997) and evoke more memories and
emotions than other words do. The detection of one’s surname
among other stimuli has been demonstrated on both behavioral
(Oswald et al., 1960) and cerebral levels (Perrin et al., 1999), even
during sleep. One’s surname seems to be a pertinent ecological
stimulus for reference to “self ” (Perrin et al., 2005). Markman
and Brendl (2005) presented individuals’ own surnames in the
middle of a screen and asked participants to categorize the
valence of positive or negative adjectives placed near or far from
their surname. Half of the participants were instructed to pull
a lever toward themselves in response to positive adjectives and
to push it away in response to negative adjectives, and the other
half were given the reverse instructions. Participants responded
faster when positive adjectives were closer to their surname
and when negative words were further away, irrespective of the
participant’s pushing or pulling the lever. The authors concluded
that the speed of response movements depended more on the
representation of the participant’s self-the subject’s surname on
the screen-than the representation of their body, the physical
activity of pushing or pulling of the lever.
If attentional processes can automatically be attracted by self-
relevant items (as participant’s names -Moray, 1959; Gray et al.,
2004- or object ownership -Turk et al., 2011), we can then expect
that this kind of stimuli have an impact on other cognitive or
behavioral processes.
The Present Study
We examined whether the addition of a more salient action
context can promote the emergence of affordance effect during
the perception of everyday objects in patients with schizophrenia.
Indeed, in this population, the simple perception of an object
without context does not automatically evoke corresponding
action processes, and this lack of sensorimotor integration (Sevos
et al., 2013) could be associated with the absence of visual
exploration of the action-relevant features of the object (Delerue
and Boucart, 2012).
In this study, we explored the emergence of object-affordance
effects in schizophrenia using variations of new experimental
contexts in two experiments focusing on action potentiation
during the perception of object handling. In the first experiment
(Experiment 1), we began with the SRC paradigm of Tucker and
Ellis (1998) and added the presentation of primes (surnames) to
enhance the context, using the participant’s surname or “Rani”
as an imaginary surname to act as a reference of owning or
not owning the perceived object. In the second experiment
(Experiment 2), we added action sentences primes that were
congruent or not with the goal of action induced by the
conventional use of a given object. For example, we would present
the sentence “For watering plants” followed by a photo of a
watering can or a remote control.
EXPERIMENT 1
To evaluate if the sense of property can modulate object’s
affordance effects (in controls and patients with schizophrenia),
we introduced surnames, known to be ecological stimuli for self-
reference (Markman and Brendl, 2005; Perrin et al., 2005), as
primes to enhance the context of an object.
Because people are also known to interact with objects
differently based on whether the objects belong to them or not
(Constable et al., 2011), we considered the affordance effects
related to the introduction of surnames to reference the subject’s
owning (participant’s name) or not owning (imaginary name,
“Rani”) the perceived objects. We expected the emergence of
affordance effects in both populations when objects were primed
with the participant’s surname but not the imaginary name.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Participants included 18 patients with schizophrenia (16 men,
2 women) recruited in the psychiatric departments of the
University Hospital of Saint-Étienne and 18 healthy comparison
subjects (15 men, 3 women) recruited by advertisement in the
local newspaper (See Table 1 for demographic comparisons).
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TABLE 1 | Comparison of ages, years of education, and scores on the
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (SD) between patients with
schizophrenia and control subjects in Experiment 1.
Patients
(n = 18)
Controls
(n = 18)
t-test; P-value
Age (years) 37.3 (6.9) 36.9 (8.8) t = 0.126; P = 0.900
Education (years) 12.1 (2.5) 11.2 (2.7) t = 0.949; P = 0.349
Edinburgh score (/20) 19.3 (1.1) 18.6 (1.7) t = 1.552; P = 0.130
PANSS positive 13.1 (3) / /
PANSS negative 16.7 (7) / /
Illness duration (months) 172.33 (93.9) / /
All were volunteers and naive about the hypothesis of
the experiment. The local ethics committee of Saint-Étienne
approved the study (N◦ IORG0007394), and written consent was
obtained from all participants after the nature of the procedures
was fully explained.
Patients were included with a DSM-5 diagnosis of schizo-
phrenia (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and no change
in antipsychotic medication and/or clinical status within 4 weeks
prior to the study. The same senior psychiatrist assessed all
patients using the positive and negative syndrome scale (PANSS;
Kay et al., 1987). All were stable outpatients living in their own
accommodations and participating in various psychosocial or
professional activities.
Across groups, participants were excluded for (1) a diagnosis
of neurological brain disorder or head trauma with loss of
consciousness, (2) mental retardation, and/or (3) a history of
substance abuse over the last 6 months. All participants were
right handed (scores> 14, assessed using the modified Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory; Oldfield, 1971).
A power analysis, conducted via G∗Power Software (Faul et al.,
2007), with Cohen’s recommendations (Cohen, 1988), which
assumed a medium effect size of 0.25 for the ANOVA with
one between-subjects factor and three within-subjects factors
(eight levels as repeated measures), indicated that a total of 20,
18, and 16 participants were required, respectively, to have a
90, 85, or 80% power (a minimum required by Cohen, 1988)
of detecting a significant effect at p-value of 0.05. Thus, our
proposed sample size of 36 subjects will be more than adequate
for the main objective of this study. The power analysis which
assumed a medium effect size of 0.25 for the ANOVA with three
within-subjects factors in each group of participants (controls
and schizophrenics) indicated that a total of 20, 18, and 16
participants were required to have 90, 85, and 80% power of
detecting a significant effect at p-value of 0.05. In the present
study, 18 subjects performed all conditions in each group.
Apparatus and Materials
We employed the same material we used previously (Sevos et al.,
2013), adding only a visual prime (participant’s surname or the
imaginary surname “Rani”) before presenting each object in each
trial. We chose an imaginary name to avoid reference to any of
the participants. Names printed in black 32-point Arial font were
presented to subjects in the middle of a white screen.
A total of 88 black-and-white photographs of 22 objects
graspable by one hand (Appendix 1) were presented in two
horizontal (compatible with either a right- or left-handed grasp)
and two vertical (upright or inverted) orientations (Figure 1)
on the computer screen. The average size of photos was
512 × 384 pixels to maintain the proportions of each object at
a distance of 50 cm.
Design and Procedure
Participants were seated with their heads 50 cm in front of the
screen and first shown every photo in both orientations to ensure
they could recognize each object upright and inverted.
During the task, they were required to indicate as quickly as
possible whether the object was upright or inverted by pressing
the corresponding response key. Each participant carried out
two blocks of 88 trials with a break of 3 min between blocks.
In one block, subjects were to respond with their right hand
for upright objects and their left hand for inverted objects.
In the second block, they were asked to do the opposite –
to respond with their right hand for inverted objects and
their left hand for upright objects. The order of these blocks
was counterbalanced between subjects. Within each block, 44
randomized trials were primed by the participant’s surname and
the other 44, by the imaginary surname “Rani.” Before carrying
out each block, the subject was informed that his surname would
appear before objects as if he owned them or the surname
Rani would appear before objects as if Rani owned them, and
FIGURE 1 | Examples of the stimuli used in Experiment 1: left
orientation, upright; right orientation, upright; left orientation, inverted;
right orientation, inverted.
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they were reminded to respond to objects according to the
object’s orientation and not the presented surname. A 1-min
break was proposed after the first 44 trials. The order of primes
was also counterbalanced between participants. Moreover, for
each participant, objects primed by their own surname were
never primed by Rani, and objects primed by Rani were never
primed by their own surname, and the order of presentation was
counterbalanced between subjects. During the whole experiment,
participants were instructed to keep their right finger on a
right response key (L) and their left finger on a left response
key (S). Response keys were situated 15 cm apart and 20 cm
in front of the screen, on a standard European (AZERTY)
keyboard.
Each participant received six practice trials for each kind of
prime (surname of participant or Rani) before each block. Each
experimental trial started with the presentation of the prime in
the center of the screen for 250 ms followed immediately by a
photo of one of the 22 objects. The stimulus stayed on the screen
until an answer was given or up to 3000 ms. A brief auditory tone
on the computer indicated errors to participants.
Results
For all conditions, participants responded within the required
time limit of 3000 ms. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
conducted on the participants’ data (errors and response times
[RT]) with group (patients or controls) as the between-subject
factor and prime (congruent or incongruent), response (left or
right hand) and object orientation (left or right) as the within-
subject factors.
Errors
Errors were rare (M = 3.64%, standard error [SE] = 0.5).
The ANOVA showed no main effect of either between- or
within-subject factors: group [F(1,34) = 3.300; P = 0.078;
η2 = 0.09]; prime [F(1,34) = 0.027; P = 0.871; η2 < 0.01];
response [F(1,34) = 0.156; P = 0.695; η2 < 0.01]; and orientation
[F(1,34) = 0.041; P = 0.840; η2 < 0.01] (Table 2). Neither did we
find interaction among factors (all F-values were less than 2.152).
Response Times
The mean RT and standard deviation (SD) were calculated for
each subject, and response times above 2 SDs of their own
individual mean were eliminated (4.3%).
We found no effect of vertical orientation [F(1,34) = 0.926;
P = 0.342; η2 < 0.03] or mapping responses [F(1,34) = 1.985;
P = 0.168; η2 < 0.06].
Globally, an increased RT of patients (M = 783 ms;
SE = 24) compared with controls (M = 671 ms; SE = 23) was
reflected by a significant main effect of group [F(1,34) = 11.492;
P = 0.002; η2 = 0.25]. We found no main effect of prime
[F(1,34) = 0.134; P = 0.717; η2 < 0.01]. RTs did not differ
significantly when the object was primed by either the
participant’s surname (M = 724 ms; SE = 19) or the surname
Rani (M = 729 ms; SE = 17). Neither did we find an effect of
response [F(1,34) = 0.233, P = 0.633; η2 < 0.01] or orientation
[F(1,34) = 0.007; P = 0.935; η2 < 0.01]. The only significant
interaction was between group, prime, response, and orientation
[F(1,34) = 8.536; P = 0.006; η2 = 0.21]. To facilitate reading, we
will present separately the analysis according to type of prime
(incongruent or congruent) and according to group (patients and
controls) (Table 3).
In the incongruent prime condition, group [F(1,34) = 2.638;
P = 0.114; η2 = 0.07] did not change the compatibility effect
(measured by the interaction of response × orientation), but
in the congruent prime condition, the 3-way interaction of
group × response × orientation was significant [F(1,34) = 6.202;
P = 0.018; η2 = 0.15]. When the prime was the participant’s
name, the temporal patterns of responses, which highlighted the
effects of compatibility and incompatibility, differed significantly
according to the group of participants.
In the control group, the interaction of response × orien-
tation, which measures the compatibility effect, was significant
[F(1,17) = 5.255; P = 0.035; η2 = 0.24], as was the 3-way
interaction of prime × response × orientation [F(1,17) = 6.642;
P = 0.020; η2 = 0.28]. For this group, in the congruent prime
condition, right-hand responses were faster when the orientation
of the object was also to the right (M = 658 ms; SE = 23)
rather than left (M = 677 ms; SE = 24) [F(1,17) = 6.582;
P = 0.020; η2 = 0.28]. Similarly, left-hand responses were
faster when the orientation of the object was also to the left
(M = 647 ms; SE = 24) rather than the right (M = 678 ms;
SE = 31) [F(1,17) = 5.802; P = 0.028; η2 = 0.25]. The interaction
of response × orientation was significant [F(1,17) = 9.602;
P = 0.007; η2 = 0.36]. By contrast, in the incongruent
prime condition, the interaction of response × orientation
was not significant [F(1,17) = 0.358; P = 0.558; η2 = 0.02]
(Figure 2).
In the patient group, the interaction of response× orientation
was not significant overall [F(1,17) = 0.354; P = 0.560;
η2 = 0.02], not modified by the prime condition [F(1,17) = 2.584;
P = 0.126; η2 = 0.13], nor significant in either the congruent
[F(1,17) = 0.390; P = 0.541; η2 = 0.13] or incongruent prime
condition [F(1,17) = 2.458; P = 0.135; η2 = 0.13] (Figure 2).
Discussion of Experiment 1
Response times of controls were shorter when the graspable
part of the object and the response hand were compatible
but only when the subject’s surname was used to prime
the object. When an imaginary surname was used as the
prime, no compatibility effect was apparent, findings in accord
with those of Constable et al. (2011) that specifying the
owner of the perceived object modulated affordance effects.
Participants might view their own surname as a request to
perform a certain action with the object, whereas seeing
another name might be interpreted that the other person
should perform the action. Therefore, using a participant’s
own name as a prime seems to be an ecological way to
lead subjects to build a sense of property of the perceived
object.
Nevertheless, this kind of prime seems insufficient to create
the sense of property in schizophrenia. Patients did not respond
faster in the case of compatibility than that of incompatibility
whether the objects were primed using their own or an
imaginary name. In this group, even when primed by the
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org October 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 155125
fpsyg-07-01551 October 3, 2016 Time: 10:38 # 7
Sevos et al. Contextual Affordance Effects in Schizophrenia
TABLE 2 | Error rates (SD) based on patient or control group, congruent or incongruent prime, left or right orientation, and left- or right-handed response
in Experiment 1.
Patients (n = 18) Controls (n = 18)
Response hand Object
orientation
Primes
Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent
Right Right 3.6 (1.4) 5.6 (1.5) 2.0 (0.8) 2.6 (0.6)
Left 5.6 (1.4) 4.7 (1.1) 1.4 (0.6) 3.1 (1.3)
Left Right 4.7 (1.2) 5.3 (2.0) 2.6 (1.0) 2.4 (0.8)
Left 4.7 (1.6) 3.6 (1.3) 4.1 (0.9) 2.3 (0.6)
TABLE 3 | Means (SD) of response times (in ms) according to patient or control group, congruent or incongruent prime, left or right orientation, and left-
or right-handed response in Experiment 1.
Patients Controls
Response hand Object
orientation
Primes
Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent
Right Right 786 (32) 774 (22) 658 (23) 679 (26)
Left 785 (28) 790 (27) 677 (24) 674 (23)
Left Right 776 (27) 789 (27) 678 (31) 676 (24)
Left 787 (35) 777 (23) 647 (24) 677 (22)
subject’s surname, the visual perception of an object did not
potentiate the actions “normally” associated with it. So, we
can assume that for patients with schizophrenia, this type of
prime is not sufficiently relevant to allow the emergence of
sensorimotor compatibility between an object and action to
perform.
Globally, responses of subjects with schizophrenia were
slower even if they committed no more errors than controls
and whether or not the name used as a prime was their own.
Thus, it seems that additional cognitive cost is required
of patients to achieve the same results. More costly in
attentional resources, the implementation of controlled
processes is required if the motor simulation does not
emerge when the stimulus and response share sensorimotor
characteristics.
The use of the participant’s first name as a prime seems
insufficient for patients to perceive the action-relevant
features of prehensile objects. Indeed, the behavioral impact
of perceived object affordance seems to depend heavily
on the action context in which the object is presented,
carrying on the subject motor intentionalities. Studies in
healthy subjects have shown, for example, that naming
an object evokes gestural knowledge about its form and
function that automatically elicits action potentialities, whereas
passively viewing the object does not (Bub and Masson,
2006).
In a second experiment, to facilitate the perception of the
action-relevant features of an object and carry on an implicit
motor intention in the patient, we primed objects using action
sentences reflecting congruency with the use of the objects in
everyday life.
EXPERIMENT 2
If context and goal of action can modulate affordance effects
(Borghi et al., 2012), the use of action sentence primes with
sensorimotor characteristics congruent with the goal of action
induced by the conventional use of a presented object should
produce affordance effects in both groups. However, this effect
should not emerge when objects are primed using incongruent
sentences.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Subjects were 18 patients with schizophrenia (15 men, 3 women)
and 18 healthy controls (15 men, 3 women) recruited in the
same manner and using the same inclusion and exclusion
criteria as those of Experiment 1 (See Table 4 for demographic
comparisons).
The local ethics committee of Saint-Étienne approved the
study (N◦ IORG0007394), and informed written consent was
obtained from all participants.
For the power analysis, see Experiment 1.
Apparatus and Materials
Among the 22 everyday objects graspable by one hand used in
the previous experiment, six of them were presented in double
exemplary (for example two different saucepans, two different
bottles of detergent. . .). In this second experiment, we kept
16 single objects. We presented all objects in two horizontal
orientations (compatible with either right- or left-handed grasp)
but in only upright orientation. Each object was primed one
time by one action sentence congruent with goals of action
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FIGURE 2 | Mean response times (in ms) for Experiment 1 as a function of name prime (congruent or incongruent), object orientation (left or right),
and response hand (left or right) in the control group and in the group with schizophrenia. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
TABLE 4 | Comparison of ages, years of education, and scores on the
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (SD) between patients and controls in
Experiment 2.
Patients
(n = 18)
Controls
(n = 18)
t-test; P-value
Age (years) 37.2 (4.8) 35.2 (6.9) t = −1.069; P = 0.293
Education (years) 11.5 (2.2) 12.6 (2.1) t = 1.542; P = 0.132
Edinburgh score (/20) 18.8 (1.1) 18.5 (1.8) t = −0.800; P = 0.429
PANSS positive 13.9 (3.6) / /
PANSS negative 17.2 (6.3) / /
Illness duration (months) 176.22 (71.4) / /
induced by the use of the object and another time by an
incongruent sentence (Appendix 2). We formulated the sentences
in relation to the photos of objects used in Experiment 1 by
asking 80 students to name the action verb and direct object
complement that seemed to them most related to the object
in each photo. We used those most often cited (>80%) and
subsequently asked the students to form pairs of pictures and
sentences that seemed to them most incongruent. The sentences
were built to be of almost the same length in French. Overall,
in this experiment, 64 pictures were displayed in the middle
of a computer screen (with the same characteristics of those in
Experiment 1) preceded by sentences written in black 32-point
Arial font.
Design and Procedure
To ensure that subjects read the sentences presented as primes,
we asked them to indicate as fast and accurately as possible
if the object pictured (e.g., an iron) was congruent with the
action sentence prime (for ironing clothes) or not (for cutting
bread). Each participant carried out two blocks of 64 trials with
a 3-min break between the blocks. These blocks differed in
terms of response mapping (right-hand congruency versus left-
hand incongruency and left-hand congruency versus right-hand
incongruency) and were counterbalanced between subjects. As
in Experiment 1, participants were instructed to keep their right
finger on the right response key (L) and their left finger on the
left response key (S) during the entire experiment. Response keys
were situated 15 cm apart and 20 cm in front of the screen on a
standard European (AZERTY) keyboard.
Each experimental trial started with the presentation of
an action sentence as a prime for 2000 ms followed by the
presentation of a photo of one object, which remained on
the screen until an answer was given up to 3000 ms. A brief
auditory tone on the computer informed participants of errors.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org October 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 155127
fpsyg-07-01551 October 3, 2016 Time: 10:38 # 9
Sevos et al. Contextual Affordance Effects in Schizophrenia
Each participant received eight practice trials using a different
set of sentences and photos before each block. Depending on
the situation, the response hand could be on the same side
as the graspable part of the object (compatible orientation) or
on the opposite side (incompatible), and the action sentence
prime could be congruent or incongruent with the normal action
induced by the given object.
Results
For all conditions, participants responded within the required
time limit of 3000 ms. We evaluated data regarding participants’
errors and response times using ANOVA with group (patients or
controls) as the between-subject factor and prime (congruent or
incongruent), response (left or right hand), and object orientation
(left or right) as within-subject factors.
Errors
Errors were rare (M= 3.46%; SE= 0.4), and the ANOVA showed
no significant main effect of either between- or within-subject
factors: group [F(1,34) = 2.738; P = 0.107; η2 = 0.07]; prime
[F(1,34) = 0.386; P = 0.539; η2 = 0.01]; response [F(1,34) = 0.461;
P = 0.502; η2 = 0.01]; and orientation [F(1,34) = 2.400;
P = 0.131; η2 = 0.07]. Table 5 delineates error rates. We found
no interaction of factors (all F-values were less than 2.400).
Response Times
We calculated the mean response time and standard deviation for
each subject and excluded RTs above 2 SDs of the individual’s own
mean (4.4%).
We found no effect of mapping responses [F(1,34) = 1.227;
P < 0.276; η2 = 0.03].
The longer RTs of patients (M = 797 ms; SE = 35) than
controls (M = 594 ms, SE = 23) reflected a significant main
effect of group [F(1,34) = 22.897; P < 0.001; η2 = 0.4]. We
also found a main effect of prime [F(1,34) = 28.236; P < 0.001;
η2 = 0.5]. Response times were shorter when the prime was
congruent with the goal of action induced by the use of the
given object (M = 672 ms; SE = 20) than when the prime
was incongruent with it (M = 719 ms; SE = 23). However, we
found no effect of either response [F(1,34) = 0.663; P = 0.421;
η2 = 0.02] or orientation [F(1,34) = 0.180; P = 0.674; η2 < 0.01].
The only significant interaction was observed between group,
prime, response, and orientation [F(1,34) = 4.254; P = 0.047;
η2 = 0.11]. As in Experiment 1, we present separate analyses
according to the congruency or incongruency of the prime and
the patient or control group (Table 6).
The 3-way interaction of group × response × orientation
was significant when the prime was congruent [F(1,34) = 8.774;
P = 0.006; η2 = 0.21] but not incongruent [F(1,34) = 0.340;
P = 0.563; η2 < 0.01]. When the prime was congruent with the
goal of action induced by the use of the object, the temporal
patterns of response differed significantly according to the
participant group.
In the control group, the interaction of response × orien-
tation, which measures the effect of compatibility, was not
significant [F(1,17) = 2.890; P = 0.107; η2 = 0.15], but the 3-way
interaction of prime × response × orientation [F(1,17) = 10.359,
P = 0.005, η2 = 0.38] was. In the congruent prime condition,
the interaction of response × orientation was significant
[F(1,17) = 9.446; P = 0.007; η2 = 0.36]. Right-hand responses
were faster when the object was also oriented to the right
TABLE 5 | Error rates (SD) based on patient or control group, congruent or incongruent prime, left or right orientation, and left- or right-handed response
in Experiment 2.
Patients Controls
Response hand Object orientation Primes
Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent
Right Right 4.0 (1.1) 3.7 (1.2) 3.0 (1.1) 2.3 (0.7)
Left 3.7 (1.3) 5.1 (1.8) 2.0 (0.8) 2.7 (0.9)
Left Right 4.4 (1.6) 2.7 (0.9) 2.3 (1.0) 2.3 (0.9)
Left 5.7 (1.7) 4.0 (1.0) 3.7 (1.0) 3.7 (1.2)
TABLE 6 | Means (SD) of response times (in ms) according to patient or control group, congruent or incongruent prime, left or right orientation, and left-
or right-handed response in Experiment 2.
Patients Controls
Response hand Object orientation Primes
Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent
Right Right 757 (38) 837 (36) 552 (18) 621 (33)
Left 733 (39) 850 (45) 577 (25) 612 (31)
Left Right 780 (38) 810 (43) 601 (29) 611 (25)
Left 802 (36) 803 (44) 570 (25) 606 (26)
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(M = 552 ms; SE = 18) rather than to the left (M = 577 ms;
SE = 25) [F(1,17) = 5.428; P = 0.032; η2 = 0.24]. Similarly, left-
hand responses were faster when the object was also oriented
to the left (M = 570 ms; SE = 25) rather than to the right
(M = 601 ms; SE = 29) [F(1,17) = 5.357; P = 0.033; η2 = 0.24].
By contrast, in the incongruent prime condition, the interaction
of response × orientation was not significant [F(1,17) = 0.061;
P = 0.808; η2 < 0.01] (Figure 3).
In the patient group, the interaction of response× orientation
was not significant [F(1,17) = 0.666; P = 0.426; η2 = 0.04] and
not modified by the prime condition [F(1,17) = 1.288; P = 0.272;
η2 = 0.07], whether congruent [F(1,17) = 2.505; P = 0.132;
η2 = 0.13] or incongruent [F(1,17) = 0.280; P= 0.604; η2 = 0.02]
(Figure 3).
Discussion of Experiment 2
Controls responded more quickly when orientation was
compatible between the graspable part of the object and the
response hand but only when the prime was a congruent action
sentence. An incongruent sentence cued no compatibility effect.
These results show that affordance effects can be modulated
according to variations in context and particularly according
to the goals of action inferred from the experimental setting.
Thus, specification of the proper conventional use of an object
facilitates the simulation of a particular pattern of motor
responses. By contrast, incongruency between the action
sentence and perceived object disrupts the affordance effect.
These results suggest that if the action implied by a sentence
cannot be performed with the object, subjects might not activate
the affordances usually provided by the object.
Nevertheless, the subjects with schizophrenia demonstrated
no sensorimotor compatibility effect regardless of the congruency
of the semantic prime. There was no action potentiation effect
even when the sentence and implied action of the object’s use
were congruent, and their responses were not faster when the
target orientation and response hand were compatible.
However, the relatively low and similar error rates between the
two groups of subjects demonstrate the correct understanding
of instructions and good involvement to perform the task
properly of all participants. These results also highlight that
patients had no more difficulty than controls in responding to
perceived congruency between the sentence prime and target
object, which indicated their understanding of the function of
the everyday objects presented to them on the screen. Thus, all
participants seemed sensitive to the congruency between the aim
of action cued semantically and the perceived object. However,
though we observed that patients considered semantic context,
the expression of the goal of the action seemed insufficient
to create action potentiation during the perception of the
objects.
DISCUSSION
We hypothesized that enriching the contextual environment
could influence affordance effects in healthy subjects and facilitate
their emergence in patients with schizophrenia. Adapting a
paradigm inspired by Tucker and Ellis (1998) to observe the
potential modulation of affordance effects, we conducted two
experiments in which we introduced a picture of a graspable
object using a semantic prime to suggest a sense of ownership
of the object (Experiment 1) or goals of action for its use
(Experiment 2).
The control group demonstrated the emergence of sensori-
motor compatibility effects, but only when the prime was
congruent with the perceived object. Indeed, the modulation
of the environmental context by conceptual priming influenced
the sensorimotor compatibility effects. In Experiment 1, they
emerged only when the objects were preceded by the participant’s
surname as a reference for ownership of the perceived object,
and in Experiment 2, they emerged when action sentences were
congruent with goals of action induced by the conventional
use of the perceived object. Action potentialities can emerge
through simulation mechanisms when the meaning of a stimulus
is relevant to the action and when the expected motor response
shares components of this action (Girardi et al., 2010).
In our study, context seems to act as a resource to potentiate
action when it is congruent with the action implied by the
perceived object and with the intention of the subject. The
presentation of a congruent prime would enable the preparation
of motor action, resulting in the emergence of the affordance
effect. Indeed, Vandevoorde (2011) showed that an efficient
coupling between the perception of and action associated with
an object that is perceived beneficial to the subject will facilitate
the reactivation of this kinesthetic image in a similar situation
by reinforcement and motor habituation. In this case, the object
becomes a “visuomotor opportunity” (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia,
2008) that is identified based on its motor potentialities. The
brain would be able to recognize its environment solely according
to these potentialities even in the absence of the superior
mobilization of reasoning, so the motor system would then fully
participate in identifying and understanding the surrounding
world.
Though many studies have focused on the influence of
physical context, it seems important to determine the influence
of other kinds of context, such as social and functional context,
on the activation of affordance (Van Dam et al., 2010; Borghi
and Riggio, 2015). In Experiment 1, we observed, we believe
for the first time, the potential influence of one’s surname, an
example of social and personal data with which we grow from
childhood, to simulate an individual’s appropriate actions toward
an object when the name is used as a prime for the object’s
perception. In Experiment 2, we measured the influence of the
input of functional knowledge using action s (“to drink coffee”)
to prime the presentation of an object (“a cup”). We wanted
to ensure that the participant simulates the expected action:
in this example, the most appropriate way to use the cup to
drink coffee is to grasp it by its handle. If Van Dam et al.’s
(2010, p. 5) showed “that preparing an action congruent to the
typical, functional use of an object, facilitates processing of the
word denoting the object,” then we demonstrated the inverse
relationship here.
The results of both our experiments provide further evidence
that affordances are both intrinsic to objects and flexible,
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FIGURE 3 | Mean response times (in ms) for Experiment 2 as a function of action prime (congruent or incongruent), object orientation (left or right),
and response hand (left or right) in the control group and in the group with schizophrenia. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
that they involve the subject and his environment. Even if
affordances are initiated automatically, they are then selected
to the current task (Borghi and Riggio, 2015). Indeed, we
also showed that an incongruent context did not provoke the
emergence of affordance effects even when perceived objects
were the same. Buccino et al. (2009) tested the modulation
of the motor system when an object’s features are violated,
such as when the handles of graspable objects are broken,
and found no activation of affordance in the absence of
pragmatic conditions to perform an action associated with an
object. Further studies are needed to detail the mechanisms
underlying a total absence of sensorimotor activation or
an inhibition of the action potentialities in the case of
incongruent context (Anelli et al., 2012; Borghi and Riggio,
2015).
In our subjects with schizophrenia, selected primes did not
seem to share sensorimotor features in a relevant way with the
current task. Even priming the perception of a visual object using
a semantic context to reinforce the sense of property or goals of
action of the object did not automatically potentiate the action
associated with its use.
In this study, patients were slower than controls in both
tasks. Our previous study (Sevos et al., 2013) revealed no such
slowdown when we measured the compatibility between the
spatial localization of a stimulus and the motor response (Simon
task), which seemed to indicate that visuo-spatial integration
is automatic in both patients with schizophrenia and healthy
subjects. However, in an affordance task, longer response times of
patients than controls suggested no automatic binding between
perception and action in patients. In that previous work, we
interpreted the increased response time as the time to implement
controlled processes more costly in attentional resources.
Our current findings again challenge the precept that the
mere observation of graspable objects is sufficient to evoke their
affordances because objects elicit components of appropriate
motor programs associated with object interaction (Borghi and
Riggio, 2015). For example, Yu et al. (2014) failed to replicate
compatibility effects when participants were not explicitly
instructed to imagine picking up pictured objects. However,
in both of our experiments, patients with schizophrenia made
no more errors than controls, reinforcing the idea that they
had functional knowledge of the presented objects-if the object
was upright or inverted, if one drinks coffee with a cup or
frying pan. Though Garbarini and Adenzato (2004) claim that
motor simulation is the only way to develop knowledge of
the action possibilities made available by objects, we cannot
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agree. Indeed, despite the lack of sensorimotor stimulation,
our subjects with schizophrenia usually demonstrated the
capacity to use everyday life objects in an appropriate way.
In this case, simulation could be considered as the default
procedure that can occasionally be supplemented or overridden
by theoretical considerations, as proposed by Jeannerod and
Pacherie (2004).
In pathology, Cattaneo et al. (2007) showed, for example,
the inability of autistic children to rely on a motor preparation
before executing a movement even if they desired to achieve a
requested goal and were fully able to carry out the requested
actions. The researchers recorded electromyographic (EMG)
activity in children with autism and children with normal
development as they executed a gesture (arm flexion toward
itself) (Experiment 2). The gesture could lead to two different
actions and so involved two different intentions-bringing a
piece of food to the mouth (eating action) or putting a piece
of paper into a container placed on the shoulder (placing
action). Controls demonstrated the increased activity of muscles
responsible for the final goal of the action (eating a piece
of food) as soon as the action began (reaching for he piece
of food). In the children with autism, those muscles became
active only during the bringing-to-the-mouth phase. In another
experiment (Experiment 1), those authors showed an indirect
link between the activity of mirror neurons supposed to support
the understanding of the intentions of others and sensorimotor
simulation. Using the same procedure, they showed increased
activation of jaw muscles as controls observed the eating action
but not during the placing action, thus demonstrating the
existence of links between motor intention and sensorimotor
simulations that activate the muscles involved in the final action.
In contrast, the children with autism showed no muscle activation
while observing either eating or placing actions. The authors
interpret these results as a lack of motor activation underlying
action-understanding in children with autism; the children may
understand the others’ intentions cognitively (particularly when
semantic cues are given by a piece of the object) but not
experientially.
Motor facilitation during action observation, which putatively
reflects the activity of mirror neurons, could also be reduced
in schizophrenia. In their study, Enticott et al.’s (2008) group
administered transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) while
presenting video clips showing the abductor pollicis (APB) of
the right hand during different activities (thumb movement, pen
grasp, or handwriting) and recorded motor-evoked potentials
(MEP) from the right APB muscle of subjects. The significant
increase in the amplitude of MEP for these three activities
compared with the baseline in controls and the absence of
any change in patients with schizophrenia led these authors to
conclude that reduced activation of mirror neurons impairs the
ability to experience an internal simulation of other’s behavior.
Using our experimental paradigm, associated with
physiological measures (TMS or MEP for example), could
be relevant to objectify the underlying sensorimotor process in
schizophrenia. In the absence of such studies, our behavioral
results seem to suggest that our subjects with schizophrenia
also have impaired ability to experience an internal simulation
of motor action potentialities when they perceived graspable
objects, which would indicate that all activities of daily life
would require the involvement of higher cognitive processes
rather than lower level sensorimotor processes. Patients
expressed, for example, knowing how to set a table but needing
to think about each step to accomplish the task. Jeannerod
(2001), Gallese (2009), and Vandevoorde (2011) agree that it
is precisely this sensorimotor simulation that not only enables
the subject to anticipate an action but provides as well a
“motor thought,” an automatic, almost intuitive knowledge
from his surrounding world. This ability to anticipate his
actions should allow the subject to act seamlessly in his
environment and feel familiar with it and current social
situations. At a perceptual level, objects and persons generally
appear familiar and intelligible according to our expectations of
them from past experience. We postulate that the impairment
of sensorimotor simulation could partly explain the loss of
this “common sense” of things, sometimes encountered in
schizophrenia. If perception appears deprived of its fullness
and no longer related to motor actions, but is more like a
purely receptive process (Parnas and Handest, 2003), it is
not surprising that subjects with schizophrenia can feel a
strangeness, that is “when the meanings of objects in the world
(e.g., “What is this chair for?”) and of the actions of others (e.g.,
“Why is he laughing?”) appear uncanny” (Stanghellini, 2000,
p. 779).
Similarly, Fuchs and Schlimme (2009) claimed that the
disintegration of all normally automatic behaviors of everyday
life is a major feature of schizophrenia that more broadly
reflects a “disembodiment” of the self or of the relation to
objects (see also Fuchs, 2005; Stanghellini, 2009; Sass, 2013). Our
experimental results seem to converge with clinical observations
as well as psychopathological and phenomenological data that
demonstrate a dissociation of patients with schizophrenia and
their environment.
The study of pathology such as that of schizophrenia, which
precisely undermines the notion of coherence, requires a more
unified, coherent, and comprehensive approach that takes into
account concepts and methods based in embodied cognition
(Glenberg et al., 2013).
Limitations and Implications for Future
Studies
This pilot study is limited by our small sample size and the
relatively weak positive and negative symptoms of patients that
might restrict the generalization of our findings.
Future studies with larger samples of subjects with
schizophrenia are warranted to confirm our findings, which
suggest the impairment of sensorimotor integration even in
patients with milder symptoms.
We explored the emergence of object affordance effects in
schizophrenia by varying experimental contexts and found that
the use of conceptual priming (making the action more specific
or reinforcing the purpose of the action for the patient) seems
insufficient to trigger motor simulation when subjects perceive
objects used in everyday life. In futures studies, we propose to
enhance context by introducing visuomotor or motor priming.
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Indeed, the literature shows that the state of the motor system can
influence the perception of objects (Craighero et al., 2002), but a
phase of motor training can also be used to facilitate the effect of
sensorimotor compatibility (Borghi et al., 2007).
In addition, the use of brain imaging techniques and
electrophysiological measures enhance understanding of the
cerebral and physiological mechanisms involved when control
subjects perform tasks that involve motor simulation (e.g., Grezes
and Decety, 2001, 2002; Buccino et al., 2009). Using such
techniques in patients could similarly improve our understanding
of these phenomena in schizophrenia.
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For first generation scientists after the cognitive revolution, knowers were in active
control over all (stages of) information processing. Then, following a decade of transition
shaped by intense controversy, embodied cognition emerged and suggested sources
of control other than those implied by metaphysical information processing. With a
thematic focus on embodiment science and an eye toward systematic consensus in
systemic cohesion, the present study explores the roles of biofunctional and conceptual
control processes in the wholetheme spiral of biofunctional understanding (see Iran-
Nejad and Irannejad, 2017b, Figure 1). According to this spiral, each of the two kinds of
understanding has its own unique set of knower control processes. For conceptual
understanding (CU), knowers have deliberate attention-allocation control over their
first-person “knowthat” and “knowhow” content combined as mutually coherent
corequisites. For biofunctional understanding (BU), knowers have attention-allocation
control only over their knowthat content but knowhow control content is ordinarily
conspicuously absent. To test the hypothesis of differences in the manner of control
between CU and BU, participants in two experiments read identical-format statements
for internal consistency, as response time was recorded. The results of Experiment 1
supported the hypothesis of differences in the manner of control between the two types
of control processes; and Experiment 2 confirmed the results of Experiment 1. These
findings are discussed in terms of the predicted differences between BU and CU control
processes, their roles in regulating the physically unobservable flow of systemic cohesion
in the wholetheme spiral, and a proposal for systematic consensus in systemic cohesion
to serve as the second guiding principle in biofunctional embodiment science next to
physical science’s first guiding principle of systematic observation.
Keywords: biofunctional understanding, declarative fact-seeking, procedural knowhow, embodiment science,
spiral of biofunctional understanding, systematic observation, systematic consensus, unobservable systemic
cohesion
INTRODUCTION
The Myth of the Knowledge Stored in Connections
In a panel discussion entitled “The computational conception of mind” with Gilbert
Harman, John Haugeland, Jay McClelland, Allen Newell, Dana S. Scott, and Zenon
Pylyshyn as participants, the moderator, Scott (1990) asked, Will there be a theory of
comprehension? The answer to be sought by the audience was hidden in the moderator’s
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statement “In our view, the implicit knowledge is stored
in connections among simple processing units organized
into networks” (p. 39). This excerpt is widely circulated in
unmistakably similar words throughout the community of
the second generation cognitivist, especially, the literature on
parallel distributed processing (PDP), a well-known predecessor
to embodied cognition (see Harnad, 1990; Iran-Nejad and
Homaifar, 2000).
For more than a decade after the cognitive revolution, short-
term control processes and long-term storage architectures
dominated the field of first-generation cognition (Neisser,
1967; Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968). Mind connections, frames,
and hierarchies ranged from the most concrete sensory to
the most abstract conceptual levels (Rumelhart and Ortony,
1977; Rumelhart, 1980). Network metaphors were everywhere
representing unobservable mind connections in concept maps,
semantic spaces, and memory taxonomies for saving content
inside knowers. The mechanistic vernacular of the first-
generation cognition, mostly metaphysical in nature, inspired
by the computer-program analogy (Neisser, 1967), soon faced
challenges from critics (Bransford and Johnson, 1972; Iran-
Nejad, 1980/1987), could not stay free from trouble (Jenkins,
1974; Bransford et al., 1977; Iran-Nejad and Ortony, 1982;
Shulman, 1999), and, before long, its pioneers began scrambling
for replacement alternatives.
Metaphysical information processing scientists found their
cues in spatial and computer metaphors (Roediger, 1980); and
were inclined accordingly to mechanize human information
processing (e.g., spreading activation) and humanize mechanical
architectures, e.g., neural networks (Collins and Loftus, 1975;
Beers, 1987; Smolensky, 1987). As a result, when information
processing controls and architectures were still at the peak of their
popularity, Neisser (1976), who wrote the original book on soft
cognitive psychology less than a decade earlier (Neisser, 1967),
lamented that information-processing and storage constructs had
prestige and momentum but their computer-inspired control
processes and structures ran contrary to the human nature (Iran-
Nejad and Winsler, 2000). Neisser (1976) himself abandoned the
computer metaphor in a hurry and turned first to ecological
psychology (Gibson, 1966) and then to biology in search of a
more natural human cognition (Neisser, 1987, 1994; Neisser and
Winograd, 1988; Neisser and Jopling, 1997). Nevertheless, even
today, articles, books, and even entire journals keep spreading
Neisser’s (1967) metaphysical footsteps in leaps and bounds
across this planet (Khemlani et al., 2014). How could one answer
Dana S. Scott’s question about comprehension or make room for
human understanding in this unlikely terrain?
As suggested by the above discussion panel, the momentum
Neisser (1976) saw at the expense of human nature kept rising
for a few more years (Rumelhart, 1975, 1976; Anderson, 1977;
Rumelhart and Ortony, 1977; Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977;
Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977; Anderson et al., 1978; Brewer
and Lichtenstein, 1981; Brewer and Nakamura, 1984; Brewer,
2000). Then, it faced stiff resistance from supporters of human
cognition (Black and Wilensky, 1979; Iran-Nejad, 1980/1987;
Thorndyke and Yekovich, 1980; Iran-Nejad et al., 1981/1984;
Alba and Hasher, 1983; Beers, 1987). During this transition
period, many authors worked on connectionist, computational,
and spreading-activation networks or similar metaphors that
honored, in the words of Beers (1987), “the major tenets of
schema theory by making them conform more clearly to an
explicitly ecological perspective relating human understanding to
the environment—social and otherwise—in which it takes place”
(p. 376). Nevertheless, the reality of the human nature Neisser
(1967) had first abandoned and then sought (Neisser, 1976) went
his way neither time.
The Myths of Vegetative Organs and
Smart Connections
In the 1990s, the second generation of the science of cognition
arrived in a hurry; and, in a short decade or two, embodied
cognition swept the planet (Wilson, 2002; Adams, 2010), filling
rapidly the post-transition void for a new mainstream field of
cognition we own today. However, the unsystematic diversity
of these embodied cognition networks, as evident in the
titles and texts of the related literature reviews, must have
been overwhelming. For example, in characterizing this period,
Kiverstein (2012), among others (Wilson, 2002; Gärtner, 2011,
2013), asked exactly what researchers had in mind when they
claimed that cognition is embodied. He came back empty-
handed and described the diverse movement in terms of four
cold Es (embodied, embedded, extended, enacted) and one
hot A (affective). Incidentally, Kiverstein left out one more E
(expanded) to account for Clark’s (2008) Supersizing the mind
apparently by adding more body to the head and more head
to the body. Kiverstein traced the origin of the diverse field of
embodied cognition uniformly to the Embodied mind (Varela
et al., 1991) that “sought to bring about nothing short of a
paradigm change” (p. 741). Others suggested that the embodied
mind perspective may be a revolution away from the first
generation disembodied cognition as well as one from the
second generation embodied cognition, a view with which we
tend to agree (see Gärtner, 2013). Embodied cognition is. as
Kiverstein (2012) suggested, about how cold and hot cognitions
are embodied, how they are tacitly embedded in smart network
connections, how they extend storage to external media, and
how they enact downloads to the body and the world or
uploads back into the head and its supersized networks of smart
connections, all of which means knowledge is stored in smart
connections without at least for now a trace of D. S. Scott’s
comprehension, not to mention understanding. Embodied mind
researchers, by contrast, lean heavily in favor of the biofunctional
wisdom of the biological body to ground the contemplative
wisdom of the human conceptual understanding (Rosch, 2000,
2001) and find the mechanistic embodied cognition hard on the
palate.
Purpose
The focus of embodied cognition during the second generation
cognition continued to be on knowledge and never on
understanding. The overall concern of the present study is with
biofunctional understanding and in that special sense with the
embodied mind (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Posner et al., 1982;
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Shulman, 1991, 2002; Johnson, 2015). To be sure, understanding
was sought by embodied cognition researchers without the
inclination to say or pretension to know the word as they looked
for revolutions in expressions like symbol-grounding (Harnad,
1990), PDP connectionism (McClelland and Rumelhart, 1986;
Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986; Rumelhart et al., 1986) or deep
processing (Craik and Lockhart, 1972; Craik and Tulving, 1972).
A closer look at the work of embodied cognition pioneers in
neuroscience like Edelman (2006) and cognition such as Clark
(2008) revealed that they used the concept of understanding 51
and 71 times, respectively, but invariably in the instrumental
sense of the term for making sense of other things but never as
a construct under investigation in its own right—like knowledge.
Perhaps for these embodied cognition scientists, the best that the
vegetative body could do would be to save in its intelligent neural
networks its own content knowledge.
Understanding in the Transition Era
In the heat of the transition period, two lines of research in
cognitive psychology addressed understanding directly, both
rising, in part, to challenge the myth that knowers needed
abstract deep structures to reach the realm of understanding
(see, however, Shulman, 1984, 1999). One of these came in a
critique by Black and Wilensky (1979) of Rumelhart’s (1975)
first generation story grammar (Wilensky, 1983). Commenting
on Rumelhart’s pioneering claim that knowers had to employ
deep structures to understand stories, these researchers reasoned
that deep story structures presupposed rather than caused
understanding. The second line of research came in the
form of the biological embodiment of understanding and the
straightforward assumptions that understanding is the special
and unique function of the biofunctional wisdom in the nervous
system as the one and only direct, necessary, and sufficient
prerequisite for understanding, just as respiration was the
special function of the biological activity in the respiratory
system as the one and only direct, necessary, and sufficient
condition for breathing (Iran-Nejad, 1980/1987; Iran-Nejad
and Ortony, 1984; Iran-Nejad and Irannejad, 2017b). The
biofunctional view of understanding is that biological systems,
subsystems, and microsystems (i.e., neurons) take their turns to
be the immediate and direct production site for the intellectual
performance that their specialty prescribes. Therefore, far from
what is implied by the botanical metaphor of vegetative
organs often applied to them, the biological systems of the
body are miraculous contributing sources, each in its own
marvelously consensual way, to a very special type of wisdom
aptly, we believe, called biofunctional understanding (Johnson,
2015).
Embodying Understanding One
Metaphor at a Time with Both Hands
Tied in the Back
The transition era provided scarce ground for the kind
of evidence, theory, and methodology about biofunctional
understanding that is available worldwide today (e.g., Iran-Nejad,
2000; Ziemke et al., 2004; Borghi et al., 2013; Ghorbani et al.,
2014; Alverson, 2015; Jin et al., 2015, 2016; Johnson, 2015; Billing
et al., 2016; Caligiore et al., 2016; Soylu, 2016; Thill and Twomey,
2016). Therefore, early biofunctional theorizing had to scrape
for embodiment one metaphor at a time, just as one had to
struggle breathlessly against the downhill current of prestigious
metaphysical cognitive psychology (Iran-Nejad, 1980/1987; Iran-
Nejad and Irannejad, 2017b). Biological metaphors were shunned
vehemently and rejected out of hand by editors, reviewers, and
readers alike. Mechanical metaphors were more likely to be
allowed; but seldom grabbed attention in the metaphysical world
of cognition. Embodied metaphors like color-coded lightbulbs—
to represent dynamic diversity in unity and cohesive unity
in diversity—were used for distributed constellations of firing
neurons, blinking traffic arrows were used for their diverse-
content sensemaking behavior, and momentary constellation
firing was used to represent the multiple-source nature of the
dynamic sensemaking process (Iran-Nejad, 1980/1987, 1984;
Iran-Nejad et al., 1981/1984; Iran-Nejad and Ortony, 1984).
Nevertheless, the sharply vivid metaphors notwithstanding, the
experience was nothing less than swimming against a sharply
downhill current.
The vivid analogy of the manual camera was used to protect
biofunctional theory against the myth of saved prior knowledge—
in the form of deep structures or otherwise. The prior knowledge
hypothesis assumed that past knowledge is inevitable for new
learning to occur. The biofunctional theory explicitly disavowed
and abandoned this assumption and used the analogy of the
manual camera to show how understanding was possible without
saved prior knowledge (Iran-Nejad, 1980/1987). However, the
assumption of saved prior knowledge was so deeply entrenched
that it kept appearing in the reviews of embodied cognition
three decades later. Consider the title of the review by Gärtner
(2013): “Cognition, knowing and learning in the flesh: six views
on embodied knowing in organization studies.” This title strongly
implies that embodied cognition meant knowledge was saved
in the flesh of the body. In fact, the assumption of saved prior
knowledge, inevitable for metaphysical theories, is contrary to
both the letter and the spirit of biofunctional theory.
The analogy of the manual camera was desperately used in the
late 1970s to show that the saved prior knowledge assumption
was unnecessary for biofunctional theory (see below). To picture
external objects, a mechanical camera needed no internal
blueprints for them and, in fact, such blueprints and their
hegemonic character would get in the way of accommodating
the ubiquitous phenomena of cohesive unity in diversity and
productive diversity in unity. To picture a dog, a mechanical
camera needed to know neither a disembodied internal template
to match against the abstract shape of the dog, as assumed
by first-generation cognition, nor an embodied internal statue
to match against the body of the dog, as suggested by second
generation embodied cognition. To picture a dog, the mechanical
camera needed only its own physical hardware and no saved
prior knowledge at all. Dynamic biofunctional embodiment
of understanding was proposed to counter the theory of
embodiment as saved prior knowledge in the body or in the
head and to get rid of the assumption altogether. Neither the
mechanically crude wisdom in the manual camera nor the
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organically sophisticated wisdom in the biofunctional body were
the wisdom of saved prior knowledge. According to biofunctional
theory, biological flesh had the capacity to create knowledge on
demand but no capacity to save and retrieve it whatsoever. That
much must have been driven home for the proponents of the
saved prior knowledge theory in the 1970s because enough of
them rapidly packed their tools and abandoned their so-called
structural schema theories and began scrambling for replacement
alternatives (e.g., Rumelhart, 1980, 1984; Anderson, 1984).
The camera metaphor was also used in the late 1970s to bring a
second problem to the attention of the proponents of saved prior
knowledge, although the problem was directly aimed at deep-
structure story grammarians: prior knowledge structures were
shown to resist change and, as a result, they were more likely to be
doubly in the way of understanding than fostering it (Iran-Nejad,
1980/1987). This was illustrated using a surprise-ending story
by Thurmond (1978). The point made was that deep-structure
templates were static long-term memory patterns. Consequently,
they were stable to the point of allowing no change at all. This
was so especially in their embodied long-term memory form,
in which static embodied forms were as unchanging as statues
(Miller, 1978)—they were permanently inordinately stable. To
be sure, surprise-ending stories like Thurmond’s also needed the
benefit of inordinate stability; but to tolerate radical change, they
had to be, paradoxically, inordinately changeable at the same
time. Biofunctional systems allow the simultaneous capability of
inordinate stability and unrestrained flexibility because they can
readily create knowledge on demand. Miller (1978) illustrated
how dynamic systems do this using the analogy of the shape of
a fountain and contrasted it with the change-resistance capacity
of static structures like the statue (Iran-Nejad et al., 1981/1984).
The Thurmond (1978) story, for example, was about a nurse,
Marilyn. One late night in a large city, she leaves work at a
hospital, where she had recently attended to patients badly beaten
by a mugger in the area. Driving home on the freeway, she
notices that she is running out of gas and debates what to do.
Thinking about the mugger in the area and scared, she exits the
freeway heading toward the station where she knows the friendly
attendant, Gabriel. He fills, cleans the car windows, and when
she is about to leave, he insists that she goes inside the station
office first to see a birthday gift from his sister. She parks as he
signals and follows him inside. Once there, he turns around, locks
the door, and pulls a gun out of the drawer. Too frightened to
defend herself, she begins experiencing the symptoms of shock as
she watches him staring haggardly outside the window with lips
moving. Finally, she hears him saying “Sorry, I had to scare you
like that. I did not know what else to do when I saw that dude
hiding on the floor in the back of your car. I will call the cops
now.”
In this relatively organically sophisticated storyline, up until
the moment of surprise, readers entertain an inordinately
stable understanding. In this pre-surprise understanding, the
friendly Gabriel is seen as a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Then, at
the moment of surprise there is a dramatic, rapid-strike flip-
flop in understanding resulting in readers seeing Gabriel as a
Good Samaritan. Remarkably, the storyline causes two mutually
incompatible perspectives on one and the same exact text of
the story, one way of understanding immediately after another
with less than 2 s in between. Administering the rapid-strike
flip-flop takes dismissing one understanding and re-assigning
another to the relatively long text of the same story. This happens
spontaneously without having to go back to actively recall and
re-allocate attention to every word, phrase, and sentence of the
text all over again (Schallert, 1982; Iran-Nejad, 1986, 1989a,b,c).
If one were to assume tightly knit deep structures for every phrase
and sentence in the story (see Rumelhart, 1975), instantaneous
reorganizations like the one in the Thurmond story would be
difficult to imagine, let alone to explain and actively enact.
How did the manual camera play the metaphoric role
assigned to it out of desperation in the late 1970 to shed light
on this storyline? Clearly, as demonstrated then in the form
of a challenge to deep-structure story grammarians, adding
the long-winded prior knowledge vernacular could do very
little than being in the way. Without the prior knowledge
vernacular, the metaphoric role of the manual camera was rather
straightforward. In the absence of pre-existing frames, it would
simply take a well-built manual camera in the hands of a life-
long photographer with flawless professional artistry to rapid-
snap in immediate consecution two pictures of a single scene
from two different angles. This would not make a perfectly tight
metaphor for replicating the manner and nature of biofunctional
embodiment of understanding but would be close enough of an
approximation to show that no saved prior knowledge would be
necessary and any would be in the way.
Knower Control Processes1
It takes two corequisite sets of control processes to explain
the manner of the biofunctional embodiment of understanding
without resorting to any saved prior knowledge and do
so over and beyond what was said above in the context
of the manual camera metaphor (Iran-Nejad, 1990; Iran-
Nejad and Chissom, 1992; Iran-Nejad et al., 1992), including
the rapid-strike feats of multiple-source understanding (Iran-
Nejad, 1986, 1989c) and enjoying (Diener and Iran-Nejad,
1986; Iran-Nejad, 1987; Iran-Nejad and Cecil, 1992) the likes
of the Thurmond (1978) surprise-ending story (Iran-Nejad,
1983a,b). The first set, prerequisite for the second, includes
processes like realization, recognition, revelation, hearing,
seeing, appreciating, grasping, getting, understanding, clicking,
apprehending, insight, and the like. Members of this set
are knowthat, as opposed to knowhow, processes (Bransford
and Schwartz, 1999); they rise spontaneously as a function
of the immediate ground of multiple-source biofunctional
understanding by the key process of biofunctional knowing
by revelation, as opposed to by recall; they are called simply
biofunctional understanding (BU) processes because they are
caused by the immediate flow of ongoing biofunctional activity;
1 The theme of this article hinges around the role of the intellectual capacity of
knowing in conceptual control. Accordingly, it is deemed advisable for the sake
of wholetheme cohesion to use derivatives like knower over the more ambiguous
learner, knowhow over the less concise “knowing how,” and knowthat over the less
uniform and, for the time being, more standard “knowing that.” Therefore, knower
is used here interchangeably with the “active I,” knowthat with declarative content,
and knowhow with procedural content.
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and they present themselves to the unwary knower, unbeckoned
and in an after-the-fact manner, all with the extraordinary but
characteristic click of unmistakably understanding, albeit, at
varying degrees of strikingness or surprise (Iran-Nejad, 2000;
Prawat, 2000). These processes assume no saved prior or any
other kind of knowledge; it is to these processes that, in part,
the immediate analogy of the manual camera applies; and it is
these processes that are the pure wisdom operators of the physical
intellectual capacity of biofunctional understanding. The second
set, post-requisite to the first, includes thinking, concentration,
contemplation, meditation, prediction, foresight, hindsight,
elaboration, application, evaluation, observing, listening, looking,
and so forth. These processes are the source and operators of
conceptual understanding (CU); they represent the key process of
understanding fresh realizations further by reflection; they make
up the wisdom of the intellectual capacity of knowing on demand;
and they are dependent for their operation on the “active I”
process—the third and only other source of contribution to the
Iran-Nejad wholetheme spiral of biofunctional understanding
and critical thinking (Iran-Nejad, 1978, 2000; Iran-Nejad and
Gregg, 2001; Iran-Nejad and Irannejad, 2017a,b). Finally,
it is this latter set of processes that links the embodied
mind and biofunctional theories supportively and turns into
oxymorons the theories of embodied cognition and biofunctional
understanding. The two sets of understanding processes function
differently, albeit complementarily, in the spiral of biofunctional
understanding (Iran-Nejad and Irannejad, 2017b).
The BU and CU processes differ in the manner they relate
to spontaneous systemic control relative to the third process—
the active I” or the person of the knower. BU processes
sharpen the ground for cohesion sensing (e.g., spontaneous
curiosity) and CU processes serve the cause of cohesion seeking
(e.g., active questioning) on the part of the agent or the
person of the knower in an overall physical system of diverse
subsystems and microsystems (Caligiore et al., 2017). More
specifically, CU processes like thinking and reflection may be
described as cohesion seeking attention-allocation processes; BU
processes such as realization and grasping may be described
as cohesion-sensing. Substantial direct and indirect evidence
suggests that embodied systems may contribute to understanding
as long as the knower uses available “knowthat” content to
keep the cohesion-seeking cursor of attention-allocation going
on embodied systems as a necessary but insufficient condition
for the CU set of control processes to play their role (Iran-
Nejad and Irannejad, 2017b). The other necessary condition
for CU processes is to serve as the corequisite knowhow for
enabling systematic cohesion-seeking on the part of the knower.
Accordingly, cohesion-sensing and cohesion-seeking make up
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the person of the
knower to stay actively involved in attention-allocation to
embodied systems thereby combining the contributions of the
available (a) declarative content and (b) procedural content.
In short, CU is something the knower must (a) knowthat
the knower does to keep the cursor of attention-allocation
going on fresh revelations caused by embodied systems and (b)
the knower must also knowhow to do the same; and do so
systematically.
Thus, BU and CU control processes work corequisitely.
The BU processes have to do with the contributions of
the spontaneous cohesion sensing ground of the intellectual
capacity of biofunctional understanding. This is the spontaneous
wisdom of the cohesion sensing intellectual capacity of the
physical biology. By contrast, the CU processes represent the
deliberate wisdom of the cohesion-seeking intellectual capacity
of metaphysical knowing. Knowers may deliberately allocate
attention to the clicks of understanding coming in the form of,
e.g., realizations. They may do so by means of the knowthat
revelation content delivered in those realizations, using the
knowthat content to allocate attention to the ongoing flow of
cohesion, doing whatever it is supposed to be spontaneously
doing, e.g., causing clicks of BU. However, the knower must
also know (e.g., in order to avoid wild-goose chases after
non-existent, unnecessary, irrelevant, or even superstitious
knowhows), paradoxically, that the knower does not have to
have the knowhow. Here, understanding as cohesion-sensing
must come from the corequisite relation between two types
of knowledge. In this case, in some very fundamental way,
cohesion-seeking works with cohesion-sensing biofunctional
understanding in a manner like “fishing” sense or meaning out
of ongoing biofunctional activity without, paradoxically, even
knowing how to fish but waiting patiently for the fish to surprise
by jumping into one’s lap.
The Old and the New in the Long Story
Made Short
The long story made short so far in this introduction (Iran-
Nejad, 1978, 2000; Prawat, 2000; Johnson, 2015) tells something
radically, if not paradoxically, new about something intuitively,
if not otherwise, old. Biology is the spontaneous systemic source
of the wisdom we have always known and called understanding.
As a whole, this idea is, in part, radically new because it
lifts dramatically in our minds the biofunctionally alive, well,
and still running biological system from the status of the
vegetative organ it has always unfairly, if not unethically,
held to the new status of the wisdom source it is expectedly
going to hold from here on. As a whole, the idea is, in
part, old because it now holds inside something we have
always known, namely, the intellectual wisdom capacity we call
understanding.
For the sake of experimental biofunctional science, and while
we are on the topic of something new and something old, the
next BU and CU examples assume that the biofunctional process
of understanding works analogously to the biofunctional process
of salivation, housing some of the oldest and widely recognized
and used variables in the experimental-science paradigm of
Pavlovian classical conditioning. Conceptually, as in both CU
and BU, we knowthat we salivate but, unlike in CU, we also
knowthat, paradoxically, the biofunctional process of salivation
is not something within the reasonable realm of our conceptual
knowhow. We know that we get a steady stream of saliva in our
mouths because we sense its post-production presence (i.e., its
effect) in there; but we also know contently that getting saliva
in our mouth does not have to be within the realm of our
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conceptual doing. Unlike for CU, we are simply content and
thankful, so to speak, that it gets there; and we are untroubled
by the absence in our conceptual understanding of the “how”
of the biofunctional process that happens to make sure that
it is there as needed to play its vital corequisite role. The
fundamental working assumption of the biofunctional theory is
that biofunctional understanding occurs in an analogous manner.
Knowers know that they understand because they sense the
steady stream of its post-production understanding clicks at
varying degrees of strikingness; and their sense of conceptual
curiosity is ordinarily as unimpressed with the absence of the
“how” of biofunctional understanding as it is by the how
of biofunctional saliva production. If so, we predict that our
study participants should, at least in principle, tend to agree
intuitively, e.g., not only with the statement I know that I
salivate [biofunctionally] even though I myself do not really know
[conceptually] how to salivate but also analogously with the
statement I know that I understand people [biofunctionally] even
though I do not really know [conceptually] how to understand
people.
MATERIALS AND METHODS2
Purpose and Rationale
The present study tests the a priori prediction, derived from the
Iran-Nejad wholetheme spiral of biofunctional-understanding,
that CU and BU processes appeal differently in cohesion sensing
to knower control; and that CU and BU statements may be used,
with ample caution, to carry out the test. More specifically, the
CU statements contain both knowthat and knowhow content as
corequisites. By contrast, BU statements carry knowthat content
but the knowhow content is conspicuously absent in them.
Since the two types of statements (a) are identical in format,
(b) the format employed pits the declarative knowthat and the
procedural knowhow types of content against each other, (c)
both statements carry knowthat contents in them, and (d) the
knowhow content is absent only in the BU statements, therefore,
CU statements are expected to be rated in cohesion sensing as less
coherent than BU statements. We report two experiments next.
Experiment 1 tests our a priori prediction and Experiment 2 is
expected to replicate the results of the first experiment.
Design
We employed a one-way design with two levels of Statement as
a within-subjects factor. In two experiments, participants read
statements like the following for internal consistency, as response
2 It should be clear by now that knowthat, knowhow, and the like are special-status
variables in content knowledge. It is also clear that time and again investigators
have turned and returned to these variables; but treatments have seldom reached
beyond content per se (Ryle, 1949; Williams, 2008). In relatively recent years,
educational researchers have employed the factor of active control in learning
(Brown, 1975; Bransford and Schwartz, 1999) and conceptual understanding
(Shulman, 2002) as used in the present article (Iran-Nejad, 1990; Iran-Nejad and
Chissom, 1992). It is in the background of this research and the literature we
have reviewed in the introduction that we are presenting here what is, to our
knowledge, the first experimental study of the relationship between knowing and
understanding.
time was recorded. The two types of statements are otherwise
identical in format and other but not all respects; and they should
be relatively well-suited for this early-stage investigation.
(1) CU1 I know that I think about the topics I consider even
though I myself do not really know how to think about the
topics I consider (relatively more incoherent).
(2) BU1 I know that I understand the topics I consider even
though I myself do not really know how to understand the
topics I consider (relatively less incoherent).
(3) CU2 I know that I swallow my saliva from time to time even
though I myself do not really know how to swallow my saliva
from time to time (analogy: not used in the study).
(4) BU2 I know that I get a steady stream of saliva in my mouth
even though I myself do not really know how to get a steady
stream of saliva in my mouth (analogy: not used in the
study).
We used a survey comprising 22 BU and 22 CU statements.
Cronbach’s Alpha was 0.88 for BU statements and 0.90 for
CU statements. An additional CU example with both knowthat
and knowhow content present in it was CU3 I know that I
pay more attention to main ideas even though I myself do not
really know how to pay more attention to main ideas. Therefore,
this negative statement was expected to represent a false first-
person claim and be rated on the relatively lower end of the
internal consistency scale, compared to BU statements. For
this CU statement, the claim of phenomenological certainty in
knowing that one pays more attention to main ideas must carry
corresponding phenomenological certainty about the corequisite
knowing how to pay more attention to main ideas. As a result,
negating the knowhow is expected to conflict with the assertion
of the knowthat and cause inconsistency. Contrariwise, the
following BU example is expected to represent a true first-
person claim and be rated as relatively more internally consistent,
compared to CU statements: BU3 I know that I experience clicks
of understanding inside me every now and then even though I do
not really know myself how to experience clicks of understanding
inside me every now and then. This (true) statement was
predicted to be rated as more consistent than CU statements
in internal consistency. Knowing that one experiences clicks
of understanding has no corequisite knowhow for experiencing
those clicks because those clicks are the work of biofunctional
understanding
Participants
A total number of 34 students from the same graduate
Educational Psychology course in the College of Education
(21 women, 13 men; M age = 25, SD = 3.4) participated
one semester apart in two studies (N Fall semester: 17,
N Spring semester = 17) in exchange for course credit.
All students who were contacted volunteered to participate
and completed the survey with no missing values. A power
analysis, using the GPower software package (Faul and
Erdfelder, 1992), revealed that the sample size of 17 was
sufficient. The recommended effect sizes ranged between small
(f 2 = 0.02), medium (f 2 = 0.15), and large (f 2 = 0.35)
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(see Cohen, 1977) and the alpha level was P < 0.05. The analysis
showed that the statistical power was 1.00 which exceeded 0.99 for
the detection of strong (perfect) power at the large effect size level
(0.671). The purpose of the second experiment was to replicate
the first.
Procedure
The two sets of statements were presented to participants in
Qualtrics version 2013 available online at www.qualtrics.com.
The order of presentation was fully randomized. The instructions
informed the participants to rate the internal consistency of
each statement on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1
(not consistent at all), 2 (somehow consistent), 3 (consistent),
4 (very consistent), to 5 (extremely consistent). Participants
received the Qualtrics link to the study by e-mail. Clicking on
the link took the participants first to an IRB-approved informed
consent form followed by brief instructions with an example of
each type of statement. The participants rated the statements
as the program recorded the rating response time between key
presses.
Data Analysis
For the first analysis, two mean consistency rating (CR) scores
were calculated over the 22 items within each statement type to
obtain two mean scores, one for CU and one for BU statements
for each participant. Similarly, two mean character response
time (CRT) scores were calculated. First, for each participant,
the time in seconds to rate the consistency of each statement
was divided by the number of characters and spaces in that
statement to obtain a response time in seconds per character.
Then, a mean CRT was calculated across the 22 BU and the 22
CU items. Averaging across statements was deemed reasonable
because these items were presented to each participant in a
fully randomized order. The four means thus obtained for each
participant were used as dependent measures in subsequent
analyses. For each of the two studies reported, two one-way
repeated-measures ANOVAs were used, one for each of the
two dependent variables, with two levels of statement type (BU,
CU) as a within-subjects variable. Subsequently, a set of linear
mixed model (LMM) analyses were also conducted for both
studies to confirm the findings of the first analyses. According
to McCulloch and Searle (2000) for analyses such as repeated
measures of survey respondents, it is common for the data
to be correlated and thus, mixed models are used to extend
the repeated measure models in GLM. In the present study,
correlated data were possible, even though less-likely given
that statement items were presented to each subject in a fully
randomized order. Therefore, reporting the LMM results was
deemed appropriate.
RESULTS
Experiment 1
As predicted, participants rated CU statements significantly less
internally consistent than BU statements (see Figure 1, left
panel), F(1,16) = 25.643, P < 0.001, η2 = 0.616 (MBU = 2.55,
SD = 0.65; MCU = 1.58, SD = 0.66). Similarly, the results
of the analyses of the response time revealed that participants
responded significantly more slowly to CU than BU statements
(see Figure 2, left panel), F(1,16) = 7.53, P < 0.014, η2 = 0.32
(MCRT/BU = 0.0925, SD= 0.045; MCRT/CU = 0.2451, SD= 0.22).
Thus, the findings confirmed the a priori predictions of the study
about the presence/absence of corequisite content knowledge
differences in rated internal consistency and response time
between CU and BU statements. Follow-up LMM analyses
with fixed levels of statement type (CU, BU) and levels of
statement items (44) set to be random confirmed the results. For
consistency ratings, there was a significant effect for statement
type, F(1,725)= 47.319, P< 0.000. This effect was also significant
for response time, F(1,725)= 12.083, P < 0.001.
FIGURE 1 | Mean consistency rating for biofunctional understanding (BU) and
conceptual understanding (CU) statement types for Experiments 1 (blue) and
2 (red).
FIGURE 2 | Mean character response time (in seconds) for biofunctional
understanding (BU) and conceptual understanding (CU) statement types for
Experiments 1 (blue) and 2 (red).
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Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 supported the hypothesis that
the knower control processes for CU such as thinking and
contemplation are different from those for BU like realization
and revelation. Experiment 2 used the exact same methodology
as Experiment 1 for the purpose of replication. Data analysis
of the consistency rating (CR) scores confirmed the results of
the first study. Subjects rated the BU statements significantly
more internally consistent than CU statements (Figure 1, right
panel), F(1,16) = 29.65, P < 0.001, η2 = 0.679, MBU = 2.80,
SD= 0.85, MCU = 1.43, SD= 0.53. The results of the analyses of
the CRT scores revealed that there was also a significant difference
between participant responses to BU and CU statements
(Figure 2, right panel), F(1,16) = 8.626, P < 0.001, η2 = 0.381,
MCRT/BU = 0.0828, SD = 0.05188, MCRT/CU = 0.2964,
SD= 0.2717. Follow-up LMM analyses also confirmed the results
both for consistency ratings, F(1,725) = 18.012, P < 0.001 and
response time, F(1,725)= 11.208, P < 0.001.
Comparison of the left and right panels in the two Figures
shows that the results of Experiment 2 closely matched those
of Experiment 1. The two adjacent panels in each figure reveal
the same pattern of results for the two experiments. As already
said, all statements used the same exact format and normal
semantic content; and they all contained knowthat knowledge.
They differed, however, in the degree they did or did not carry
knowhow content. In both studies, as expected, CU statements
(that contained knowhow content) were rated as being more
internally inconsistent and showed slower response time relative
to BU statements that were characterizable by the relative absence
of conceptual how content.
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION, AND
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Knowledge Everywhere, and Not a Faint
Sign of Understanding Anywhere
Historically, knowing and understanding have been regarded as
one and the same intellectual capacity. As a result, studies of
understanding have been non-existent in the midst of widespread
investigations of knowledge. The default assumption has been
that today’s accumulation of basic scientific research on knowing,
aided by physical science’s brand of systematic observation,
is allowing us for the time being to separate the relevant
grains of fact from the irrelevant chaff of fiction in the realm
of knowing and will, in all likelihood, some day serve the
cause of tomorrow’s understanding. The most characteristic
attributes of this attitude in favor of knowledge at the expense
of understanding have been inordinate stability of thinking about
knowledge and resistance to change in favor of understanding. To
add one more example to the literature cited in the introduction,
Piaget’s developmental research has been all about knowledge
and none about understanding. For another different example,
Grimm (2006) acknowledged that every serious epistemologist
has denied the interchangeable relationship between knowing
and understanding, but then Grimm himself went on to make the
case again for the seductive idea that understanding is a species of
knowledge.
The present study sought evidence for the opposite
viewpoint—that knowing and understanding are different,
in fact mutually corequisite, and complementary intellectual
capacities; and they embody contrastively in their relative causes
and consequences. The goal of this article, as described in the
introduction, was to present the first original research study
of the two main sets of dynamic and active control processes
that integrate in relative cohesion the intellectual capacities
of knowing and understanding into a wholetheme spiral of
biofunctional understanding. Backed by evidence of the kind
obtained in the original research reported in this article, the
spiral promises to shed light on the historically dark ground
of uncertainty, both in theory and method, surrounding the
manner and nature of understanding. Given the transparent
outline of the spiral in the introduction as the intrinsic context
for the two sets of control processes targeted in the study, the
evidence from the experiments reported—the first of its kind
from where the non-existent state of the art in the experimental
science of understanding stands at this early stage in the
development of embodiment science—supported the a priori
predictions tested in one experiment and replicated in a second
experiment.
A Different Kind of Consideration
Perhaps the non-existent state of the art of the experimental
science of biofunctional understanding (ESBU) is ominously
symptomatic of something too different altogether to expect
from our existing state of the art in the experimental science
of knowing that is confined today to the “prison house” of
conceptual understanding (ESCU, see, e.g., Prawat, 2000; Iran-
Nejad and Irannejad, 2017a). In other words, the sacred run of
the mill in ESCU is something to which we have grown too
accustomed as a comfort zone, which makes it something too
frustrating to question. Nevertheless, question we must before
we may figure out that hitherto-inconceivable way that must
give us the new pair of feet for walking across the no man’s
land that Eleanor Rosch identified between today’s ESCU and
tomorrow’s ESBU. Intriguingly, as we have been trying to show
in this article, it is too simplistic to blame the bloom in ESCU
for the doom in ESBU; nor is it realistic to wish for the bloom of
ESBU to flourish in the doom of ESCU. The two-horn beast of
the challenge we are facing is analogous to presenting the future
scientists with the challenge of having their cake and eating it
as well. Remarkably, that is exactly what the wholetheme spiral
of biofunctional understanding promises us to be able to do.
If so the findings of the two experiments reported here may
represent, their limitations in the lights of both ESCU and ESBU
notwithstanding, a distant ray of light at the end of the dark
tunnel of the history of the intellectual capacity of understanding.
Therefore, before we take another step toward experimenting
with understanding, we must first take a good look at today’s
experimental science paradigm. In fact, this was the assumption
with which the present investigation began and, now having
completed the study for it, it might not be too farfetched a
conclusion to palate.
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Physical Science’s Guiding Principle of
Systematic Observation
The main problem with today’s experimental science is its
exclusive reliance for a guiding principle on the physical
science’s systematic observation. With this principle in
hand, we join Shulman (1999) to reminisce fondly with the
comforting simplicity of behavioral science and sadly with the
dismayingly unmanageable and possibly pseudo complexity
of cognitivism, as behavioral scientists had predicted and
cognitivists miscalculated. Of course, luckily today’s cognitive
science is an interdisciplinary science, which could include the
embodied science of biofunctional understanding. The real
problem with the experimental science of today is the extent of
its overreliance on its one and only guiding principle of sensory
observation based on two seductive assumptions, both of which
can be readily shown to be flawed. One assumption is that
sensory observation offers the most immediate window to the
so-called physically observable world. The second assumption
is that the sensory modalities have the widest and the most
immediate contact with the real world. In fact, it is possible to
show that it is the biofunctional modality that has the widest and
the most immediate contact with the real world, which includes
contact through the senses as well.
Systematic Observation and Analytic
Fact-Seeking
It may appear otherwise, but it may be fair to say, as
suggested by Shulman, that behavioral scientists successfully
transitioned psychology to science at the expense, fairly or not,
of conceptual understanding and other unobservable mental
states as overly subjective threats to the objective science of
the kind established according to the powerful physical-science’s
guiding principle of systematic observation. Later, cognitive
psychologists adopted the principle of hard and observable
external objects and, encouraged by the soft and immediately
unobservable nature of the computer program analogy (Neisser,
1967; Iran-Nejad and Winsler, 2000), generalized it to the
soft and unobservable internal representations of the hard and
observable external objects. According to the guiding principle
of systematic observation, the hard external-world and its soft
internal representation are, inherently or through the subjective
eyes of study participant beholders, shrouded in unsystematic
complexity. The goal of analytic science of cognition was
to simplify complexity of mental representations by isolating
observable facts in the form of declarative propositions, e.g.,
Mindfulness enhances critical thinking (Noone et al., 2016).
These propositions could, then, be framed into binary if-
question hypothesis testing, aimed at separating the significant
gold of true propositions, discarding the insignificant chaff
of false propositions, add the new truths in the form of
basic scientific knowledge to the previously stored wealth
of basic or pragmatically useful knowledge in external-media
(e.g., textbooks) or internal long-term memory stores (e.g.,
hierarchical semantic networks). Subsequently, these soft but
storable scientific (i.e., systematically-derived) facts might be
uploaded or downloaded for the purposes of replication,
generalization, and application. If we assume that knowledge
and understanding are one and the same intellectual species,
this is the tragic end of the story for human understanding.
In the realm of the fact seeking field of cognition, the
difference between the hard and the objective and the soft
and the subjective is stark but confounded, making conceptual
understanding abstract, subjective, and a bemuddling scientific
liability.
For many decades, interested investigators have puzzled
over the challenges that understanding-related factors such
as motivation and transfer present to the community of
experimental cognitive researchers. The reasons behind the
challenging state of the art have been diverse; but they
are all traceable to the study of cognition or knowledge in
isolation. Among these investigators are leading practitioners
like Bransford et al. (1977, 2000), Schön (1983), Bloom (1984),
Shulman (1986, 1999), McCombs (1991), Gardner and Boix-
Mansilla (1994), Willis (2000), and Salomon (2006). These
scholars of science and practice have keenly observed the problem
and its dismaying consequences in the trenches of the real world
of practice. Shulman (1999), for example, pointed out.
After I finished graduate school and first began teaching
the psychology of learning, I was confident that I really
understood what the process of learning entailed. However,
over the past 35 years, I have systematically studied learning
and understanding in many contexts, and I have taught many
courses on the subject. Alas, my understanding has now
become more complex, vague, and somewhat ambiguous.
Having voiced concerns like this, Shulman spoke of the
consequences as pathologies of which he named three: “we forget,
we don’t understand that we misunderstand, and we are unable
to use what we learned. I have dubbed these conditions amnesia,
fantasia, and inertia” (italics in original).
If we assume that factual knowledge and biofunctional
understanding are different, we enter the new realm of the hard
and unobservable biological systems and must deal with the
evidence of the kind reported in the present study in this new
light.
Biofunctional Science’s Guiding Principle
of Systematic Consensus in Systemic
Cohesion
The present study made use of participant subjective reports, a
methodological liability if viewed solely through the objective
fact-seeking lens of analytic cognition. As reviewed in the
introduction, a growing literature now embraces the theory that
the physical biology is a diverse—color-coded, so to speak—
source of special systemic functions (Iran-Nejad, 1980/1987).
Among these are the special systemic sources that support
the embodied-mind functions (Iran-Nejad and Ortony, 1984;
Iran-Nejad and Gregg, 2011; Borghi et al., 2013; Alverson,
2015; Jin et al., 2015, 2016; Scorolli and Borghi, 2015;
Caligiore et al., 2016; Thill and Twomey, 2016). Chief among
these functions are those having to do with the newly
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discovered idea that physical biology is the direct and immediate
source of the hitherto-neglected wisdom of the intellectual
capacity of biofunctional understanding that is the principle
contributor to the systemic spiral of biofunctional understanding.
Therefore, it is possible to show how human understanding
is, by virtue of its fundamentally consensual nature, uniquely
characterizable by systemic cohesion sensing, cohesion seeking,
and, thereby, systematic science-quality consensus-seeking.
Given this line of reasoning, the newly found direct
and immediate wisdom of biofunctional understanding frees
embodiment science from the confining prison house of
systematic fact-seeking observation (Iran-Nejad and Irannejad,
2017a). In this light, subjective data-gathering of the type done
in the present study is a methodological asset rather than
a subjective liability. Specifically, the spiral of biofunctional
understanding spontaneously delivers its extraordinary clicks
of understanding in systemic cohesion with affectively rich
revelations (Iran-Nejad, 1987). Subsequently, the “active I” may
use the knowthat results of the spontaneous revelations by
immediate means of direct systemic cohesion sensing and seeking
to engage in further conceptual understanding by reflection
(Iran-Nejad et al., 2015). Therefore, in the embodied flow of
the revelation-producing spiral of biofunctional understanding,
subjective sense-making and sense-reporting find a new,
indispensable, and unique methodological role to play (Iran-
Nejad and Irannejad, 2017b, p. 3). Thus, in the science of
biofunctional embodiment, the physical science’s principle of
systematic observation is a necessary but insufficient front
for science making. What is needed, in addition, is the
complementary guiding principle of systematic sensemaking
backed by systematic consensus making. It gets a bit long-
winded here to say given the available space, but it is in
the light of the unified function of this immediate and direct
(a) systemic cohesion sensemaking, (b) systematic consensual
sensemaking, with (c) potential backing from systematic science-
quality consensus-making that the methodology and the findings
of this study must be evaluated.
The finding of the difference between CU and BU supports
the idea that the paradox of the missing “how” of the (physical)
biofunctional understanding is real and within the grasp of
systemic cohesion sensing of study participants and systematic
consensus-seeking among professional scientists. There are
indications that exemplary scientists like Einstein and Pasteur
make systematic use of this spontaneous capacity for cohesion
in their science (Iran-Nejad, 2016). At the level of study
participants, compared to thinking, college students in the
present experiments seemed to be content not knowing how
to understand even though they knew, paradoxically, that they
did understand. An intriguing implication is that knowers at
all levels from naïve study participants to advanced scientists
may (be encouraged to) engage in systemic body-mind cohesion-
sensing as well as consensus-seeking (Caligiore et al., 2016).
Further supportive evidence has been reported in a semester-long
classroom intervention study in which undergraduate teacher
education students were encouraged to seek their own first-
person revelations and engage in writing to reflect on them
(Iran-Nejad et al., 2015). Therefore, there is hope for new
embodiment-science methodology (Caligiore et al., 2016; Iran-
Nejad and Irannejad, 2017a,b), that the physically hard and
forbidding black box of the physical body may have now
developed access windows for airing its infinite wisdom and
for the light of systemic cohesion-sensing to shine through as
directed by science-quality sources of systematic consensus.
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In this paper we outline a framework for the study of the mechanisms involved in
the engagement of human agents with cultural affordances. Our aim is to better
understand how culture and context interact with human biology to shape human
behavior, cognition, and experience. We attempt to integrate several related approaches
in the study of the embodied, cognitive, and affective substrates of sociality and
culture and the sociocultural scaffolding of experience. The integrative framework we
propose bridges cognitive and social sciences to provide (i) an expanded concept
of ‘affordance’ that extends to sociocultural forms of life, and (ii) a multilevel account
of the socioculturally scaffolded forms of affordance learning and the transmission of
affordances in patterned sociocultural practices and regimes of shared attention. This
framework provides an account of how cultural content and normative practices are built
on a foundation of contentless basic mental processes that acquire content through
immersive participation of the agent in social practices that regulate joint attention and
shared intentionality.
Keywords: affordances (ecological psychology), cultural affordances, radical embodied cognition, enactive
cognitive neuroscience, free-energy principle, predictive processing, regimes of attention, cognitive
anthropology
INTRODUCTION
The acquisition of culture is notoriously difficult to study. Over 70 years of research on the
development of person-perception, for example, have made it clear that children as young as
4 years of age have already acquired implicit biases about ethnicity and other socially constructed
categories of persons (Clark and Clark, 1939; Clark, 1963; Hirschfeld, 1996; Machery and Faucher,
2005; Aboud and Amato, 2008; Kelly et al., 2010; Huneman and Machery, 2015; Pauker et al., 2016).
These biases are consistent with the dominant culture of their societies, but are most often not
consciously held or explicitly taught by their caregivers and educators. While most young children
express a positive bias toward people they identify as members of their own group, children from
minority groups typically show preferences for dominant groups, rather than for persons of their
own ethnicity (Clark and Clark, 1939; Kinzler and Spelke, 2011). How such biases are acquired is
still an open question. Ethnographic studies of socialization, education, and language acquisition
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have pointed to broad cross-cultural variations in how children
are instructed, spoken to, expected to behave, involved in
community activities, and exposed to other socializing agents
beyond nuclear or extended families (Mead, 1975; Schieffelin
and Ochs, 1999; Rogoff, 2003). However, by age 5, children
across cultures have for the most part become proficient in
the dominant set of expectations and representations of their
cultures, despite the much discussed poverty of cultural stimuli
to which they are exposed (Chomsky, 1965). These matters point
to a human propensity for ‘picking up’ the broad scripts of culture
even without any explicit instruction. In other words, we all
come to acquire the shared background knowledge, conceptual
frameworks, and dominant values of our culture. The presence
of intuitive or implicit, yet stable and widely shared beliefs and
attitudes among children constitutes a challenging problem for
cognitive and social science.
In this paper, we outline a framework for the study of the
mechanisms that mediate the acquisition of cultural knowledge,
values, and practices in terms of perceptual and behavioral
affordances. Our aim is to better understand how culture and
context shape human behavior and experience by integrating
several related approaches in the study of the embodied,
cognitive, and affective substrates of action and the sociocultural
scaffolding of embodied experience. The integrative framework
we propose bridges cognitive and social sciences to provide (i)
an expanded concept of ‘affordance’ that extends to sociocultural
forms of life, and (ii) a multilevel account of the socioculturally
scaffolded forms of affordance learning and the transmission of
affordances in patterned sociocultural practices.
The context of the present discussion is the search for the
‘natural origins of content’ (Hutto and Satne, 2015). We hope
to contribute to the naturalistic account of the emergence of
semantic content, that is, of the evolution (in phylogeny) and
acquisition (in ontogeny) of representational or propositional
content. Cultural worlds seem to be full of meaningful ‘content’—
of explicit ways to think about and respond to the world in terms
of kinds of agents, actions, and salient events. ‘Content,’ here, is
defined in terms of representational relations with satisfaction
conditions: a vehicle x bears some semantic or representational
content y just in case there are satisfaction conditions which,
when they obtain, tell us that the vehicle is about something.
Semantics is an intensional notion (Millikan, 1984, 2004, 2005;
Haugeland, 1990; Piccinini, 2015). How do humans acquire this
cultural knowledge and capacity to respond in social contexts in
ways that actors and others find meaningful and appropriate?
We hypothesize that agents acquire semantic content through
their immersion in, and dynamic engagement with, feedback
or looping mechanisms that mediate shared intentionality and
shared attention. Semantic content, we suggest, is realized
in culturally shared expectations, which are embodied at
various levels (in brain networks, cultural artifacts, and
constructed environments) and are enacted in ‘regimes’ of shared
attention. We generalize contemporary ecological, affordance-
based models of cognitive systems adapting to their contexts over
ontogeny and phylogeny to account for the acquisition of cultural
meanings and for the elaborate scaffoldings constituted by
constructed, ‘designer’ niches (Hutchins, 2014; Kirchhoff, 2015a;
Clark, 2016). We suggest that ‘regimes of shared attention’—
that is, patterned cultural practices (Roepstorff et al., 2010)
that direct the attention of participant agents—modulate the
acquisition of culturally specific sets of expectations. Recent
work in computational neuroscience on predictive processing
provides a model of how cultural affordances could scaffold the
acquisition of socially shared representational content. In what
follows, we shall sketch a multilevel framework that links neural
computation, embodied experience, cultural affordances, and the
social distribution of representations.
We begin by specifying a conceptual framework for ‘cultural
affordances’, building on recent accounts of the notion of
affordances in ecological, enactivist, and radical embodied
cognitive science (Box 1). We propose to distinguish two kinds
of cultural affordances: ‘natural’ affordances and ‘conventional’
affordances. Natural affordances are possibilities for action, the
engagement with which depends on an organism or agent
exploiting or leveraging reliable correlations in its environment
with its set of abilities. For instance, given a human agent’s
bipedal phenotype and related ability to walk, an unpaved
road affords a trek. Conventional affordances are possibilities
for action, the engagement with which depends on agents’
skillfully leveraging explicit or implicit expectations, norms,
conventions, and cooperative social practices. Engagement with
these affordances requires that agents have the ability to
correctly infer (implicitly or explicitly) the culturally specific
sets of expectations in which they are immersed—expectations
about how to interpret other agents, and the symbolically and
linguistically mediated social world. Thus, a red light affords
stopping not merely because red lights correlate with stopping
behavior, but also because of shared (in this case, mostly
explicit) norms, conventions, and rules. Both kinds of cultural
affordances are relevant to understanding human social niches;
and both natural and conventional affordances may be socially
constructed, albeit in different ways (Hacking, 1999). Human
biology is cultural biology; culture has roots in human biological
capacities. The affordances with which human beings engage are
cultural affordances.
We then assess the tensions between our proposed framework
and radical enactivist and embodied approaches, which
are typically committed to forms of non- (or even anti-)
representationalism. On these views, perception, cognition,
and action need not involve computational or representational
resources. The scope of this claim varies. For some, this
entails a rejection of computational or representational
models and metaphors in the study of the mind—a staunch
commitment to anti-representationalism (Varela et al., 1991;
Gallagher, 2001, 2008; Thompson, 2007; Chemero, 2009).
More conciliatory positions instead suggest that basic cognitive
processes are without content, but accommodate a place for
contentful cognition. They claim that certain typically human
forms of cognition involve representations, in the sense that
human agents have the dispositions (mechanisms, behavioral
repertoires, etc.) that are required to immersively engage
with sociocultural content (e.g., patterned symbolic practices,
linguistic constructions, storytelling and narration). We argue
that contemporary computational neuroscience complements
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BOX 1 | Basic concepts of a framework for cultural affordances
Affordance: A relation between a feature or aspect of organisms’ material environment and an ability available in their form of life (Chemero, 2003, 2009; Bruineberg
and Rietveld, 2014; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014).
Landscape of affordances: The total ensemble of available affordances for a population in a given environment. This landscape corresponds to what evolutionary
theorists in biology and anthropology call a ‘niche’ (Rietveld, 2008a,c; Rietveld et al., 2013; Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014).
Field of affordances: Those affordances in the landscape with which the organism, as an autonomous individual agent, dynamically copes and intelligently adapts.
The field refers to those affordances that actually engage the individual organism because they are salient at a given time, as a function of the interests, concerns, and
states of the organism (Rietveld, 2008a,c; Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014).
Cultural affordance: The kind of affordance that humans encounter in the niches that they constitute. There are two kinds of cultural affordances: natural and
conventional affordances.
Natural affordance: Possibilities for action (i.e. affordances), the engagement with which depends on the exploitation or leveraging by an organism of ‘natural
information’, that is, reliable correlations in its environment, using its set of phenotypical and encultured abilities (roughly what Grice meant by ‘natural meaning’)
(Piccinini and Scarantino, 2011; Piccinini, 2015).
Conventional affordance: Possibilities for action, the engagement with which depends on agents’ skillfully leveraging explicit or implicit expectations, norms,
conventions, and cooperative social practices in their ability to correctly infer (implicitly or explicitly) the culturally specific sets of expectations of which they are
immersed. These are expectations about how to interpret other agents, and the symbolically and linguistically mediated social world (Scarantino and Piccinini, 2010;
Tomasello, 2014; Satne, 2015; Scarantino, 2015).
the more conciliatory of these approaches by providing minimal
neural-computational scaffolding for the skilled engagement of
organisms with the available affordances.
Having done this, we turn to affordances in social and
linguistic forms of life. We examine local ontologies, understood
as sets of shared expectations, as well as the complex feedback
relations (or looping effects) between these ontologies and human
modes of communication, shared intentionality, and shared
attention. Drawing on the skilled intentionality framework
(Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014), we examine the dynamics
of cultural affordance acquisition through patterned cultural
practices, notably attentional practices. We hypothesize that
feedback mechanism between patterned regimes of attention
and shared forms of intentionality (notably shared expectations
and immersion in local ontologies) leads to the acquisition of
such affordances. This framework can guide future research on
multilevel, recursive, nested cultural affordances and the social
norms and individual expectations on which they depend.
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR
AFFORDANCES
Much recent work in cognitive science has been influenced by
the notion of affordances originally introduced by Gibson (1986).
The interdisciplinary framework currently being developed to
study affordances provides us with a point of departure for
thinking about the evolution and acquisition of semantic,
representational content. The aim of this section is to clarify the
implications of adopting this framework.
Affordances are central to the emerging ‘enactivist’ and
‘radical embodied’ paradigms in cognitive neuroscience.
Theorists of enactive cognition model the intelligent adaptive
behavior of living cognitive systems as the dynamic constitution
of meaning and salience in rolling cycles of perception and
action, explicitly recognizing the emergence of meaning and
salience in the active, embodied engagement of organisms with
their environment (Di Paolo, 2005, 2009; Noë, 2005; Thompson,
2007; Froese and Di Paolo, 2011; Hutto and Myin, 2013; Di Paolo
and Thompson, 2014; Hutto and Satne, 2015; Kirchhoff, 2016).
Embodied approaches in cognitive science explain the feats
of intelligence displayed by cognitive systems by considering
the dependence of cognition on the various aspects of the
body as it engages with its environment, both internal and
external (Barsalou, 2008; Shapiro, 2010). ‘Radical embodied’
cognitive science extends the theoretical framework of ecological
psychology (Gibson, 1986) to the embodied cognition paradigm,
providing a phenomenologically plausible account of active,
dynamical coping (Thompson and Varela, 2001; Chemero, 2003,
2009; Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014; Rietveld and Kiverstein,
2014). Recently, the enactive, radical enactive, and radical
embodied approaches have been extended to ‘higher-order’
social and cultural systems (Froese and Di Paolo, 2011; Hutto
and Myin, 2013; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014). This latter
branch of enactivist theory will concern us especially.
Perspectives, Affordances, and
Phenomenology
One of the distinctive contributions of ecological, radical
embodied, and enactivist theories of cognition is their shared
emphasis on the point of the view of the organism itself,
understood as an intentional center of meaningful behavior.
The implication of these ‘perspectivist’ approaches in cognitive
science is that the world is disclosed as a set of ‘affordances,’ that
is, possibilities for action afforded to organisms by the things
and creatures that populate its environmental niche, as engaged
through their perceptual and sensorimotor abilities (Turvey et al.,
1981; Turvey, 1992; Reed, 1996; Heft, 2001; Silva et al., 2013; cf.
also Varela, 1999; Thompson, 2007). To paraphrase Wittgenstein,
the world is the totality of possibilities of action, not of things.
Perspectivist approaches in cognitive science operationalize this
view of the organism and propose an account of perception,
cognition, and action that is closer to the phenomenology of
everyday experience.
Affordances provide an alternative framework for thinking
about perception, cognition, and action that dissolves the strict
conceptual boundary between these categories in a way that is
closer to the phenomenology of everyday life1. This approach
1Enactive accounts reject the rigid separation of perception, cognition, and action,
emphasizing that organisms cope with their environment in rolling cycles of
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echoes the kernel insights of the phenomenology of Heidegger
(1927/1962) and Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012, 1964/1968) about
perception and action. Cognitive agents experience the world
perceptually through the mediation of action, as a function of
those actions that things in the world afford. For example, my cup
of coffee is not first perceived as having such and such properties
(size, shape, color), and only then as providing the opportunity
for sipping dark roast. Instead, my filled cup is directly perceived
as affording the action of sipping. Filled cups of coffee afford
sipping; a paved road affords walking; a red traffic light affords
stopping. The claim, then, is that cognitive agents typically do not
encounter the world that they inhabit as a ‘pre-given,’ objective,
action-neutral set of things and properties, to be reconstructed in
perception and cognition on the basis of sensory information, as
classical models in cognitive science once suggested (e.g., Fodor,
1975; Marr, 1982; Dawson, 2013). The things that we engage are
disclosed instead directly as opportunities for action—that is, as
affordances. As Heidegger (1927/1962) famously argued, it is only
when my smooth coping breaks down (say, when I run out of
coffee, or when the cup breaks) that the objective properties of
the cup become salient, present in perceptual experience at all.
The principal motivation for thinking of perception,
cognition, and action in terms of engagement with affordances
is that cognitive scientific accounts of these activities ought to
be coherent with the phenomenology of action and perception
in everyday life. Phenomenology tells us that there are dense
interrelations between action and perception, that perception is
mainly about the control of action, and that action serves to guide
perception (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012, 1964/1968). Affordances
provide a framework apt for this task, allowing us to integrate
phenomenological experience into our models of explanation in
cognitive science (Varela, 1996; Petitot et al., 1999). As the story
goes, in the wake of the behaviorist turn, experiential factors and
mentalist language were banished from psychology (Watson,
1913; Skinner, 2011). Cognitive science rehabilitated mentalism,
at least to some extent, in its postulation of cognitive states and
processes (Fodor, 1975; Putnam, 1975). Most contemporary
functionalist and mechanistic accounts of cognition, however,
contend that it is possible to exhaustively explain a cognitive
function by specifying its functional organization or the
mechanism that implements that function (e.g., Craver, 2007;
Bechtel, 2008). As we shall see presently, the perspectivist
emphasis on the dynamics of the phenomenology of everyday life
that characterizes enactive and ecological approaches allows us to
account for cognitive functions with a conceptual framework that
engagement in which the distinction between action, cognition, and perception
is blurred. When such a distinction is made, enactivist thinkers typically resist the
traditional picture that subordinates action to perception or cognition. Theorists
who draw the distinction nevertheless emphasize the deep connection between
perception, cognition, and action. There are good reasons to think that action is
a precondition for perception or that perception is a form of action (Clark, 2016;
Kirchhoff, 2016). As we shall see in Section “The Neurodynamics of Affordances,”
free-energy approaches frame perception and action as complementary ways of
minimizing ‘prediction error.’ Our preference is to speak of rolling cycles of
‘action-perception’ to refer to the complex looping process whereby organisms
cope with their environment. These cycles rely on various complementary
computational strategies to minimize prediction error, which may (or may not)
correspond to the traditional concepts of action, cognition, and perception.
explicitly bridges the phenomenology of action and perception,
system dynamics, and functionalist cognitive neuroscience.
Landscapes and Fields
Affordances, as possibilities for action, are fundamentally
interactional. Their existence depends both on the objective
material features of the environment and on the abilities of
different kinds of organisms. This dependence on interaction
does not mean that affordances have no objective reality
or generalizability (Chemero, 2003, 2009). Affordances exist
independently of specific individual organisms. Their existence
is relative to sets of abilities available to certain kinds of
organisms in a given niche. ‘Abilities,’ here, refers to organisms’
or agents’ capabilities to skillfully engage the environment, that
is, to adaptively modulate its patterns of action-perception to
couple adaptively to the environment. Without certain abilities,
correlative opportunities for action are unavailable. Certain
chimpanzees, for instance, are able to use rocks to cracks nuts.
But for nuts and rocks to afford cracking, the chimp must already
be cognitively and physiologically equipped for nut-cracking. In
Chemero’s model of affordances, objectivity and subjectivity do
not have separate ontological status; they co-exist and co-emerge
relationally.
Building on Chemero (2003, 2009) and Rietveld and
Kiverstein (2014) define an affordance as a relation between
a feature or aspect of organisms’ material environment and
ability available in their form of life. ‘Form of life’ is a notion
adapted from the later Wittgenstein (1953). A form of life is
a set of behavioral patterns, relatively robust on socio-cultural
or biographical time scales, which is characteristic of a group
or population. We might say that each species (or subspecies),
adapted as it is to a particular niche and endowed with specific
adapted abilities, constitutes a unique form of life. Different
human communities, societies, and cultures, with sometimes
strikingly different styles of engagement with the material and
social world, constitute different forms of life. There are thus at
least two ways to change the affordances available to an organism:
(i) by changing the material aspects of its environment (which
may vary from small everyday changes in its architecture or
configuration to thoroughgoing niche construction) and (ii) by
altering its form of life or allowing it to learn new abilities already
available in that form of life (interacting in new ways with an
existing niche by acquiring new abilities through various forms
of learning).
Following recent theorizing on affordances (Rietveld, 2008a,c;
Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014), we
consider the distinction between the ‘landscape’ of affordances
and the ‘field’ of relevant affordances. The claim is that, typically,
organisms do not engage with one single affordance at a given
time. The world we inhabit is instead disclosed as a matrix
of differentially salient affordances with their own structure or
configuration. The organism encounters the world that it inhabits
as an ensemble of affordances, with which it dynamically copes
and which it evaluates, often implicitly and automatically, for
relevance. For an affordance to have ‘relevance’ here means
that the affordance in question ‘solicits’ the individual, concrete
organism by beckoning certain forms of perceptual-emotional
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appraisal and readiness to act. This occurs because affordances
are both descriptive and prescriptive: descriptive because they
constitute the privileged mode for the perceptual disclosure of
aspects of the environment; and prescriptive because they specify
the kinds of action and perception that are available, situationally
appropriate and, in the case of social niches, expected by others.
The ‘landscape’ of affordances is the total ensemble of
available affordances for a population in a given environment.
This landscape corresponds to what evolutionary theorists in
biology and anthropology call a ‘niche’ (Odling-Smee et al., 2003;
Sterelny, 2007, 2015; Wilson and Clark, 2009; Fuentes, 2014).
A niche is a position in an ecosystem that affords an organism the
resources it needs to survive. At the same time, the niche plays
a role vis-à-vis other organisms and their niches in constituting
the ecosystem as a whole. A typical ecosystem (that is, a physical
environment where organisms can live) has multiple niches,
which have some degree internal structure: affordances have a
variety of dynamics relationships (one thing leads to another,
depends on, reveals, hides, enables, other possibilities for action;
Pezzulo and Cisek, 2016). Thus, the niche is the entire set of
affordances that are available, in a given environment at a given
time, to organisms that take part in a given form of life. More
narrowly, a niche comprises the affordances available to the group
of organisms that occupy a particular place in the ecosystem—
or, in the case of humans, the social world—associated with (and
partly constituted by) a form of life.
The ‘field’ of affordances, on the other hand, relates to
the dynamic coping and intelligent adaptivity of autonomous,
individual organisms. The field refers to those affordances that
actually engage the individual organism at a given time. Of
those affordances available in the landscape, some take on
special relevance as a function of the interests, concerns, and
states of the organism. These relevant affordances constitute the
field of affordances for each organism. They are experienced
as ‘solicitations,’ in that they solicit (further) affective appraisal
and thereby prompt patterns of ‘action readiness,’ that is, act as
perceptual and affective prompts for the organism to act on the
affordance (Frijda, 1986, 2007; De Haan et al., 2013; Rietveld et al.,
2013). This engagement will vary in complexity, conformity, and
creativity from pre-specified or pre-patterned ways of acting to
“free” improvisation, as we shall see below2.
The field of affordances changes through cycles of perception
and action. Changes in the situation that the organism engages
give rise dynamically to different solicitations, as a function of
the state of the organism, much the way a physical gauge field
gives rise to different potentials as a function of the local forces
(Sengupta et al., 2016). Consider the action of drinking a cup of
2Some might express unease at the mixed language we use, which straddles
phenomenology, system dynamics, and cognitive functions. We take this as a
virtue of the multilevel nature of the explanatory framework provided by the
notion of affordances, which is operative at all of these different descriptive levels.
Readers who would prefer to keep phenomenological description distinct from
other explanatory levels (i.e., neural, social, cultural levels of explanation) can
replace our talk of directly modulating the landscape or field of affordances with
a more phenomenologically neutral concept, such as the organism’s ‘selective
openness’ (Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014). With this terminology, we might say
that changes in the patterns of activity in the organism (states, interests, etc.) and
the environment shape the organism’s selective openness to saliencies.
coffee. The filled cup affords a gradient (grasping, sipping), that
is, a potential for coupled engagement. When generated by the
organism-environment system, this gradient can be experienced
by the organism as a solicitation. The gradient is dissipated
through engagement. The experience of satiation that follows
drinking, combined with the fact that cup has been emptied,
alter the field of affordances, which as indicated changes as a
function of the states of organism and niche. Thus, the gradient
is ‘consumed’ or dissipates after successful engagement.
Meaning and Affordances
Not all affordances are of the same kind. Here we draw on Grice’s
theory of meaning to suggest an approach to the varieties of
cultural affordances in terms of their dependence on content-
involving conventions. We argue that the affordances in human
niches (what we call generally ‘cultural’ affordances) are of two
distinct kinds: ‘natural’ and ‘conventional’ affordances.
Grice’s theory of meaning, elaborated in a series of papers
in the philosophy of mind (Grice, 1957, 1969, 1971, 1989), and
later refined by Sperber and Wilson (1986), Levinson (2000), and
Tomasello (2014), is often termed ‘intention-based semantics’, or
‘implicature.’ On a Grician account, meaning lies in a speaker’s
communicative intent; that is, in what she intends to convey
through an utterance. Grice elaborated the first formula of his
theory of meaning in these terms (using the subscript NN to
signify to ‘non-natural’):
“A meantNN something by X” is roughly equivalent to “A uttered
X with the intention of inducing a belief by means of the
recognition of this intention” (Grice, 1989, p. 19)
Taking this model beyond the dyadic sphere of conversational
implicature, Grice later attempted to explain how “timeless” (that
is to say, durable and widely shared) conventions of meaning are
recognized in a shared cultural repertoire:
“x meansNN (timeless) that so-and-so” might at a first shot
be equated with some statement or disjunction of statements
about what “people” (vague) intend (with qualifications about
“recognition”) to effect by x (Grice, 1989, p. 220)
In the subsequent ‘relevance’ account, Sperber and Wilson
(1986) translated this automatic ‘first shot’ recognition of
conventional meaning as one in which human minds scan for
salient, meaning-generating cues in the environment, and stop
processing when the cues are secured.
Our model draws on Grice to describe the stabilization of
cultural cues as affordances. Key to our approach is the implied
ontological and epistemic status of other minds (that is, the
intentions of ‘persons’) in the embodied cognitive work required
in the ‘recognition,’ or more precisely, the enactment of meaning.
Our proposal, then, is to follow Grice in understanding the
thought, affect, and behavior of human agents as determined by
implicit expectations about others’ expectations. Specifically, we
argue that humans behave according to the way they expect others
to expect them to behave in a given situation (see Figure 1)3. As
3This basic cognitive formula for sociality requires three orders of automatic
intentionality; that it is to say, an implicit, non-narrative, hypothesis-generating,
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FIGURE 1 | Basic cognitive formula: three orders of automatic intentionality.
we shall explicate below, we contend that humans operate (often
pre-reflectively) within the landscape and field of possibilities for
variations in action4 as a function of their expectations about
what others expect of them in specific contexts (see Figure 2).
The importance of these revisions to Grice’s model of
meaning to our framework for cultural affordances is to
highlight the dependence of certain kinds of affordances on joint
intentionality, and effective social and cultural normativity and
conventionality, or equivalently, the shared expectations (both
implicit and explicit) that codetermine the affordance landscape
and local field dynamics. Grice (1957) distinguished between
error-reduction scenario of the “I think they think I think” variety that can be
translated as “what would relevant others expect me to think/feel/do in this
situation?”
4The notion of variation and improvisation in action within a convention is very
important. Humans do not simply obey prescribed expectations, but also resist,
transgress and transform them. Specific fields of joint-intentional affordances, thus,
invariably entail different licenses for improvisation on expected behavior. The
background formula for action is not simply “what would others expect me to do
here?” but also “how much license or room to improvise do I have here given what
the set of local cues tells me about others’ expectations and the norms that should
otherwise govern my behavior in this specific situation?”
natural and non-natural forms of meaning, emphasizing the
latter in most of his work. Natural meaning is a relation between
two things that are correlated. Smoke ‘means’ fire because tokens
of smoke reliably correlate with tokens of fire. Similarly, (certain
kinds of) spots mean measles (understood not as the popular
category but as the biomedically recognized infection with a
particular virus). Non-natural meaning instead depends on the
capacity of individual agents to exploit explicit and implicit
social ‘conventions’ (in the wide sense of locally shared norms,
values and moral frames, expectations, ontologies, etc.) to infer
the intentional states of other agents and thereby engage them
or engage aspects of the environment with them. Red traffic
lights, in virtue of convention (and law), ‘mean’ stop, and hence
afford (and mandate) stopping—and this is made possible by the
specifically human mastery of recursive inferences, both explicit
and implicit, that agents make about other agents (Tomasello,
2014).
Recent work on information processing has extended Grice’s
framework to account for different kinds of information
(Scarantino and Piccinini, 2010; Piccinini and Scarantino, 2011;
Piccinini, 2015). A token informational vehicle x of kind X
FIGURE 2 | Full cognitive formula: three orders of intentionality governing improvisational variations in action.
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(that is, a sign, a pattern of neural activation, or what have
you) carries ‘natural information’ about some information
source y of kind Y just in case there are reliable correlations
between X and Y. Natural information, in other words, cannot
misrepresent, for it is non-semantic; it is not the kind of
thing that can be simply true or false. Such information can
be exploited and leveraged by a cognitive system to guide
intelligent behavior. Conversely, ‘non-natural information’ (or
as we prefer to put it, ‘conventional information’), pertains
to semantic, content-involving representations that depend on
social norms and cultural background knowledge. Non-natural
information allows an agent to make a correct inference about
some aspect of an intentional system, e.g., other agents, language
and other symbolic systems such as mathematics, etc. Non-
natural information is semantic in that it obtains in virtue of
satisfaction conditions (e.g., truth conditions). A vehicle carries
this kind of information about some state of affairs just in
case some (explicit or implicit) shared convention, in the sense
outlined above, links a vehicle to what it represents.
In the psychological and anthropological literature,
affordances are usually understood as interactional properties
between organisms and their environment that can be
individually discovered in ontogeny without social learning.
Chimpanzees, for example, rediscover how to crack nuts with
rocks in each generation without vertical social transmission of
skills (Ingold, 2000, 2001; Howes, 2011; Moore, 2013). Most of
what humans do, in contrast, is learned socially and requires
complex forms of coordination. We suggest, however, that
successfully learned human conventions that govern action
are also best conceptualized as affordances. Such affordances
depend on shared sets of expectations, reflected in the ability
to engage immersively in patterned cultural practices, which
reference, depend on, or enact folk ontologies, moralities and
epistemologies. We might call these ‘conventional’ affordances.
An empty street affords being walked on or driven on to
the lone pedestrian or driver. Yet affordances, especially those
depending on conventions, might differ depending on context.
A red traffic light, as we have seen, affords an agent stopping,
particularly in the presence of others, and especially in the
presence (real or imagined) of police who are expecting to
intervene. But a driver might alter her behavior as a result
of not being seen by others. A red traffic light in an empty
street at 4:00 AM, thus, might afford transgression of the
stopping rule following an inference about the absence of other
minds likely to judge the agent. Departing from Grice and
earlier theories of information processing (Dretske, 1995), one
might understand the notion of information as probabilistic:
to carry information implies only the truth of a probabilistic
claim (Scarantino and Piccinini, 2010; Scarantino, 2015).
Although this account was developed for natural information,
we extend it here to conventional information, given the
prominence of social improvisation. ‘Conventions’ need not be
explicitly formulated as rules, and may instead originate in the
actors’ engagement with local backgrounds over time that is,
from non-contentful developmental experiences, learning, or
participation in social and cultural practices (Piccinini, 2015;
Satne, 2015).
A cultural artifact may have multiple affordances according
to its embedding in larger webs of relationships that are part
of the individual’s history of learning and the expectations
for the potential participation of others. Indeed, to operate
with conventional affordances, agents must have shared sets of
expectations—we must know what others expect us to expect.
Simple rule-governed models of sociality go on the
assumption that conventions lead to stable, binary affordances,
where satisfaction conditions are either met or not. However,
cultural symbols and signs are usually polysemous and their
interpretation depends on context. Moreover, variations in the
way agents engage with affordances in practice, often license what
we could term ‘skilled improvisation.’ Rules and conventions
can be followed slavishly, selectively ignored, deliberately
transgressed, or re-interpreted to afford new possibilities. Natural
dispositions for shared intentionality in what Searle (1991,
1992, 1995, 2010) calls the deep background, on this view,
give rise to cooperative action not only through convention
but also through iterative variations governed by modes of
engagement with cultural affordances (Terrone and Tagliafico,
2014).
THE NEURODYNAMICS OF
AFFORDANCES
Some aspects of culture clearly involve content in the
improvisational sense of the term: namely, those affordances
that depend on conventions, social normativity, and the ability
to improvise from a joint-intentional background enriched by
cultural learning. Here, we aim to contribute to the effort to
explicate the mechanisms by which basic minds are scaffolded
into more elaborate content-involving processes. To explain
agents’ engagement with contentful affordances requires a theory
of cultural content and representations.
Our hypothesis, to be explicated below, is that feedback loops
mediating shared attention and shared intentionality are the
principal mechanism whereby cultural (especially conventional)
affordances are acquired. Before proceeding, however, we must
face an objection stemming from tensions between our enactivist-
embodied-ecological framework and our aim of providing
a theory for the acquisition of semantic content. We have
suggested that conventional affordances depend on shared
expectations, perspective-taking, and even mindreading abilities.
However, proponents of radical embodiment and enactivism
argue that cognition can be understood as the coupling of an
organism to its niche through dynamical processes, without
any need to invoke representational processes and resources
like explicit expectations and mindreading (Varela et al., 1991;
Gallagher, 2001, 2008; Thompson, 2007; Chemero, 2009). On
these accounts, classical theories of cognition (Fodor, 1975;
Marr, 1982), which modeled cognition as the rule-governed
manipulation of internal representations, radically misconstrue
the nature of agents’ intentional engagement with their worlds.
The claim, then, is that much cognition can (indeed, must)
be explained by appealing only to dynamical coupling between
organism and environment.
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Rejecting the claim that cognition necessarily involves
representations, radical enactivists insist that basic cognitive
processes (‘basic minds’) can function entirely without content
(Thompson, 2007; Hutto and Myin, 2013). The argument,
then, is that minds, especially basic minds like those of
simple organisms (and many of the unreflective embodied
engagements of more complex minds), do not require content.
They only require adequate forms of coupling, which need
bear no content at all. Adequate coupling only requires an
organism to leverage correlations that are reliable enough
to be exploited for survival. This poses a challenge to a
theory like ours, which aims to explicate the acquisition
of cultural content in the form of conventional affordances.
In this section, we accommodate this radical minimalism
about representations and semantic content while sketching
a neural computational account of the scaffolding of cultural
affordances.
Computation, Representation, and
Minimal Neural Models
Recent work on computation and neurodynamics helps to
clarify the scope of radical arguments against content-involving,
representational theories of cognition. Although older semantic
theories view computation as the processing of representations
(with propositional content and satisfaction conditions) more
recent theories do not make this assumption. The ‘modeling view’
of computation (Grush, 2001; Shagrir, 2006, 2010; Chirimuuta,
2014) suggests that computation in physical systems (calculators,
digital and analog computers, neural networks) employs a
special kind of minimal, structural or analogical model based
on statistical correlations (O’Brien and Opie, 2004, 2009, 2015).
On this view, a computational process is one that dynamically
generates and uses a statistical model of a target domain (say,
things in the visual field). The model is said to ‘represent’
that domain only in the sense that the relations between its
computational vehicles (digits, neural activation patterns, or
what have you) preserve the higher-order statistical, structural-
relational properties of the target domain, which can be leveraged
to guide adaptive action. We might call this ‘weak’ (non-
propositional) content, based on structural analogy between
vehicle and target domain (O’Brien and Opie, 2004, 2009,
2015). Such statistical models are much more minimalistic than
traditional representational theories of mind, which require
that internal representations bear propositional content (Fodor,
1975). Even more minimalistic accounts of computation are
available. Computation can be defined mechanistically, as the
rule-governed manipulation of computational (rather than
representational) vehicles (Milkowski, 2013; Piccinini, 2015).
On the mechanistic account, computations (digital, analog,
neural) can occur without any form of semantic content
(Scarantino and Piccinini, 2010; Piccinini and Scarantino,
2011).
Thus, some of the newest theories of computation are
minimalistic about the representational nature of neural
processes. Whether the modeling-structural and the mechanistic
minimal statistical models deserve the label ‘representation’ is
debatable (Anderson and Chemero, 2013; Piccinini and Shagrir,
2014; Hutto, 2015; Clark, 2016). To some degree the conflict may
be merely terminological. What matters for our purposes is to
note that the minimalistic statistical-computational models in
the cognitive system can be leveraged to guide skilled intelligent,
context-sensitive, adaptive behavior. This provides additional
weight to the claim that basic minds are without strong,
propositional, semantic content (Hutto and Myin, 2013; Hutto
et al., 2014).
While this may be the case, human societies clearly transact
in content-laden representations. We use language replete with
images, metaphors and other symbols to tell stories and narrate
our lives. We imagine particular scenarios or events, and we
think about, describe, elaborate and manipulate these images or
models in ways that treat them as pictures or representations
of possible realities. Importantly, even on the radical view on
offer here, nothing precludes such content-involving cognition.
In recent discussions around the natural origins of content,
it is hypothesized that neural computations can come to
acquire representational content when coupled adequately to
a niche or milieu through dense histories of causal coupling
(Hutto and Myin, 2013; Hutto and Satne, 2015; Kirmayer and
Ramstead, 2016). We suggest that immersive involvement of
agents in patterned cultural practices during development, and
the subsequent practice of the abilities acquired in enculturation,
allows for the acquisition of stable cultural affordances. In the case
of human beings, whose learning is mostly social, the function
of the neural computations performed by a system becomes that
of interfacing adequately with both representational and non-
representational aspects of culture so as to guide appropriate
behavior.
Free-Energy and the Neurodynamics of
Affordances
The framework we think can account for the acquisition
of cultural affordances by agents rests on recent work in
computational neuroscience and theoretical biology on
the ‘free-energy principle.’ The free-energy principle is a
mathematical formulation of the tendency of autonomous
living systems to adaptively resist entropic disintegration
(Friston et al., 2006; Friston, 2010, 2012a, 2013a,b; Sengupta
et al., 2016). This disintegration can be thought of as the
natural tendency of all organized systems (which are by their
nature far-from-equilibrium systems) to dissipate, that is,
to return to a state of low organization and high entropy
or disorder—in other words, to return to (thermodynamic)
equilibrium. The free-energy principle states that the
dynamics of living organisms are organized to maintain
their existence by minimizing the information-theoretic quantity
‘variational free-energy.’ By minimizing free-energy, the
organism resists entropic dissipation and maintains itself in its
phenotypical steady-state, far from thermodynamic equilibrium
(death).
One application of the free-energy principle in computational
neuroscience is a family of models collectively referred to as
‘hierarchical predictive processing’ models, which instantiate
a more general view of the brain as a ‘prediction machine’
(Frith, 2007; Friston and Kiebel, 2009; Friston, 2010, 2011,
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2012b; Bar, 2011; Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2016; for empirical
evidence, see Adams et al., 2016). In this framework, the
brain is modeled as a complex dynamical system, the main
function of which is to ‘infer’ (in a qualified sense) the
distal causes of its sensory stimulation, starting only from
its own sensory channels. The strategy employed by the
brain, according to this view, is to use a ‘generative model’
of the distal causes and engage in self-prediction (Friston,
2010; Eliasmith, 2005). That is, the system’s function is
to predict the upcoming sensory state and compare it the
actual sensory state, while minimizing the difference between
these two distributions (predictions and prediction errors)
through ongoing modification of predictions or action on the
environment (see Figures 3 and 4).
‘Generative models’ are minimal statistical models, of the kind
discussed above. The use by a system of generative models need
not entail semantic content. Their function is to dynamically
extract and encode information about the distal environment as
sets of probability distributions. The information involved here
can be natural or conventional in kind. The only entailment
is that the system or organism must leverage its generative
model to guide skilled intentional coupling. The system uses this
generative model to guide adaptive and intelligent behavior by
‘inverting’ that model through Bayesian forms of (computational,
subpersonal) inference, allowing it to leverage the probability
distributions encoded in the model to determine the most
probable distal causes of that distribution and to act in the most
contextually appropriate way (Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2013; Clark,
2016).
FIGURE 3 | Hierarchical prediction error minimization frameworks. In
the predictive processing approach, the main activity of the nervous system is
to predict upcoming sensory states and minimize the discrepancy between
prediction and sensory states (‘prediction errors’). The information propagated
upward to higher levels for further processing consists only in these prediction
errors.
FIGURE 4 | A diagram of Bayesian inference in predictive processing
architectures. The dynamics of such systems conform to the principles of
the Bayesian statistical inference framework. The Bayesian statistical
framework is central to predictive processing architectures, for the latter
assume that neural network interactions operate in a way that maximizes
Bayesian model evidence. Bayesian methods allow one to calculate the
probability of an event taking place by combining the ‘prior probability’ of this
event (the probability that such an event takes place before considering any
evidence) with the ‘likelihood’ of that event, that is, the probability of that event
given some evidence. This allows the Bayesian system to calculate the
‘posterior probability’ of the event, that is, the revised probability given any
new available evidence. Prior probabilities are carried by predictions (green
arrows) issued by the generative model units (green units). Likelihoods are
carried by prediction errors (red arrows) issued by the error units (red units). In
the ‘empirical Bayes’ framework, the system can then use the posterior
obtained from one iteration as the prior in the next iteration. Predictions issued
from the generative models, which encode prior beliefs, propagate up, down,
and across the hierarchy (through backwards and lateral connections) and are
leveraged to guide intelligent adaptive action-perception. This leveraging is
achieved by canceling out (or ‘explaining away’) discrepancies, which encode
likelihood, through rolling cycles of action-perception. This same process
allows the system to learn through plastic synaptic connections, which are
continuously updated through free-energy minimization in action-perception.
The system thus continuously and autonomously updates its ‘expectations’
(Bayesian prior beliefs) in rolling cycles of action-perception.
How does this inversion take place? Generative models
are used to generate a prediction about the upcoming
sensory distribution. Between the predicted and actual sensory
distributions, there almost always will be a discrepancy
(‘prediction error’), which ‘tracks’ surprisal (in the sense that,
mathematically, it is an upper bound on that quantity). The
free-energy principle states that all living systems act to reduce
prediction error (and thereby implicitly resist the entropic
tendency toward thermodynamic equilibrium—dissipation and
death). This can occur in one of two complementary ways: (i)
through action, where the best action most efficiently minimizes
free-energy by making the world more like the prediction
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(‘active inference’); and (ii) through perception and learning,
by selecting the ‘hypothesis’ (or prediction, which corresponds
to the probable distal cause of sensory distribution) that most
minimizes error, or changing the hypotheses when none fits
or when one fits better (Friston, 2011, 2013a; Friston et al.,
2012a,b; Friston and Frith, 2015a,b). Given that generative
models embody fine-grained statistical information about the
distal environment at different scales, the top-down prediction
signals (produced by higher levels in the processing system)
provide crucial contextualizing information for the activity
of lower levels in the predictive hierarchy, rendering the
feedforward error signal contextually sensitive and adaptive (see
Figure 5).
The representational minimalism of embodied generative
models nicely complements the representation-sparse
phenomenology of affordances. Such minimal models
might be described as exploiting (non-semantic) information
for affordances, rather than (semantic) information about
affordances (van Dijk et al., 2015); that is, the sensory array only
carries information given certain uses of it by organisms (i.e.,
being a statistical proxy). The ‘internal representations’ involved
here might best be thought of as transiently ‘soft-assembled
neural ensembles,’ adequately coupled to environmental
affordances (Anderson, 2014).
It can be argued that predictive processing models
complement enactivist and radical embodied approaches
and are compatible with minimalism about representations,
provided we do not interpret the statistical computations and
error signal processes in a strong semantic, content-involving
sense (Hutto and Satne, 2015; Kirchhoff, 2015a,b, 2016; Kirmayer
and Ramstead, 2016). Generative models are simply embodied
statistical models that are dynamically leveraged to guide
intelligent adaptive behavior.
Generative models are embodied at different systemic levels
and timescales, in different ways. As indicated, at the level of the
brain, the predictive hierarchical architecture of neural networks
come to encode statistical regularities about the niche, which
allow the organism to engage with the field of affordances in
adaptive cycles of action-perception. But the embodiment of
generative models does not stop at the brain. Indeed, one radical
implication of the free-energy principle is that the organism itself
is a statistical model of its niche (Friston, 2011, 2013b). States
of the organism (i.e., its phenotype, behavioral patterns, and
so forth) come to statistically model the niche that it inhabits
FIGURE 5 | Diagram of hierarchical structure of the predictive processing networks. Predictive networks have hierarchical structure in the sense that their
processing is layered. The layered (hierarchical) structure of the generative model allows the model to capture the nested structure of statistical regularities in the
world. This inferential architecture effectively allows the system to leverage new information dynamically and implement a ‘bootstrapping’ process, whereby the
system extracts its own priors from its dynamic interactions with the environment. Computationally, each individual layer has the function of extracting and
processing information leveraged to cope with regularities at a given level or scale. In this example, information about the visual scene is decomposed into high,
medium, and low spatial frequency bands. Typically, low spatial frequency features change at a faster than high spatial frequency features. As such, lower spatial
frequency information is encoded higher up in the processing hierarchy, to guide lower-level, faster processing of higher spatial frequency information. The
hierarchical or layered statistical structure of the generative model enables it to recapitulate the salient statistical structure of those systems to which it is coupled. As
discussed in the text, this need not imply semantic content (but does not exclude it either).
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over evolutionary timescales (Badcock, 2012). Thus, phylogeny
conforms to the free-energy principle as well, because the effect
of natural selection is to select against organisms that are poor
models of their environments. Those organisms that survive
and thrive are those that embody, in this literal sense, the best
generative models of their niche. Organism phenotypes can
be described as conforming to the free-energy principle over
developmental timescales in morphogenesis as well (Friston et al.,
2015b). Generative models are thus not only ‘embrained,’ but
embodied in an even stronger sense, over the timescales of
phylogeny and ontogeny. This strong embodiment allows one
to interpret free-energy approaches in a non-internalist way and
to counter some objections raised against earlier formulations
of predicting processing approaches (e.g., Hohwy, 2013; Clark,
2016). This multilevel embodiment of the generative model, as
we shall argue below, extends to the concrete, material, human-
designed milieus (or ‘designer environments’) in which humans
operate.
Some generative models (in this wide sense) involve semantic
content and others do not (they involve something more minimal
than satisfaction conditions, i.e., reliable covariation). The study
of minds without content is compatible with more extensively
content involving forms of (social and cultural) cognition that
are scaffolded on such basic minds through processes of social
learning and enculturation.
On the radical enactivist account, content-involving forms
of intentionality emerge in the context of certain cultural
practices in human forms of life (Hutto and Satne, 2015).
Many of these practices involve multi-agent situations in which
proper engagement requires forms of implicit perspective-taking
and perspective-sharing (Sterelny, 2015). In some cases, such
practices can involve explicit ‘mindreading’ as well, that is,
inferring the beliefs, intentions, and desires of other agents as
such (Michael et al., 2014). There is a long-running debate
among anthropologists over the extent to which inferences
about other people’s mental states (as opposed to, say, bodily
states) may reflect a folk psychology that is more pronounced
among modern Western peoples (Robbins and Rumsey, 2008;
Rumsey, 2013). This ‘transparency of mind’ folk psychology is
contrasted in the literature with so-called ‘opacity doctrines’
found in other cultures, in which people’s interior states are
said to be ‘opaque,’ or unknowable. As recent multi-systems
account of social cognition have shown, however, situations
involving novel cues or too many orders of intentionality will
often trigger ‘higher’ cognitive resources and compel humans
to think about other people’s intentions as such (Michael et al.,
2014). Engagement with affordances in the human niche also
often requires ‘mindshaping,’ as our interpretation of other
agents’ intentional profiles in turn shapes those same profiles
through interpersonal loops (Sterelny, 2007, 2015; Zawidzki,
2013). Perspective-taking can be implicit and embodied in
that organisms can act on situations by leveraging minimal
models that encode information about other agents and their
behavior without entailing the presence of semantic content (i.e.,
having satisfaction conditions). But this is not incompatible with
the claim that perspective-taking and mindshaping abilities, in
the human niche, often involve symbolically and linguistically
mediated forms of communication, which substantially change
the kind of affordance landscape available to human agents
(Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2013, 2015).
Although the perspectivist focus on the dynamic embodied
enactment of meaning in a shared social world is central to
our understanding of cultural affordances (Gallagher, 2001,
2008; Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009), our contention is that
the acquisition of representational content in ‘epidemics’ of
socially shared representations (Sperber, 1996; Claidière et al.,
2014) entails that cognitive agents must be endowed with a
neural-computational scaffolding adequate to such activities5.
Even though basic cognition (and indeed, some forms of
‘higher’ cognition; Hutto and Myin, 2013) may be without
content, given the symbolic and linguistic nature of human
experience and culture, the human cognitive system must
be equipped with the neural-computational resources needed
to adequately couple with shared social representations, if
we are to account for how the latter are transmitted stably
and reliably. Semantic content is acquired through dense
histories of embodied engagement with the environment. For
humans, this involves participation in patterned, linguistically
and symbolically mediated practices—which include patterns of
shared attention and shared intentionality.
Predictive Processing and Attention
One aspect of the architecture of predictive processing is crucial
for our account of cultural affordances: the predictive processing
model specifies a deep functional role for attention. Attention,
on the predictive processing account, is modeled as ‘precision-
weighting,’ that is, the selective sampling of high precision
sensory data, i.e., prediction error with a high signal-to-noise
ratio (Feldman and Friston, 2010). The efforts of the cognitive
system to minimize free-energy operate not only on first-order,
correlational statistical information about the distal environment,
but on second-order statistical information about the signal-
to-noise ratio or ‘precision’ (that is, inverse variance) of the
prediction error signal as well. This allows the system to give
greater weight to less noisy signals that may provide more reliable
information. Based on this information, the cognitive system
balances the gain (or ‘volume’) on the units carrying prediction
errors at specific levels of the hierarchy, as a function of
precision. This control function, in effect, controls the influence
of encoded prior beliefs on action-perception (Friston, 2010).
Greater precision means less uncertainty; the system thus ‘ups
the volume’ on high precision error signals to leverage that
information to guide behavior. Attention, then, is the process
whereby synaptic gain is optimized to ‘represent’ (in the sense
of reliably co-varying with) the precision of prediction error in
hierarchical inference (Feldman and Friston, 2010; Clark, 2016).
Precision-weighting is centrally important in these
architectures and has been proposed as a mechanism of neural
5We should note a few limitations of the ‘epidemic’ metaphor: (i) representations
are not merely transmitted through contagion, but through many different means,
modes of communication, and practices that are themselves culturally mediated;
(ii) they reside not just in individuals, but also in artifacts and institutions; and
(iii) they are usually not simply replicated, but modified or transformed by each
individual or institution that takes them up.
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gating. Gating is the process whereby effective connectivity in
the brain (Friston, 1995, 2011), that is, the causal influence of
some neural units on others, is controlled by the functioning of
distinct control units (Daw et al., 2005; Stephan et al., 2008; den
Ouden et al., 2010). These are called ‘neural control structures’
by Clark (1998) (For assessments of the empirical evidence, see:
Kok et al., 2012, 2013; Friston et al., 2015a). Attention-modulated
‘gating’ is the central mechanism that allows for the formation of
transient task- and context-dependent coalitions or ensembles of
neural units and networks (Sporns, 2010; Park and Friston, 2013;
Anderson, 2014).
Thus, in the predictive processing framework, attention is the
main driver of action-perception. Clark (2016, p. 148ff) describes
possible implementations of this scheme in the brain. Much
like for first-order expectations, the system encodes expectations
about precision in the generative model, presumably in the
higher levels of the cortical hierarchy (Friston et al., 2014). These
signals, which carry context-sensitive second-order statistical
information, then guide the balancing act between top–down
prediction signals from the generative models and bottom–up
error signals in attention (see Figure 6).
It has been argued that predictive processing models
offer a plausible implementation for the neural-computational
realization of affordance-responsiveness in the nervous system
(Clark, 2016). As we shall see below, the free-energy model
provides a mechanistic implementation of the dynamical
gradient generation and consumption conception of affordance
engagement examined above (Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014).
Free-energy is minimized through action and perception
by the predictive processing hierarchy, which provides a
mechanistic implementation of the descriptive-prescriptive
aspect of affordances.
CULTURAL AFFORDANCES AND
SHARED EXPECTATIONS
We lack comprehensive accounts of how the conventions
that give rise to sociocultural affordances are successfully
internalized, both as implicit knowing how and explicit knowing
that. As Searle and others (Sterelny, 2007; Tuomela, 2007;
Tomasello, 2014; but see Zahavi and Satne, 2015) have shown,
and as our models suggests, it takes higher-order levels of
intentionality, meta-communication, and perspective-taking in
order for symbolic conventions to be used and manipulated—
and for more complicated, self-referential thinking (“I know that
she thinks that I believe that she intends to X,” etc.), collective
intentionality, and multiple orders of mindreading.
FIGURE 6 | A diagram of the looping effects that mediate cultural affordance learning. Regimes of attention, a central kind of patterned cultural practice,
and higher level expectations encoded in higher levels of the cortical hierarchy, guide agents’ attentional styles. In the free-energy framework, attention is modeled as
precision-weighting and has the function of controlling activation across the various levels of the cortical hierarchy by tuning the gain on error units (that is, they
realize the function of gating effective connectivity in the brain). In turn, differences in how attention is deployed (through gating) lead to varying salience landscapes
and to different expectations being encoded in the predictive hierarchy. Based in part on Figure 1 in Friston et al. (2014).
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The question for the present essay is how this framework
can be scaled up to account for cultural and social cognition
and learning. The everyday phenomenology of affordances is one
of possibilities for action and their variations; in other words,
of expecting certain nested action possibilities and prescriptions
for action. In effect, the phenomenology of affordances is a
phenomenology of expectations about available and appropriate
agent-environment couplings. The neural-computational models
derived from the free-energy principle traffics in predictions and
conditional probability distributions (called ‘beliefs’ in Bayesian
probability theory, without any claim to correspond to the folk
psychological notion). Arguably, the phenomenological correlate
of these Bayesian beliefs can, at least at some (presumably higher)
levels of the predictive hierarchy, be thought of as (or at least
codetermine) agent-level expectations. Our remarks below focus
on clarifying how the social scaffolding of agents leads to their
acquisition of representational content in regimes of shared
attention.
Skilled Intentionality and Affordance
Competition
On the radical embodied view, the central feature of the dynamic
relations between organisms and environment is the tendency
of the organism to move toward an ‘optimal grip’ on the
situation. The optima in question, as nearly everywhere in
biology, are local optima, rather than a single global optimum.
Under the free-energy framework, the ‘optimal grip’ can be
understood as the pattern of action-perception that most
minimizes variational free-energy. The free-energy minimizing
dynamics of the predictive hierarchy might be described as
a kind of weighted or biased competition between different
affordances, the ‘affordance competition’ hypothesis (Cisek, 2007;
Cisek and Kalaska, 2010; Pezzulo and Cisek, 2016). This model
of action selection theorizes that the cognitive system appraises
different trajectories for motor action simultaneously during
action selection (that is, appraising a whole field of affordances in
parallel and dynamically settling on the most salient affordance).
Sport science provides an illustration of this tendency toward
optimal grip (Hristovski et al., 2006, 2009; Chow et al., 2011).
Studies of the dynamic interplay between a boxer’s stance and
position, and the action possibilities available to them as a
function of stance and position, have shown that punching bags
afford different kinds of strikes to boxers as a function of the
distance between boxer and punching bag. Boxers tend to move
their bodies to an optimal distance from the punching bag,
specifically, one that affords the greatest variety of strikes. This is a
case of moving toward optimal grip. When observing a painting,
we also move our bodies and our gazes in a way that maximizes
our grip on the scene or details observed. We might call such
dynamic adaptive engagement with field of affordances in rolling
cycles of action-perception ‘skilled intentionality’ (following
Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012; Rietveld, 2008b, 2012; Bruineberg
and Rietveld, 2014).
Using the theoretical frameworks of dynamical systems
and self-organization, Bruineberg and Rietveld (2014) have
conceptualized this skilled intentionality as a kind of coping
with the potentials that well up in the field of affordances, as
a result of the dynamic relations between organism (with its
phenotypical states, its states of action readiness, its concerns,
etc.) and environment. More specifically, they suggest that skilled
intentionality is the generation and reduction (or ‘consumption’)
by the organism of a ‘gradient’ or potential tension in the
field of affordances (which can be modeled using attractor
dynamics). We sketched this approach in Sections “Landscapes
and Fields” and “Meaning and Affordances,” without the free-
energy framework. The full significance of dissipative dynamics
in the field of affordances can now be appreciated.
Affordances that are relevant to the organism at a given
time (solicitations) drive system dynamics by soliciting rolling
loops of action-perception and are prescribed and consumed
or dissipated by those very dynamics (Tschacher and Haken,
2007). That is, solicitations are equivalent to potentials in the
field of affordances, which act as attractors on the organism-
environment dynamics, changing those affordances to which
the organism is selectively open and receptive. The solicitations
with which the organism engages, on this view, is the one
that most effectively minimizes free-energy. Affect, attention,
and affordances interact to sculpt a field of solicitations out
of the total landscape of available affordances, adaptively and
dynamically moving the organism toward an optimal grip on
situations through action-perception. As the organism moves
along a gradient toward an optimal grip, the gradient dissipates.
The field of affordances thus changes dynamically along with
perception-action and changes to states of the organism and
environment. Responsiveness to the field, informed by states
of the organism and environment, prescribe modes of optimal
coupling. The radical embodied conception of cognition as
skilled intentionality, then, can be modeled using systems
theoretical models as a kind of selective responsiveness to salient
available affordances or solicitations, modulated by states of
the organism (concerns, interests, abilities) and states of the
environment. This framework effectively bridges the descriptive
levels of phenomenology, system dynamics, and cognitive
functions or mechanisms.
To date, most work on affordances has focused on motor
control and basic behaviors related to dynamical embodied
coping (e.g., Chemero, 2009; Cisek and Kalaska, 2010; Pezzulo
and Cisek, 2016). For a theory of cultural affordances, the
notion of affordances must be extended to more complex
features of the social and cultural niche inhabited by humans
(Heft, 2001; Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014; Rietveld and
Kiverstein, 2014). Quintessential human abilities like language,
shared intentionality, and mind-reading/perspective-taking
emerge from human forms of life and are patterned by human
sociocultural practices (Roepstorff et al., 2010), which in turn
involve sophisticated forms of social cognition. We live in a
landscape of cultural affordances.
Shared Expectations, Local Ontologies,
and Cultural Affordances
The upshot of our discussion so far is a general concept of
skilled intentionality as selective engagement with a field of
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affordances supported by embodied generative models. Skilled
intentionality is a graded phenomenon. At one extreme, skilled
intentionality consists in contentless direct coping. It has been
suggested that this most basic form of intentionality, which
Hutto and Satne (2015) call ‘ur-intentionality,’ acquires its
tendencies for selective targeted engagement with the world in
a ‘teleosemiotic’ process shaped by evolutionary history6. At
this extreme, the only information (and affordances) needed
are of the natural kind (exploitable reliable correlation). At the
other extreme, we find stereotypical human intentionality, that
is, symbolically dense and strongly content-involving forms of
collectively and conventionally rooted intentionality (Kiverstein
and Rietveld, 2015), which involves conventional information
and affordances. This is a spectrum, and all points between
these extremes are viable (at least prima facie). The teleological
basis of this variation might be the needs, concerns, and abilities
relevant to a given form of life, (Bruineberg and Rietveld,
2014; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014), in specific social niches
with their own idiosyncratic shared representations, symbols,
etc.
Our claim here is that cultural affordances (especially
conventional ones) form a coordinated affordance landscape,
which is enabled by sets of embodied expectations that are
shared by a given community or culture. Social niches and
cultural practices generally involve not isolated, individual
affordances or expectations but local landscapes that give
rise to and depend on shared expectations. We submit
that these shared expectations—implemented in the predictive
hierarchies, embodied in material culture, and enacted in
patterned practices—contribute to the constitution of the
landscape of affordances that characterizes a given community
or culture. Indeed, shared expectations modulate the specific
kinds of intentionality that are effective in a given community,
determining the forms taken by skilled intentionality, especially
the shared skilled intentionality of the kind that constitutes a
patterned sociocultural practice.
Patterned practices are specific ways of doing joint activities
in domain-specific material-discursive environments (Roepstorff
et al., 2010). Echoing recent work on the natural origin of
semantic content (Hutto and Satne, 2015; Sterelny, 2015),
we hypothesize that such ontologies, as socially shared and
embodied expectations, come to be acquired by the individual
agent through their participative immersion in specific patterned
practices available in multi-agent, symbolically and linguistically
mediated forms of social life.
Building on work in cognitive science as well as by Hacking
(1995, 1999, 2002, 2004), Kirmayer and colleagues have argued
for an embodied, enactivist approach to the study of the
multilevel feedback or ‘looping’ effects involved in jointly-
mediated narratives, metaphors, forms of embodiment, and
mechanisms of attention (Kirmayer, 2008, 2015; Seligman and
6‘Teleosemiotics’ is teleosemantics minus the semantics, that is, using the
teleosemantic framework developed by Millikan (1984, 2004, 2005) to explain
how organisms develop selective intentional response tendencies without trying
to provide thereby an account of semantic content (Hutto and Myin, 2013). See
also Kiverstein and Rietveld (2015) for a complementary account of minimal
intentionality as a contentless form of skilled intentionality.
Kirmayer, 2008; Kirmayer and Bhugra, 2009; Kirmayer and Gold,
2012). In human life, the regularities to which agents are sensitive
are densely mediated (and often constituted) by cultural symbols,
narratives, and metaphors, which may explicitly reference or
tacitly assume particular ontologies. These mechanisms shape
social experience and in turn are shaped by broader social
contexts.
Elsewhere, we have suggested that local, culturally specific
ontologies can be understood as sets of shared expectations
(Kirmayer and Ramstead, 2016). A ‘local ontology’ can be
defined as a mode of collective expectation: agents expect
the sociocultural world to be disclosed in certain ways rather
than others and to afford certain forms of action-perception
and nested variations to the exclusion of others. A local
ontology, then, is a set of expectations that are shared by
members of a cultural community. We claim that these sets of
shared expectations are installed in agents through patterned
practices that result in enculturation and enskillment. In the
framework explored above, these ontologies codetermine the
exact affordances that are available in a given niche, for they
prescribe specific ways of being, thinking, perceiving, and acting
in context that are situationally appropriate.
These local ontologies need not be explicitly formulated as
metaphysical theories. They are more often implicit and acquired
through participation in patterned practices and the enactment
of customs and rituals, or embodied in the social material
reality itself (as symbols, places, stories). Such distinctively
human practices take place in social niches rich with narratives,
symbols, and customs, which enable individuals to respond
cooperatively and, at times, to infer other agents’ states of
mind. Such practices may underlie everyday processes of person-
perception. For example, as noted in the introduction, by
age 5, children have acquired local ontologies and categories
of personhood—which reproduce the dominant set of biases,
expectations, and representations of their cultures—showing
preference for dominant group culture often without being
explicitly taught to do so, and despite their caregivers not
consciously holding such views, even when these biases are not
consonant with their minority identities (Clark and Clark, 1939;
Kinzler and Spelke, 2011). These tacit views of others may arise
both from the ways in which local niches are structured by
social norms and conventions and from regimes of attention
and interpersonal interactions shaped by cultural practices
(Richeson and Sommers, 2016). Biases in person-perception will,
in turn, influence subsequent social interaction and cooperative
niche construction in a cognitive-social loop (Sacheli et al.,
2015).
As discussed above, a number of theorists of embodied
cognition have criticized the view that intersubjective interactions
require that human beings be endowed with the capacity for
mind-reading, opting instead for an explanation in terms of
embodied practices and coupling (Gallagher, 2001, 2008; Fuchs
and De Jaegher, 2009). Although we readily grant the importance
of such embodied coping for basic minds on which more
elaborate cognition can be scaffolded, we advocate a middle
ground that posits both embodied contentless abilities and more
contentful mindreading abilities (Michael et al., 2014; Tomasello,
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2014; Sterelny, 2015; Veissière, in review). Indeed, the framework
we have proposed, which posits predictive processing hierarchies
apt to engage with both natural and conventional information
and affordances, can accommodate both modes of cognition.
The view that human societies rely on explicit and implicit
forms of mindreading does not commit us to intellectualism
or to a strong content-involving view. The shared enactment
of meaning, involving expectations about other agents, comes
to constitute the shared, taken-for-granted meaning of local
worlds, which in turn feeds back, in a kind of looping effect, to
developmentally ground and scaffold the enactments of meaning
by individual agents, by altering the shared expectations that are
embodied and enacted in the social niche (Kirmayer, 2015). These
shared ontologies shape experience by changing the abilities and
styles of action-perception of encultured agents.
Shared Expectations and Implicit
Learning
We have already appealed to Grice’s theory of meaning to
clarify some aspects of affordances. Affordances come in a
spectrum, ranging from those that depend only on reliable
correlation to those that depend on shared sets of expectations.
Grice’s account, as improved by others (Sperber and Wilson,
1986; Levinson, 2000; Tomasello, 2014), can help account for
how we successfully learn to detect and selectively respond
to context in situations that involve higher order contextual
appraisal, including perspective-taking and reading of other’s
goal-directed intent and actions. In higher-order, rule-governed
semiotic contexts, the actual presence of others is not necessary
for inferences to be made about the ‘correctness’ of affordances in
terms of their correspondence to others’ expectations, norms or
conventions. The general internalized idea of how others would
interpret a situation and context (or how a culturally competent
actor would respond) suffices for ‘meaning’ to be derived or
inferred.
Most of us have never been explicitly taught precisely how
to behave, sit, move, speak, take turns, and interact with
others in shared spaces such as metros, elevators, hallways,
airplanes, university classrooms, bars, dance floors, janitors’
closets, or the many other spaces we know not to enter.
As mentioned in the introduction to this essay, children
acquire the dominant social norms and appropriate behavioral
repertories and responses without explicit instruction. Although
we do occasionally receive explicit instructions, these do not
seem necessary for normal social functioning; as Varela (1999)
pointed out, we have acquired the implicit ‘know how’ to
act appropriately. That is, human beings acquire characteristic,
stereotypical ways of doing and being in response to social
contexts; in a sense, each of these constitutes habitual ‘micro-
selves’ as we variously engage the world as our ‘getting-on-the-
bus-self ’ to our ‘having-lunch-self,’ etc., where each self is a style
of situationally adequate and socially appropriate coupling to
a context. How do we acquire the ability to selectively detect
and respond to such sociocultural affordances? Or to rephrase
the question in anthropological terms: how do us come to be
socialized or enculturated for participation in shared worlds of
expectations?
The highly stable conformity of behavior in all of these
contexts goes beyond direct imitation (Michael et al., 2014).
Many everyday situations involve coordinated action among
many participants. Although some forms of coordinated group
action can occur entirely through individual responses to local
impersonal affordances (e.g., the swarming of birds), in order to
read and master the social cues and scripts in complex human
settings, the actors involved need to grasp the situation from the
perspective of other actors. This perspective-taking is essential if
each actor’s appraisal of the situation is to have any counterfactual
depth with regard to explicit social norms (e.g., inferring that
one’s behaving differently would fail to conform to others’
expectations about correct behavior). However, as argued above,
in some instances this perspective-taking might not involve
explicit, content-involving processes; the expectations might
simply be encoded and leveraged for the generation of adaptive
behavior without mentalistic assumptions being made about
agents at an explicit, conscious level. Thus, in any case, for a given
space to afford the same engagements to a given population, that
community must come to share a set of collective expectations—
indeed, shared expectations about others’ expectations about our
expectations, and so forth.
REGIMES OF SHARED ATTENTION AND
SHARED INTENTIONALITY
The framework we have outlined for cultural affordances
allows us to reconsider the natural origins of content. We
hypothesize that the central mechanism whereby cultural
affordances are acquired, especially conventional, content-
involving affordances, consists in the looping or feedback
relations between shared intentionality and shared attention.
Shared intentionality is enacted in various concrete, materially
embedded cultural practices and embodied as shared sets
of expectation. Shared attention is one such form of
shared intentionality. We suggest that shared attention is
crucial because directed attention modulates the agent’s
selective engagement with the field of affordances. Given
the nature of the predictive hierarchy, to wit, to extract
explicit and implicit statistical information, directing an
agent’s attention is tantamount to determining which
expectations (Bayesian prior beliefs) will be encoded in
the hierarchy. This, in turn, leads to different sets of
abilities being implemented by the gating mechanisms of
the predictive hierarchy. Under the free-energy principle,
action-perception is guided attention (precision-weighting),
and the gating process that is realized by attention itself
rests on the expectations encoded in the generative models
embodied by the organism. These high-level expectations
about precision, which modulate allocations of attention
(and thereby determine action-perception through gating),
are leveraged to guide skillful intentional behavior. The
sets of expectations embodied and enacted by organisms
change the field of affordances. This mechanism, we
submit, is exploited by culture in the acquisition of cultural
affordances.
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Gating, Abilities, and Affordances
In the framework outlined above, we followed Rietveld and
Kiverstein (2014) in defining an affordance as a relation between
a set of features or aspects of the organism’s material environment
and the abilities available in that organism’s form of life. We are
now in a position to better define ability in terms of a gating
control pattern, that is, a sequenced or coordinated process. An
ability is simply the capability of an organism to coordinate its
action-perception loops to skillfully engage an affordance in a way
that is optimal under the free-energy principle. An ability, then,
in the free-energy framework, includes a pattern of attention,
in the specific sense employed by the free-energy framework.
We use the term ‘attention’ not in the folk-psychological sense,
as that effort or mechanism that allows us to attend to specific
aspects of experience, but as the mechanism of precision-
weighting that mediates neural gating and allows the agent
to engage with specific affordances in action-perception cycles.
Attention, in our technical sense, therefore modulates effective
connectivity and, as such, determines the trajectories taken by
the rolling cycles of action-perception. Typically, in the case
of human agents, such patterns of attention are acquired over
development.
We conjecture that we acquire our distinctively human
abilities from our dense histories of temporally coordinated
social interaction and shared cultural practices (Tomasello et al.,
2005; Roepstorff, 2013). Attentional processes are central to
this enculturation and installation of shared semantic content.
In particular, the landscape of affordances available to the
infant is sculpted, through joint-attentional practices that reflect
sociocultural norms, into a field of relevant solicitations. Thus,
participation in patterned practices allows the installation
of socially, culturally, and situationally specific expectations,
which, once acquired, determine agent allocations of attention
(the acquisition of abilities) and, as a result, guide action-
perception.
Joint (and, eventually, shared) attentional processes
(Tomasello, 2014) provide a central mechanism through
which the individual is molded to conform to specific group
expectations and participate in forms of cooperative action.
Joint and shared attention alters the field of affordances
by directing the agent to engage with specific affordances,
marking them out as relevant, and making them more
salient. Given the nature of the predictive hierarchy, that
is, to automatically extract statistical information about
the distal world in its dynamic engagement (in action-
perception), the agent will encode the regularities of the
solicitations that it engages (that is, the relevant affordances
to which it is directed in joint and shared attention).
Of course, local practices of joint and shared attention
themselves depend on agents sharing sets of expectations—
the same expectations that become encoded by agents as
they participate in these practices. Through participation in
patterned cultural practices that direct attention in specific
ways, the agent acquires sets of expectations that gave rise,
in the first instance, to (earlier versions of) that very form
of cooperative action (see Figure 6). Cultural affordances
are thus mediated by recursive regimes of shared attention,
of which joint-attention is a special, signal case (Tomasello,
2014).
The study of everyday social interactions reveals how
regimes of joint attention shape our understanding and sensory
experiences of being in our worlds. For example, Goffman,
who pioneered studies of face-to-face interaction in modern
societies, showed how the ‘anonymized,’ ‘surface character’
of life in cities is routinized through what he called ‘civic
inattention’—that is, through the many ways in which strangers
avert their gazes, avoid conversations or physical contact, and
reinforce private boundaries in the public sphere (Goffman,
1971, p. 385). We can follow Goffman’s lead to consider how
different regimes of shared and joint-attention mediate lived
experiences of meaning and being. Civic inattention, for example,
is a specific regime of attention, but it is certainly not an absence
of attention. In Goffman’s ‘Invisible City’ model, attentional
resources are mobilized to not pay attention to certain features
of the world, particularly other agents caught in a symbolically
marked game of allegiances that renders them strange or
invisible.
Looping the Loop: Regimes of Shared
Attention and Skilled Intentionality
As we have seen above, in the predictive processing scheme,
attention, understood as precision-weighting of prediction error
signals, is a central mechanism behind the dynamical trajectory
of action-perception. The expectations about precision that
guide action-perception are acquired in ontogeny and stored
as high-level priors, which have the effect of arbitrating the
balancing act between top–down prediction and bottom–up
error signals. It follows that one pathway by which cultural
affordances may be transmitted is through the manipulation of
attention. This may occur in a variety of ways including what
we might call ‘regimes of shared attention.’ In the model of
affordances outlined above, this kind of attentional modulation
involves carving a local field of affordances out of the larger
landscape of available affordances through social practices.
Local environments and their associated practices are designed
to solicit particular patterns of coordinated attention from
participants (Kirchhoff, 2015a; Clark, 2016). In effect, these
patterns act as dynamical attractors on the field of affordances,
directing action-perception in some ways rather than others
(Juarrero, 1999).
In this light, one can view social norms and conventions
as devices to reduce mutual uncertainty, that is, consonantly
with the free-energy framework, as entropy-minimizing devices
(Colombo, 2014). One must know ‘what is in the minds’ of
others (such as what one would see and how one would
interpret another’s action generally and in context) in order to
make a successful inference (both explicit, content-involving or
implicit, correlational inferences) about other agents in each
situation. Goffman (1971) was hinting similar processes with
his comments on the ‘faces’ we learn to perform when we
interact with others in different situations. We can be a mentor
in one situation and a mentee in another; a father in one
and a friend in another. In Goffman’s famous comments on
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interaction in public, he describes (using other terms), how
certain spaces afford more ‘backstage,’ ‘off-screen’ performances
than others. The privacy of the home affords such relaxed ‘off-
stageness,’ and the bedroom and bathroom even more so. All
these instances require inferential mindreading or perspective-
taking, that is, inferences about the presence or absence of other
agents and their expectations as a normative guide for how one
can behave. None of this depends specifically of whether these
inferences consist in explicit mindreading or more implicit forms
of embodied coupled enactments—both are compatible with our
framework.
Now, we might suppose that the distinctly human abilities
with which we are endowed result simply from better
evolved predictive machinery, that is, more computationally
powerful predictive hierarchies (Conway and Christiansen,
2001). However, as we argued above, in human ontogeny, it
is more likely that affordances are learned through regimes of
imitation, repetition, positive and negative conditioning, and
culturally selective forms of attention (Meltzoff and Prinz, 2002;
Whitehouse, 2002, 2004; Roepstorff and Frith, 2004; Banaji
and Gelman, 2013; Veissière, 2016). The capacity for cultural
learning may itself be a cultural innovation (Heyes, 2012).
Indeed, the feedback or looping mechanisms between cultural
practices of scaffolding individual attention (what we called
regimes of attention) are themselves determined by the local
ontologies (shared sets of expectations) and abilities (acquired
patterns of attention and gating) of agents in that community.
Repetition and reiteration of patterns of social and technological
interaction, as well as reward for ‘correct’ inferences that denote
an adequate grasp of relevance, prescription, and proscription
(e.g., when a child ‘gets’ that some X means some Y, or figures
out an ‘appropriate’ combination of meaningful elements in
any given context), come to shape attentional mechanisms in
ontogeny, and assist the child in successfully inferring a set of
rules and categories (the culturally sanctioned sets of shared
expectations).
Joint attention is usually understood as occurring in a dyad
of two people, or between agents in direct interactional spheres
of communication, gaze-following, finger-pointing, or other
verbal or non-verbal cues (Vygotsky, 1978; Tomasello, 2014).
To address more complex social situations, it is useful to revise
current sociocognitive models of joint-attention to encompass
fundamentally triadic situations in which ‘the third’ is the socially
constituted niche of affordances, supported by local ontologies
and abilities.
Shared human intentionality is sufficient to project joint
attention to larger groups in the process of forming joint goals
and inferring from joint expectations. Crucially, it commonly
takes place without any direct interaction from members, in
the many routinized, anonymous, symbolically and linguistically
mediated forms of sociality, including engagement with social
institutions.
To go beyond the ‘toy models’ of dyadic joint attention
to grasp the process of culture transmission we need to
study the dynamics of ‘designer environments’ (Goldstone
et al., 2011; Salge et al., 2014). Human beings pattern their
environments in a process of recursive niche construction, which
in turn modulates the attributions of attention in individual
agents, leading them to acquire certain sets of priors rather
than others, in what Sterelny (2003) has called ‘incremental
downstream epistemic engineering.’ This incremental process
of constructing our own collective, epistemic niches, involves a
kind of bootstrapping in which symbolically and linguistically
mediated forms of human communication can be modeled
as forms of re-entrant processing. Linguistically abled human
beings produce patterned, structured outputs that become
part of the material environment, and are subsequently
picked up and further processed by other agents in ways
that stabilize and elaborate a local social world (Clark,
2006, 2008). Indeed, human-constructed environments, which
shape agent expectations and guide patterns of attention,
can be viewed as another level of the generative statistical
model of the niche, which human beings leverage to guide
intelligent behavior in their sociocultural symbolically- and
linguistically laden niches (Kirchhoff, 2015a; Clark, 2016). The
prior knowledge that is leveraged in action-perception is thus
encoded in multiple level and sites: in the hierarchical neural
networks, in the organism’s phenotype (over phylogeny and
ontogeny), and in patterned sociocultural practices and designer
environments.
Thus, our suggestion is that regimes of attention, which
mediate the acquisition of cultural affordances (both natural
and conventional), are enacted through patterned practices
(especially those which modulate the allocation of attention)
and are embodied in sundry ways: in the predictive hierarchies
of individual agents in a community, as encoded sets of
expectations, and in the concrete social and cultural world, as
constructed human environments, designed to solicit certain
expectations and direct attention.
CONCLUSION
We have outlined a framework for the study of cultural
affordances in terms of neural models of predictive processing
and social practices of niche construction. This approach can
help account for the multilevel forms of affordance learning
and transmission of affordances in socially and culturally
shared regimes of joint-attention and clarify one of the central
mechanisms that can explain the natural origins of semantic
content. The concepts of affordance and skilled intentionality
in ecological, radical embodied, and enactivist cognitive science
can be supplemented with an account of the nature of
affordances in the humanly constructed sociocultural niches.
Turning to cultural niche construction, we argued in favor of
a conception of local ontologies as sets of shared expectations
acquired through the immersive engagement of the agent
in feedback looping relations between shared intentionality
(in the form of shared embodied expectations) and shared
attention (modulated by regimes of attention). We elaborated
Grice’s account of meaning by highlighting the dependence
of selective responsiveness to cultural affordances on shared
and joint intentionality, modes of conventionality and social
normativity. We ended with an account of the patterned regimes
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of attention and modes of social learning that might lead to the
acquisition and installation of such ontologies and affordances,
leading to agent enculturation and enskillment. We hope that our
proposal of a framework for the study of cultural affordances will
spur further research on multilevel, recursive, nested affordances
and the expectations on which they depend.
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According to embodied cognition, language processing relies on the same neural
structures involved when individuals experience the content of language material. If
so, processing nouns expressing a motor content presented in a second language
should modulate the motor system as if presented in the mother tongue. We tested
this hypothesis using a go-no go paradigm. Stimuli included English nouns and pictures
depicting either graspable or non-graspable objects. Pseudo-words and scrambled
images served as controls. Italian participants, fluent speakers of English as a second
language, had to respond when the stimulus was sensitive and refrain from responding
when it was not. As foreseen by embodiment, motor responses were selectively
modulated by graspable items (images or nouns) as in a previous experiment where
nouns in the same category were presented in the native language.
Keywords: embodied cognition, second language, semantics, objects, nouns
INTRODUCTION
Embodied cognition maintains that language processing involves the recruitment of the same
sensory, motor, and even emotional neural substrates recruited when one executes, perceives or
feels the content of language material (Glenberg, 1997; Barsalou, 1999; Pulvermüller, 2001; Gallese
and Lakoff, 2005; Zwaan and Taylor, 2006; Jirak et al., 2010; Buccino et al., 2016). If so, then
processing graspable objects and the corresponding nouns shouldmodulate in a similar manner the
motor system. Observing objects and manipulating them recruit a sensorimotor circuit, including
premotor and parietal areas (Jeannerod et al., 1995; Binkofski et al., 1999; Chao and Martin, 2000;
Grezes et al., 2003a,b). This circuit on one side codes for the intrinsic features of objects that make
them appropriate for manual action; on the other it selects and implements the most appropriate
actions to manipulate those objects. There is evidence that the recruitment of the motor system
during object observation is finely tuned to the intrinsic features of objects (Buccino et al., 2009;
Makris et al., 2011).
As for nouns, several studies showed amodulation of themotor system activity depending on the
intrinsic features (e.g., size, type of prehension required to interact with them) of objects expressed
by nouns (Glover et al., 2004; Tucker and Ellis, 2004; Lindemann et al., 2006; Myung et al., 2006;
Bub et al., 2008; Cattaneo et al., 2010; Gough et al., 2012, 2013). Moreover, a specific modulation
of hand motor responses has been shown during the processing of nouns referring to hand-related
objects (Marino et al., 2013), as compared to foot-related objects. Two recent studies (Marino et al.,
2014; Zhang et al., 2016) showed a similar modulation of the motor system during the processing
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of objects and nouns belonging to the same category.
Additionally in an fMRI study (Desai et al., 2016), during
reading nouns expressing graspable objects activations were
found in areas also involved in action performance, thus
supporting a grounded view of semantics. Taken as a whole,
current literature supports the notion that processing visually
presented graspable objects and nouns referring to the same
object category recruit common neural substrates crucially
involving the motor system (Ganis et al., 1996; Vandenberghe
et al., 1996). In this context it is worth reminding that pivotal
neurophysiological studies (for review see Pulvermüller et al.,
2009) showed an early recruitment (within 200ms from stimulus
presentation) of the motor system during language processing.
Furthermore in behavioral studies the modulation of the motor
system during language processing may change over time
moving from an early interference (operating between 100 and
200ms after stimulus onset) to a later facilitation (operating
when responses are requested later than 200ms from stimulus
presentation), as maintained by some models (see Chersi et al.,
2010; Garcia and Ibanez, 2016). What about the processing of
nouns expressing natural graspable objects when presented in a
second language (L2)? If language is embodied and grounded
in the sensory, motor and even emotional representations
of the speaker coding for the language content, then during
processing graspable nouns in fluent speakers of L2 we should
find a modulation of the motor system similar to that found for
nouns presented in their mother tongue (L1). In the present
study, we assessed the modulation of motor responses in native
Italian speakers with a high competence in English as L2 (Level
C1 of the Common European Framework of Reference for
Languages, CEFR), using the same paradigm of a previous study
(Marino et al., 2014) where verbal stimuli were presented in
L1. In that study participants were requested to give a semantic
judgment, namely whether the presented stimulus was sensitive
or meaningless, pressing a button at 150ms after the stimulus
onset. Native Italian speakers showed a specific modulation of
hand motor responses (namely slower motor responses) during
the processing of graspable items (presented as either pictures or
nouns) as compared to non-graspable ones. We interpreted these
results as a manifestation of the motor system being engaged in
two tasks (processing the graspable picture or word and giving
the hand motor response), thereby supporting the notion that
the motor system is necessary to process language material
expressing a motor content. The experimental hypothesis
underlying the present study was that in a similar group of
participants fluent speakers of English as L2, this task would
lead to similar modulation of motor responses found during
the presentation of comparable stimuli in the L1, as foreseen by
embodiment.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-six right-handed undergraduate students from the
University of Parma took part in the study (20 females; mean
age= 22.07± 1.76 years). They were native Italian speakers who
had an English language proficiency at the reference level C1 on
the CEFR scale (Common European Framework of Reference for
Languages: Learning, Teaching, Assessment). All had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, and reported no history of language
disorders. They were unaware of the purpose of the experiment
and gave their informed consent before testing. The study was
conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki (1964)
and the procedure recommended by the Italian Association of
Psychology (AIP).
Stimuli
Thirty-six English nouns (see Appendix 1) referring to natural
objects and 36 pseudowords as well as 36 digital color photos
(see Appendix 2) depicting natural objects and 36 scrambled
images were used as stimuli. Eighteen nouns referred to natural
graspable objects (e.g., “leaf”) and 18 to natural non-graspable
objects (e.g., “fog”). The pseudo-words were built by substituting
one or two consonants or vowels in each noun (e.g., “leat”
instead of “leaf”). With this procedure, pseudo-words contained
orthographically and phonologically legal syllables for the
English language. The photos depicted 18 graspable objects and
18 non-graspable objects. Figure 1 shows an example of each
category. The scrambled images were built by applying an Adobe
Illustrator distorting graphic filter (e.g., zigzag) to the photos
depicting natural objects so to make them unrecognizable and
then meaningless. All the photos and the scrambled images were
440× 440 pixels.
The English nouns used as verbal stimuli and the nouns
of the objects depicted in the photos were matched for word
length [4.61, 4.72, 4.39, and 5.22 average letter number for
graspable nouns, non-graspable nouns, graspable images, and
non-graspable images, respectively; F(3, 68) = 1.32, p = 0.27],
syllable number [1.17, 1.33, 1.17, and 1.33 average syllable
number; F(3, 68) = 0.76, p = 0.52], and written lexical frequency
[4.37, 4.68, 4.47, and 4.53 average number of occurrences per
FIGURE 1 | Examples of stimuli presented in the study. Upper row shows
visual items while lower row shows verbal items. (A) A non-graspable object.
(B) A graspable object. (C) A scrambled image. (D) A noun referring to a
non-graspable object. (E) A noun referring to a graspable object. (F) A
pseudo-word.
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million in Google search engine; F(3, 68) = 2.03, p = 0.12].
They were also matched for word imageability [i.e., how easily
the word evokes a mental image of its referent; 5.36, 5.01,
5.23, and 5.17 average imageability score; F(3, 68) = 1.53, p =
0.21] and familiarity [i.e., how often one encounters the word
referent in natural environments; 4.79, 4.29, 4.28, and 4.32
average familiarity score; F(3, 68) = 1.16, p = 0.33] as rated
by 10 graduate and post-graduate student not involved in the
experiment (7 females, mean age: 40.5 ± 12.9 years) using a
seven-point scale (0: absent; 6 = extremely present). All the
English nouns used as verbal stimuli and the nouns of the objects
depicted in the photos had a reference level ranging between
A1 and B1 except for 1 word of a B2 level on the CEFR scale.
Whereas, the nouns of the objects depicted in the photos ranged
from an A1 to a C1 level on the CEFR scale.
Experimental Design and Procedure
The experiment was carried out in a sound-attenuated room,
dimly illuminated by a halogen lamp directed toward the ceiling.
Participants sat comfortably in front of a PC screen (HP 21.5′
LCD, 1,920× 1,080 pixel resolution, and 60 Hz refresh rate). The
eye-to-screen distance was about 57 cm.
Figure 2 shows the experimental procedure. Each trial started
with a black fixation cross displayed at the center of a gray
background. After a delay of 1,000–1,500ms (in order to avoid
response habituation), the fixation cross was replaced by a
stimulus item, either a noun/pseudo-word or a photo/scrambled
image. The verbal labels were written in black lowercase Courier
New bold (font size = 24). Stimuli were centrally displayed and
surrounded by a red (RGB coordinates = 255, 0, 0) 440 × 440
pixels frame (20 pixels-wide line). The red frame changed to
green (RGB coordinates = 0, 255, 0) 150ms after the stimulus
onset. The color change of the frame was the “go” signal for the
response. Participants were instructed to give a motor response,
as fast and accurate as possible, by pressing a key on a computer
keyboard centered on participants’ body midline with their right
index finger. They had to respond when the stimulus referred to a
real object, and refrain from responding when it was meaningless
(go-no go paradigm). Stimuli remained visible for 1,350 ms or
until participant’s response. Blanch A custom program developed
in the MATLAB environment was used for stimulus presentation
and response time collection.
The experiment consisted of 1 practice block and 1
experimental block. In the practice block, participants were
presented with 32 stimuli (4 photos of graspable objects, 4
photos of non-graspable objects, 8 scrambled images, 4 nouns of
graspable objects, 4 nouns of non-graspable objects, and 8 non-
sense pseudowords) which were not used in the experimental
block. During the practice block, participants received feedback
(“ERROR”) after giving a wrong response (i.e., responding to
a meaningless or refraining from responding to a real item),
as well as for responses given prior to go signal presentation
(“ANTICIPATION”), or later than 1.5 s (“YOU HAVE NOT
ANSWERED”). In the experimental block, the 144 items selected
as stimuli were randomly presented with the constraint that
no more than three items of the same kind (verbal, visual)
FIGURE 2 | Schema of the experimental procedure used in the study. Each
trial started with a fixation cross. The appearance of the green frame
represented the go-signal. Stimuli remained visible until a motor response was
given or the time limit had elapsed (1,350ms).
or referring to objects of the same category (graspable, non-
graspable, meaningless) could be presented on consecutive trials.
No feedback was given to participants. Thus, the experiment,
which lasted about 20min, consisted of 72 go trials (36
nouns of objects, 50% graspable and 50% non-graspable, plus
36 photographs of objects, 50% graspable, and 50% non-
graspable) and 72 no-go trials (36 non-sense pseudowords plus
36 scrambled images), and 32 practice trials, for a total of
176 trials. To sum up, the experiment used a 2 × 2 repeated
measures factorial design with Object Graspability (graspable,
non-graspable) and Modality (verbal, visual) as the within-
subjects variables.
RESULTS
Trials with errors were excluded without replacement. Errors
were not further analyzed given they were extremely rare (<5%).
Three participants were excluded from the analysis because their
error rate exceeded 10%. Response times (RTs) below 130 ms
or above 1,000ms were omitted from the analysis. This cut-off
was established so that no more than 0.5% of correct RTs were
removed (Ulrich and Miller, 1994).
Median values of remaining RTs were calculated for
each combination of Object Graspability (graspable and non-
graspable) and Stimulus Type (photo and noun). These
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data entered a 2-way repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with Object Graspability and Stimulus Type as the
within-subjects factors. Partial eta square values (η2p) are reported
as an additional metric of effect size for all significant ANOVA
contrasts.
The ANOVA revealed a main effect Object Graspability
[F(1, 22) = 11.87, p < 0.003, η
2
p = 0.35], indicating that
the participants gave slower responses to stimuli referring to
graspable objects (387ms ± 73) as compared to stimuli referring
to non-graspable objects (371ms ± 62). There was also a main
effect of Stimulus Type [F(1, 22) = 15.72, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.42],
reflecting slower responses to verbal stimuli than those to visual
stimuli (395± 62 vs. 360ms± 70).
Figure 3 shows the main results. Response times are expressed
as means of medians.
DISCUSSION
During the processing of graspable objects and nouns presented
in English, in the present study Italian participants, fluent
speakers of English as L2, showed the same kind of modulation
of motor responses as participants in a previous experiment
(Marino et al., 2014), where the same kind of stimuli were
presented in their L1. In details, participants gave slower reaction
times during the processing of graspable items as compared
to non-graspable ones, independent of presentation (noun or
picture). We forward that, as for the L1, to solve the task
participants relied on themotor representations of potential hand
interactions with the object expressed by the noun or depicted
in the photo. In this way, the motor system was engaged in two
tasks at the same time, that is processing the presented stimuli
and performing a motor response. Hence participants paid a
cost as revealed by a slowing down of their motor responses.
These results are relevant within the neuroscientific literature on
L2. Ullman’s differential hypothesis (Ullman, 2001) claims that
L2 acquisition cannot depend on the same brain mechanisms
that are used to process the native language. Coherently in
earlier studies in bilingual aphasics the observation of selective
recovery of one language was often interpreted as evidence
for a different neural representation of L1 and L2 (Albert
and Obler, 1978). More recently, several brain imaging studies
have led to the notion that L1 and L2 are processed by the
same neural structures (Perani and Abutalebi, 2005; Abutalebi,
2008). However, differential activations were found when the
age of acquisition of L2 and the level of fluency are taken into
account (Liu and Cao, 2016). When considering grammatical
and syntactic processing, several studies (Sakai et al., 2004; Dodel
et al., 2005; Ruschemeyer et al., 2005, 2006; Golestani et al., 2006;
Indefrey, 2006; Jeong et al., 2007) showed stronger activations in
L2 speakers within areas classically known as devoted to syntax
(Grodzinsky and Friederici, 2006), including Broca’s region and
the adjacent left inferior frontal gyrus, left prefrontal cortex, basal
ganglia and cerebellum. These studies included late bilinguals
and their findings have been interpreted as due to a stronger
effort in processing L2 as compared to L1. The very few studies
that assessed early bilinguals showed that, as compared to late
bilinguals, these individuals more strongly recruited left inferior
frontal gyrus and prefrontal cortex (Wartenburger et al., 2003;
Hernandez et al., 2007). As for semantics processing, studies in
the field show that L2 is essentially processed through the same
neural substrates underlying L1 processing, including anterior
inferior frontal cortex and supramarginal gyrus. Differences
related to L2 are found for low proficiency and/or less exposed
bilinguals in terms of greater engagement of the left inferior
frontal gyrus or selective engagement of prefrontal areas. It
should be underlined that the age of L2 acquisition seems to have
no major role in the semantics domain (Perani and Abutalebi,
2005; Indefrey, 2006). In other words L2 proficiency seems to
be the main and only determinant in the semantics domain
since late bilinguals with native like L2 proficiency activate the
same identical areas for both languages. In the present study,
we tested in a semantic task a rather homogenous group of
students with a high competence in English as an L2. In keeping
with the current literature, the present findings clearly show that
motor responses to verbal stimuli presented in L2 are similarly
modulated as in L1. This, in turn, suggests and supports at
behavioral level the notion that the neural mechanisms (and
possibly the neural substrates) underlying the processing of
nouns in different languages are shared, and overlap with those
necessary to process the corresponding objects, when presented
pictorially. As a whole, experimental evidence supports the neural
convergence hypothesis (Green, 2003), according to which the
acquisition of an L2 relies on a specified language system devoted
to L1 and claims that potential neural differences between L1
and L2 are overwhelmed as proficiency in L2 increases. It is
worth stressing that at difference with the previous study (Marino
et al., 2014) using L1 stimuli, in the present one we found
a different role for modality of presentation. With L1 stimuli,
motor responses to graspable objects were faster with nouns
than with photos. In the present study, motor responses to
graspable items were faster with photos than with verbal stimuli.
We have no clear explanation for this finding. However, if it is
true, as forwarded in our discussion that L2 verbal labels share
the same neural representations as for L1, then it may be that
while processing L2 verbal items participants also re-enacted
the correspondent L1 verbal labels. This strategy, in turn, might
have led to an additional cost when processing L2 items, as
revealed behaviorally by a further slowing down of motor
responses.
The present findings are also relevant within the embodiment
literature. In a recent paper (Buccino et al., 2016), it has been
suggested that meaning is strictly grounded in experience: the
same neural mechanisms and neural substrates devoted to make
sensory, motor and even emotional experience are also recruited
and re-enacted when individuals have to attribute a meaning
to language expressing those experiences. According to this
proposal, the meaning of the word “flower,” for example, is not
a particular flower or a bunch of flowers, and not even the
stereotypical flower as a socially-defined entity that each speaker
has to grasp in order to understand the meaning of that word.
On the contrary, the word “flower” points at a cluster of flower-
related real and concrete experiences that the speakers have made
of that specific object called flower.
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FIGURE 3 | The main results of the experiment concerning the object graspability (graspable vs. non-graspable, A) and the modality of presentation (verbal vs. visual,
B) are shown. Response times are expressed as means of medians. Asterisks mark significant effects.
A recent proposal in the field of linguistics (Dor, 2015)
seems to reach similar conclusions. This proposal defines a word
as a “discrete instructor of imagination” whose basic function
is to refer to and describe a set of personal experiences of
the speakers. In other words, when communicating, the words
have the primary role of expressing, on one side, a set of
experiences that the utterer wants to focus on or convey, and of
raising, on the other (or on the reader’s side), an analogous set
of personal experiences. Following this theoretical framework,
the evidence that motor responses given to nouns presented
in L2 were similar to those given for nouns in L1 (and for
similar objects presented pictorially), strongly support the notion
that, whatever the language used, at least for highly competent
speakers, attributing a meaning to words implies re-enacting the
neural substrates where experiences related to words are coded.
Since we used graspable vs. non-graspable items, we found a
specific modulation of motor responses common to the L1 and
the L2.
In our opinion, these findings have implications in teaching
and learning a second language. As discussed above, sensori-
motor experience to which specific language elements refer
appears central to language processing. If so, we believe that
this notion is most relevant in second language learning and
teaching: when a content has to be expressed and learned
in a second language, it should refer to something which
has already been experienced sensorially or motorically by
the learner (Buccino and Mezzadri, 2015). This should lead
language teachers (and learners) to adopt experience-based
teaching methods whereby the content to be taught has to
be targeted to the learner and revolve around the learner’s
experience. If experience does not support the language elements
to be taught, the teacher should encourage the development of
specific sensori-motor experiences which will then be verbally
labeled. In other words, during the language teaching process
the approach to any new language input should move from
the (re)activation of pre-existing knowledge and experience.
In keeping with this general statement, there is evidence that
action may improve the acquisition of a foreign language or, in
general, new words (Macedonia and von Kriegsten, 2012; Kronke
et al., 2013) and may even be effective in the rehabilitation of
language (Marangolo et al., 2010).
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APPENDIX 1
List of the English nouns used as verbal stimuli, their related
pseudo-word, graspability of their referents, word frequency
on Zipf scale (logarithmic frequency of occurrence) (van
Heuven et al., 2014) word length (letter and syllable number),
and reference level on CEFR scale verified with the English
Vocabulary Profile [based on the Cambridge Learner Corpus
(CLC), a multi-billion word corpus of spoken and written current
English].
English Pseudo Ref Zipf-value Letter/ CEFR’s
noun word grasp syllable level
Ankle Antle Yes 3.94 5/1 B1
Beard Beaft Yes 3.98 5/1 A1
Bone Bose Yes 4.51 4/1 B1
Diamond Diafond Yes 4.39 7/2 B2
Dust Dunt Yes 4.39 4/1 B1
Ear Eaz Yes 4.41 3/1 A1
Flower Floter Yes 4.50 6/2 A1
Fur Fup Yes 4.03 3/1 B1
Garlic Gatlic Yes 4.45 6/2 A2
Grass Grast Yes 4.58 5/1 A1
Herbs Hergs Yes 4.02 5/1 B1
Knee Snee Yes 4.26 4/1 B1
Leaf Leat Yes 4.29 4/1 B1
Plant Plaft Yes 4.81 5/1 A1
Salt Sart Yes 4.69 4/1 A1
Sand Sast Yes 4.51 4/1 B1
Stone Slone Yes 4.84 5/1 B1
Wool Woop Yes 4.11 4/1 A2
Air Aiz No 5.22 3/1 A2
Bay Zay No 4.55 3/1 B1
Cliff Tliff No 4.37 5/1 B1
Fog Fot No 4.08 3/1 A2
Forest Fodest No 4.67 6/1 A2
Heat Heas No 4.76 4/1 B1
Hill Hiln No 4.71 4/1 A2
Island Istand No 4.96 6/2 A2
Jungle Rungle No 4.38 6/1 B1
Lake Lare No 4.49 4/1 A2
Moon Moof No 4.74 4/1 A2
Rain Raim No 5.08 4/1 A1
Sea Xea No 5.20 3/1 A1
Space Spale No 5.29 5/1 B1
Thunder Thunser No 3.93 7/2 B1
Universe Unigerse No 4.37 8/3 B1
Valley Vatley No 4.47 6/2 B1
Wind Winz No 5.00 4/1 A1
APPENDIX 2
List of the nouns of the objects depicted in the photos
used as visual stimuli, their word frequency on Zipf scale
(logarithmic frequency of occurrence), word length (letter
and syllable number), and reference level on CEFR scale
verified with the English Vocabulary Profile [based on
the Cambridge Learner Corpus (CLC), a multi-billion
word corpus of spoken and written current English].
English Ref Zipf-value Letter/ CEFR’s
noun grasp Syllable level
Branch Yes 4.10 6/1 B1
Bulb Yes 3.68 4/1 B2
Coal Yes 4.32 4/1 C1
Daisy Yes 4.61 5/1 NA
Egg Yes 4.80 3/1 A1
Gold Yes 5.10 4/1 A2
Hair Yes 5.03 4/2 A1
Honey Yes 4.60 5/2 A2
Ice Yes 4.98 3/1 A2
Net Yes 4.53 3/1 B1
Nut Yes 3.99 3/1 B2
Parsley Yes 3.98 7/2 NA
Pepper Yes 4.38 6/2 B1
Shell Yes 4.39 5/1 B2
Snow Yes 4.79 4/1 A1
Tail Yes 4.45 4/1 B2
Trunk Yes 3.93 5/1 B2
Wood Yes 4.78 4/1 A2
Beach No 4.72 5/1 A1
Cavern No 3.08 6/2 NA
Cell No 4.22 4/1 B2
Cloud No 4.77 5/1 A2
Coast No 4.86 5/1 B1
Earth No 5.00 5/1 B1
Field No 4.92 5/1 A2
Landscape No 4.62 9/2 B1
Mountain No 4.64 8/2 A2
Ocean No 4.49 5/2 B1
Planet No 4.66 6/2 B1
Pond No 4.20 4/1 B2
Shadow No 4.49 6/2 B1
Shore No 4.12 5/1 B1
Sky No 4.79 3/1 A2
Smoke No 4.53 5/1 B1
Storm No 4.46 5/1 A2
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Two experiments were carried out to investigate whether and how one important
characteristic of the motor system, that is its goal-directed organization in motor chains,
is reflected in language processing. This possibility stems from the embodied theory of
language, according to which the linguistic system re-uses the structures of the motor
system. The participants were presented with nouns of common tools preceded by a
pair of verbs expressing grasping or observational motor chains (i.e., grasp-to-move,
grasp-to-use, look-at-to-grasp, and look-at-to-stare). They decided whether the tool
mentioned in the sentence was the same as that displayed in a picture presented shortly
after. A primacy of the grasp-to-use motor chain over the other motor chains in priming
the participants’ performance was observed in both the experiments. More interestingly,
we found that the motor information evoked by the noun was modulated by the specific
motor-chain expressed by the preceding verbs. Specifically, with the grasping chain
aimed at using the tool, the functional motor information prevailed over the volumetric
information, and vice versa with the grasping chain aimed at moving the tool (Experiment
2). Instead, the functional and volumetric information were balanced for those motor
chains that comprise at least an observational act (Experiment 1). Overall our results
are in keeping with the embodied theory of language and suggest that understanding
sentences expressing an action directed toward a tool drives a chained activation of the
motor system.
Keywords: embodied language, motor chains, motor system, affordances, reaction times
INTRODUCTION
According to the theory of re-use (Anderson, 2010), evolutionworks in a conservative way, building
on previously formed systems. In line with this general view, the embodied theory of language
(Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg, 2007; Gallese, 2008; Glenberg and Gallese, 2012) claims that
the linguistic system re-uses the structures and the organization characterizing the motor system.
From this perspective, language comprehension is rooted in action as it recruits the same neural
areas that are active while performing movements.
Thus far, some of the most striking evidence for embodied language comes from
psychophysiological and neuroimaging studies documenting an activation of the motor system
during the comprehension of nouns referring to manipulable objects (i.e., tools), which parallels
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the activation of the same system while both actively
manipulating and passively viewing these objects (see e.g.,
Martin et al., 1996; Grafton et al., 1997; Binkofski et al.,
1999; Chao and Martin, 2000; Gerlach et al., 2002; Creem-
Regehr and Lee, 2005; for a review see Martin, 2007). For
example, Cattaneo et al. (2010), using transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS) technique, found an involvement of
ventral premotor cortex in processing of nouns referring to
tools. Rueschemeyer et al. (2010) with functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) showed that functionally manipulable
words (i.e., nouns denoting man-made objects that require
manipulation for use, such as “hammer”) elicit greater levels
of activation in the fronto-parietal sensorimotor areas than
volumetrically manipulable words (i.e., nouns denoting man-
made objects that can be held in the hand but function
without regular manipulation, such as “clock”). Similar
findings were obtained in a TMS study by Gough et al.
(2012).
Coupled evidence for an activation of motor system while
processing of nouns referring to manipulable objects has been
collected also in behavioral studies such as those investigating
the influence of tool noun presentation on planning and
executing hand movements in categorization tasks (Tucker and
Ellis, 2004), lexical decision tasks (Myung et al., 2006), and
gesture imitation tasks (Bub et al., 2008). For example, it has
been demonstrated that planning reach-to-grasp movements
aimed at using a tool interacts with the semantic activation of
nouns related to the action goal of the tool use (Lindemann
et al., 2006). More recently, it has been shown that the
motor activation by nouns referring to manipulable objects
is time-locked to the very moment at which the meaning of
these nouns is accessed (Marino et al., 2013) and overlaps
with the one driven by passive viewing of the manipulable
objects to which the nouns are related (Marino et al.,
2014).
Although, the evidence of an activation of the motor
system by action-related nouns is compelling, little focus
has been placed upon the aspects of this activation. The
embodied theory of language predicts that the basic features
characterizing the motor system should be maintained in
processing action-related language. The present study
is addressed at investigating this possibility. Specifically,
it is aimed at testing whether and how one important
characteristic of the motor system, that is its goal-directed
organization in motor chains, is reflected in language
processing.
The chained organization of the motor system has been
recently described in some neurophysiological studies on
monkeys (e.g., Fogassi et al., 2005; Bonini et al., 2011). These
studies showed that, in the parietal and premotor cortices,
the majority of neurons coding a specific motor act have
a different activation pattern depending on the overall goal
of the action sequence in which the act is embedded. For
example, among the neurons selective for object grasping,
some discharge best when the act is executed for placing
the object into a container while others for eating it. These
results show that a basic mechanism of the motor system is
structuring of the same motor act in different motor chains.
In humans, the chained organization of the motor system
has been revealed by the results collected in a brain imaging
study by Iacoboni et al. (2005) who found a significant signal
increase in the brain areas where hand actions are represented
(the posterior part of the inferior frontal gyrus and the
adjacent sector of the ventral premotor cortex) while watching
a grasping gesture embedded in a motor chain (i.e., grasp-to-
drink and grasp-to-clean) as compared to watching the same
gesture alone. An important assumption of the present study
is that such chained organization can characterize language as
well.
A model based on motor chains and language has been
proposed by Chersi et al. (2010) to account for contradictory
findings that understanding verbs associated to different effectors
can lead to either facilitation or interference in motor responses
(e.g., Boulenger et al., 2006). However, to our knowledge,
the issue of a chained activation of the motor system during
the comprehension of linguistic material related to action has
not yet been directly addressed by either behavioral or brain
imaging studies. To investigate this possibility we used the
procedure employed by Stanfield and Zwaan (2001), and by
Borghi and Riggio (2009). Participants were presented with
sentences composed by the noun of a tool and a pair of verbs
expressing different grasping motor chains (i.e., grasp-to-move
the tool, grasp-to-use the tool) or observational motor chains
(look at-to-grasp the tool, look at to stare the tool). Each sentence
was followed by a picture of a tool graspable with either a
precision or power grip, with its handle oriented to the right
and its functional part (i.e., the tip) oriented to the left, and vice
versa. Participants were required to decide whether the tool in
the picture was the same as the one presented in the sentence
(i.e., word-picture matching task). If the chain organization of
motor system is encoded in language, then the priming effect
typically observed when the object described in the sentence
overlaps with the object represented in the following picture,
should be shaped by the motor chain expressed by the pair of
verbs with which the noun was combined. In particular, given
that objects are represented primarily in terms of their actions,
a priming advantage of the motor chains containing the act
of grasping over the pure observational motor chain should
be observed. Moreover, since tools are represented primarily
in terms of their function (e.g., Costantini et al., 2011), a
primacy of the grasp-to-use motor chain over the other motor
chains containing the act of grasping should be found. Finally,
if a chained activation of the motor system during language
processing occurs, then the motor information evoked by the
noun of the tool should contain different details depending
on the motor chain expressed by the sentence in which the
noun is embedded. Specifically, details related to the relation
between the hand and the graspable part of the tool (i.e., the
handle) should be evoked by nouns of tools embedded in the
grasp-to-move and look at-to-grasp motor chains. In contrast,
details pertaining also to the relation between the hand and the
functional part of the tool (i.e., the tip) should be somehow
evoked by nouns of tools embedded in the grasp-to-use motor
chain.
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EXPERIMENT 1
Materials and Methods
Participants
Thirty-four students of the University of Parma (14 males and
20 females, mean age ± SD, 21.2 ± 3.8 years) took part in the
experiment. All were right-handed native Italian speakers (mean
Edinburgh Handedness Questionnaire score ± SD, 0.85 ± 0.13,
Oldfield, 1971) and were unaware of the purpose of the study.
The participants had normal or corrected to normal vision and
reported no history of speaking and/or motor disorders. All the
participants gave a written informed consent before testing. The
study was conducted in accordance with the ethical standards laid
down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki and fulfilled the ethical
standard guidelines recommended by the Italian Association of
Psychology. The experimental protocol was also approved by the
research ethics committee at the University of Parma.
Materials
Fourteen digital color photographs of common tools were
selected. All the tools, which had a shape elongated along the
vertical axis, were composed of two structurally separated parts,
the handle and the tip serving to accomplish the tool function. All
the tool exemplars were chosen so that neither their handle not
their tip differently popped out of the background due to a large
difference in color contrast. Half of the tools were graspable with
a power grip (e.g., hammer), while the other half were graspable
with a precision grip (e.g., pen). A complete list of the tools is
provided in Table 1. Each tool was scaled to be displayed within a
130× 130 mm white frame, with its handle pointing downwards
both to the left and to the right, and its tip pointing upwards both
to the right and to the left, respectively.
We also created 6 different kinds of Italian imperative
sentences in which a pair of transitive verbs, separated by
the copulative conjunction “e” (English translation: and), was
followed by a determinative article and a noun that referred
to one of the tools represented in the pictures (i.e., verb 1
+ conjunction + verb 2 + determinative article + noun).
The sentences could include two action verbs (i.e., “afferra e
sposta”—grasp and move, or “afferra e usa”—grasp and use), an
observational verb and an action verb (i.e., “osserva e prendi”—
look at and grasp, “osserva e indica”—look at and point, or
“afferra e fissa”—grasp and stare), or two observational verbs
(i.e., “osserva e fissa”—look at and stare). Sentences that included
the verbal pairs “look at and point” or “grasp and stare” served
as catch trials to induce the participants to process the whole
sentence (see below). All the verb pairs included in the critical
sentences were composed of 6 syllables, and had a similar additive
relative lexical frequency (“afferra e sposta” = 1.70 + 20.49 =
22.19, “afferra e usa”= 1.70+ 28.63= 30.33, “osserva e prendi”=
22.86+ 6.66= 29.52, “osserva e fissa” = 22.86+ 9.90= 32.76 in
occurrences per million; see (Laudanna et al., 1995) ∼ 3,798,000
words). The nouns referring to the tools graspable with either
a precision or a power grip were matched for syllable number
[average values: 3.00 vs. 3.14 syllables, t(1, 12) = 0.36, p = 0.73]
and lexical frequency [average values: 10.59 vs. 1.78 in occurrence
per million, t(1, 12) = 1.46, p= 0.17].
TABLE 1 | Tools used in Experiment 1 and 2.
Precision grip Power grip
Cucchiaio (spoon) Pennello (paintbrush)
Chiave (key) Martello (hammer)
Penna (pen) Pinze (pliers)
Pennellino (little paintbrush) Spazzola (hairbrush)
Forchetta (fork) Schiaccianoci (nutcracker)
Matita (pencil) Cacciavite (screwdriver)
Fiammifero (match) Pettine (comb)
Procedure
The experiment was carried out in a sound-attenuated room,
dimly illuminated by a halogen lamp directed toward the ceiling.
The participants, tested individually, sat comfortably in front of
the screen of a computer monitor (a ViewSonic 18 inch flat color
CRT monitor with a 1024× 768 pixel resolution, interfaced with
an Intel R CoreTM 2.40 GHz computer equipped with an ATI
Radeon HD 2600 Pro Video Board) with their head supported
by a chin rest in order to maintain a stable eye-to-screen distance
of 57 cm.
Each trial started with a black fixation cross displayed at the
center of a white background. After a delay of 600ms, the fixation
cross was replaced by a sentence. The sentence was centrally
displayed and written in black lowercase Courier New bold font
(point size = 24). The sentence remained visible for 800 ms.
After the offset of the sentence a digital photograph of a tool
centrally appeared. The timer started operating simultaneously
to the onset of the visual tool which remained visible until
the participant responded, or until 1500 ms had passed (see
Figure 1).
The participants were randomly assigned to one of two
groups. Those in the first group were asked to press the “p” key
with their right index finger when the tool in the photograph
was the same as that mentioned in the sentence, and to press
the “q” key with their left index finger when it was not; the
participants in the other group were required to do the opposite.
All the participants were instructed to refrain from responding in
case the sentence included the verb pair “look at and point” or
“grasp and stare” (i.e., catch-trials). The keyboard was positioned
in front of the participants, so that the two response keys
were placed symmetrically with respect to the participants’ body
midline. All the participants were informed that their response
times (RTs) would be recorded and were invited to respond
as quickly as possible while still maintaining accuracy. They
received feedback after pressing the wrong key in a critical trial
(“ERROR”), after pressing a key in a catch trial (“ERROR”), after
taking more than 1500ms to respond (“TOO SLOW”), or after
responding correctly (“CORRECT”). The feedback remained
visible for 1500ms.
In the first phase of the experimental session, the participants
performed a block of 48 practice trials. Different tools as those
used in the following test phase were used. If the participants
felt confident with the task, then the test phase was started,
otherwise another block of practice trials was run. In the test
phase, the participants performed a block of 336 trials. The
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FIGURE 1 | The experimental procedure.
order of stimulus presentation was randomized and Verb Pair
(“grasp and move,” “grasp and use,” “look at and grasp,” “look at
and point,” “look at and stare,” “grasp and stare”), Tool Handle
Orientation (left, right), and Tool Grip (precision, power) factors
were fully balanced. Each of the 6 verb pairs was combined
with each of the 14 tool nouns (for a total of 84 different
sentences). Each sentence, which was presented 4 times during
the whole test phase, was followed twice by the photograph of
the tool mentioned in the sentence (i.e., same-tool trials),—with
the handle directed downward once to the left and once to the
right—, and twice by the photograph of a tool not mentioned in
the sentence (i.e., different-tool trials),—with the handle directed
downward once to the left and once to the right. The photos used
in the different-tool trials depicted tools which were graspable
with the same kind of grip as that required to grasp the tool
mentioned in the sentence for half of the times, and with a
different kind of grip for the other half of the times.
Throughout the test phase, the participants could take a break
after every 42 trials. For each trial, RTs and errors were recorded.
Stimulus presentation and response collection were controlled
using the software package E-Prime, version 1.1. (Psychology
Software Tools, Inc.).
Results
All cases in which the participants responded to a critical trial
by pressing a wrong key and all cases in which the participants
responded to a catch trial were considered as errors (i.e., response
errors and catch errors, respectively). The grandmean percentage
error was 16.92% (response errors = 10.72%, catch errors =
6.20%). The catch trials and the wrong critical trials were
excluded from the analysis. Six participants (2 from the first
group and 4 from the second group) were removed from the
analysis because their error rate was statistical outlier (i.e., two
standard deviation higher than the error rate grand mean).
Before being analyzed, the response times (RTs) measured for
the correct critical trials were screened for outliers: RTs two
standard deviations higher or lower than the individual grand
mean were omitted from the analysis (19.23%). Given that
there was no speed-accuracy tradeoff, as determined by plotting
the error rate across decile temporal bins (see Figure 2A), the
remaining RTs measured for the same-tool trials and for the
different-tool trials were separately submitted to a mixed analysis
of variance (ANOVA) with Response Hand (left, right) as a
between-subjects factor and Tool Grip (power, precision), Verb
Pair (“grasp and move,” “grasp and use,” “look at and grasp,”
“look at and stare”), and Hand/Handle Orientation (compatible,
incompatible) as within-subjects factors. This latter factor was
obtained by combining the orientation of the handle of the tool
shown in photographs (left, right) with the hand used to give the
response (left, right). In the ANOVA on RTs measured for the
different-tool trials, Grip Congruency (congruent, incongruent)
between the tool mentioned in the sentence and the visual tool
was considered as an additional within-subjects factor. Besides,
the levels of Tool Grip factor referred to the hand posture
appropriate for grasping the visual tool. In both the ANOVAs,
skewness and kurtosis of RTs distributions were examined to
determine whether the data were normally distributed. Following
West et al. (1995), we assumed as reference to substantial
departure from normality, an absolute skewness index > 2
and an absolute kurtosis index > 7. Violations of sphericity
were controlled using Mauchly’s test of sphericity and either
Greenhouse-Geisser or Huynh-Feldt corrections were applied
according to Girden (1992). If a Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon of
>0.75 was found, the Huynth-Feldt corrected value was used
for that parameter. Otherwise the Greenhouse-Geisser corrected
value was used. Partial eta squared values (η2p) were reported
as a metric of effect size for all significant ANOVA contrasts.
The Duncan’s test was used for post-hoc comparisons with a
significance level set at 0.05. Only the significant results will be
reported.
Same-Tool Trials
RTs were normally distributed as the skewness and kurtosis
indexes were within acceptable ranges of normality (skewness =
0.93 ± 0.05; kurtosis = 0.38 ± 0.10). The ANOVA revealed a
main effect of Tool Grip [F(1, 26) = 18.37, MSE = 155,733, p
< 0.001, η2p = 0.41], indicating longer response latencies when
the tool was graspable with a power grip than with a precision
grip (647 vs. 609 ms). The analysis also showed a main effect of
Verb Pair [F(1.9, 49.46) = 36.83, MSE = 540959, p < 0.0001, η
2
p =
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Experiment 1—Response errors over time. The critical trials were sorted according to increasing RTs and grouped into 10 different temporal bins of
approximately 285 trials each. For each bin, the averaged error rate was computed separately for the same-tool trials (outline disks) and the different-tool trials (outline
diamonds). (B) Experiment 1—Same-tool trials. Averaged RTs as a function of Verb Pair separately for compatible and incompatible Hand/Handle Orientations (light
gray rectangles and dark gray rectangles, respectively). The error bars represent the standard error.
0.59]. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that RTs were faster for the
sentences comprising the verb pair “grasp and use” (582 ms) as
compared to all the other verb pairs (“grasp and move” = 608
ms, p < 0.05; “look at and grasp” = 609 ms, p < 0.05; “look
at and stare” = 705 ms, p < 0.001). RTs measured for the verb
pairs “grasp and move” and “look at and grasp” did not differ
from each other (p = 0.91), but they were significantly faster
than RTs measured for the verb pair “look at and stare” (all ps
< 0.001). In addition, there was a significant 2-ways interaction
between Verb Pair and Hand/Handle Orientation [F(3, 78) = 2.80,
MSE = 17675, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.10], indicating that in the
“grasp and use” trials the participants were faster when their
response hand was spatially incompatible with the tool handle
(562 ms) than when the response hand and the tool handle
were spatially compatible (601 ms, p < 0.02, see Figure 2B). No
effect of Hand/Handle Orientation was found for the other verb
pairs.
Different-Tool Trials
RTs were normally distributed as the skewness and kurtosis
indexes were within acceptable ranges of normality (skewness =
−0.33 ± 0.05; kurtosis = 0.02 ± 0.10). The ANOVA revealed
a main effect of Verb Pair [F(3, 60) = 20.34, MSE = 346,782,
p < 0.0001, η2p = 0.50], with longer response latencies for
the sentences comprising the verbal pair “look at and stare”
(715ms) as compared to the other sentences (all ps < 0.001). In
contrast with the results found for the same-tool trials, the post-
hoc comparisons revealed no significant differences between the
sentences comprising the verb pair “grasp and use” (628ms) and
those expressing the other grasping sequences (“grasp and move”
= 619ms, “look at and grasp”= 654ms, all ps> 0.07).
Discussion
The results of both the analyses showed converging support
for our hypothesis that the chained organization is encoded
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in language. In line with the idea that objects are represented
primarily in terms of the actions they afford, we found that in the
same-tool trials the sentences expressing the pure observational
motor chain (i.e., look-at-to-stare) primed the participants’
responses less efficiently than the sentences expressing a chain in
which the motor act of grasping was embedded (for convergent
findings on the difference between observation and action
sentences, see Borghi and Riggio, 2009; Costantini et al., 2011).
In addition, consistently with the fact that tools are represented
primarily in terms of their function, the time required to perform
the word-picture matching task in the same-tool trials was
modulated by the final goal of the action expressed by the
sentence. The sentences expressing the grasp-to-use motor chain
primed the participants’ responses more efficiently than the
sentences expressing the graspingmotor chains not overtly aimed
at using the tool (i.e., grasp-to-move and look-at-to-grasp). This
finding (see Costantini et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2012, for similar
results) points toward the possibility that the grasping motor
chain aimed at using a tool, as compared with the other motor
chains, selectively triggers the activation of the most crucial
motor information of the conceptual representation of the tool,
that is its functional information (i.e., the motor information
about how to use an object). As already observed in previous
studies, functional knowledge associated with manipulable man-
made objects is an important component of their conceptual
representation (e.g., Kellenbach et al., 2003; Vainio et al., 2008;
Jax and Buxbaum, 2010). This knowledge is activated very early
when identifying words or reading them formeaning and showed
amarked benefit in priming tasks (Moss et al., 1997; Myung et al.,
2006; Bub et al., 2008; Bub and Masson, 2010).
The idea that the grasp-to-use motor chain drove a selective
activation of the functional information during tool noun
understanding is further supported by the third result collected
in the same-tool trials. In particular, we found that the grasp-
to-use motor chain led to faster responses when the response
hand and the handle of the visually presented tool were spatially
incompatible. While the inversion of the affordance effect has
been occasionally found in previous studies with objects (e.g.
Pellicano et al., 2010; Kostov and Janyan, 2015), to our knowledge
it is the first time in which it is reported in language processing.
This remarkable inversion of the classic affordance effect (i.e.,
faster responses when the response hand and the handle of a
graspable object are spatially compatible, see e.g., Tucker and
Ellis, 1998) suggests that the functional information evoked by
the grasp-to-use motor chain included details pertaining to the
tool tip which subserves tool usage. It is likely that the activation
of these details drove the attention of the participants to focus
on the functional portion of the tool during the successive
processing of the visual stimulus, so that the tip of the tool
acquired a directional meaning and generated the inverted
affordance effect which parallels the Simon effect that occurs
with centrally presented stimuli conveying spatial information,
such as arrows (e.g., Tipples, 2002). Notably, recent findings
suggest that the way we shift attention or explore an object is
biased toward action-relevant information (e.g., Handy et al.,
2003; Roberts and Humphreys, 2011; Ambrosini and Costantini,
2017). In particular, Ambrosini and Costantini (2017) showed
that participants mostly fixate the action-related, functional part
of the tools, regardless of its visual saliency. Crucially, the effect
was strongly reduced when participants were required to tie their
hands behind their back. The results lead to the conclusion that
the action-relevant object information at least in part guides gaze
behavior and visual attention.
The lack of a canonical affordance effect in the sentences
expressing the grasping motor chains not overtly aimed at
tool usage does not imply that no motor information was
evoked during the comprehension of the tool noun. Indeed,
these sentences were significantly more effective than the
sentences containing the pure observational motor chain in
priming participants’ responses. More likely, the non-functional
grasping chains triggered, along with the functional information,
the activation of the volumetric information (i.e., the motor
information about how to manipulate an object) with the result
that the details associated to the tool tip were contrasted with the
details associated to the tool handle, generating no observable
bias in the participants’ responses. This is in keeping with the
results of recent studies (Bub et al., 2008; Bub and Masson, 2010;
Jax and Buxbaum, 2010; Pellicano et al., 2010) showing that both
functional and volumetric information are activated in parallel
by visual tools and that a convergence between these two kinds
of information takes place, with the result of a conflict or a
summation depending on their mutual consistency.
The idea of a parallel and converging activation of functional
and manipulation information during tool noun comprehension
is also supported by the results of the different-tool trials. In
particular, when the tool in the sentence and the tool in the
picture did not share the same function, the advantage for the
grasp-to-use motor chain over the other grasping motor chains
disappeared. This finding converges with results collected by
Myung et al. (2006), showing that nouns denoting man-made
objects can prime one another only if hand gestures related to
their conventional use are similar (e.g., running a lexical decision
on the word “piano” was faster when it was preceded by the
word “typewriter” than by a control word), and indicates that
presenting the picture of a different tool as that mentioned in a
grasp-to-use sentence, suppressed the primacy of the functional
information evoked by the noun, thus redressing the balance
between the functional and manipulation information.
EXPERIMENT 2
The word-picture matching task used in Experiment 1 turned out
to be quite difficult. Indeed, for most of the participants more
than one block of training trials was required. Moreover, at the
end of the experimental session, the participants often reported
that the task was quite demanding, mainly because of the high
number of verbs and their combinations they had to retain in
order to accomplish the task. The difficulty in performing the
word-picture matching task was also revealed by the grand mean
percentage error which resulted to be relatively high (16.92% of
total trials) and by the high variability of the data. In Experiment
2, we aimed at reducing the task difficulty by decreasing the
number of the verb pairs used in both critical and catch trials. We
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also aimed at reproducing the inverted affordance effect observed
in Experiment 1.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-four right-handed students of the University of Parma
(12 males and 12 females, mean age ± SD, 26.25 ± 3.47 years,
mean Edinburgh Handedness Questionnaire score ± SD, 0.75
± 0.19) took part in the experiment. The selection procedure
of the participants was the same as in Experiment 1. All the
participants gave a written informed consent before testing. The
study was conducted in accordance with the ethical standards laid
down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki and fulfilled the ethical
standard guidelines recommended by the Italian Association of
Psychology. The experimental protocol was also approved by the
research ethics committee at the University of Parma.
Materials
Fourteen digital color photographs of tools, identical to those in
Experiment 1, were used as visual stimuli. Unlike Experiment
1, in this experiment we created only 4 kinds of imperative
sentences with the same structure as the one previously used.
These sentences always included the verb “afferra” (or its
synonymous “prendi,” English translation: grasp) along with
an action verb (i.e., “afferra e usa”—grasp and use, “prendi e
muovi”—grasp and move, “afferra e disturba”—grasp and disturb,
and “prendi e ostacola”—grasp and hinder). The sentences
comprising the verbal pairs “grasp and use” and “grasp andmove”
were already used in Experiment 1 and served as critical trials.
Sentences comprising the verbal pairs “grasp and disturb” and
“grasp and hinder” worked as catch trials. It should be noted that
the combination of these two verb pairs with a noun referring to
a tool gave rise to sentences which did not make sense. We used
this kind of sentences as catch trials so that the participants would
not have to memorize the verb pairs to which they have to refrain
from responding. As in Experiment 1, the verb pairs used in the
critical sentences were composed of 6 syllables, and had a similar
additive relative lexical frequency. Moreover, nouns referring to
the precision-grip and power-grip tools were matched for syllable
number and lexical frequency (see Materials of Experiment 1).
Procedure
The same procedure was used as in Experiment 1, except that
the participants performed a block of 32 trials in the training
phase and a block of 224 trials in the test phase. In both phases,
the order of stimulus presentation was randomized and Verb
Pair (“grasp and use,” “grasp and move,” “grasp and disturb,”
and “grasp and hinder”), Tool Handle Orientation (left, right),
and Tool Grip (precision, power) factors were fully balanced.
As in the test phase of Experiment 1, each of the 4 verb pairs
was combined with each of the 14 tool nouns (for a total of
56 different sentences). Each sentence, which was presented 4
times during the whole test phase, was followed twice by the
photograph of the tool mentioned in the sentence (i.e., same-tool
trials),—with the handle pointing once downward to the left and
once downward to the right—, and twice by the photograph of a
tool not mentioned in the sentence (i.e., different-tool trials),—
with the handle pointing once downward to the left and once
downward to the right. The photographs used in the different-
tool trials depicted tools which were graspable with the same
kind of grip as that required to grasp the tool mentioned in the
sentence for half of the times, and with a different kind of grip
for the other half of the times. Throughout the test phase, the
participants could take a break after every 56 trials.
Results
The grand mean percentage error was 3.16% of total trials
(response errors= 1.96%, catch errors= 1.17%). The catch trials
and the wrong critical trials were excluded from the analysis.
Three participants were removed from the analysis because their
error rate was statistical outlier (i.e., two standard deviation
higher than the error rate grand mean). Before being analyzed,
the RTs measured for the correct critical trials were screened for
outliers according to the same criteria as applied in Experiment
1 (4.25% of correct RTs were omitted from the analysis). Given
that there was no speed-for-accuracy tradeoff, as determined by
a plot of error rate across decile temporal bins (see Figure 3A),
the remaining RTs measured for the same-tool trials and for
the different-tool trials were separately submitted to a mixed
ANOVA with the same between- and within-subjects factors
as considered in Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, skewness
and kurtosis of RTs distributions were examined to determine
whether the data were normally distributed (values for departure
from normality: skewness>2 and kurtosis>7; West et al., 1995).
Partial eta squared values (η2p) were reported as a metric of effect
size for all significant ANOVA contrasts. The Duncan’s test was
used as a post-hoc test with a significance level set at 0.05. As
before, only significant results have been reported.
Same-Tool Trials
RTs were normally distributed as the skewness and kurtosis
indexes were within acceptable ranges of normality (skewness =
1.42 ± 0.07; kurtosis = 2.38 ± 0.14). As in Experiment 1, the
ANOVA revealed a main effect of Tool Grip [F(1,20) = 29.76,
MSE = 44576, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.60], with longer response
latencies when the tool was graspable with a power grip than
with a precision grip (551 vs. 519 ms), as well as a main effect
of Verb Pair [F(1,20) = 12.10, MSE = 28,776, p < 0.003, η
2
p =
0.38], indicating faster RTs for sentences comprising the verbs
“grasp and use” (522 ms) than “grasp and move” (548 ms). In
addition, the ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between
Tool Grip and Verb Pair [F(1,20) = 4.90, MSE = 6343, p < 0.04,
η
2
p = 0.20], indicating that the primacy of the “grasp-and use”
sentences in priming subjects’ responses was confined to the tools
graspable with a precision grip (precision-grip tools = 499 ms,
power-grip tools= 544 ms; p< 0.001). Noticeably, there was also
a significant interaction between Verb Pair and Hand/Handle
Orientation [F(1,20)= 15.67,MSE= 25,068, p< 0.001, η
2
p = 0.44],
showing an inversion of the affordance effect for the sentences
containing the verbs “grasp and use” (congruent orientation =
531 ms, incongruent orientation = 513 ms; p < 0.05) and a
classic affordance effect for the sentences containing the verbs
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Experiment 2—Error rate across decile temporal bins of
approximately 108 trials each, for the same-tool trials (outline disks) and the
different-tool trials (outline diamonds), separately. (B) Experiment
2—Same-tool trials. Mean RTs as a function of Verb Pair separately for
congruent and incongruent Hand/Handle Orientations (gray squares and black
squares, respectively). The error bars represent the standard error.
“grasp and move” (congruent orientation= 533 ms, incongruent
orientation= 563 ms; p< 0.003; see Figure 3B).
Different-Tool Trials
RTs were normally distributed as the skewness and kurtosis
indexes were within acceptable ranges of normality (skewness =
1.72 ± 0.07; kurtosis = 3.47 ± 0.15). The ANOVA revealed a
main effect of Hand/Handle Orientation [F(1, 20) = 4.64, MSE =
13,117, p< 0.05, η2p = 0.19], indicating faster RTs when subjects’
response hand was spatially incompatible with the tool handle
(590 ms) that when it was compatible (603ms).
Discussion
Decreasing the number of verb pairs used in the critical trials
and reducing the cognitive load for the catch trials led to a
marked reduction of the task difficulty. Indeed, the grand mean
of percentage error was much lower than that of Experiment 1
(3.16 vs. 16.92%, respectively).
The results for the same-tool trials converge and extend those
collected in the previous experiment. First, it is confirmed our
interpretation that while understanding sentences obtained by
combining a pair of action verbs with the noun of a tool, the
motor information evoked by the noun is modulated by the
specific motor-chain expressed by the verbs, as the primacy of
the grasping-to-use motor chain over the grasp-to-move motor
chain in priming word-picture matching was replicated.
Second, we were able to reproduce the inverted affordance
effect observed in Experiment 1 for the “grasp and use” sentences.
Interestingly, the removal of the sentences containing at least an
observational act (i.e., “look at and grasp” and “look and stare”)
enabled the classic affordance effect to be significantly detected
in those trials where the grasp-to-move chain motor was used. It
is likely that, under this condition, the non-functional grasping
motor chain was plainly contrasted with the functional grasping
motor chain, rather than being assimilated to the observational
motor chains. As a consequence, the manipulation information
evoked by the noun was capable of prevailing over the functional
information, causing the affordance effect.
The results for the different-tool trials confirmed those
collected in Experiment 1, since the advantage for the functional
grasping motor chain over the non-functional motor chain in
priming picture matching completely disappeared. In addition,
there was an inversion of the affordance effect independently
of the specific motor chain expressed by the sentence likely
reflecting that coding the functional part of the visual tool assured
a better recognition when it was inconsistent with the tool
mentioned in the sentence.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In two experiments, we investigated the chained activation of the
motor system during language understanding by exploring the
priming effects exerted by the comprehension of a tool noun on
the recognition of a tool displayed in a picture presented shortly
after. The tool noun was combined with a pair of action verbs to
form a sentence expressing different grasping and observational
motor chains. Overall, our results reveal an important role of the
context as defined by the sentence in affordance perception; this is
in line with previous studies documenting the importance of both
verbal and visual context in affordance perception (e.g., Kalénine
et al., 2012, 2016; Borghi and Riggio, 2015). More specifically,
we found that accessing the meaning of the tool noun activated
motor information that changed in accordance with the final
goal of the motor chain expressed by the verbs. The functional
information prevailed on the volumetric information when the
noun of the tool was embedded in the grasp-to-use motor chain.
Motor information of the volumetric kind was likely activated
for the grasp-to-move motor chain and when the tool noun was
embedded in the look-at-to-grasp motor chain. Instead, action
information was absent if the pure observational motor chain was
used (i.e., look-at-and-stare), as the slower RTs reveal.
The advantage of the precision-grip tools over the power-
grip tools that we found in both the experiments is in contrast
with a number of studies showing lower RTs in responding to
power-grip tools as compared to precision-grip tools (Ehrsson
et al., 2001; Borghi and Riggio, 2009; Kalénine et al., 2014).
It is likely that our functional motor chains selectively activate
motor information related to a grasping gesture performed using
a precision grip and this may be the likely reason why we found
an advantage of the prevision-grip tool over the power-grip tool.
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This possibility is supported by the results of Experiment 2,
showing that the precision-grip tool advantage is consistent only
in trials where the grasp-to-use motor chain was used.
The current study is novel as it provides evidence that
the motor information activated while understanding nouns of
common tools has a goal-directed structure. In other words,
the motor information these nouns are capable of activating is
dependent on the aim of the global action performed with the
tool and described by the other linguistic component of the
sentence. This is in keeping with the idea that the activation
of motor information by graspable objects always demands a
selection of competing motor information (e.g., Fagg and Arbib,
1998). The context in which the objects are presented is thought
to be a crucial factor that drives this selection. In an fMRI
study, Iacoboni et al. (2005) showed reliable differences in the
activity of the inferior frontal region during the observation of a
grasping action (i.e., a hand seizing a cup) carried out in different
contexts (i.e., “before tea” vs. “after tea”), likely indicating an
automatic coding of the intention/goal behind the observed
action (i.e., grasping the cup for drinking vs. grasping the cup
for cleaning, respectively). More recently, Mizelle and Wheaton
(2010), evaluating the neural correlates for tool identification and
conceptual understanding with electroencephalography (EEG),
found greater activity over the left temporo-parietal junction
(that is thought to be part of a manipulation network) for
tools presented in a matching functional-related context (i.e.,
followed by objects upon which the tools can act) than in a
mismatching functional-related context. Preliminary evidence
supporting a context-guided selection of motor information
evoked by graspable objects was found also when a verbal
presentation was used. For example, Lee et al. (2012), using eye-
movement recording, found that the activation time course of
functional and volumetric motor information by words of tools
was modulated by the linguistic context in which the words
are embedded (neutral vs. action-relevant context). Similarly,
Marino et al. (2012) found that the motor information evoked
during the comprehension of nouns of graspable objects was
shaped by the sensorimotor specificity expressed by the sentence
in which the nouns are embedded.
Since context (mostly expressed by verbs) and objects
(expressed by nouns) are not presented in parallel by language,
as it is for vision, it is an open question how these two
factors interact in activating and selecting themotor information.
Two processes are theoretically possible. According to Bub and
Masson (2010), a process of activation-then-selection occurs
during sentence understanding. Specifically, different types of
motor information become active in response to a noun
denoting a manipulable object. This activation is followed by a
selection of relevant motor programs which is determined by
the context expressed by the remaining linguistic components
of the sentence. The current study provides evidence compatible
with the alternative process, that is selection-then-activation:
understanding action-related verbs, that in most of west
European languages, such as Italian and English, precede the
nouns defining the graspable objects to which the verbs refer,
seems to automatically select a motor intention that enhances the
activation by the nouns of the most contextually-relevant set of
motor information among those possible.
Our finding of a goal-directed structure of motor information
evoked by nouns referring to tools is consistent with the
idea of a chained activation of the motor system during
the comprehension of action-related linguistic material. This
supports the embodied theory of language (Gallese and Lakoff,
2005; Glenberg, 2007; Gallese, 2008; Glenberg and Gallese, 2012)
according to which, the linguistic system re-uses the structures of
themotor system (see Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998 for the basic role
of the motor system in language evolution). Taken together the
results of the current work suggest that processing combinations
of action-related nouns and verbs involve the activation of the
cortical motor system in a manner that parallels the organization
of motor behavior and provide some hints that the syntax of
language may be equivalent to the syntax of action (Dominey
et al., 2003; Gallese, 2007, 2008; Clerget et al., 2009; Fazio et al.,
2009; Pulvermüller and Fadiga, 2010; Marino et al., 2013).
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Language and emotions are closely linked. However, previous research suggests that
this link is stronger in a native language (L1) than in a second language (L2) that
had been learned later in life. The present study investigates whether such reduced
emotionality in L2 is reflected in changes in emotional memory and embodied responses
to L2 in comparison to L1. Late Spanish/English bilinguals performed a memory task
involving an encoding and a surprise retrieval phase. Facial motor resonance and skin
conductance (SC) responses were recorded during encoding. The results give first
indications that the enhanced memory for emotional vs. neutral content (EEM effect)
is stronger in L1 and less present in L2. Furthermore, the results give partial support
for decreased facial motor resonance and SC responses to emotional words in L2
as compared to L1. These findings suggest that embodied knowledge involved in
emotional memory is associated to increased affective encoding and retrieval of L1
compared to L2.
Keywords: embodiment, emotional memory, first language, second language, EMG, facial motor resonance, skin
conductance
INTRODUCTION
Theories of grounded, or embodied cognition propose that the role of the body goes well beyond
that of an instrument by which our actions are realized. Instead, these theories argue that bodily
processes contribute to our perception, feelings, thoughts, and behavior (for reviews, see Barsalou,
2008; Winkielman et al., 2015). In the embodied view, knowledge about emotions is grounded
in internal systems including the motor, sensory, and autonomic nervous systems. For example,
upon the mere viewing of an emotional word or picture, a series of bodily reactions is evoked: Skin
conductance (SC; an indicator of physiological arousal) and heart rate (HR) may increase, and we
may produce spontaneous facial expressions reflecting a stimulus’ relevant emotional connotation.
For example, the zygomaticus major muscle, involved in smiling, has been shown activate in
response to positive stimuli, such as pictures and words (Larsen et al., 2003). This involuntary
activation of mimetic muscles, sometimes also called facial muscle resonance, can be measured
by electromyography recordings (EMG) from probes placed directly above the facial muscle of
interest (Cacioppo and Petty, 1981). The range of emotional stimuli to which the mimetic muscles
automatically react includes facial expressions (e.g., Dimberg et al., 2000), emotional tone (Quené
et al., 2012), as well as emotional words and sentences (e.g., Foroni and Semin, 2009, 2013; Davis
et al., 2015; Foroni, 2015; Fino et al., 2016).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org March 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 39488
fpsyg-08-00394 March 21, 2017 Time: 18:4 # 2
Baumeister et al. Embodiment and Emotional Memory in L2
However, some recent studies suggest that these embodied
activations are less evolved in a second language (L2) as compared
to a first language (L1; see Pavlenko, 2012, for a review). For
example, Eilola and Havelka (2010) showed that L1 speakers
reacted with higher SC to negative and taboo words compared
with neutral and positive words while performing an emotional
Stroop task (naming color of emotional words). No such pattern
was observed for L2 speakers. In line with this, other studies have
demonstrated higher SC responses in late bilinguals when they
listened to or rated emotional words, phrases, or reprimands in
L1 but not in L2 (Harris et al., 2003; Harris, 2004; Caldwell-Harris
and Ayçiçegˇi-Dinn, 2009). A recent study extending this line of
research indicated that a reduction in embodied responses to L2
might also reflect only partial activation of facial motor resonance
(Foroni, 2015).
The idea that facial motor resonance is less developed in an L2
gains importance when considering that the theories of embodied
cognition regard facial motor resonance as an important
source of embodied knowledge. It is thought to facilitate
affective processing and help us to understand the emotional
connotation carried by a given stimulus (e.g., Niedenthal, 2007;
Winkielman et al., 2008; Wood et al., 2016). For example,
blocking participants’ mimic muscles and thereby hindering their
spontaneous facial motor resonance has been shown to impair
the recognition of emotional words and other people’s facial
expressions, and to increase difficulty in processing of emotional
sentences (e.g., Oberman et al., 2007; Niedenthal et al., 2009;
Havas et al., 2010; Ponari et al., 2012; Davis et al., 2015). In
a recent study (Baumeister et al., 2015), we extended this line
of research by showing that blocking facial motor resonance
during encoding or retrieval not only interferes with initial
recognition of emotional words but also impedes their later
retrieval. When facial motor resonance had been blocked during
the experiment the usually observed memory advantage for
emotional words over neutral ones [Emotional Enhancement of
Memory (EEM) effect; see Hamann, 2001, for a review] was
hampered.
Considering this latter finding, and bearing in mind
that an L2 has been found to only partially evoke facial
motor resonance (Foroni, 2015), the question arises as to
whether such a presumable ‘disembodiment’ of L2 (see also
Pavlenko, 2012) might also reflect in diminished affective
processing and a weakened EEM effect for emotional L2 words.
Several introspective reports, surveys, interviews, and clinical
observations suggest that people remain emotionally distant
from an L2 if it was not learned during early childhood1 (see
Caldwell-Harris, 2015, for a recent review). The cognitive and
behavioral effects of this emotional distance to an L2 are well
documented (e.g., Colbeck and Bowers, 2012; Keysar et al., 2012;
Duñabeitia and Costa, 2015). However, there has been a debate
as to whether these behavioral differences also extend to the EEM
effect.
1This study only reviews, discusses and draws conclusions from studies in which
participants acquired their second language in late childhood, meaning after the
age of 8. Whenever we use the term L2 within this study, we refer to a L2 that was
learned after the age of 8.
If facial motor resonance occurring in response to emotion-
laden words is decreased in L2 as compared to L1, then this
could interfere with an EEM effect in L2. In line with this
hypothesis, a study by Anooshian and Hertel (1994) resulted
in an EEM effect for L1 but not for L2. Yet, the absence of
an EEM effect in L2 is not a consistent phenomenon. Ayçiçegˇi
and Harris (2004) found that both L1 and L2 displayed an
EEM effect, and the effect was even stronger in L2. In a follow-
up to their research, the authors modified the incidental study
task to control how deeply participants processed the emotional
connotation of the stimuli. This time, the results revealed an
EEM effect for L1 but not for L2, provided that the study
phase required deep encoding (Ayçiçegˇi-Dinn and Caldwell-
Harris, 2009). A possible explanation for these different results
may be that encoding of L2 is more effortful than encoding
of L1. When L2 and L1 words are mixed during encoding,
as was the case in the procedures employed by Ayçiçegˇi and
Harris (2004) and Ayçiçegˇi-Dinn and Caldwell-Harris (2009),
the elaborative processes and novelty effects associated with
L2 may interfere with the processing of words presented in
L1. In order to avoid such carry-over effects and distractive
task-switching, it could be important to present words in
separate blocks for each language. Furthermore, if deep and
elaborative processing is encouraged by task instruction for
both L2 and L1, then this may lead to a more comparable
encoding depth for L2 and L1. These two aspects have been taken
into consideration for the experimental set-up of the present
study.
The present study aimed to explore the link between embodied
processes and memory for emotional content within the frame
of L1 and L2 processing. A group of late Spanish/English
bilinguals underwent a classical memory task involving encoding
and retrieval of both emotionally charged and neutral words in
both languages. Facial muscle EMG activity and SC responses
were obtained during the encoding phase, in which participants
performed a categorization task, which required them to
categorize words into “associated to emotion” or “not associated
to emotion.” This specific categorization task was meant to
induce deep word processing, thought to encourage participants
to internally simulate their emotional content (Niedenthal et al.,
2009). We predicted that the processing of emotional L2 words
would elicit less facial motor resonance and reduced SC responses
in comparison to the processing of emotional L1 words. Since
embodied simulations have been shown to be modifiable on
different levels, including their magnitude, onset, and duration
(Simmons et al., 2008), we theorized that the presumable weaker
response of facial motor resonance to an L2 could either lead
to lower magnitude, to a delay and abbreviation in the mimetic
muscle responses, or both. Furthermore, we hypothesized that
any reduction of embodied simulations in L2 will impact
the initial perception and later memory of emotional words.
Regarding the encoding phase, this means that accuracy for
categorizing emotional words should be reduced in L2. The
presumable link between facial motor resonance and memory for
emotional content (Baumeister et al., 2015) raises the expectation
that in terms of the memory performance the EEM would
be present in L1 but absent or reduced in L2. Finally, we
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speculated that participants’ levels of facial motor resonance
would covary with the retrieval accuracy of emotional word-
types in L1. Since processing information in L2 may depend
more than L1 on executive control functions (Keysar et al., 2012),
our hypothesis in regard to any correlations between motor
resonance activation and memory for emotional words in L2 was
less definite.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Thirty-two young healthy late bilinguals (17 females; mean age:
26.4 ± 5.2) recruited in Southern California and bordering areas
of Mexico participated in the experiment. Participants’ first-
learned (native) language was either English (13 participants)
or Spanish (19 participants), and they spoke their second
language (Spanish or English, respectively) at an advanced level.
Participants self-assessed (cf. Marian and Neisser, 2000; Pavlenko,
2005) their levels of speaking, reading, and understanding of
L2 on a scale from 1 (very poor) to 10 (perfect) as being on
average very good [speaking: M = 8.5. SD = 1.1; reading:
M = 8.8, SD = 1.1; understanding: M = 8.9, SD = 1.1;
ratings ranged from 7 (good) to 10 (perfect)]. Participants
reached fluency in their L2 at a mean age of 15 (SD = 6.3;
age range from 8 to 32 years). Though, most participants had
started learning their L2 in a classroom setting, all participants
reported to have spent a minimum of 12 months in a country
where their L2 was the native language (either because of
immigration or because of a student exchange) and to have
reached fluency in their L2 during that time. In a classical 1-min
letter fluency task, participants produced on average 11 words
in L1 (SD = 3.1) and nine words in L2 (SD = 3.2). A paired-
samples t-test showed that this difference was significant,
t(28) = 2.5, p = 0.02. Three participants were excluded from
all analyses, two because of insufficient fluency in L2 and one
due to self-judged onset of fluency in L2 earlier than age
8. Technical malfunctioning led to a loss of data of three
further participants, leaving data of 26 participants for the
analyses.
Stimuli
Pilot
All final stimuli were selected from a large pool of words
composed mainly by word pairs (English–Spanish translations)
from an affective database for English and Spanish words
(Conrad et al., n.d.), and some emotional words used in a
previous research project. A total pool of 345 word pairs was
selected for piloting. Words were pre-selected to be associated
to the concepts of Happiness or Anger (see also Niedenthal
et al., 2009, for the same emotion concepts) or to be neutral
according to the previous ratings they had received. To allow
comparability, all words were rated again in both languages by
24 native speakers (12 native English speakers rating the English
words; 12 native Spanish speakers rating the Spanish words) in
an online survey. Not all participants completed all blocks of the
pilot, but all words received ratings by at least 10 participants.
Ratings were done in regard to the words’ association to the
concepts of anger, happiness, and overall emotionality on a scale
from 1 (not at all associated to) to 9 (very much associated
to). Further ratings were done by the same native speakers
in regard to imageability and arousal, again on scales from
1 to 9.
Final Word-Selection
In order to be selected as a stimulus, the happy and angry word-
pairs were required to be rated across both languages > 3.5
on the respective emotion scale, to be associated to emotional
content in general (rating > 3.0), and to not be associated to
the other emotions considered (rating < 2.5). Word-pairs were
considered as neutral when they were rated in both languages
below 3.3 both on the general and the specific emotionality
scales. In this way, 320 word-pairs were selected. Happy words
were rated higher on the happiness scale (M = 6.8, SD = 1.10)
than angry (M = 1.1, SD = 0.13) and neutral words (M = 1.7,
SD = 0.52), and angry words were rated higher on the anger
scale (M = 6.2, SD = 1.5) in comparison with happy (M = 1.5
SD= 0.60) and neutral words (M= 1.5, SD= 0.24). Furthermore,
neutral words were rated lowest on overall emotionality (M= 1.6,
SD = 0.60) in comparison with both happy (M = 5.7, SD = 1.6)
and angry words [M = 6.0, SD = 1.5; all Fs(2,639) > 1006,
ps< 0.001]. There were no differences between the languages for
neither the individual emotion ratings nor in terms of arousal
and imageability, frequency or word length (all ps > 0.25).
Furthermore, the individual word categories did no differ in
terms of frequency, word length, or imageability. This was
true also when analyzed separately for each language [all
Fs(2,319) < 1.72, ps > 0.18], nor when averaged across them
[all Fs(2,639) < 2.0, all ps > 0.13]. As expected, neutral words
were less arousing than happy and angry words [F(2,639) = 379,
p < 0.001]. Detailed information on individual variable ratings
per language and word category are given in Supplementary
Table 1. All words were divided into eight wordlists (four
English wordlists and four Spanish wordlists). Each wordlist
was composed of 20 happy words (e.g., Joy, Sweets), 20 angry
words (e.g., Murderer, Harassment), and 40 neutral words (e.g.,
Code, Subject). These wordlists were assembled to form four
sets, each including one English and one Spanish wordlist. An
English word and its Spanish translation were never assigned
to the same set. The four sets (composed of one English and
one Spanish wordlist and thus containing 160 words each) were
designed to not differ in word frequency (based on the English
and Spanish versions of SUBTLEX; Brysbaert and New, 2009;
Cuetos et al., 2011), word length, imageability, and arousal within
the English [Fs(3,319) < 2.0, ps > 0.12] and Spanish words
[Fs(3,319) < 1.4, ps > 0.26]. Furthermore, English and Spanish
emotion-laden words (angry and happy) were separately matched
across all four sets in terms of their ratings on the respective
emotion-scale (anger- and happiness-scale), whereas neutral
words were matched for their average overall emotionality ratings
[all Fs(3,156) < 0.34, all ps > 0.80]. Finally, it was ensured
that within each set, words differed significantly on happiness,
anger, and overall emotionality ratings [all Fs(2,159) > 247, all
ps < 0.001]. See Supplementary Table 2 for the full list of words.
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PROCEDURE
The study protocol was approved by the Ethics Committee of the
University of California, San Diego. The experiment involved an
encoding phase and a surprise retrieval phase on two consecutive
days. Instructions were presented in the participant’s native
language and described the experiment as investigating the effect
of SC on word processing in a native and second language.
Participants were not informed about the hypothesis related
to facial muscle activity and about the subsequent memory
test.
Encoding Phase
Upon arrival for the first session, participants first read and
signed a consent form and then completed the Language
Experience and Proficiency Questionnaire (LEAP-Q; Marian
et al., 2007) to assess their language ability in L1 and L2. Potential
baseline differences in daily affect and mood were assessed by the
Positive and Negative Affect Schedules (PANAS; Watson et al.,
1988), presented in the respective L1 (for the Spanish version,
see Sandín et al., 1999). To lower skin impedance for better
EMG signals, the skin areas above the zygomaticus major and
corrugator supercilii were prepared with cotton pads and abrasive
lotion. Residue of the abrasive lotion was removed with cotton
pads soaked in alcohol. Bipolar 4-mm EMG electrodes were
attached to the corrugator supercilii and the zygomaticus major
on the left side of the face. SC was recorded with gold-plated
electrodes on the index and middle fingers of the non-dominant
hand.
During the first session, participants performed a classification
task, requiring them to categorize words into “associated to
emotion” or “not associated to emotion” by pressing one of
two buttons on a keyboard. Labels to the left and right of the
computer monitor served as reminders of the button-assignment
throughout the experiment. The English and Spanish word lists
of one of the four sets were presented in separate blocks on a
computer screen, divided by a short break (5 min). The order
of word-lists (English word list vs. Spanish word list) within
each set and the set presentation itself were randomized across
participants. Each trial started with a fixation-cross presented
for 2 s. This was followed by the randomly ordered display
of the word stimulus for 3 s and was concluded with the
display of a question mark, all presented via E-Prime software
(Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA). To avoid
movement interference with the EMG recordings, participants
were instructed to wait for the question mark to give their
response. After the response, the next trial started. Every
participant started with a short practice session (six trials).
Retrieval Phase
The second session took place 24 h later and started with
participants filling out the PANAS for a second time. This was
followed by a surprise memory task. Words from the old and the
new set were mixed and randomly presented within a Spanish
and English block, providing an equal number of old and new
words. Each word was presented individually on a computer
screen. Participants’ task was to indicate whether the word had
been presented during the encoding phase (old) or whether it was
new (new) by pressing one of two buttons. Signs left and right of
the computer screen indicated the button-assignment and served
as reminders.
EMG/SC Acquisition
Electromyography and skin conductance signals were recorded
using BIOPAC MP150 modules (BIOPAC Systems, Inc., Goleta,
CA, USA) set at a sample rate of 2,000 samples per second with
gain set to 100. The signals were filtered using a bandpass from 20
to 400 Hz and a notch filter at 60 Hz. The acquisition of the EMG
signals was controlled by BIOPAC’s AcqKnowledge software
Version 3.0.21 (Mindware Technologies LTD., Gahanna, OH,
USA).
RESULTS
PANAS
The self-ratings of the PANAS revealed no significant differences
between the first and second session of the experiment
(ps > 0.25), and were thus disregarded in further analyses.
EMG/SC Data Preparation
Offline processing of the EMG data was performed with software
from Mindware Corporation. EMG signals were rectified,
integrated, and averaged for a period of 2500 ms in chunks
of 500 ms after stimulus onset. Data were cleaned for each
participant and each muscle individually, removing data points
above or below three SD of participant’s mean. The baseline
(recorded during the presentation of the fixation cross, 500 ms
before the target) was subtracted from the mean activity. The
baseline-corrected score was used as the dependent variable.
The same cleaning was applied to the SC data, with the only
difference that due to their usual delayed by around 1–3 s after
cue onset (see Dawson et al., 2007), SC signals were averaged
in chunks of 500 ms for a time period from 1500 to 3000 ms
after stimulus onset. For the SC, the root mean square was
calculated and all data were standardized. All EMG and SC data
associated to trials in which the word presented was incorrectly
categorized during the encoding phase were excluded from the
analyses (8%).
Statistical Analysis EMG Data
To examine the relationship between EMG data, language,
and word-type, we ran two separate repeated measures
ANOVAs one for each muscle (zygomaticus and corrugator;
see Figure 1). The within-subjects factors were language (L1
vs. L2), word-type (happy vs. angry vs. neutral), and time-
point (0–500 ms, 500–1000 ms, 1000–1500 ms, 1500–2000 ms,
2000–2500 ms). The Greenhouse–Geisser epsilon correction
was applied throughout all analyses to adjust the degrees
of freedom of the F-ratios when necessary. Furthermore, all
p-values of paired-samples t-tests are 2-tailed and were Holm–
Bonferroni corrected. For the zygomaticus muscle, this analysis
revealed a strong effect of word-type [F(2,40) = 5.80, p < 0.01,
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FIGURE 1 | Mean zygomaticus (Upper) and corrugator activity (Lower) by time as a function of word-type and language. Figures show electromyography
(EMG) activity in response to happy words (black) vs. angry words (gray) in L1 (left panel) and in L2 (right panel). Error bars represent ±1 SEM. ∗p ≤ 0.05 (two-tailed).
η2p = 0.19] and a strong interaction of word-type and time-
point [F(3,67) = 5.32, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.18]. The interactions
between language and word-type [F(2,50) = 0.15, η2p = 0.006]
or between language, word-type, and time-point [F(4,97)= 0.94,
η2p = 0.04] revealed, however, no significant effects (p = 0.87
and p = 0.49, respectively). For the corrugator muscle, a
marginal interaction between language and word-type was
present [F(2,47) = 2.47, p = 0.09, η2p = 0.09]. The expected
main effect of word-type remained, despite a medium sized
effect, insignificant [F(2,39) = 1.29, p = 0.28, η2p = 0.05]. Also
the interaction between language, word-type, and time-point
remained insignificant [F(8,200)= 0.90, p= 0.52, η2p = 0.04].
Despite the absence of the expected interactions, the visual
inspection of the data (see Figure 1) suggested that the
zygomaticus and the corrugator muscle are differently activated
by L1 and L2, particularly in later time windows. We therefore
decided to conduct further analyses with the intention to explore
facial muscle reactivity in response to emotional words in L1 and
L2 at each time point. In a series of pairwise comparisons, EMG
activity in response to happy vs. angry words was compared over
the five time intervals. Hereby, the activity over zygomaticus and
corrugator muscles was analyzed separately.
Zygomaticus
Significant differences in response to happy vs. angry words in
L1 were recorded in the time window 1500–3000 ms after word
onset. In comparison, the zygomaticus activity for happy vs.
angry words in L2, differentiated only in the time window
2000–2500 ms after word onset. This result indicates a
later onset and shorter duration of specifiable zygomaticus
activity in response to happy vs. angry words in L2
compared with L1 (see Figure 1). A direct comparison
of the averaged differential activity of the zygomaticus
in response to happy vs. angry words in L1 vs. L2 did
not reach significance [t(25) = 1.02, p = 0.22, Cohen’s
d = 0.26].
Corrugator
Exploring the specifiable activity of the corrugator in response
to angry vs. happy words across time revealed significant results
only within L1. Corrugator activity was stronger in response
to angry words vs. happy words in L1, starting from 2000 ms
after stimulus onset. No significant differences of corrugator
activity in response to angry vs. happy words were observed in L2
(see Figure 1). A direct comparison of the averaged differential
activity of the corrugator in response to angry vs. happy words in
L1 vs. L2 gave some indication that the corrugator activity evoked
by L2 words was lower than in L1 [t(25)= 1.25, p= 0.06, Cohen’s
d = 0.39].
Statistical Analysis of SC Data
Since the Skin Conductance Response (SCR) is only sensitive to
arousal but not to different valences, it was averaged for both
emotional word-types (happy and angry) within each of the
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org March 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 39492
fpsyg-08-00394 March 21, 2017 Time: 18:4 # 6
Baumeister et al. Embodiment and Emotional Memory in L2
FIGURE 2 | Skin conductance (SC) in response to emotional (happy
and angry together) and neutral words presented in L1 vs. L2
averaged for the period from 1.5 to 3 s after stimulus onset. Error bars
represent ±1 SEM. ∗p ≤ 0.05 (two-tailed).
three 500 ms long time windows from 1500 to 3000 ms after
cue onset. SCR-scores were submitted to a repeated-measures
ANOVA with language (L1 vs. L2), word-type (emotional vs.
neutral) and time point (1500–2000 ms, 2000–2500 ms, 2500–
3000 ms) as within-subjects factors. The analysis resulted in
a marginal three-way interaction [F(1,30) = 3.3, p = 0.07,
η2p = 0.12] and a significant interaction between language and
emotion [F(1,25)= 4.5, p= 0.05, η2p= 0.15]. We hence continued
the analysis by disregarding the factor time point and averaged
the SC responses across the time windows from 1500 to 3000 ms
post cue onset (Figure 2). Pairwise comparisons with these values
revealed a significantly stronger SCR to emotional words in L1
(M = 0.03, SD = 0.10) in comparison with L2 [M = −0.01,
SD= 0.11, t(25)= 2.2, p= 0.04, Cohen’s d= 0.68]. No differences
between L1 (M = 0.02) and L2 (M = 0.01) were present for the
neutral words [t(25)= 0.43, p= 0.67, Cohen’s d = 0.12].
Statistical Analysis of the Behavioral
Data
Encoding Phase
The dependent variable was the accuracy in discriminating
emotional words from neutral words, expressed by the sensitivity
index d’ (Green and Swets, 1966/1974). A paired-samples t-test
showed that performance was significantly better in L1 than in L2
[t(28)= 2.1, p= 0.05, Cohen’s d= 0.38]. Since it could be argued
that this was simply due to lower proficiency rather than reduced
emotionality in L2 we investigated whether any differences in
response bias, as calculated by the measure c, would be present
for L1 and L2. The criterion c is defined as the distance measured
in SD between the criterion and the neutral point, where neither
response is favored. This analysis revealed a subtle bias toward
judging words to be neutral in L2 (c = 0.04) and to be emotional
in L1 (c = −0.30). The difference between these two response
tendencies was marginally significant [t(28) = 2.0, p = 0.09]. To
further investigated on the suspected reduced emotionality in L2,
two paired samples t-tests compared the accuracy in percent for
emotional words and accuracy for neutral words separately across
languages. As expected, this revealed no significant difference
between L1 (M = 0.85, SD= 0.08) and L2 (M = 0.82, SD= 0.11)
for neutral words [t(27) = 1.6, p = 0.12, Cohen’s d = 0.31];
however, unexpectedly, it also revealed no effect for emotional
words [L1: M = 0.84, SD = 0.12; L2: M = 0.80, SD = 0.16;
t(27)= 1.3, p= 0.20, Cohen’s d= 0.28]. In both cases, L1 showed
a tendency for higher accuracy compared with L2.
Several interpretations of these results seem possible. For
example, these results could lead one to assume that the difference
in d’ might simply be a matter of fluency, which equally affects
the neutral and the emotional word-types. However, the marginal
response bias toward judging words as emotional in L1 but not
in L2 speaks against this explanation. An alternative explanation
is based on the fact that the present study used emotional
stimuli with different emotional intensity. Some previous studies
and reviews have suggested that the facilitative role of facial
motor resonance in the encoding of facial expression stimuli
may be determined by their emotional intensity (Adolphs, 2002;
Oberman et al., 2007; Baumeister et al., 2016). For example,
Baumeister et al. (2016) found that blocking facial muscles
mainly affected the perception of slightly emotional stimuli.
Processing of neutral and strongly emotional stimuli was not
at all or less affected. This raises the question of whether a
specific impairment in encoding of emotional L2 words was
possibly overshadowed by emotional L2 words with stronger
emotional intensity. To investigate this possibility, we categorized
the emotional words into slightly and highly emotional. Note
that the original categorization criteria for the emotional words
(described in the subsection, Stimuli) accepted a large scale
in emotionality ratings, including words with only moderate
emotionality ratings. Thus, to obtain a better understanding
of the impact that this broad scale in emotionality ratings for
the emotional words might have had, any words with ratings
between 3.0 and 6.5 on the overall emotionality scale ranging
from 1 to 9 during the pilot were considered to be slightly
emotional. Any words with ratings above 7.5 on the same scale
were considered highly emotional. See Supplementary Table 3
for the variable ratings of the slightly and highly emotional
words and the associated statistical comparisons. To test the
prediction that specifically slightly emotional L2 words were
impaired during categorization, a 2 (emotionality: high vs.
low) × 2 (language: L1 vs. L2) repeated measures analysis was
conducted, with both factors being within-subjects. This revealed
a significant effect of emotionality [F(1,27) = 35, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.56] and a marginal interaction between emotionality
and language [F(1,27) = 3.31, p = 0.08, η2p = 0.11]. Pairwise
comparisons confirmed that participants performed equally
well at categorizing highly emotional words in L1 and L2. In
contrast, they exhibited a strong bias to incorrectly categorize
slightly emotional L2 words as neutral, while this tendency was
significantly less pronounced in L1 (see Figure 3).
Retrieval Phase
Since, we were interested in the memory of emotional words
vs. neutral words, we controlled for participants’ individual
differences in emotion perception by excluding words that had
been incorrectly classified during the encoding phase. This was
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FIGURE 3 | Accuracy (%) in identifying emotional words as associated
to emotion during the encoding phase as a function of emotionality
(slightly emotional vs. very emotional) and language (L1 vs. L2). Error
bars represent ±1 SEM. ∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
done for each participant individually and guaranteed that our
analysis of the memory task for emotional and neutral words
was run only on words that had been perceived according to
their piloted emotional category (see Baumeister et al., 2015, for
a similar procedure). The dependent variable was the memory
performance indexed by d’, which measures the performance
in discriminating between old and new words. This d’ index
was computed separately for neutral and emotional words, and
submitted to a repeated measures ANOVA with the within-
subjects factors language (L1 vs. L2) and word-type (emotional
vs. neutral). The analysis did not result in any main effects or
in an interaction (all Fs < 2.0, ps > 0.18). However, because of
the a priori interest in the comparison of the EEM effect within
L1 and L2, pre-planned pairwise comparisons of emotional
vs. neutral words in L1 and L2 were conducted. As expected,
participants showed enhanced memory for emotional words
(d’ = 1.46, SD = 0.49) in contrast to neutral words (d’ = 1.26,
SD = 0.55) in L1 [t(25) = 2.20, p = 0.04, Cohen’s d = 0.38].
Importantly, the EEM effect was absent in L2 [t(25) = 0.10,
p = 0.93], for which participants’ memory for emotional words
(d’ = 1.44, SD= 0.65) versus neutral words (d’ = 1.43, SD= 0.59)
did not differ (Cohen’s d = 0.02). Since the visual inspection of
the EEM effects (Figure 4) suggested that the reported difference
in the EEM effects in L1 and L2 was mainly driven by enhanced
memory of neutral words in L2 as compared with L1, a paired
sample t-test investigated whether this difference was significant.
This was, however, not the case [t(25) = 1.40, p = 0.17, Cohen’s
d = 0.30]. Finally, two pairwise comparisons showed that the
effect size for the EEM in L1 was comparable across angry and
happy words, though the p-value reached standard significance
levels for the happy words only [angry vs. neutral: t(25) = 1.80,
p = 0.08, Cohen’s d = 0.44; happy vs. neutral: t(25) = 2.50,
p= 0.02, Cohen’s d = 0.46; see Figure 4].
Correlation between Motor Resonance and Memory
for Emotional Words
We further explore the relationship between facial motor
resonance and retrieval performance for emotional words by
FIGURE 4 | Memory accuracy expressed in d’ for neutral and
emotional (angry and happy) words. Error bars represent ±1 SEM.
∗p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
looking at possible correlations between them. For this, we
separately averaged the muscle activity recorded between 1000
and 2500 ms after stimulus onset for each muscle (corrugator
and zygomaticus) in response to each emotional word-type
(happy and angry) and language (L1 and L2) individually
for each participant. This time window was chosen since the
previous analyses revealed a rather late onset of differential
muscle activity (see Figure 1). A series of bivariate correlation
analyses was conducted to assess whether individual differences
in the intensity of corrugator and zygomaticus activation would
correlate with the retrieval performance of happy and angry
words in L1 and L2. The results did not provide support for any
relationship between individual levels of facial motor resonance
and the memory for emotional words in L1 nor in L2 [all
rs(26) < 0.31, all ps > 0.13].
Since previous studies suggested that facial motor resonance
has a stronger impact on the recognition of slightly emotional
stimuli (Adolphs, 2002; Oberman et al., 2007; Baumeister et al.,
2016), we were interested in whether similar patterns could
be found regarding their memory. For this, we restricted a
second series of bivariate correlation analyses to words that
had been rated 3.0–6.5 on the general emotionality scale (see
section Statistical Analysis of the Behavioral Data). This time the
correlation analyses revealed marginal correlations between the
levels of zygomaticus activation and the percentage of correctly
retrieved slightly happy L1 words [r(26) = 0.49, p = 0.08], as
well as between the levels of corrugator activation and slightly
angry L1 words [r(26) = 0.35, p = 0.09]. Thus, the more
zygomaticus or corrugator activation a participant showed during
encoding in response to slightly happy and slightly angry L1
words, respectively, the more likely she/he was to remember those
words later. A similar non-significant pattern was observed for
the levels of zygomaticus activation and retrieval performance of
slightly happy L2 words [r(26)= 0.42, p= 0.10]. No relationship
could be found between the corrugator activation and memory
for slightly angry L2 words [r(26)= 0.01, p= 0.97].
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DISCUSSION
The goal of the present study was to test the hypotheses derived
from embodied cognition in the context of memory processes for
emotional language in L1 and L2. First, the hypothesis that the
processing of emotional words in L2 would evoke a lesser degree
of embodied simulations compared with L1 was investigated. The
results partially supported this hypothesis: Though the expected
interactions between muscle resonance and language were not
at all or only marginally significant, the visual inspection and
pairwise comparisons indicated a tendency for reduced motor
resonance in response to emotional L2 words for both corrugator
and zygomaticus muscle.
In a second step, the hypothesis that L2 processing would
interfere with both the categorization and later retrieval
of emotional words was tested. The results were again
not decisive but support the notion that L1 but not L2
evokes an EEM effect. Finally, the correlation analyses,
gave some indication that participants whose activation of
facial motor resonance was strong during encoding were
more likely to retrieve emotional words during the memory
task. This pattern seemed, however, to be restricted to
slightly emotional L1 words and only be partially applicable
to L2.
The overall results of the EMG and SC recordings suggested
some reductions and differences in embodied simulations of
emotional L2 words in comparison with emotional L1 words
and extend these results to SC and generalize the results to
the corrugator muscle activity not investigated so far in L2
(Foroni, 2015). Even though the expected two-way interaction
of language and word-type was not significant for the analysis
of zygomaticus activity and only marginal for the corrugator,
some interesting results emerged. For example, whereas pairwise
comparisons across time indicated that the activation of the
zygomaticus showed typical activity in response to emotional L1
words, these patterns in activation seemed delayed and short-
lived in response to emotional L2 words (see Figure 4). The
difference between L1 and L2 processing became particularly
clear in the corrugator muscle, which showed typical response
patterns to emotional L1 words but no detectable responses
to emotional L2 words. Similarly, the SC was significantly
increased in response to emotional words presented in L1
as compared to L2. The direct comparisons of facial muscle
responsiveness to L1 vs. L2 revealed a significant difference
only for the corrugator muscle but not for the zygomaticus
muscles. However, despite not being significant, the zygomaticus
showed a similar pattern of decreased responsiveness in L2.
Interestingly, Foroni (2015) in testing the somatic correlates
of different linguistic forms assessed only zygomaticus muscle
activation and reported significant reduction in muscle activation
in L2 compared to L1. The present results complement and
extend Foroni’s results showing a significant difference for
the corrugator muscle and, thus, together they support an
embodiment account of emotion processing and a reduced
embodiment in L2.
An explanation for the difference between zygomaticus
and corrugator muscle activation in L2 found here could
lie in the emotional content, which activates the respective
muscle. Whereas the zygomaticus reacts to positive stimuli,
the corrugator muscle predominantly reacts to negative
stimuli. Two recent studies argued that particularly negative
words may be at risk of emotional disembodiment during
L2 reading, potentially reflecting a positivity bias for
L2 processing. A positivity bias is thought to occur if
second language acquisition coincides with positive life
experiences (Conrad et al., 2011; Sheikh and Titone,
2016). This could be involved in determining the current
findings.
Overall, the results of the EMG and SC recordings give some
indications that the processing of emotional L2 words is less
grounded in embodied simulations than the processing of L1
words. This aligns with previous reports of decreased SC (Harris
et al., 2003; Harris, 2004; Caldwell-Harris and Ayçiçegˇi-Dinn,
2009; Eilola and Havelka, 2010) and agrees with studies, which
have shown reduced behavioral responsiveness to emotional
language in L2 (Colbeck and Bowers, 2012; Keysar et al., 2012).
Such results may indicate that L2 learning in adulthood does
not necessarily involve the same affective linguistic grounding
as L1 learning in childhood. When conceptual and emotion
regulation systems have already reached a relatively stable state,
the affective grounding of abstract symbols, such as words,
may remain shallow. This aspect is particularly relevant for
intercultural communication where a weaker somatic base of L2
could on the one hand cause emotional barriers for L2 speakers
and on the other hand may be beneficial if emotional distance
helps to counteract biases (Keysar et al., 2012; Caldwell-Harris,
2015).
The secondary hypothesis, which states that differences in
embodied simulations between L1 and L2 would additionally
be associated to performance differences during the encoding
and retrieval phase, could be partially supported. During the
encoding phase, participants were more accurate at categorizing
L1 vs. L2 words. In contrast to the expectation, this effect
was caused by an interference with categorizing both emotional
and neutral L2 words. This finding opposes the expected
difficulty in categorizing specifically emotional words in L2
and could be an indicator of participant’s general lower
fluency in their L2. Further investigation and post hoc analysis
of this alternative account, however, suggested a specific
difficulty at identifying slightly but not strongly emotional
stimuli in L2, which speaks against a general proficiency
effect.
The finding suggesting that the processing of slightly
emotional words is particularly linked to motor resonance is
in line with the assumption that motor resonance functions
primarily as an ancillary information resource, providing
additional feedback to the cognitive processes in question (e.g.,
Adolphs, 2002; Oberman et al., 2007; Oosterwijk et al., 2015).
Under clear-cut conditions, the information provided by facial
feedback (e.g., Strack et al., 1988; but see also Wagenmakers
et al., 2016) may be superseded by dominant established cognitive
processes associated to the evaluation of emotional content,
reducing its influence on our percept and behavior. However,
when the emotional intensity decreases, the interpretation of
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the emotional stimulus by means of memory and logical
reasoning becomes more difficult. Consequently, in order to
make a fast and qualified response to a given ambiguous
stimulus, we rely more on bodily feedback. In this way, the
influence that facial motor resonance has on the interpretation
of emotional stimuli increases when cognitive resources reach
their limits or leave us uncertain. However, given the post
hoc nature of this analysis, its results should be interpreted
with caution (but see for similar account and supporting
evidence Baumeister, 2015). Although stimuli were carefully
matched across languages and emotions, the splitting of words
in slightly and strongly emotional stimuli was not planned.
Therefore, other possible interpretations of the difference we
are reporting cannot be completely ruled out. In fact, other
variables for which we did not control here may have played
a role and future replication or extension of this work should
investigate this further. Regarding memory performance, the
expected interaction between language and word-type did not
appear. Yet, the comparison of memory performance for neutral
and emotional words in L1 and L2 supported the initial
hypothesis, suggesting the presence of an EEM effect in L1 but
not in L2.
Even though the results of the memory task were relatively
weak, they align with previous findings reporting no EEM
effect in L2 (Anooshian and Hertel, 1994). However, they
are in opposition to reports of an equal or even stronger
EEM effect for L2 (Harris, 2004; Ayçiçegˇi-Dinn and Caldwell-
Harris, 2009). Two reasons could be responsible for these
differences in results for emotional memory in L2 reported
in the literature. First, it is possible that these differences
are owed to dissimilar experimental procedures. For example,
while both the present study and the study by Anooshian and
Hertel (1994) presented L1 and L2 words in different blocks,
the two studies by Ayçiçegˇi and Harris (2004) and Ayçiçegˇi-
Dinn and Caldwell-Harris (2009) presented L1 and L2 stimuli
intermixed. This may have caused a novelty effect for L2, which
may in turn have inhibited normal processing of L1 words.
Second, they may be mediated by the distinct circumstances
in which participants acquired L2. The Turkish participants
in the studies by Ayçiçegˇi and Harris (2004) and Ayçiçegˇi-
Dinn and Caldwell-Harris (2009) acquired their second language
(English) in the classroom and/or in self-instruction settings
and were generally less fluent in L2. Because of this, they may
have been more likely to mentally translate L2 words into L1,
which may have accounted for the EEM effect in L2. In contrast,
most participants in the present study and in the study by
Anooshian and Hertel (1994) were exposed to their L2 via
immigration or via studies abroad and spoke their L2 with
high fluency on a daily basis. It is, however, noteworthy that
the current study also encountered large behavioral variances
across subjects (see Figure 4), which corroborates the assumption
that the processing of L2 is determined by more factors besides
proficiency.
The reported absence of an EEM effect in L2 is similar
to the interference effect observed in our previous study
(Baumeister et al., 2015), in which blocked motor resonance
specifically inhibited retrieval of emotional words. Those results
suggested that facial motor resonance has a crucial role in
the processing of emotional content and contributes to the
presence of an EEM effect. It is thus of particular interest
that the current results gave some indications that facial motor
resonance could be reduced when processing L2 words. This
suggests that both the external blocking of facial motor resonance
and the reduction of facial motor resonance by means of
processing in L2 are associated to the absence of an EEM
effects.
There are some limitations associated with this study, which
should be considered when interpreting the current results. First
and foremost, the effects were often subtle and did not always gain
the expected significance levels for the interactions. Nevertheless,
we decided to continue with pairwise comparisons based on
visual inspection of the data. The reason for the weak effect may
depend both on the small sample size and the large variations in
the data associated to the heterogeneous sample. As mentioned
above, the analysis of the slightly vs. very emotional stimuli was
explorative in nature and should be interpreted as such. The goal
was to direct the reader’s attention to the possibly important
aspect of emotional intensity to be considered in future motor
resonance studies.
Another subject that awaits further investigation is the
determination of the mechanism underlying such reduced
affective processing in L2. Lamendella (1977) proposed that
implicit linguistic competence, unlike explicit or semantic
knowledge, is integrated within the limbic system, involving
the striatum and amygdala. This is especially interesting
because the amygdala, a structure known to be involved in
both experiencing and processing emotional stimuli, shows
attenuated activity if facial muscles are blocked by an external
force (Hennenlotter et al., 2009). In line with this and the current
results, a recent study (Hsu et al., 2014) demonstrated that
emotional content in L2 evokes less amygdala activity than it
does in L1. Those findings indicate a general interdependence
between affective processes, embodied responses, and the
recruitment of limbic structures in emotional language
processing.
Overall, the results suggest that reading emotional words
in a native language provides a deep and embodied emotional
experience, which may subsequently also support their salient
encoding and retrieval and, as suggested by previous work,
even the modulation of subsequent judgments (e.g., Berridge
and Winkielman, 2003; Halberstadt et al., 2009; Foroni and
Semin, 2011, 2012). The present results together with the results
reported by Foroni (2015) suggest that cognitive processes
associated with L2 encoding and retrieval seem to be less
associated to embodied processes, reinforcing the idea that
embodied cognition and emotional memory are linked. Some
research already shows how difference in embodiment between
L1 and L2 differentially affect individuals (e.g., Puntoni et al.,
2009; Keysar et al., 2012) and future research should investigate
memory processes as well other domains where the differences
between L1 and L2 may have a significant impact implementing
other paradigms used to investigate the impact of emotion
on behaviors (e.g., Ambron and Foroni, 2015; Ambron et al.,
2016).
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The question motivating the work presented here, starting from a view of music as
embodied and situated activity, is how can we account for the complexity of interactive
music performance situations. These are situations in which human performers interact
with responsive technologies, such as sensor-driven technology or sound synthesis
affected by analysis of the performed sound signal. This requires investigating in detail
the underlying mechanisms, but also providing a more holistic approach that does not
lose track of the complex whole constituted by the interactions and relationships of
composers, performers, audience, technologies, etc. The concept of affordances has
frequently been invoked in musical research, which has seen a “bodily turn” in recent
years, similar to the development of the embodied cognition approach in the cognitive
sciences. We therefore begin by broadly delineating its usage in the cognitive sciences
in general, and in music research in particular. We argue that what is still missing
in the discourse on musical affordances is an encompassing theoretical framework
incorporating the sociocultural dimensions that are fundamental to the situatedness
and embodiment of interactive music performance and composition. We further argue
that the cultural affordances framework, proposed by Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014)
and recently articulated further by Ramstead et al. (2016) in this journal, although
not previously applied to music, constitutes a promising starting point. It captures
and elucidates this complex web of relationships in terms of shared landscapes and
individual fields of affordances. We illustrate this with examples foremost from the first
author’s artistic work as composer and performer of interactive music. This sheds
new light on musical composition as a process of construction—and embodied mental
simulation—of situations, guiding the performers’ and audience’s attention in shifting
fields of affordances. More generally, we believe that the theoretical perspectives and
concrete examples discussed in this paper help to elucidate how situations—and with
them affordances—are dynamically constructed through the interactions of various
mechanisms as people engage in embodied and situated activity.
Keywords: affordances, cultural affordances, embodied activity, embodied cognition, composition, interactive
music, responsive technology, situated activity
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INTRODUCTION
Given that this paper deals with music, but is submitted to
a cognitive science/psychology journal, we assume that the
majority of readers are cognitive scientists, and only a minority
of readers are familiar with music theory. The first question
that comes to mind for the average cognitive scientist, who is
to some degree familiar with Gibson’s (1979/1986) notion of
affordances, might be whether music really has affordances in the
first place. After all, Gibson was mainly concerned with the sense
of vision and the affordances of concrete physical objects. These
were affordances conveyed by the optical array and perceived by
agents being far from stationary, but moving about interacting
with those objects, such as the sit-ability of chairs or the grasp-
ability of cups. Nonetheless, hearing also deals with concrete
objects, since sound carries information about a source. We are
always in search for what is causing the sound, learning about
environmental occurrences (Gaver, 1993; Windsor, 2000). As
Jonas (1966/2001) writes, hearing is related to event and not to
existence. Half a century later, Gibson’s ecological psychology is
still highly influential, not least in research on embodied cognition
(e.g., Varela et al., 1991; Chemero, 2009; Shapiro, 2011), and,
although widely debated, the concept of affordance is still very
much used (e.g., Thill et al., 2013; Sakreida et al., 2016) and new
conceptual frameworks are continuously being developed (e.g.,
Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014; Ramstead et al., 2016; Davis and
Chouinard, 2017).
In musical research, perhaps contrary to what one may
assume, discussing the affordances of music is nothing new. It is
in accord with the more over-arching bodily turn of musicology
and related fields since the beginning of the twenty-first century
(Pelinski, 2005). There is in fact a growing body of support
for music as embodied and situated activity Performing and
interacting with musical instruments, for example, is widely
recognized as an embodied phenomenon (e.g., Leman, 2007;
Windsor and De Bézenac, 2012). Furthermore, Clarke (2005),
among others, has discussed the role of embodiment in the
experience of music, particularly listening, and there also is
support for an activation of the human mirror neuron system
when experiencing music (Molnar-Szakacs and Overy, 2006). The
concept of affordance has been used in music by a number of
authors in recent years (e.g., Windsor, 1995, 2000; Clarke, 2005;
Leman, 2007; Krueger, 2011, 2014; Menin and Schiavio, 2012;
Windsor and De Bézenac, 2012; Einarsson, in press). It offers
unique ways of describing the reciprocal relationship between
performer/composer and musical structures, but also, as we will
see, toward the performance situation as a whole, in all its
complexity. Windsor and De Bézenac (2012), for example, have
argued that “the concept of affordances helps to conceptualize the
mutual relationships that exist between listeners and sounding
objects and events, between performers and their instruments,
and between musicians in a manner quite foreign to more
cognitive structural approaches to music psychology” (2012,
p. 103). This reciprocity being a topic of great research interest is
emphasized also by Geeves and Sutton (2014). However, current
interpretations of the concept of affordances in musical research
vary very significantly among each other. Most of them also
deviate significantly from the Gibsonian notion of affordances,
which is not always acknowledged by the authors (as will be
discussed in detail in the next section). As Davis and Chouinard
(2017) state in their discussion of the general use of the affordance
concept, the challenge for researchers is to delineate their usage
of the concept and adopt this in ways displaying both relational,
material and dynamic dimensions. We agree with them that the
mechanisms of affordances operate within a situation, whose
aspects interact and thus affect the efficacy of affordances, a
notion highly applicable to music.
Over the last decade questions of aliveness and embodiment,
in the light of advancements in technology (i.e., increased
computer processing speed enabling interactivity between agents
and computer system(s) to be staged and performed live in
real time), have been a major concern in artistic fields such
as performance studies (Broadhurst and Machon, 2011; Barrett
and Bolt, 2013), dance (Kozel, 2007), and music (Emmerson,
2007; Peters et al., 2012). In the field of music, an interesting
special case, in our opinion, is music whose composition and
performance is aided by computer technology in real time
(running time), i.e., live electronic music. We are particularly
interested in interactive music utilizing responsive technologies,
such as sensor-driven technology or, as the major focus in this
article, computer sound synthesis affected by computer analysis
of an acoustically performed sound signal. For example, features
of a sung input (e.g. vibrato) are analyzed by the computer, and
the subsequent electronic sounding (e.g., a chord) is dependent
on the amount of vibrato. In musical works of this kind, a notion
of interacting with “a disembodied other” (Emmerson, 2009)
(i.e., computer technology), brings questions of embodiment and
music to the heart of the discussion. We believe that the notion
of affordances—in the broadened sense of cultural affordances
discussed in this paper—can play a central role in such endeavors.
Hence, the aim of this paper is threefold: Firstly, to expand
on the notion of affordances as it has been used in musical
research previously, by clarifying the diversity of interpretations
of the concept, but also the limitations of its present use.
Secondly, to suggest an application of the notion of cultural
affordances—originally proposed by Rietveld and Kiverstein
(2014) and recently further elaborated by Ramstead et al. (2016)
in this journal—to interactive music, where the performers, the
audience, and the composer shape, experience, and perform
music with and through individual yet overlapping, and
dynamically varying, fields of affordances. This will be illustrated
with examples from the first author’s artistic work as composer
and performer of mixed works, where a combination of acoustic
sound sources (singers) and digital sound sources (responsive
computer technologies) perform together live. Last, but not least,
the focus of this paper is on musical performers’ and composers’
skill and embodied affective appraisal in dynamic relationship
with the environment, situated inside a sociocultural practice.
In our opinion, this contributes to bridging the conceptual
gaps between the seemingly disembodied work of the composer,
the concrete embodied activity of musical performers, their
interaction with more or less “invisible” technologies, and the—
according to some—highly abstract social and cultural practices
that they are part of.
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ON AFFORDANCES
In order to contextualize the discussion, without any attempt
to provide a complete historical account here1, we will
recapitulate some relevant notions of the concept of affordances
in psychology/cognitive science in general and elucidate its use in
music research in particular.
Affordances in the Cognitive Sciences
The Reciprocity between Organism and Environment
Most of James J. Gibson’s ecological psychology and his theory
of perception were formulated in the late 1960s and−70s, i.e.,
long before embodiment had become a popular topic in the
cognitive sciences. His work was a reaction against a mechanistic
worldview and a move away from seeing cognitive processing as
causation. First and foremost his work was concerned with visual
perception, such as his influential theory of the visual field and
the optical array (Gibson, 1979/1986).
Gibson introduced the notion of affordances for what he
viewed as action opportunities for humans, or other animals,
in their environment. In Gibson’s original sense these have a
peculiar ontological status: they are neither a property of the
environment alone, nor a feature of the animal alone, but rather
a property of both, i.e., emerging from the animal’s interaction
with its environment. In Gibson’s own words:
[. . . ] an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective
property; or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the
dichotomy of subjective–objective and helps us to understand its
inadequacy. It is equally a fact of the environment and a fact
of behavior. It is both physical and psychical, yet neither. An
affordance points both ways, to the environment and to the observer
(Gibson, 1979/1986, p. 129).
Hence, a key aspect of affordances is that they are not just physical
properties, but have to be considered relative to the animal. This
reciprocity between organism and environment is fundamental
to the Gibsonian notion of affordances. Affordances are specified
by the pick-up of invariant information from the ambient light,
the so-called optical array, whilst the animal—its body, legs,
hands and mouth—is coperceived (Gibson, 1979/1986, p. 141).
Thus, information does not equal affordances—information only
points toward affordances. Furthermore, affordances, according
to Gibson, are permanent and stable. They do not change
relative to the organism’s varying internal states, such as needs
or motives. He writes: “Something that looks good today may
look bad tomorrow but what it actually offers the observer will
be the same” (Gibson, 1982, p. 410). This is, of course, not
uncontroversial, because it means that, for example, a particular
staircase is either—in principle—“climbable” for you or it is not,
but its “climb-ability” does not vary over time just because some
days you might be, for example, too tired or too drunk to actually
climb it. So, to Gibson it is a reciprocal concept between organism
and environment, but it is binary and relies on properties, which
do not change according to changing needs. At this point, you
1More complete historical accounts of the notion of affordances have recently been
provided by, for example, Dotov et al. (2012) and Osiurak et al. (2017).
might ask if affordances are opportunities for behavior, why do
we not act on every possibility? What about social and cultural
influences? And what about affordances not so readily available?
These are issues we will come back to in the following.
As often is noted, Gibson’s writings are sometimes ambiguous,
some would say incomplete, and his theories have been a
target of substantial criticism (e.g., Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1981).
Nevertheless, his theories have undoubtedly spurred lots of
interesting research and debate in the field. There are different
interpretations and reformulations of Gibson’s original theory,
some of which have focussed more on the agent, some more on
the object, and others have attempted to stay close to Gibson’s
original relational concept encompassing both agent and object.
From Dispositional Properties to Relational Abilities
Turvey, Shaw, and Mace took up the challenge of developing
Gibson’s ideas into a more philosophically sound and empirically
tractable theory through a number of papers (e.g., Turvey et al.,
1981). For them it was dispositional properties in the object
and in the organism that enable action. They introduced the
concept of effectivities (Shaw et al., 1982), complimentary to
affordances, and intended to specify an animal’s means for action,
i.e., a combination of the function of its tissues and organs
relative to the environment, to realize a specific affordance in a
given situation. That means, the dispositional affordance and the
effectivity complement one another. Hence, their theory relies on
ecological laws, which are not universal but relate to a niche.
In particular this latter aspect has been one of the major
criticisms formulated by Chemero (2006, 2009). Although he
recognizes Turvey, Shaw, and Mace’s contributions to the
development of Gibson’s ecological theory, his point is that they
have turned the theory into having too little information available
for direct perception, ruling out direct perception of individuals
and perception of things partly determined by convention. “If
information depends on laws,” he writes, “there is also no
information about individual people available for perception.
So although a human infant might have information available
about humans, she has none about her mother” (Chemero,
2009). Moreover, ecological laws may structure the way that,
for example, light is reflected off of an aluminium can, but
according to Chemero they cannot account for instances where,
for example, there has been a mix up in the factory between milk
and soda, or someone has played a practical joke. Conventions
build upon public agreement and are easily violated, he states.
Chemero’s (2009) own take on modernizing Gibson, is—in
a nutshell—to combine Gibson’s theory with dynamic systems
theory (also employing situational semantics in order to avoid
natural laws and instead allowing for constraints connecting
situations, which may be cultural or conventional). This is part
of the formulation of what he refers to as radical embodied
cognitive science. He argues that affordances are relations in
a similar sense as one entity is taller than another. He also
makes an important distinction between feature and property.
While perceiving a feature is a matter of perceiving that the
situation as a whole has a certain feature, perceiving a property,
on the other hand, presupposes much more previous knowledge
than perceiving features. Perceiving affordances, according to
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Chemero, is placing features. Secondly, Chemero argues, that
instead of talking about an individual’s capacities in terms of
body scales, we should consider how an individual’s ability is
more relational. Dispositions never fail, but abilities may, thus
allowing us to account for occasions when performance does
not meet up with for example biological expectations (or where
musical performances fail!). For example, one day somebody
might simply be too tired to walk the steep stairs. Affordances and
abilities, according to Chemero, causally interact and are causally
dependent. That means, what Chemero refers to as affordance 2.0
is a relation between the abilities of the individual and features of
the environment.
Affordances as Aspects of a Sociocultural
Environment
Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014) propose a significantly broader
application of affordances than Chemero. They emphasize how
the exercise of abilities happens in a context, and that we as
humans participate in sociocultural practices. Their two key
concerns are: (1) the notion of a form of life, denoting human
patterned behavior, i.e., “normative behaviours and customs
of our communities” (ibid, p. 328), a concept borrowed from
Wittgenstein, and (2) the influence of normativity on our
engagement with affordances. Instead of features they prefer
speaking of aspects of an environment, since “in the human case
the material environment has been sculpted by our sociocultural
practices into a sociomaterial environment (ibid, p. 335).
Accordingly, they suggest the following definition: “Affordances
are relations between aspects of a material environment and
abilities available in a form of life” (ibid, p. 335). This is very
much in line with Chemero’s (2009) argument that “the situation
as a whole supports (perhaps demands) a certain kind of action”
(cf. Affordances in the Cognitive Sciences). In other words,
this view enables us to consider the reciprocity between human
and environment as conveyed by learned behaviors under the
influence of social niches and conventions.
To Rietveld and Kiverstein, affordances are both relational and
a resource (ibid, p. 327). They are relational in that they depend
on the material environment and the abilities in the form of life.
At the same time, they are resources in the way opportunities for
action rely on how we create, for example, tools for our projects
and concerns, and engage with changing aspects of the material
situation. In their reading of Gibson, instead of affordances, they
give primacy to the ecological niche for a kind of animal with
a certain form of life. Accordingly, they introduce the notion of
a landscape of affordances, meaning affordances available in an
ecological niche. As Bruineberg and Rietveld (2014) put it: “In
our human form of life, these are related to the whole spectrum
of abilities available in our socio-cultural practices.” Furthermore,
some affordances that “stand out more than others” to the
individual (cf. Withagen et al., 2012), and which are relevant to
a particular individual in a particular situation, are denoted as a
field of affordances (Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014). Sensitivity to
a situation, to the landscape of affordances, is achieved through
abilities or skills. These are in turn generally acquired through
training and experience in sociocultural practices.
But, recapitulating the question in section From Dispositional
Properties to Relational Abilities, how come we do not act on
every affordance available in our field? According to Rietveld
and Kiverstein, this is due to an agent’s drive to achieve an
optimal grip on the situation, a striving for improvement of the
situation. The concept of optimal grip stems from philosopher
Merleau-Ponty, intending to capture how living systems are
always simultaneously “in a state of relative equilibrium and
in a state of disequilibrium” (Merleau-Ponty in Kiverstein and
Rietveld, 2015). Improving optimal grip entails a bodily action
readiness: “In many real-life situations multiple states of action
readiness interact in generating action tendencies and action”
(ibid, p. 342). Ramstead et al. (2016) exemplify the concept of
optimal grip nicely with the image of a boxer who orients toward
the punching bag so as to afford a suitable variety of possible
strikes. Optimal grip helps explaining the way some affordances
in the field, through interaction with affective appraisal and
attention, cause action readiness and become solicitations to the
individual.
Lastly, Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014) also introduce the
concept of skilled intentionality, i.e., “the individual’s selective
openness and responsiveness to a rich landscape of affordances”
(Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2015) in overlapping cycles of action-
perception. This ability is developed over the years as part of
an increasing sensitivity to discriminate between situations. In
other words, skilled intentionality is a tendency to act toward an
optimal grip on a field of affordances (Bruineberg and Rietveld,
2014).
Cultural Affordances
Ramstead et al. (2016), in their discussion of cultural affordances,
building on Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014) and Kiverstein and
Rietveld (2015), among others, have recently raised the question
how culture and context interact with human biology to shape
cognition, behavior, and experience. They distinguish between
two kinds of cultural affordances: natural affordances, which are
possibilities for action, dependent on agents’ exploiting reliable
correlations in its environment with its set of abilities (similar
to Chemero’s affordance 2.0) and conventional affordances,
which depend on a shared set of expectations, norms and
conventions. Important to note, there is a continuum of
affordances between those that depend on reliable correlation
(natural affordances) to those that depend on shared sets of
expectations (conventional affordances). This view of affordances
as gradual is also in accordance with Davis and Chouinard’s
(2017) recent characterization of affordances, as determined by
and depending on a number of, in practice not easily discernable,
situational cues. According to Ramstead et al. (2016), it is
important to note that culture underpins both natural and
conventional affordances. Herein also lies their definition of
culture. In their own words: “Human biology is cultural biology;
culture has roots in human biological capacities. The affordances
with which human beings engage are cultural affordances.” Even
more so, in their view, both kinds of affordances may be socially
constructed. Hence, according to their theory, an affordance may
be changed either by altering aspects of the material environment
or the organism’s form of life. Thus affordances may be shaped
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and vary in relation to enculturation, social influence, and
skill, which is highly relevant to our discussion on musical
practice.
Ramstead et al. (ibid) also adopt the concepts of a landscape
of affordances (cf. previous section), which for them is relatively
static and constituted by the totality of affordances available to a
population in a given environment. They also use the notion of a
field of affordances, which for them is the subset of “affordances
in the landscape with which the organism, as an autonomous
individual agent, dynamically copes and intelligently adapts,” i.e.,
“those affordances that actually engage the individual organism
because they are salient at a given time, as a function of the
interests, concerns, and states of the organism.” They argue,
similar to Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014) that an organism does
not encounter affordances one by one, but “as an ensemble
of affordances, with which it dynamically copes and which
it evaluates, often implicitly and automatically, for relevance.”
These affordances are themselves entangled in various ways and
appear as nested, depending on each other, hiding, enabling,
or revealing other possibilities for action. Certain affordances,
in this view, are also highly influenced by joint intentionality,
social and cultural normativity and shared expectations (implicit
and explicit), codetermining the landscape of affordances. The
field of affordances is “experienced as “solicitations,” in that they
solicit (further) affective appraisal and thereby prompt patterns
of “action readiness,” that is, act as perceptual and affective
prompts for the organism to act on the affordance.” This idea of
affective appraisal causing readiness to act (cf. Lowe and Ziemke,
2011) is again highly relevant to a performer or composer’s
practice. Indeed, thismeans they depart fromGibson in a number
of ways, including their argument that the individual experiences
affordances as solicitations.
One of the assumptions the theoretical framework of
conventional affordances rests upon is the dependence on shared
expectations, or as they put it, how behavior is influenced
by expectations about others’ expectations. Accordingly, the
presence of others affects the salience of affordances, due to
human conventions. Also culturally shared expectations are
embodied at various levels (brain networks, artifacts, constructed
environments).
In effect, Ramstead et al. (2016) suggest a predictive processing
model, emphasizing how the generative model does not need
to entail semantic content. Generative models are embodied at
different levels, may it be neurally in the brain or in terms of
behavioral patterns. Here, attention plays a key role in guiding
action perception, affecting the acquisition of culturally specific
sets of expectation.
Affordances in Music Research
How then do affordances in music work? Despite—or maybe
due to—the extensive usage of the concept in music theory and
related fields in recent years (e.g., Windsor, 1995, 2000; Clarke,
2005; Leman, 2007; Krueger, 2011, 2014; Menin and Schiavio,
2012; Windsor and De Bézenac, 2012; Einarsson, in press),
interpretations and applications vary significantly. One thing
most music scholars do seem to agree on though is that music
affords movement (e.g., Clarke, 2005; Windsor and De Bézenac,
2012), although some focus mostly on aspects of synchronization
or entrainment (e.g., Leman, 2007; Krueger, 2014), where
entrainment, in Leman and Maes’s (2014, p. 239) definition
stands for “pre-reflective adaptation of human movement to
music.”
To begin with, Clarke (2005), who primarily addresses the
listener’s point of view, accounts for culture as being a vital part
of what we perceive. He writes on culture: “once a tradition or
convention is established and is embodied in widespread and
relatively permanent objects and practices, it becomes as much a
part of the environment as any other feature” (ibid). In his view,
music, carrying invariant structures, can reveal almost any source
in a situation: instrument, medium, social functions in which
they participate, emotional states, bodily actions, and spaces.
Moreover, according to Clarke, affordances change in accordance
with an organism’s changing needs. He acknowledges that there
are social constraints that make some affordances less likely, for
instance a violin that affords burning, but does not elaborate on
these aspects.
To Windsor and De Bézenac (2012), in line with Clarke,
affordances are not fixed. Their view on culture follows Sanders
(1997), entailing a stance according to which direct perception of
affordances both may and should be applied in complex cultural
contexts (Windsor and De Bézenac, 2012)—again, in line with
Clarke. However, unlike Clarke,Windsor and Bézenac’s approach
resembles Reed’s adaptation of Gibson (cf. Withagen et al., 2012),
according to which affordances exert a selective pressure on the
behavior of individuals. Windsor et al. also adopt from Shaw et al.
(1982) the concept of effectivities (cf. section From Dispositional
Properties to Relational Abilities).
Moreover, they acknowledge the relevance of other people and
social/material context to human behavior, which they illustrate
with the example of jazz musicians “going with” or “going
against” what other musicians’ actions afford. It is, however, not
clear what the underlying mechanisms are. It is also somewhat
contradictory how these affordances, on the one hand, can
“determine the characteristics” of a particular music, while at the
same time it is emphasized “that while the pianist’s actions afford
particular behaviours, they do not demand such behaviours”
(ibid). Finally, a more controversial stance of theirs is that music
affords semiotic acts, and the production of particular signs, for
example through verbal or textual action (ibid, p. 114). All in
all, Windsor and Bézenac make a substantial contribution to the
discussion of different ways of applying direct perception and
affordances to music, and do include music-making to a larger
degree than Clarke. Still, we lack the full picture, and the concept
remains far from being well defined.
The focus of Krueger (2014), another influential voice,
on the other hand, is on emotion regulation. His view is
one of distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995), according to
which music is for off-loading emotional responses. He equates
affordances with the concept of invites (Withagen et al., 2012),
but in a manner rather different from what Withagen et al.
intended (ibid). He assigns a demand character to the concept
of affordance, discussing them from a perspective of “the
way that we often experience music as affectively irresistible”
(Krueger, 2014, p. 2), and draws upon the notion of entrainment
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(see section Affordances in Music Research). Music, according
to Kreuger, is part of a distributed system where “musical
affordances provide resources and feedback that loop back onto
us and in so doing, enhance the functional complexity of
various motor, attentional, and regulative capacities responsible
for generating and sustaining emotional experience” (ibid).
Kreuger focuses on the listener’s point of view, and although
he is more detailed than Clarke (2005) or Windsor and De
Bézenac (2012) regarding the theoretical underpinnings of this
position—drawing upon, amongst other things, the extended
mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers, 1998)—his focus is rather
narrowly set on solicitations of different emotional experiences.
Hence, his theory is difficult to apply to a performance situation
as a sole theory. He only touches slightly upon any social
dimension in terms of affective synchrony, albeit not particularly
in relation to affordances, and culture is addressed only as a
consequence of discussing the many contexts in which music can
be utilized.
Menin and Schiavio (2012), finally, delimit, but also
reinterpret the concept of affordances as dealing with intentional
relationships between musical subjects and objects exclusively,
a relationship grounded in how the motor possibilities of the
subject’s body can interact with the environment. Therefore
they reject the idea of inferential relationships—such as, for
example, a movie trailer “affording” going to the cinema—as
being affordances. They draw a parallel to the work of Delalande
(in ibid, p. 210) on children’s exploratory behavior toward
musical objects, concluding how embodiment (and the discovery
of musical affordances as intentional acts) arises from sensory-
motor modalities of interaction with an object. Thus their stance
relies on relationships that have emerged during early childhood
discoveries such as plunging, hitting and scratching. Accordingly,
they propose “an embodied approach that radically diverges
from the standard accounts, considering musical objects as
entities constituted within the intentional motor-based relation
that defines a musical context” (ibid, p. 211). It is not at
all clear, however, how—and to what degree (if any)—they
consider cultural or social aspects to influence or be part of the
embodiment musical theory they describe.
Where Do We Go From Here?
To summarize, in most music theorists’ interpretations of
affordances, cultural aspects are inevitably included, while the
degree to which social aspects are incorporated varies to a large
extent. What is still missing in the field of music research, in
our opinion, is a more encompassing theoretical framework
incorporating the sociocultural dimensions that are fundamental
to the situatedness and embodiment of music performance,
providing a detailed account of the underlying mechanisms,
but also providing a more holistic approach that does not lose
track of the complex whole constituted by the interaction of
composers, performers, audience, technologies, etc. We believe
that Ramstead et al.’s (2016) cultural affordances framework, as
discussed in the previous subsection, although not previously
applied to music, constitutes a promising starting point for
capturing and elucidating this complex web of relationships. We
will therefore in the next section illustrate this with examples
foremost from the first author’s artistic works as composer and
performer of mixed works, where a combination of acoustic
sound sources [singer(s)] and digital sound sources (responsive
computer technologies) perform together live (cf. Figure 1).
AFFORDANCES IN INTERACTIVE MUSIC
The mechanisms of affordances in music operate within a
situation whose aspects interact and thus affect the efficacy
of affordances. Hence, affordances and situation are inevitably
intertwined. However, for the sake of analysis, we will attempt
to address in the following different parameters as if they
were separable. Importantly though, by discussing affordances
in terms of aspects of a situation, as Rietveld and Kiverstein
(2014) proposed, this enables us to address affordances as graded
instead of binary, which ismuchmore applicable to the reciprocal
dynamics that are crucial to music performance in general, and
interactive music in particular.
The Landscape and Fields of Affordances
What then constitutes the shared landscape of affordances in
an interactive music work of which a performer is part? The
landscape (cf. section Cultural Affordances) is the totality of
available affordances in a niche, associated with a form of life,
so for most cases it is the action possibilities offered by the
audience, the concert space, the reciprocal relationship toward
sounds generated by the computer technology and possibly
other participating performers. As the framework suggests (cf.
section Cultural Affordances), there are cultural affordances of
both natural kind and conventional kind. An example of the
former is a chair on stage that affords sitting, and in the latter
case a microphone that affords singing into. In an interactive
performance work, such as the first author’s Metamorphoses
(Einarsson, in press; cf. Figure 1), the situation holding the
landscape is very complex; the music composition is realized
only when the computer technology is interacted with, and stage
directions are added to the performance, e.g., physical actions
such as walking, sitting, standing, and singing elevated in the air
in harnesses. Affordances appear, just as Rietveld and Kiverstein
(2014) state, as nested and as an ensemble, where situation and
affordances are inevitably intertwined.
Fields of affordances, on the other hand, (cf. section Cultural
Affordances), are at the level of the individual. What will stand
out for the individual performer, thus constitute their field of
affordances, is dependent on the performer’s concerns, needs and
abilities. These are in turn under the influence of enculturation,
patterned practices, directed attention and shared expectations.
Altogether this will color the performer’s detection of possibilities
for action nested in the interplay with the computer, other
performers, the audience, and the performance space. Again,
there typically are cultural affordances of both natural kind
and conventional kind. An example of the former is the act
of turning toward a sound suddenly projected from a specific
loudspeaker.
The latter, conventional affordances, may be exemplified with
a musical structure containing short sampled sounds lasting for
20–100 ms or so, (i.e., granular synthesis) implemented at one
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FIGURE 1 | An illustration of the performance piece Metamorphoses (Einarsson, 2015a), a mixed work composed and co-performed by the first author (Einarsson, in
press; see also https://vimeo.com/153345880 for a Vimeo video).
location in the work Metamorphoses. The structure invites a
sort of mimicking, which the score also devises. This electronic
response is dependent on the length of the sung input (alongside
additional parameters), and elicits a way of singing where space
is left for the computer response. Following this, the character of
the response impacts the improvisation toward becoming more
fragmented and the denser the response gets, it brings about
more pause on part of the singers. Thus there is a potential to
reshaping the affordance gradually toward a background texture,
increasing the likeliness of soliciting contrasting musical gesture
like silence (Einarsson, in press). Singing itself is an interesting
subcase, for singing words evoke emotions, and these in turn will
impact appraisal of the affordance field.
In some instances this distinction between natural and
conventional may be less clear-cut, which at the same time
illustrates how natural and conventional affordances are poles on
a continuum rather than two distinct categories. For example, an
interesting study by Berg et al. (2016) reveals how a classically
trained pianist adjusts his playing in relation to the room
acoustics. The study was based in a modern concert hall where
ceiling height could be altered, and there were also listeners
present. The larger the concert hall the longer the reverberation
time, and the slower the tempo the pianist performed at became.
Interestingly, there was also a heightened focus on details
in the interpretation when the reverberation was shorter. So,
modifications to the material environment, and the impact this
had on the sociocultural situation (as constituted by for example
performance practice, the character of the music and listener’s
expectations), influenced the pianist’s behavior.
Striving for Optimal Grip
One challenge that arises in artistic practice is, in comparison
to many other activities we as humans engage in, the goal, or
optimum, is not very clearly defined. Perhaps the goal, to a
performer or composer, can be put as ways of being and engaging
with/in music. As T.S. Eliot famously stated: “You are the music,
while the music lasts.” On the other hand, as Bruineberg and
Rietveld (2014) write, “the skilled individual does not necessarily
have an explicit goal in mind, but rather is solicited by the
environment in such a way as to improve her grip on the
situation.” Striving toward optimal grip is thus according to them
equivalent to “having an action readiness for dealing adequately
with an affordance” (ibid). Our suggested “goal” in terms of ways
of being in music, is constrained by the demands of the situation,
its physical, social and cultural prerequisites. One prerequisite
may simply be the artistic work to be performed or composed.
Theremay also be inner constraints derived from themotivations
behind engaging in music, in particular emotionally laden ones.
The ways for improving grip, as a performer, may therefore
be a tending toward having the full palate of artistic expression
made available, in relation to the situational demands. The
performer may optimize feedback monitoring, placement of
equipment, positioning in relation to the audience and/or fellow
musicians, controlling muscular tension/level of anxiety in order
to perform at his or her best, minimize possible distractions,
rehearse, acknowledge and adapt to present room acoustics—
just to mention some. The performer may also learn new
behaviors, cf. modifying affordances by changing the form
of life. For example, in the work PS. I will be home soon
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by the first author (Einarsson and Friberg, 2015), performers
reported that they had to find new listening strategies in order
to achieve a satisfactory interaction with the computer. Many
aspects applicable to the performer’s situation may also be
applied to the composer’s situation. In addition, the composer
can be said to have a goal set in terms of a directedness—
let us call it an affective bearing toward which the artistic
course for the work is set. An affective appraisal is always
present when acting. So the skilled intentionality (cf. above),
i.e., striving for optimal grip, in this case, speaking from
the first author’s experience, is reflected in having concrete
tools readily available for composition (computer, instruments,
synthesizers etc.), but also in terms of having access to the
desired bodily state (as Damasio denotes it), pertaining feelings
and cognitive processes in accordance with the idea for the
work. The composer, similar to what composer Vaggione (2001)
describes, attempts to using his/her own body as a template
when shaping and listening to the work in progress, making
use of embodied simulation in order to work with expectations
and directing the attention of as well performers as audience as
the work proceeds. Affect, attention and affordances interact to
sculpt a field of affordances, as Ramstead et al. (2016) put it.
These aspects of skilled intentionality may be seen as ways of
unveiling embodied expectations in the landscape of affordances
(i.e., shared expectations embodied in material culture, social
niches and patterned cultural practices, enabling the landscape of
affordances), by hands-on testing and experiencing sounds and
computer responses when composing.
Attention and Joint Attention
As Ramstead et al. (2016) point out, constructed human
environments, which we suggest a musical work may be likened
with, work with soliciting certain expectations and directing
attention. Attention impacts the ways the performer engages with
the field of affordance. How a performer is attentive is shaped
over the course of development, as part of an enculturation, thus
ways of relating to computer responses in an interactive piece of
music is part of a larger picture, where preconceptions in terms of
ways of being attentive are part of how the performer attends to
themusic. Since parameters for analysis and synthesis not seldom
change dynamically throughout the piece, many affordances are
highly dynamic.
Drawing upon interviews with singers from two different
musical works, it is possible to compare a classically trained
vocalists’ conceptualisation of the computer (Einarsson and
Friberg, 2015) with jazz vocalists’ preconceptions of the computer
(Einarsson, in press). These differences in sociocultural situation
between singers identifying with different genres, i.e., different
fields of affordances, show how waywardness in the relationship
toward the computer may cause uncertainty in some singers, but
the appraisal of uncertainty and subsequent course of action may
vary very much due to what formal training (enculturation and
skill) they have and what connotations the computer brings along
(the object). Uncertainty was experienced as inherently negative
by the classically trained vocalist, while to the jazz singers it was
at the heart of the practice and to a large degree indispensible
(Einarsson and Friberg, 2015; Einarsson, in press).
The singer’s accounts in the work Metamorphoses (ibid) also
reveal expectations, such as listening out for what is not already
there, in other words, listening out for where the piece of music is
heading trying to anticipate the computer’s (re-) action, or trying
to “un-listen” what some singers or computers are performing
in order to execute difficult passages. This directly relates to
the agent’s selective engagement with the field of affordance, as
modulated by directed attention.
According to Ramstead et al. (2016), joint and shared
attention mark out some affordances as more salient, and this
we suggest is part of how the composer works, i.e., by guiding
the attention of both performers and audience. Particularly
with interactive works, the first author’s research brings forward
performers’ experiences of putting the relationship toward the
computer on display for the audience or for fellow musicians
(Einarsson, in press) in a “look what I found” sense. For
example, the violinist in PS. I will be home soon! (Einarsson,
2012), performing in a motion-tracking system, described how
she wanted to show the sounds to the audience. Through
her path across the floor, where the motion detector tracked
her movements, she achieved this display. Simply put, in one
moment, the audience afforded the action of putting on display,
and the electronic sounding afforded exploration andmovement,
yet these affordances can be assumed to interact, similar to
what is suggested by Ramstead et al. (2016), which also would
be interesting grounds for continuous study. This also applies
to a mechanism only briefly touched upon by Ramstead et al
(ibid), a description of how joint attention, usually only applied
to dyadic relationships, may be projected to larger groups. The
first author’s research suggests that the musical work containing
interactive technology may constitute one such case of expanded
joint attention, where computer technology is part of the field of
affordance holding an ensemble of nested affordances.
Sociocultural Dimensions
Recurring in this discussion, the musical performance situation
is indeed a sociocultural environment, but as previously noted
in section Affordances in Music Research, this is surprisingly
often not addressed when discussing affordances in music. For
instance, this entails that fellow musicians influence available
affordances by directing attention to certain aspects of the
landscape, making some behavioral responses more likely due
to expectations based on formal training and experience than
others.
Already Gibson spoke of information, of secondary
knowledge, as a way of accessing some affordances, and by
emphasizing similar sociocultural dimensions, as Rietveld and
Kiverstein (2014) and later Ramstead et al. (2016) do, the theory
makes much more sense in the field of music. For example, in
an interactive musical work, for a performer to have some of
the background information, such as knowing the composer’s
intentions with the relationships between materials, contributes
to the sense of a whole and the discovery of affordances, i.e., how
to choose between actions (Einarsson, in press).
One mechanism at work, affecting the fields of affordances
for all parties involved (performers, audience, composer), is
sociocultural normativity. This includes, but is by no means
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restricted to, (1) cultural artifacts such as the score, enculturation
in terms of the singer’s formal training, the ease with which
certain actions are preferred over others—i.e., the ability of
the performer, the participating institution (s), or (2) social
influence such as the presence and proximity of the audience,
the presence and proximity of other musicians, composer and
technicians/staff, even social identity in terms of members
of a social group not present at the moment. In interactive
works it is apparent how emotions as well as culture and
social relations are part of the interplay between performer and
computer technology. Returning to the notion of experiencing
waywardness in the relationship toward the computer, the
situatedness, the enculturation and social influence, impact how
this is experienced. With four singers in Metamorphoses, all
having the same sort of “fickle playmate,” creates, according to
the singers’ accounts (Einarsson, in press), a sense of a shared
handling of the situation (social influence).
One kind of computer response commented on by the singers
performing Metamorphoses (ibid) was imitation, a driving force
that enforces social liking (Leman, 2007). Engaging with certain
responses offers a give and take of imitative gestures between
singer and computer. Many of the affordances in the responsive
work are thus nested, or of give-and-take character, and taking
the musical lead in one direction opens up an array of action
possibilities in the next step.
The Role of the Composer
Given what has been discussed so far, the role of the composer
is then to shape dynamical fields of affordances accounting
for their possible interactions, based on a shared landscape
of affordance [cf. subject position in film theory (see Clarke,
2005), shaping a shared frame of reference for interpretation,
but here with an emphasis also on action—among other things].
Within this larger landscape of affordances and the musical
performance situation with all its parties and multiple layers,
there are clusters and overlaps: the singers’ somewhat permeable
and overlapping fields of affordances, and the listeners’ fields of
affordances. Considering this—consciously or unconsciously—
is part of the composer’s practice. Even when composing, we
suggest composers create their field of affordances to operate
within, relying on mechanisms of predictive processing and
embodied simulation. Quiet inner listening brings about action
cues, and extracts of musical passages or certain sounds projected
over loudspeakers in the studio also suggest musical action in
an embodied manner. Anticipating and forming relationships,
as well as playing with expectations, is many times at the core
of the composer’s practice. This is in line with Ramstead et al.’s
statement: “The everyday phenomenology of affordances is one
of possibilities for action and their variations; in other words, of
expecting certain nested action possibilities and prescriptions for
action” (Ramstead et al., 2016, p. 13, our emphasis).
An interesting example of working with the field of
affordances is the audiovisual performance work One piece of a
shared space (Einarsson, 2015b), where sung vowel sounds had
an impact on the localisation of sound in the concert space (i.e.,
spatialization). The singer experienced the relationship toward
the live electronics as quite ephemeral, and looking through the
lens of the cultural affordances framework some interesting issues
arise. A response in the domain of location does not first and
foremost solicit an action of vocalizing. Rather the suggested
action is to turn toward the sound, to approach and examine
(a natural affordance). The concert space where this particular
piece was rehearsed did not allow for very much movement, thus
restricting the field, but when this kind of action was added as
a kind of stage direction, to turn toward the sound (a guidance
in the field of affordances), it did become more meaningful
to watch and also made more sense to the performer. As a
continuation, one could hypothesize that this kind of affordance
would be better highlighted in an environment allowing for
more exploration (changing the “form of life” by manipulating
the environment, and/or behavior), or, a situation where the
system was also susceptible for movement, i.e., the performer’s
movement was also taken into account for analyses, in addition
to the sung input (changing the form of life by manipulating the
material).
Hence, pertinent to our discussion of music performance
is a dynamic between shared landscape and individual fields
of affordances, and we suggest that considering this dynamic
is at the heart of the music composer’s practice. We are,
however, not saying that compositional practice is devoid of
rationalizations or structured approaches, but rather—following
Damasio (1994), Johnson (2007), and Ziemke (2016)—that
embodiment is fundamental to every aspect of human life and
meaning-making.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
One of the driving forces behind this research has been the
question how we can begin to account for the complexity of
interactive music performance situations and analyze details
without losing track of the whole. We have argued that
what is still missing in the discourse on musical affordances
is an encompassing theoretical framework incorporating
the sociocultural dimensions that are fundamental to the
situatedness and embodiment of interactive music performance.
This would be facilitating a detailed account of the underlying
mechanisms, but also providing a more holistic approach that
does not lose track of the complex whole constituted by the
interaction of composers, performers, audience, technologies,
etc. We believe that Ramstead et al.’s cultural affordances
framework, drawing upon the work by Rietveld and Kiverstein
(2014), although not previously applied to music, constitutes
a promising starting point for capturing and elucidating this
complex web of relationships. Furthermore, by providing
insights into the underlying mechanisms, it also facilitates new
ways of considering the process toward new musical works as
well as the performance situation as such. We hope to have
illustrated this in this paper, at least to some degree, with
examples from the first author’s artistic work as composer and
performer of mixed works, where a combination of acoustic
sound sources (singers) and digital sound sources (responsive
computer technologies) perform together live.
To begin with, Ramstead et al. (2016) put forward, echoing
Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014), that an ecological niche equals
a landscape of affordances. “The total ensemble of available
affordances for a population in a given environment. This
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org September 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1701107
Einarsson and Ziemke Affordances of Interactive Music
landscape corresponds to what evolutionary theorists in biology
and anthropology call a ‘niche”’ (Ramstead et al., 2016, p. 3).
We then learn how a niche: “[. . . ] in the case of humans, the
social world [is]—associated with (and partly constituted by) a
form of life” (ibid, p. 5). We also learn that: “Different human
communities, societies, and cultures, with sometimes strikingly
different styles of engagement with the material and social world,
constitute different forms of life.”
Hence, the consequence of what they are saying is,
different forms of life entail different landscapes of affordances.
Furthermore they describe how there is also a strong influence
on available affordances in a niche from “local ontologies,”
i.e., collective expectations, installed through specific ways of
doing joint activities in domain-specific material-discursive
environments (patterned practices). They write: “[. . . ] these
ontologies codetermine the exact affordances that are available
in a given niche, for they prescribe certain ways of being,
thinking perceiving and acting in context that are situationally
appropriate” (ibid, p 14). So, local ontologies also influence
affordances available in a niche, i.e., the landscape.
In our analysis, we have seen the need for a way to describe
these arenas of a landscape of affordances where local ontologies
derived from social niches and cultural practices have shaped a
community as part of a landscape. Reading Ramstead et al. (2016)
closely, they also seem to be grasping for this level of analysis:
“Our claim here is that cultural affordances (especially conventional
ones) form a coordinated affordance landscape, which is enabled
by sets of embodied expectations that are shared by a given
community or culture. Social niches and cultural practices generally
involve not isolated, individual affordances or expectations but local
landscapes that give rise to and depend on shared expectations.
We submit that these shared expectations—implemented in the
predictive hierarchies, embodied in material culture, and enacted in
patterned practices—contribute to the constitution of the landscape
of affordances that characterizes a given community or culture”
(Ibid, p.14 our emphasis).
Kiverstein and Rietveld (2015) write: “The human landscape of
affordances is one that is tightly interwoven with both material
aspects and social and cultural practices local to different regions
of this landscape” (ibid, p. 712 our emphasis).
We interpret this as a common reaching for an intermediate
level between landscape and field, a “local landscape” in the words
of Ramstead et al, or a “region of the landscape” in the words
of Kiverstein and Rietveld (2015). In a similar vein, Kiverstein
and Rietveld (ibid) touch upon how a landscape of affordances
relies on possibilities for action available in a particular form of
life, because of the patterned and coordinated activities in which
members of this form of life are able to partake in. We see a
need for this level constituted by clustered fields, an arena of
affordances, for example when discussing performers identifying
with different genres, stemming from different sociocultural
background, i.e., different formal training, different repertoire
knowledge, different ideals and expectations, and familiarity with
different institutions and patterned practices associated with
these. These differences are distinct and relatively stable, although
not as distinct we would claim as to call them different forms of
life, i.e., different landscapes. We therefore advocate an addition
to the framework in terms of an intermediate level, an arena of
affordances, meaning clustered fields of affordances determined
by shared local ontologies and social and cultural practices, as
part of the landscape of affordances.
Hence, what this paper contributes to the understanding
of music as embodied and situated activity, we believe, is
the presentation and illustration of a theoretical framework
centered on affordances, yet a broader notion of affordances than
previously discussed in the musical context. We argue that this
is more suitable for capturing the social and cultural aspects that
are central to musical performances, while also not losing track of
their embodied nature. In our opinion, the crucial departure from
the original Gibsonian notion of affordances, and many later
variations and interpretations thereof, lies in the position that it
is the situation as whole that has affordances. This also sheds new
light, as discussed in detail in the previous section, on musical
composition as a process of construction—and embodied mental
simulation—of situations, guiding the performers’ and audience’s
attention in shifting fields of affordances.
Finally, what this paper contributes to the research topic
“Beyond Embodied Cognition”, is an illustration—using the
case of interactive music—of how seemingly highly abstract,
disembodied and unsituated activities, such as the composition
of musical works, can in fact be strongly grounded in concrete
embodied and situated activity. Hence, the contribution to the
cognitive sciences in general, beyond the specific application
to interactive music, lies in the formulation, discussion, and
illustration of a significantly broader notion of affordances as
aspects of situations, building on the recent work of Rietveld and
Kiverstein (2014) and later Ramstead et al. (2016) on cultural
affordances. The distinction between a population’s relatively
static landscape of affordances and individuals’ dynamically
varying fields of affordances, is also in line with recent work
on the neural and cognitive mechanisms underlying affordances,
which indicates that affordance perception is less direct, more
context- and goal-dependent than Gibson thought 40–50 years
ago (Thill et al., 2013), and that there are separate brain
pathways for stable and variable affordances (Sakreida et al.,
2016). The question of what exactly constitutes a situation is of
course not trivial—that discussion goes back to at least Dewey
(1938) and Russell (1939), and is beyond the scope of this
paper. However, we believe that the theoretical perspectives
and concrete examples discussed in this paper help to elucidate
how situations—and with them affordances—are dynamically
constructed through the interactions of biological, contextual,
social, and cultural mechanisms as embodied and situated
activity unfolds.
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One of the most important sequela in persons who suffer from acquired brain
injury is a behavioral disorder. To date, the primary approaches for the rehabilitation
of this sequela are Applied Behavior Analysis, Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, and
Comprehensive-Holistic Rehabilitation Programs. Despite this theoretical plurality, none
of these approaches focuses on rehabilitating behavioral disorders considering the
relation between affordance and environmental adaptation. To introduce this therapeutic
view to neurorehabilitation, we apply the theoretical tenets of the enactive paradigm to
the rehabilitation of a woman with severe behavioral and cognitive impairment. Over
seventeen sessions, her behavioral and cognitive performance was assessed in relation
to two seated affordances (seated on a chair and seated on a ball 65 cm in diameter)
and the environmental adaptation while she was working on various cognitive tasks.
These two seated affordances allowed to incorporate the theoretical assumptions of
the enactive approach and to know how the behavior and the cognition were modified
based on these two postural settings and the environmental adaptation. The findings
indicate that the subject exhibited better behavioral (physical and verbal) and cognitive
(matching success and complex task) performances when the woman worked on
the therapeutic ball than when the woman was on the chair. The enactive paradigm
applied in neurorehabilitation introduces a level of treatment that precedes behavior
and cognition. This theoretical consideration allowed the discovery of a better relation
between a seated affordance and the environmental adaptation for the improvement
behavioral and cognitive performance in our case study.
Keywords: enaction, seated affordance, dual-tasks, neurorehabilitation, behavioral disorder, cognitive
impairment
INTRODUCTION
Persons who suffer from acquired brain injury have multiple impairments that prevent
their performing activities of daily life, such as locomotion, self-care, communicating, and
reasoning, normally. In addition, such persons suffer from mood changes (depression, anxiety).
Nevertheless, one of the most important problems of the brain damaged is the behavioral disorder
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(Lezak, 1986; Tate, 1986; Brooks et al., 1987; Burke and
Wesolowski, 1988; Livingston and Brooks, 1988; Jacobs, 1998).
The magnitude and persistence of these behavioral sequelae
suggest that the problem extends beyond the individual sphere,
affecting the person’s social and familiar contexts such as
emotional overburdening in a familiar environment (Godfrey
et al., 1991; Franulic et al., 2000), problems with community
integration and psychosocial adjustment (Milders et al., 2003;
McCabe et al., 2007). In addition to all of these sequelae, the
behavioral disorder may be a serious obstacle to the rehabilitation
process and the patient’s recovery (Sohlberg and Mateer, 2001;
Wood and McMillan, 2001; van Reekum et al., 2005).
Behavioral disorders are commonly classified into
externalizing (impulsiveness, irritability, aggression, loss of
emotional control, hyperactivity) and internalizing (depression,
withdrawal, apathy) symptoms in both childhood (Cicchetti and
Toth, 2014) and adulthood (John et al., 2008). The persistency
of these symptoms is such that they may be present for many
years after brain injury (Kelly et al., 2008). The severity of this
impairment depends on various factors such as premorbid
behavior, personal skills, extent of brain injury, and the types of
physical, emotional, and cognitive sequelae the person suffers
(Eames et al., 1990; Mateer and Ruff, 1990; Davis and Goldstein,
1994).
To date, the primary approach for the treatment of behavioral
disorder following acquired brain injury is based on behavioral
therapy (McGlynn, 1990; Jacobs, 1993; Wesolowski and Zencius,
1994). According to the majority of the modern literature
(Ylvisaker et al., 2005, 2007; Cattelani et al., 2010; Geurtsen
et al., 2010), these interventions may be organized into
three main categories: Applied Behavior Analysis, comprising
contingency management procedures and positive behavior
intervention; Cognitive-Behavior Therapy; and Comprehensive-
Holistic Rehabilitation Programs. Each of these approaches has
its own theoretical and therapeutic assumptions that target
specific features of behavioral disorders.
Despite this theoretical plurality, none of these therapeutic
approaches focuses on rehabilitating behavioral disorder
considering the relation between affordance and environmental
adaptation. Current perspectives do not consider how physical
structure and the environment compose the first step in
the emergence of behavior and cognition. The theoretical
assumptions of conventional behavioral therapies are based
on the dichotomy between subject and object. The subject and
the object cause a natural division between the person who
suffers from the disability and the environment that surrounds
that person. For example, Applied Behavior Analysis focuses
on manipulating the environment to improve misbehavior.
In Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, the intervention is based on
improving self-consciousness and learning cognitive strategies.
And finally, the third group, the Comprehensive-Holistic
Rehabilitation Programs, simultaneously incorporate the
manipulation of the environment and cognition to recover from
behavioral disorders (Cattelani et al., 2010). Nevertheless, and
opposed to these therapeutic models, the enactive view is not
based on the division between subject and object. The enactive
approach assumes the process of interaction, constant, and
unbreakable, between the environment and the sensorimotor
schemas for the emergence of behavior and cognition. In the view
of the therapeutic approach that we introduce in this publication,
it indicates that any clinical intervention must consider the
interaction between body and environment to improve the
neurological sequelae. Following we briefly explain the enactive
approach.
Enaction is a novel paradigm in the cognitive sciences (Di
Paolo et al., 2010) that was initially articulated by Varela et al.
(1991) in “The Embodied Mind.” In this approach, behavior
and cognition develop through a dynamic interaction between
the physiology of the organism, the sensorimotor systems, and
the environment (structural coupling between the body and
the world). Human beings enact the world; their embodied
actions in the world are the first steps in the development of
perception and the basis of cognition. In opposition to other
theories of the mind in which the subject and the environment
are considered to be separate entities, enaction claims that the
study of the action and the cognition requires the simultaneous
study of the mind, the body and the environment because
all three are indissolubly intertwined in the mind processes
(Thompson, 2007). Originally, this paradigm focused primarily
on simple cognitive processes such as color perception (Varela
et al., 1991). Currently the enactive approach addresses the
explanation of action and cognition in activities that require high-
level cognitive processes such as mathematics (Núñez, 2010),
language (Bottineau, 2010), the human brain (Engel, 2010), social
interaction (Di Paolo et al., 2010), and emotion (Colombetti,
2010). However, the enaction approach has not been applied in
neurological therapy.
To introduce this therapeutic view to the field of
neurorehabilitation, we apply the theoretical tenets of enaction
to clinical practice. Thus, to research this interacting system
of body structure and the environment, we assessed, during
17 sessions, the behavioral and cognitive performances of a
woman with a severe acquired brain injury (ABI) in two different
therapeutic contexts. Following Gibson’s (2014) works about
ecological perception we call these settings seated affordances.
In one seated affordance, the woman was required to perform
various cognitive tasks in the traditional posture of cognitive
rehabilitation, that is, seated on a chair. In the other seated
affordance, the woman was required to attempt the same tasks
that she had performed in the chair; this time, however, the
woman was seated on a therapeutic ball (65 cm in diameter). In
both seated affordances, misbehaviours (physical and verbal),
and the successes and failures of the cognitive tasks were
recorded during the performance of the cognitive tasks.
We formulated a primary hypothesis and a peripheral
hypothesis based on prior clinical experiences. The primary
hypothesis was that the sensorimotor dynamics between the body
and the environment in the ball condition would allow a better
modulating effect of the externalizing symptoms than when
the woman was seated on a chair. The peripheral hypothesis,
considering that enaction claims that motor action is directly
linked to cognition, was that the woman achieved a better
cognitive performance working in the ball condition than in
the chair condition. A multiple schedule design was developed
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to examine how these bodily and environmental adjustments
modified the behavior and cognitive variables.
CASE REPORT
The Subject
We applied the experimental design to a 36-year-old woman
who, in 2007, suffered a severe brain injury. The injury occurred
48 h after a normal childbirth, at which time the woman suffered
from a severe encephalopathy secondary to fulminant hepatic
failure. At the emergency service, cerebral oedema and multiple
non-specific lesions in bilateral white matter were observed.
One week later, the woman was diagnosed with preeclampsia.
Afterward, she received a liver transplant. Ultimately, she began
her rehabilitation in a specialized center for neurological therapy.
At the time of this research, 6 years after the ABI, the
neuropsychological assessment was only qualitative because
of severe behavioral and cognitive disorders. During the
exploration, the woman was restless, impulsive, uninhibited, and
verbally incoherent. Orientation to person place and time was
impaired.
Although the neuropsychological impairments were
generalized in all cognitive functions, with regard to this study,
the most important injuries were associated with attention,
reasoning, comprehensive and expressive aphasia, and executive
functions.
The subject was highly impaired in sustained, selective,
alternant, and divided attention. The woman was incapable of
paying attention because of extreme distractibility. Her language
was verbose and meaningless, with alterations in grammar,
use of neologisms, palilalia, and echolalia. The subject made
inappropriate comments and numerous perseverations without
being able to maintain social relationships. The woman could
understand simple sentences but struggled with the pragmatic
elements of language. Her executive functions were severely
affected, functions such as planning and sequencing capabilities
and mental flexibility. The woman could not focus her attention
on relevant stimuli or omit irrelevant stimuli. The woman could
not inhibit verbal and motor behaviors because of her impulsivity
and made decisions and solved problems without reflection
because her abstract and complex reasoning were extremely
affected.
Physically, the woman could move and walk without any
external support and was capable of organizing her movements
adequately, both fine motor and gross motor skills. Therefore,
the subject did not have any difficulty in her physical posture or
balance.
This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of Fundación Polibea’s ethical committee.
Family of the person who participated in this study gave written
informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Procedures
The experimental design was applied in seventeen sessions.
In each session, two cognitive tasks were rated, and different
behavioral and cognitive variables were collected while the
person was seated on different affordances (on a chair or on a
ball). Behavioral and cognitive variables were assessed on both
seated affordances; however, to counterbalance, the data from
the sessions were assessed changing the order of the affordance
(Session 1: First on the ball and second on the chair. Session 2:
First on the chair and second on the ball, etc.). Between changing
from one seated affordance to the other seated affordance, the
task was stopped for 5 min.
When the woman was seated on the chair, we used the
standard posture of a traditional cognitive session. The subject
had to be seated in a chair with her feet on the floor. Moreover,
the subject had to keep her trunk erect without resting against
the chair back although she was allowed to place her arms on the
table. In the second seated affordance, we exchanged the chair
for a therapeutic ball (65 cm in diameter). The woman had to
keep her trunk straight with both feet on the floor, neither foot
touching the ball to avoid her using her ankles for stabilization.
The researcher did not allow the woman to rest her arms on the
table.
In both seated affordances, two cognitive exercises were
implemented. The first exercise required the woman to perform a
matching task, and the second task required the woman to utilize
greater cognitive resources (complex task). In the matching
exercise, the woman worked on visual perception and sustained
attention, and the complex task involved auditory perception,
language comprehension, visual perception, selective attention,
and motor skills. The performance of the first exercise (the
matching task) comprised giving the woman cards, one by one,
to match to the card with the identical figure located on the table
in front of her. The exercise lasted 15 min, and during the session,
the therapist recorded the number of successes and failures.
Then, the second exercise (complex task) began. This exercise
comprised the researcher’s asking her to point to a specific day
of the week on a timetable. This performance was repeated seven
times and the number of successes recorded.
During the sessions, there were two therapists in the room.
One therapist, the psychologist, managed the psychological
session seated in front of the woman on the other side of the table,
and the other therapist, the physical therapist, was located behind
the woman checking to see whether the woman touched the ball
with her ankles.
All sessions were recorded on video for later study to allow
various researchers to assess the behavioral variables. The score of
disruptive behavior was computed as the number of laughs, grabs,
strikes to the therapists, and looks back to the second therapist.
Self-verbalization was computed by the number of times the
woman talked without communicative intention. Finally, the
verbalization variable was computed by the number of times the
woman talked to one of the therapists.
Experimental Design
We applied a multi-treatment design (Kazdin, 1982) and more
specifically, a multi-schedule design (Hersen and Barlow, 1978;
Kazdin, 1982). The primary feature of this single-case design is
that separate interventions are associated with distinct stimulus
conditions. This methodological design is consistent with the goal
of this research because “after the stimulus has been associated
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with its respective intervention, a clear discrimination is evident
in performance” (Kazdin, 1982, p. 173).
The data analysis began by assessing the autocorrelation of
all variables in both the control phase and the experimental
phase. The variables that were not autocorrelated were matching
failure (on the chair, r = −0.18, p = 0.51, ns; on the ball,
r = 0.23, p = 0.38, ns.), disruptive behavior (on the chair,
r = −0.014, p = 0.96, ns; on the ball, r = −0.26, p = 0.33,
ns.), verbalization (on the chair, r = 0.318, p = 0.23, ns; on
the ball, r = 0.36, p = 0.17, ns.), self-verbalization (on the
chair, r = 0.25, p = 0.35, ns; on the ball, r = 0.15, p = 0.57,
ns.), and complex tasks (on the chair, r = −0.18, p = 0.50,
ns; on the ball, r = 0.28, p = 0.30, ns.). The only variable that
showed autocorrelation was matching success and only in the
chair condition (r = 0.60, p < 0.05 on the chair compared
with on the ball, r = −0.30, p = 0.26, ns.). We processed
this analysis in various manners depending on whether the
variables were autocorrelated. The non-autocorrelated variables
were assessed with the Mann–Whitney U test. This analysis is
considered the most appropriate and strict for this type of data
(Tate and Perdices, 2012). Relatively, the autocorrelated variable
was assessed with c-statistics according to the proposal suggested
by Tryon (1982) and DeCarlo and Tryon (1993). This analysis
allows detecting small changes in successive measurements.
Three researchers were employed to increase the internal
validity of the observational variables (disruptive behavior, self-
verbalization, and verbalization). These researchers conducted
the independent measurement. In addition, the intra-class
correlation coefficient was analyzed for each variable. The
measurements of this analysis showed a high reliability of the
intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC Point Estimate [95% CI]):
disruptive behavior 0.949 (0.900–0.979), self-verbalization 0.932
(0.865–0.972), and verbalization 0.937 (0.876–0.974).
RESULTS
We identified significant differences between the performance of
the person in the ball condition and in the chair condition, which
are summarized in Table 1.
The variables assessed with the Mann–Whitney U test had
significant results. For the behavior variable, a significantly
lower number of disruptive behaviors were observed on the
ball (Figure 1A), Z0 = −3.55, p < 0.001, than on the chair.
The sum of the ranks was 400.50 for the chair condition and
194.50 for the ball condition. For the verbalization variable,
the woman decreased her communication when working on
the ball (Figure 1B), Z0 = −3.08, p < 0.001. The sum of the
ranks was 387 for the chair condition and 208 for the ball
condition.
We observed that the subject accomplished a better complex
task performance while working on the ball, Z0 = −1.74,
p< 0.05. The sum of the ranks was 250.50 for the chair condition
and 344.50 for the ball condition. When we assessed the manner
in which the subject developed the task, the psychologist who
guided the sessions did not observe that the woman modified any
of the strategies used to successfully accomplish the task (visual
strategy or a longer time scanning).
By contrast with our initial hypothesis, both the self-
verbalization variable and the matching failure variable were
significantly higher in the ball condition than in the chair
condition. For self-verbalization, the person significantly
increased her verbal response when working on the ball,
Z0 = −1. 98, p = 0.02. The sum of the ranks was 240 for
the chair condition and 355 for the ball condition. In the
matching failure, the person made significantly more mistakes
working on the ball, Z0 = −2.82, p < 0.001. The sum of the
ranks was 217 for the chair condition and 378 for the ball
condition.
Finally, the only autocorrelated variable (matching success)
was the applied c-statistic. Assessing the baseline, a significant
trend was observed: c-statistic = 0.62 (SE = 0.22), z (two-
tailed) = 2.82, p < 0.01 (p = 0.0024). Following the analysis
protocol, the difference between the treatment line (on the
ball) and the baseline (on the chair) for each session (days)
was calculated. The results showed a better matching success
when working on the ball: c-statistic = 0.90 (SE = 0.22),
z (two-tailed) = 4.09, p < 0.01 (p = 0.004). Despite the
differences between the statistics, the average differences were
small (Mbaseline = 38.53 compared with Mtreatment = 38.94).
The results showed a significant trend. This was possible
because the differences between the experimental conditions
were maintained in each session (like a trend).
TABLE 1 | Mann–Whitney U test results.
Variables Seated affordance Mean (SD) Sum of ranks z-value p-value
Matching failure On the chair
On the ball
1.76 (1.751)
3.88 (2.421)
217
378
−2,823 0.00∗∗
Disruptive behavior On the chair
On the ball
50.41 (24,819)
22.27 (13,929)
400.50
194.50
−3,548 0.00∗∗
Verbalization On the chair
On the ball
150.44 (68.846)
86.29 (36.308)
387.00
208.00
−3,083 0.00∗∗
Self-verbalization On the chair
On the ball
169.97 (44.165)
192.86 (34.384)
240
355
−1,981 0.02∗
Complex task On the chair
On the ball
1.88 (1.054)
2.53 (1.068)
250.50
344.50
−1,740 0.04∗
∗Statistically significant (P < 0.05). ∗∗Statistically significant (P < 0.01).
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FIGURE 1 | Both (A and B) figures show that variables behaved quite similarly in the sessions; a larger number of misbehaviours or verbal
productions were collected during the sessions with both seated affordances. Nevertheless, one consistent element in all sessions is that behavioral
variables that developed in the ball condition (- - -) were always significantly smaller than in the chair condition (−).
DISCUSSION
The present study was designed to assess whether different seated
affordances (on a ball and on a chair) affected the behavioral and
cognitive performance of a person with severe acquired brain
injury. We hypothesized that the structural coupling of the body
and the environment in the ball condition would be better than
in the chair condition. The findings indicate that the subject
produced a better behavioral and cognitive performance when
working on the therapeutic ball than when working on the chair
(the traditional postural setting in cognitive rehabilitation).
The results indicate that the woman managed misbehaviours
(physical and verbal) better while working on the ball. We
believe these better results are because the work on the
ball elicits higher automatic body resources than the work
on the chair, helping the person avoid irrelevant stimuli
from the environment and centring herself in both her body
and her task. In addition to the improvement in behavioral
management, the woman also significantly improved the
cognitive performance variables (matching success and complex
task) while working in the ball condition, suggesting that the
therapeutic strategy not only has a modulating effect on the
externalizing symptoms but also allows better cognitive function.
This cognitive outcome is consistent other studies, demonstrating
that cognitive function improves when postural control becomes
more difficult (Caldwell et al., 2003; Elliott et al., 2005; Barra et al.,
2015).
By contrast with our initial premise, both the matching failure
and self-verbalization variables behaved differently from our
predictions. These results are consistent with some studies that
observed that the increase in the exigency of postural control
caused a decrease in the success of tasks (Andersson et al., 1998;
Vuillerme et al., 2000; Brauer et al., 2001; Riley et al., 2003; Barra
et al., 2006; Rapp et al., 2006; Simoneau et al., 2008).
Although the most important evidence in behavioral
disorders arise from single-case experimental designs
(Alderman et al., 1999; Alderman, 2002; Barlow et al.,
2009), which avoid the uncontrolled variance produced by
the heterogeneous nature of this disorder (Alderman and
Wood, 2013), we find two main limitation in this study.
The first one is related to a possible learning effect. The
experimental design developed consisted of the application
of two seated affordances during 17 sessions, which might
produce this undesirable learning effect. Nevertheless, and
even if the outcome was affected by learning effect, it would
not impact the main outcome of this research because in
each session the person performed both seated affordances.
The second limitation of this study is related to ecological
approach. The development of this study was applied in
a therapeutic context, which means it was performed in a
place without any noise, disruption, or distortion of social
environment. As a future improvement of the proposed study,
we suggest to carry out this research in a more ecological
environment in order to evaluate how the relation between
the seated affordances and the environmental adaptation
modulates cognition and behavior in a rehabilitation center,
a day center for people with disabilities and the family’s
house.
In recent decades, physical therapies have incorporated
dual-task training into motor development theory. This
intervention requires that an individual maintain balance
while simultaneously performing another task (cognitive or
motor). There may be some confusion regarding the similarity
between dual-task training and the therapeutic intervention
that we present; however, the two interventions are not, in
fact, similar. We resolve these differences with two arguments.
The first argument is that dual-task training is categorized
as a therapy based on information processing theory, which
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is known as computational therapy (Martínez-Pernía et al.,
in press), whereas our proposal is based on the enactive
approach. The second argument is that the majority of dual-task
training focuses on motor development; however, the aim
of the present study is the improvement of behavioral and
cognitive performance. To our knowledge, only three other
studies apply a dual-task paradigm to improve cognitive function
(Caldwell et al., 2003; Elliott et al., 2005; Barra et al., 2015),
and this work is the only study that is based on the enactive
paradigm.
The Particularities of the Enactive
Approach in Neurorehabilitation
In recent decades, new theories have arisen in the cognitive
sciences to address the study of cognition in an innovative
manner. These perspectives may be summaries from four
primary perspectives, or in Gallagher’s words, “the 4e approaches
of the mind” (Rowlands, 2010): embodied, embedded, enacted,
and extended. Despite differences among these perspectives,
all have one similar characteristic. These perspectives assign
major significance to extra-neuronal structures for the study
of cognition. Their theories emphasize the importance of the
body and the environment in the emergence of cognition.
Currently, these theoretical stances are a primary line of research
in non-Cartesian cognitive sciences (Rowlands, 2010): such
as philosophy, (Gallagher, 1986, 1995, 2000, 2005; Johnson,
1987; Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008; Shapiro, 2011), neuroscience
(Varela et al., 1991; Damasio, 1994, 2003; Thompson and
Varela, 2001; Edelman, 2004), psychology (De Jaegher, 2013;
McGann et al., 2013), education (van der Schyff, 2015; Lozada
and Carro, 2016), and artificial intelligence (Clark, 1998).
And although these types of studies remain scarce in the
rehabilitation sciences, there are some publications based
on this theory, such as studies regarding the rehabilitation
of persons who suffer from an experiential disorder called
hemiphobia (Martínez-Pernía and Ceric, 2011) and embodied-
enactive clinical reasoning in physical therapy (Øberg et al.,
2015).
This work may be relevant in the clinical field. This
statement is not only based on the fact that our study
shows hints of an effective treatment in rehabilitation of
persons with severe behavioral and cognitive disorder, but
also because it allows people who are usually excluded from
conventional therapies [due to the lack of insight and motivation
(Burgess and Wood, 1990; Sazbon and Groswasser, 1991)
and also because of the severity of their behavioral disorder
(Wood, 1987)] to receive a rehabilitation treatment. Traditional
rehabilitation programes can only be employed with patients
with less sequelae (Wood and Worthington, 2001). As a
consequence, the spectrum of more serious impairments falls
outside of any possible treatment. From the point of view
of neurorehabilitation based on enactive approach, the main
problem of classical therapeutic interventions is that they
focus on increasing behavioral management by techniques
of self-control. These types of strategies can be successful
in people with high cognitive levels because such people
are able to understand internal and external instructions.
Nevertheless, these strategies are not effective in persons with
low cognitive levels because such persons are not aware of what
is going on internally and what the therapist is demanding
(Alderman, 2003). By contrast, the therapeutic strategy based
on the enactive approach overcomes this drawback because
enactive therapy is working on unconscious structures of the
mind; the interaction between the body and the environment
modify behavior and cognition without the necessity of self-
awareness.
Surprisingly in cognitive therapy, the discussion of the
importance of the body and the environment has been
absented despite the fact that it is a basic element into
the therapeutic setting. The reason for this lack of interest
is due to the fact that cognitive neurorehabilitation is
based on functionalism (Martínez-Pernía et al., in press).
From the functionalist perspective, the body is reduced to
somatosensory cortex or it is restricted to perceive the stimulus
of the environment for being later used by the cognition
(Gallagher, 1995, 2005). From this view the body is reduced
to provide the “raw sensory input” to the brain, but it does
not have any contribution in cognition (Gallagher, 2005).
This is the reason why most of clinical interventions do
not consider what is the best corporal posture to improve
cognitive impairment. As a consequence of this omission,
therapy implicitly accepts that the gold standard for this
issue is to develop cognitive intervention with the patient
seated on a chair, posture that has to be maintained along
all session. Although this is the ordinary corporal posture to
recover from cognitive impairment there are some therapeutic
strategies that assume the corporal work in a more innovative
way. For instance, the cognitive diagnosis based on dual-
task paradigm and some strategies of the unilateral neglect
integrate a corporal therapy more pragmatically than to be
seated on a chair. Nevertheless, and in spite of these scarce
therapeutic interventions, the theoretical assumptions of
cognitive neurorehabilitation do not show interest in knowing
how the body and the environment improve the cognitive
function. By contrast to the functionalist view, the embodied
cognition approaches raise the importance of the body and
the environment in the emergence of consciousness. The
sensorimotor schemas and the environment are the substrate
from which the cognition emerges and from where the
perception, attention, memory, thought, reasoning, and so
on are shaped. In this way, the structural coupling between
the body and the environment provides specific conditions
that shape the cognition. From this view cognition can be
understood as a dynamic process that is situated prior to
brain activity (Gallagher, 1995, 2005; Gallagher and Zahavi,
2008). The body (through its movements and its corporal
posture) and the particular characteristics of the environment
[that affords the action of specific sensoriomotor programs
(e.g., walking, sitting, swimming)] work together to shape
the cognition (Gallagher, 2005). The meaning of this theory
applied to the field of cognitive neurorehabilitation is that
any therapeutic strategy has to consider what is the best
interaction process between the body and the environment
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to favor the recovery of a person from his/her cognitive
impairment.
CONCLUSION
The enactive paradigm applied in the rehabilitation of a woman
in this case study introduces a level of treatment that precedes
behavior and cognition and emerges from the relation between
seated affordance and environmental adaptation. This theoretical
consideration allowed the discovery of a better seated affordance
for the improvement behavioral and cognitive performance in
our case study.
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Previous studies have shown that the hand-over-heart gesture is related to being more
honest as opposed to using self-centered dishonesty. We assumed that the hand-over-
heart gesture would also relate to other-oriented dishonesty, though the latter differs
highly from self-centered lying. In Study 1 (N = 79), we showed that performing a hand-
over-heart gesture diminished the tendency to use other-oriented white lies and that the
fingers crossed behind one’s back gesture was not related to higher dishonesty. We
then pre-registered and conducted Study 2 (N = 88), which was designed following
higher methodological standards than Study 1. Contrary, to the findings of Study 1,
we found that using the hand-over-heart gesture did not result in refraining from using
other-oriented white lies. We discuss the findings of this failed replication indicating the
importance of strict methodological guidelines in conducting research and also reflect
on relatively small effect sizes related to some findings in embodied cognition.
Keywords: other-oriented dishonesty, white lies, body gestures, hand-over-heart, pre-registration, replication
INTRODUCTION
Chandler Bing: Janice said “Hi, do I look fat today?” So I looked at her...
Ross Geller: Whoa, whoa. You looked at her? You never look. You just answer, it’s like a reflex. Do I look
fat? No! Is she prettier than I am? No!
Friends (TV Series, 1994-2004)
We started writing this article with the idea to focus on the possible effects of the hand-over-
heart gesture on refraining from using other-oriented white lies. The experiments presented in
this article were in fact designed to test the idea that body gestures commonly associated with
(dis)honesty influence white lies. We have drawn hypothesis from previous psychological research
and then designed and conducted a study (Study 1) to put this hypothesis to the test. The study,
however, was designed and conducted few years ago, following our best intention and using the
knowledge we had back then, which, looking at it today, was not flawless. Due to recent crisis
regarding replications of studies (see e.g., Open Science Collaboration, 2012, 2015; Klein et al.,
2014; Hagger and Chatzisarantis, 2016) and especially with reference to the uncertainty regarding
some embodied cognition effects (e.g., Ranehill et al., 2015; Wagenmakers et al., 2016), we felt that
we should also make an effort to replicate our own findings. As we truly hope not to be chasing noise
with our scientific endeavor, we have decided to pre-register the design and conduct a replication
of Study 1. The replication held to higher methodological standards as compared to the original
study. Thus this article shows first why we have developed the hypothesis we had and then, after
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presenting the research we have conducted and the results we
found, we focus on both theoretical and methodological issues
related to the (possible lack of) hand-over-heart gesture effect on
other-oriented white lies.
EMBODIED COGNITION
The pure experience of reading a good novel is often thought to
involve the feeling of being totally immersed in the whole multi-
perceptual reality (by the means of visual imagery). Similarly,
mere thinking about a concept is argued to involve simulating
the relevant perceptual states (Barsalou, 2008; Bergen, 2015).
According to the embodied perspective, people represent these
concepts by the means of the same sensations that co-occur with
the activation of such concepts (see Riskind, 1984; Chandler and
Schwarz, 2009). Our bodies and their modalities can be perceived
as grounding mechanism in cognitive processes (see Barsalou,
2009).
From very early on in our development, we make sense of
social situations by assimilating their meaning with the states
of our bodies, their movement or their orientation in space in
those specific conditions. After many exposures, we learn how
to associate the fact that giving somebody a hug means that you
like that person or that pushing something away means that
you do not like it. Similarly, a little child jumps around rapidly
when faced with exciting stimulation. This kind of situated
conceptualisation represents the configurations of multimodal
components, that is, e.g., visual, auditory, proprioceptive, or
interoceptive information that can be viewed as a specific
perceptual pattern (Barsalou, 2009). The embodied cognition
perspective suggests that when a component of a specific pattern
is evoked or triggered, the remaining components are likely to
be activated as well, as they form a pattern in which in the past
they have frequently co-occurred with the perceived component.
Hence, after many incidents where such modal patterns co-occur
in quick succession, they are thought to form a unified situated
conceptualisation in our memory that plays an important role
in social cognition later in life (Barsalou, 2009). For example,
the numeracy cognition observed among pre-schoolers is often
based on their operations with fingers representing numbers in
space (e.g., SNARC hypothesis – spatial-numerical association of
response codes, Dehaene et al., 1993; Riello and Rusconi, 2011).
After much exposure to such co-occurrence early in life, we can
observe a pattern of spatial preference among adults as well –
people respond faster to large numbers with their right answer
key than with the left one, while small numbers are categorized
faster with the left than with the right key (Dehaene et al.,
1993).
The grounding theory (Barsalou, 1999, 2009; Niedenthal et al.,
2005) proposes that simply increasing the accessibility of the
specific concept (say the physical stimuli appears on left side
of the visual field) can elicit thoughts, feelings, and judgments
related to the concept that is applicable in this pattern (it would be
appraised, judged, and coded as being smaller or of lesser value:
Dehaene et al., 1993; Parzuchowski et al., 2016). For example,
when hugging somebody – apart from signaling a liking for
that person – it also involves a whole perceptual pattern of
various sensations (experience of warmth, the smell of the person,
softness of their skin, and so on). Thus when people experience
warmth (e.g., when they are placed in a warm room), they are
more likely to perceive others as friendly and kind (IJzerman and
Semin, 2009, 2010; Szymkow and Parzuchowski, 2013; Szymkow
et al., 2013; IJzerman et al., 2016).
It is important to note that these bodily induced association
activations are thought to take place unobtrusively, and even
without awareness of their semantic meaning (see Chandler and
Schwarz, 2009; Jostmann et al., 2009). For instance, Chandler
and Schwarz (2009) claimed to study text comprehension while
instructing participants to perform various finger movements.
During this experiment they asked participants to extend their
middle fingers (a hostile gesture), or to extend their index
fingers (a neutral, control gesture). The participants were asked
to indicate their impressions of an ambiguously described
person while performing the finger movement (hostile or control
gesture). None of the participants noticed that they had, in
fact, been performing the valenced gesture. Interestingly, those
making the hostility–associated gesture perceived the target
person as more hostile than the controls did.
To sum up, many research findings appear to show that merely
experiencing a bodily sensation associated with certain concepts
is enough to shape subsequent information processing, although
the pattern of associations related to the body manipulation
should be limited to the previous repetition pattern and its
recognition. Thus the effects of such bodily manipulation are
at the same time sensitive to culture and contextual clues (for
a discussion on this topic, see Bialobrzeska and Parzuchowski,
2016). There is therefore theoretical and empirical evidence in
psychological literature that indicates the effects of embodied
cognition. We next turned to the literature on dishonesty and its’
link with embodied cognition, as we wanted to focus on gestures
related to dishonesty.
SELF-ORIENTED AND
OTHER-ORIENTED DISHONESTY
People in long-term relationships would often agree with the
anecdotal advice coming from a fictitious character, Ross Geller
and mentioned at the beginning of this article. When sensitive
questions are being asked by the partner (e.g., “Do I look nice in
that dress/suit”), one should not take time to give an informed
response (“Well, let me see”). Many would agree that the highest
scoring response will be a prompt and firm confirmation (“Yes,
you look great in everything”) to prevent any type of unwanted
discussions that a hesitation may trigger. We often lie for the sake
of our relationships with others. Yet even though people report
having lied at least once a day, most of our daily communication
is free from deception (DePaulo et al., 1996).
Interestingly, contextual cues may trigger the tendency to
give more honest responses. Previous research shows that
emblematic gesture manipulation (namely hand-over-heart) can
induce a more honest response regarding the way we behave
or judge ourselves and others (Parzuchowski and Wojciszke,
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2014; Parzuchowski et al., 2014, 2017). However, the hand-over-
heart gesture has been proven to elicit a more honest approach
mainly in perceiving other’s intentions (Parzuchowski et al.,
2014, 2017) or self-oriented motivational contexts (Parzuchowski
and Wojciszke, 2014). Namely, people were less inclined to be
dishonest to benefit themselves when they posed the hand-over-
heart gesture.
In the present article, we were interested in verifying the
application of this gesture when dishonesty is motivated more
prosocially. There are many ways of differentiating the types of
lies (see, e.g., Camden et al., 1984; Arcimowicz et al., 2015). One
of the most important categorization depends on the type of the
beneficiary of the lie (e.g., DePaulo et al., 1996; Erat and Gneezy,
2011). The primary beneficiary of the lie can be the liar, another
person or both. There is strong evidence showing that in fact
self-oriented (or self-centered) and other-oriented dishonesty are
significantly different from each other (e.g., Kashy and DePaulo,
1996; Cantarero and van Tilburg, 2014).
While self-oriented lies are the ones that are primarily aimed
to benefit the liar (DePaulo et al., 2004), other-oriented lies aim
at providing benefit to another person (DePaulo et al., 1996).
White lies (or Pareto white lies) are aimed to benefit both the liar
and another person (Erat and Gneezy, 2011). They are related to
the willingness to be polite and to care about another person’s
feelings. The benefits of another person related to these lies can
involve trying to make another person feel good by saving them
from an unpleasant truth. On the other hand, white lies also
bring benefits to the liar, like maintaining good interactions with
others, being perceived as a nice, good person, or being liked.
Nevertheless, in white lies, the other-oriented motivation is more
important than in self-oriented dishonesty one. In the present
article, we wanted to focus on lies that are not primarily aimed to
benefit the liar, that is, on other-oriented white lies that include
the interests of others.
The decision of whether to lie or to tell the truth depends
on the consequences that a discovered lie has (e.g., Mazar and
Ariely, 2006). Other-oriented lies, when unraveled, can be argued
to have less severe consequences (Arcimowicz et al., 2015). Lies
that are aimed at bringing benefits to others are also far more
acceptable than the ones that are centered on the benefits of the
liar (Lindskold and Walters, 1983). As a result, the cost-benefit
analysis of the decision as to whether to lie or to tell the truth
should differ depending on whether a lie is self-centered or there
is other-oriented motivation involved. Since the psychological
costs of lying are much lower for other-oriented lies, we should
expect the decision of whether to use such lie to be much easier,
than when a lie is self-centered. Interestingly though, when we
lie, most of our lies are self-centered and not other-oriented
(DePaulo et al., 1996). It seems that we are willing to accept
more psychological costs of lying in exchange for receiving more
personal benefits that a lie might bring.
This poses an interesting dilemma related to truth telling
and lying. Previous studies have indicated that self-oriented
and other-oriented dishonesty might relate in an adverse way
to a self-regulation process (Cantarero and van Tilburg, 2014).
Namely, while ego-depletion promotes self-centered dishonesty
(Mead et al., 2009), the same conditions should push us toward
reduced proneness to other-oriented deception (Cantarero and
van Tilburg, 2014). This is due to the assumption that other-
oriented dishonesty demands more effort and is less of a
‘default’ option for people. Should using an unobtrusive hand
gesture be related to other-oriented dishonesty? As previously
mentioned, the hand-over-heart gesture when performed by
a target person he/she appeared more trustworthy than the
same targets photographed with both hands down. Using the
hand-over-heart gesture lead to refraining from self-centered
dishonesty (e.g., Parzuchowski et al., 2014). Presumably, when
the gesture is incorporated by the agent (unobtrusively within
some other bogus task), it serves as the implicit association
with the honesty and trigger participants to behave accordingly.
Just as Mazar et al. (2008) showed that swearing an oath of
allegiance to a bogus honor code or attempting to recall norms
(The 10 Commandments), made people act in a more honest
way, presumably because this drew attention to one’s internal
standards of integrity. One could argue that since polite, white
lies are so socially acceptable, they pose almost no dilemma in the
communicator and thus people will not refrain from telling such
lies even when placing their hand over their heart.
In study 3, Parzuchowski and Wojciszke (2014) have shown
that placing a hand over the heart caused people to withhold
their honest opinion about the (un-) attractiveness of the alleged
acquaintances of the experimenter. Participants were asked to
rate how attractive people presented in the photos were. This
information was not given in the presence of the judged person or
in a face-to-face setting. As a consequence, such a situation might
not have engaged much of the interest of the interlocutor. In the
presented study, we address these issues and add new insights
into the role of using hand gestures in promoting and refraining
from dishonesty. In the study presented below, we wanted to test
whether a white lie aimed at protecting others from harm will
depend on a performing a gesture related to honesty, namely the
hand-over-heart gesture.
In order to reach this goal, the design of the presented
experiments involved the presence of the supposed author of
considered artworks. We focused on the disliked artworks of the
‘author’ and asked participants to give their feedback about the
work to the face of the alleged author, similarly as in the study
by Bell and DePaulo (1996). We introduced this setup to trigger
a dilemma for our participants between telling the blunt truth
about their aesthetic dislike, or acting politely and expressing the
alteration of their ratings. This is a clear situation that should
involve other-oriented white lies – social norms should trigger
expression of less extreme preferences when faced with the author
in order to spare him/her from feeling bad. This motivation to
lie is other-oriented especially because the participants did not
expect to interact with the alleged author after the experiment and
telling the truth could possibly hurt the feelings of the author.
Our goal was to test if gestures related to (dis)honesty can
influence one’s particular social behavior – tendency to tell
other-oriented white lies aimed at protecting others from harm
(namely to exaggerate ones’ aesthetic judgments about artworks).
Additionally, in Study 1, we wanted to see whether it is gestures
that promote and prevent lying that will affect telling white
lies. For this reason, in Study 1 we also included the fingers
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crossed behind one’s back gesture that should augment lying
behavior. Previous studies have shown that the hand-over-heart
gesture reduces self-centered dishonesty (e.g., Parzuchowski and
Wojciszke, 2014). We wanted to test whether the use of the
gesture primes other-oriented honesty by measuring whether
people are more likely to give true (non-flattering) feedback to
others (unfamiliar author of a work of art). More specifically, we
wanted to focus on other-oriented white lies and hypothesized
that the tendency to use these lies will be diminished when
performing the hand-over-heart gesture. The second aim was to
check if the opposite gesture (fingers crossed behind one’s back)
promotes dishonesty, we hypothesized that it would prime people
to give more positive but untrue feedback to others. Additionally,
we wanted to control the degree to which the ‘author’ was
liked, as it should be related to higher proneness to use other-
oriented lying, which was the case in former studies (e.g., Bell
and DePaulo, 1996). To test the hypothesis we conducted a
laboratory experiment (Study 1) and then conducted a replication
study (Study 2) that was focused solely on the hypothesis
regarding the hand-over-heart gesture and the other-oriented
white lies.
METHOD
The main aim of the studies was to test whether the hand-over-
heart gesture is related to refraining from using other-oriented
white lies.
STUDY 1
Participants and Design
Eighty-three university students (67 women; Mage = 20.92,
SD= 1.61) participated in the experiment in exchange for course
credit. Participants in the study were enrolled to participate via
a campaign advertising the study as ‘Body posture and perception
of artistic work.’ The study was run in individual sessions, and
each lasted around 30 min. All participants gave their informed
consent. At the end of the procedure, participants were asked to
guess what the purpose of the research was. Data from the four
participants that guessed the correct hypothesis were excluded
from the analysis and thus the total sample consisted of 79
people.
The procedure of the experiment was adapted from Bell and
DePaulo (1996). The laboratory was turned into an ‘art gallery’
displaying 10 photos (which were numbered from 1 to 10).
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental
conditions (hand-over-heart, fingers crossed behind the back,
or a control gesture: hand over elbow, see Appendix 1). In
each of the experimental conditions, participants were asked to
pose the main gesture and two other gestures (these were: hand
over arm, hand over hip, see Appendix 1) while evaluating the
artwork (the order of the gesture use was counterbalanced). We
refrained from using the expression ‘hand-over-heart,’ to avoid
having the possibility of receiving the effect by means of simply
instructing participants to behave according to the meaning
of the gesture. In the hand-over-heart condition participants
were asked to place the hand at a given height of their
chest. We did this to distract the participants from the factual
aim of the study. Participants were instructed to pose these
gestures after having heard a verbal signal that described it. To
standardize the instruction, the verbal signals of the gestures
were pre-recorded and were played to participants during the
experiment.1
There were always two experimenters conducting the study.
Experimenter 1 was mostly responsible for conducting the
first part of the story and Experimenter 2 was conducting the
conversation about the photos after being introduced as an
alleged author of some of the artworks. Firstly, in order to
present the cover story, participants were asked to, first, privately
assess without verbal or written statement one by one all of the
photographs presented in the ‘gallery,’ while rotating gestures
in accordance with the pre-recorded verbal signals played from
the speakers. Only then were participants given a piece of paper
and asked to choose two photos from the gallery: the one they
liked the most and one they liked the least and to evaluate both
chosen pictures on a Likert scale from 1 to 7, where 1 was
“Definitely don’t like it” and 7 was “Definitely like it.” After having
the participant evaluate the photos on paper, Experimenter 1
would pass that information to Experimenter 2 (without being
noticed by the participants), so that s/he knew which photos
to talk about with the participant. The participant was then
asked to back up his or her opinion (in writing) stating why
he or she had chosen the ‘favorite’ and the ‘worst’ photographs
(while writing the evaluations participants were not posing any
gestures).
At this phase of the experiment, seconds after having written
their evaluations of the photos, participants were asked to talk to
the alleged author (the Experimenter 2) of some of the photos
that were presented in the ‘gallery.’ Experimenter 2 was blind
to the hypothesis of our study. We said that, in the experiment,
we were also interested to know how people discuss artwork
verbally while posing gestures. We also told participants that this
would be useful feedback for the “author.” At this point, the
auditory instruction (‘chest,’ ‘fingers,’ and ‘elbow’) was played and
we asked the participant to hold the gesture during the whole
conversation with “the author” (Experimenter 2). At this stage
Experimenter 2 (alleged author) entered the room and asked
participants about three photos. The questions were the same
every time (whether the participant liked a photo on a 1–7 scale,
where 1 was “Definitely don’t like it” and 7 was “Definitely like
it”; then two open-ended questions were asked: to justify their
evaluation and to describe the topic of the photo). The first two
1The verbal signal was changed every 15 s. The order of the verbal signals presented
to the participants was identical across conditions with the exception of the key
gestures that were under study (hand-over-heart vs. fingers crossed behind one’s
back, vs. hand over elbow): hip, arm, (key gesture), arm, (key gesture), hip, arm,
hip, (key gesture), arm. That is, the first verbal signal was ‘hip,’ when the participant
heard the word they were supposed to place their hand over their hip while
evaluating a photo. Then they were asked to turn to another photo when they heard
a new verbal signal (and change their gesture). If the participant was in the ‘hand-
over-heart’ condition, they would hear the word ‘chest’ as the third signal. In such
an instance, a participant would turn to the next photo and place their hand over
their heart. The examples of the gestures are presented in Appendix 1.
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photos to be evaluated were random ones and not that were not
indicated by the participant as the most liked one or the most
disliked one in writing a few minutes earlier. The third photo
was always the one that the participant chose as the most disliked
one in the phase of the written evaluations of the photos. The
evaluation of this third photo in conversation, the one we knew
was the disliked one (and evaluated in writing a couple of minutes
earlier), was the main interest of the experiment and our main
operationalisation of the dependent variable.
Afterward, we asked the participant to evaluate both of the
experimenters (we said that we would appreciate the feedback
from each participant regarding the experiment). The questions
that we used were for example: ‘I think that this person
was professional’ (this was the mock phrase, used to make
the assessment of the experimenters seem more credible to
participants), ‘I think that this person is nice.’ The answers were
on a 1 (‘Definitely yes’)–7 scale (‘Definitely not’). The questions
came from Kulesza et al.’s (2015) liking scale.
We then thanked the participants for their participation, gave
the credit points and after we had examined all the participants,
we debriefed them. We expected that higher ratings given in
the oral evaluation phase of the experiment (compared to the
first, written evaluations) would indicate that the situation indeed
promoted lying (i.e., giving an excessively positive feedback on
artwork to an alleged author). We assumed that participants
would be less eager to lie when placing their hand over their heart.
We assumed that the participants would be more willing to lie in
the oral evaluation while presenting the fingers crossed gesture.
Results
The six items liking scale (after exclusion of one mock item)
reached a good reliability coefficient of α = 0.76. We then
calculated an index of deception, which was the difference
between the second, oral evaluation of the least liked photo and
the first, written evaluation of the same, least liked photo.2 A one-
way ANCOVA was conducted with the deception index as a
dependent variable, liking of the alleged author as a covariate
and type of gesture (hand-over-heart, fingers crossed, and hand
over elbow) as a between-subjects factor. The results showed a
main effect of the gesture F(2,75) = 5.16, p = 0.008, η2 = 0.12.3
Comparison of means with Bonferroni correction showed that
there was a significant difference between the hand over elbow
gesture (M = 1.04, SD = 0.92) and hand-over-heart (M = 0.27,
SD = 0.78), p = 0.006, while the fingers crossed gesture results
did not differ from the aforementioned significantly (M = 0.67,
SD = 1.07). Lower deception index in the hand-over-heart
2For the sake of clarity and brevity in the main body text, we decided to present
the findings using a deception index. However, a repeated measure mixed-model
ANOVA, with oral and written evaluations as within-subjects factors and type
of gesture as between-subjects factor, yields practically the same results. The
difference between oral (M = 2.38, SD = 1.15) and written (M = 1.72, SD = 0.90)
evaluation is significant, indicating that the experimental setting did promote lying
F(1,76)= 39.34, p< 0.001.
3Results of the ANOVA analysis without the covariate yield similar results. Namely,
the experimental manipulation does show a main effect on the deception index,
F(2,76)= 4.26, p= 0.015, η2 = 0.10. Comparison of mean replies with Bonferroni
correction indicates significant differences only between the control and the hand-
over-heart condition (p= 0.012).
condition means that participants were indeed less likely to use an
other-oriented lie when performing the gesture, which supports
our hypothesis. The fingers crossed behind one’s back, however,
did not promote lying, leaving our second hypothesis without
support.4 These results are presented in Figure 1.
The results also revealed that there was a trend regarding the
likeability of the author F(1,75) = 2.87, p = 0.094, η2 = 0.04.
Further analysis showed a trend that indicated that the more
the alleged author was liked, the higher the deception index was
rs(79)= 0.16, p= 0.077 (one-tailed).5 It suggests that people may
be more likely to give positive, even if not true, feedback to those
whom they like more. The liking of the alleged author did not
differ between the experimental conditions (p= 0.183).
The results of Study 1 suggested that the hand-over-heart
gesture is related to refraining from using white lies comparing
to control gesture. We wanted to replicate these findings and
conducted a study that was of similar design to Study 1. We
focused solely on the hand-over-heart gesture in Study 2 and
decided to improve the design of the study. We intended to
make both the procedure and the study material better. With
the new design, we have, among others, excluded the part, where
Experimenter 1 unnoticed passes information to Experimenter 2.
The following studies were pre-registered at osf.io.6
4We ran a supplemental study afterward to test the recognisability of the gestures
used in the main study. The reason behind this identification test is that the level
of gesture recognition could be a proxy for the strength of the association between
the bodily movement people perform while making the gesture and the concept
that it is represented being activated in the same time. Eighty-four pedestrians
in Cracow, Poland (48 women, Mage = 23.47; SDage = 4.17) were asked one
dichotomous question about a gesture’s familiarity (“Are you familiar with the
gesture?”; answers were either “yes” or “no” while the experimenter presented the
gesture), and one open-ended question about the knowledge of the context the
gesture is used (“Do you know in which situations this gesture would be used?”). We
also asked participants to rate how frequently they use the target gesture (“How
often do you use this gesture yourself?”) on a scale from 1 (never) to 7 (always).
Half of the participants were presented the accompanying hand-over-heart gesture
and half of them the fingers crossed behind one’s back gesture. A χ2 test showed
a significant difference in judgments of familiarity between the gestures used:
χ2(1)= 6.89, p= 0.009, v= 0.29. When asked about the hand-over-heart gesture,
more participants declared knowing it (42.9% of participants, 18 people claimed
that they know the gesture,) than when asked about the fingers crossed gesture
(16.7% of participants; 7 people). Next, we coded open-ended answers on the
knowledge of the context the gesture was used. Participants’ responses were divided
into two groups ‘1’: ‘recognized’ (i.e., answers “when lying” in the case of the fingers
crossed gesture and “when telling the truth” or “to be perceived more truthful”
in the case of the hand-over-heart gesture) and ‘2’: – ‘not recognized’ (or any
other answers, such as “don’t know,” “for a laugh” or “doesn’t matter”). A χ2 test
showed that more people correctly recognized the hand-over-heart gesture (76.2%
of participants; 32 people) than the fingers crossed gesture (52.4% of participants;
22 people), χ2(1) = 5.19, p = 0.023, V = 0.25. Ratings of frequency of gesture
usage were analyzed using the independent t-test, which showed a significant
difference between declared frequency of using the hand-over-heart and fingers
crossed gestures, F(1,82) = 12.99, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.14. Participants declared
using the hand-over-heart more often than the fingers crossed gesture (M = 3.57,
SD= 1.23 and M = 2.57, SD= 1.31, respectively).
This suggests that the hand-over-heart gesture is better known than the fingers
crossed behind one’s back gesture. Also, people seem to be more aware of the
context in which the gesture is used. Finally, people declare that they are more
likely to use the hand-over-heart gesture than the gesture of fingers crossed behind
one’s back.
5There was also a positive correlation between the liking of the alleged author
and the extent to which the oral evaluation of the author’s photo was positive,
r(79)= 0.24, p= 0.016.
6https://osf.io/vkpdb/
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FIGURE 1 | Aesthetic judgments of the ‘worst photo’ as a factor of the type of gesture (control gesture, N = 26; fingers crossed, N = 27;
hand-over-heart, N = 26). The results show the deception index – the difference between the oral, face-to-face, more flattering evaluation and the written and
honest evaluations of the same, least liked photo, as communicated to the alleged author of the photo. Error bars present standard errors.
STUDY 2
We preceded Study 2 with an additional pilot study to choose the
appropriate stimuli.7 The aim of Study 2 was to replicate the main
finding from Study 1.
7We also conducted a pilot study to be able to choose the best research material for
the Study 2. Two hundred and seventy four students (Mage = 24.69, SDage = 7.49)
took part in an online study on evaluation of research material. The sample
consisted of 213 women and 59 men. We have prepared photographs of landscape.
The photographs were aimed at being of rather medium to poor quality. After
gathering informed consent, participants were asked to evaluate a set of photos.
Thirty photos were then randomly displayed to participants. Participants were
asked to answer to four questions regarding each of the photos. We asked
about the extent to which participants liked the photo, considered it of good
quality, perceived it as a photo professionally taken and finally we asked whether
participants thought that the photo was taken by a professional. All of the questions
were answered on a Likert-type 1 to 7 scale, where 1 = definitely not, and
7= definitely yes.
We analyzed mean replies of the thirty photos regarding the four questions. We
focused on two pictures that would be most disliked and not differ regarding
the evaluation of the three additional questions. We then also picked two photos
that would be at least 1 SD liked more that the two most disliked ones. We
also wanted the more liked photos to be evaluated more favorably than the
disliked photos regarding the other qualities, while at the same time be of similar
evaluation among each other. This allowed us to pick two photos that were
equally negatively evaluated and two photos that were evaluated positively. Table 1
presents descriptive statistics of the four photos.
We have analyzed mean evaluations of the four chosen photos regarding the
four characteristics. We then calculated a series of dependent t-tests. We found
that the photos chosen as the disliked ones did not differ between each other
regarding liking, quality, perceived professionalism and perceptions of whether
the photos were taken by a professional. At the same time the more liked photos
did not significantly differ between each other regarding the four characteristics.
We calculated two indexes of the evaluation: one comprised of the evaluations of
the four characteristics of the two disliked photos (Cronbach’s α = 0.85) and one
comprised of the evaluations of the two more liked photos (Cronbach’s α = 0.86).
We then conducted a final dependent t-test analysis and found that the disliked
photos in overall were more negatively evaluated (M = 3.03, SD = 0.97) than the
more liked photos (M = 4.37, SD= 1.06), t(273)= 20.10, p< 0.001, d = 1.22. We
used the four photos in Study 2.
Participants
Eighty-eight participants (65 women, Mage = 29.27,
SDage = 10.21) took part in this study in exchange for course
credits.
Materials and Procedure
We invited our participants to join a two-part study. The
first study one was said to be aimed at investigating the way
people talk about photographs. We said that the second study
would be on further evaluation of research material. Upon
the arrival to the lab, participants were asked by Experimenter
A (blind to the hypothesis of the study) to take part in a
supposedly unrelated, third study (with additional small credit
given to all participants willing to join the short study) where
the new breathing measurement device needs to be calibrated
for an upcoming student project for sport psychology. The new
breathing measurement device supposedly involved having a
chest rubber band that needed to be tightened with the use
of the shoulder (resulting in a hand over shoulder gesture) or
with the right hand (resulting in a hand over heart gesture).
This information allowed us to have participants perform the
gestures without being aware of the factual aim of the study.
Participants were then asked to simply have the device placed on
their body for 20 s and then Experimenter A started recording
their breathing rhythm during the remaining time spent in the
lab (in order to calibrate the measurements of the device). After
that Experimenter A left the participant with Experimenter B.
Experimenter B (blind to the hypothesis of the study) then
explained that she was a fellow student but in her free time she
took photo class and that for her Master thesis qualification she
was pursuing some qualitative research interested in how people
talk about photographs. She explained that for the purpose of the
study she will ask participants to rate pictures taken by her and
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics of the evaluations of the two most disliked photos and two photos of more attractiveness of +1 SD.
Type of characteristic Disliked photo A Disliked photo B Liked photo A Liked photo B
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Liking 2.54 1.34 2.66 1.48 4.62 1.58 4.48 1.53
Quality 3.82 1.51 3.78 1.50 4.92 1.44 4.95 1.29
Professional photo 2.90 1.34 2.92 1.33 4.09 1.60 4.07 1.47
Author professional 2.75 1.27 2.86 1.34 3.93 1.63 3.89 1.45
other students that pursue the hobby of taking pictures as a part
time class.
The photos were then displayed at a computer screen one, by
one. The participants always first saw the two mildly unattractive
photos (in random order) and then the two most unattractive
photos (in random order). The pictures appeared with their
authors and numbers below them, to make it easy to refer to
them. Experimenter B asked separately about each of the photos
(saying its’ number and author) whether the participants liked it
on a 1–7 scale, where 1 stood for definitely not and 7 stood for
definitely yes. She then asked what the participant liked about the
photo and what s/he disliked about it. Each time a third photo
came up, the Experimenter B would inform the participant that
in fact she was the author of the presented photo.
Participants were then asked to stop the breathing
measurement (and release the gesture) and answer via computer
open-ended questions regarding how they had felt when talking
about art, whether they had used the type of words they typically
use when they discussed the photos and whether they had
felt comfortable talking about the photos or anything unusual
happened during the procedure. These questions were used to
probe for hypothesis guessing and cover up the real aim of the
study. Participants were then asked demographic data.
After 1 week from the main part of the study, participants
were asked to fill an online second part of the study. Participants
were presented with 10 photos consisting of the four pictures
from the main part of the study and other six that came from
the pilot study. Among the six pictures, three were evaluated in
the pilot study as the most liked ones, two were of average liking
and there was also one of low evaluations (as shown in the pilot
study). Participants were asked to rate on a 1 = definitely not to
7 = definitely yes scale whether they liked the photo, considered
it of good quality, perceived it as a photo professionally taken,
thought that it was taken by a professional and whether they had
ever seen this photo before. We then gathered demographic data
and asked about the perceived aim and hypothesis of the study.
After the study participants were fully debriefed.
Results
We conducted repeated measures ANOVA with liking of the
photo as a dependent variable, type of evaluation (face to face
vs. online afterward) and authorship of the photo (unknown
vs. the interlocutor) as a within-subject and type of gesture
(hand-over-heart vs. hand over arm) as a between-subject factor.
We found the main effect of the type of evaluation,
F(1,73) = 44.69, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.38. Participants gave more
favorable evaluations in person (M= 4.11, SD= 1.41), than in an
online setting (M = 3.35, SD = 1.54). There was also the main
effect of the authorship F(1,73) = 5.88, p = 0.018, η2 = 0.08.
When participants were informed that they were talking to the
‘author’ of a photo, they declared higher liking of that photo
(M = 3.89, SD = 1.49), than when they were not talking to the
alleged author (M = 3.57, SD = 1.51). There was no significant
main effect of the gesture F(1,73) = 0.02, p = 0.900. There was
no significant interaction between the type of gesture and the
authorship F(1,73)= 0.08, p= 0.781.
We only found a significant interaction between the gesture
and the type of evaluation F(1,73) = 10.15, p = 0.002, η2 = 0.12.
Comparison of means with Bonferroni correction revealed that
in the hand-over-heart condition participants gave more positive
evaluations in person (M = 4.30, SD = 1.31) to the online
evaluations (M = 3.20, SD = 1.44), p < 0.001. Similarly so, in
the hand over arm condition evaluations in person were higher
(M= 3.91, SD= 1.50) than the online ratings of liking (M= 3.51,
SD= 1.64), p= 0.016.
We conducted an additional analysis, similar to that used
in Study 1. We first calculated a deception index, which was
the difference between the face-to-face evaluation and the
ratings made online. We then conducted t-test analysis with
the experimental condition as an independent variable and
the deception index as a dependent variable. Results showed
a significant main effect of the experimental manipulation
t(73) = 2.64, p = 0.010, d = 0.61. Surprisingly, the deception
index was higher in the hand-over-heart condition (M = 1.32,
SD= 1.38), than the hand over arm (M= 0.49, SD= 1.35). These
results are graphically displayed in Figure 2.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We hypothesized that participants who used the hand-over-
heart gesture would be more likely to give true feedback to
“authors” of the work of art. The results of Study 1 showed that
participants were more honest (less flattering) while performing
the hand-over-heart gesture. However, the results of Study 2
showed no difference between the hand-over-heart gesture and
the control gesture in the proneness to use other-oriented white
lies regarding a photo that was either authored by the interlocutor
or of an unknown authorship. What is more, when we conducted
a similar analysis as in Study 1, we found the deception index to
be significantly higher in the hand-over-heart condition to the
control group. These inconsistent results raise several important
issues of both methodological and theoretical kind.
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FIGURE 2 | Aesthetic judgments of the photo ‘authored’ by the
experimenter as a factor of the type of gesture (control gesture,
N = 37; hand-over-heart, N = 38). The results show the deception index –
the difference between the oral, face-to-face, more flattering evaluation and
the written and honest evaluations of the same photo. Error bars present
standard errors.
Methodological Concerns
We designed and conducted Study 1 a few years ago, using our
best knowledge and intentions. We do recognize, however, that
the study had imperfections and we had not pre-registered our
experimental protocol. The design was unnecessarily complex,
we did not calculate the sample size before conducting the
study and relied on the rule of thumb instead. We also could
not exclude the possibility that there could be an influence of
posing gestures in the first stage of the experiment on evaluations
and preferences regarding the photos. A post hoc analysis
of the preferences did not show any patterns in preferences
depending on the condition, limiting such a possibility, yet
without excluding it. What is more, it would have been better
if Experimenter B had not known the preferences of each of the
participants while talking to each of them.
We thus designed and conducted Study 2. We wanted to focus
solely on the hand-over-heart effect on other-oriented white lies
hypothesis and replicate previous findings, yet this time using
a better design. Of course Study 2 is not free from limitations.
Most importantly, we failed to gather the desired number of
participants. We aimed at reaching 114 participants, when we
could only gather 88 (in the time limit we had), out of which
75 took part in the follow-up assessment of the photos. This is
clearly a drawback of the study. However, we also conducted a
similar analysis to that in Study 1. Namely, we decided to conduct
an additional analysis relying on the deception index. Post hoc
analysis regarding the attained power showed that the achieved
power was 0.83. This implies that the number of participants we
gathered should be enough to detect the effect, had we wanted to
rely solely on the deception index.
Furthermore, there were other differences between Studies
1 and 2 that might have affected the results, although based
on taxonomy developed by Hendrick (1991) the methodological
similarities between Studies 1 and 2 would have to call it a
fair replication. We used a different cover story to introduce
the necessity to pose the hand-over-heart gesture. We do think,
however, that should the lack of effect of the gesture be the result
of the different cover story applied, it only points to the fact that
the effect (should it exist), is much weaker than we originally
thought. Importantly, in Study 2 we gathered replies on personal
evaluation of the photos 1 week after having stated verbally in
front of the alleged author the extent, to which one liked the
photo. It is possible that when participants are in the situation
of just having judged a photo as unattractive (which they did
in Study 1), they are more aware of the conflict between social
norms and the norm of being honest and thus such a setting
might have a stronger influence. Yet, both experimental settings
did promote giving over positive feedback to the alleged author,
which suggests that the argument of the moment in time when we
gather private opinions about the photo should not affect much
the hypothesized effect.
Theoretical Implications
The hypothesis presented in this paper were driven from
psychological theory and research findings supporting it. We
think that it would be most correct to draw careful conclusions
regarding theoretical implications. It is important to note, that we
conducted only one replication of that effect. A series of multilab
studies would give more solid grounds to be able to talk about
robustness of an effect. We do think that above all, the results of
the studies presented in this article point to the fact, that should
the hand-over-heart gesture indeed influence the tendency to
refrain from other-oriented white lies, it would probably be a
much weaker effect. Changes in the setting between Studies 2 and
1 might have altered the obtained results, yet as stated previously,
this would only imply the weakness of the original effect.
We need to point to an important theoretical issue regarding
the subject of the study. We knew that the hand-over-heart
gesture is related to refraining from self-oriented dishonesty (e.g.,
Parzuchowski et al., 2014). We therefore wanted to verify whether
the effect could be generalized for other-oriented white lies. These
kinds of lies are prosocially oriented and their aim is to protect
others and to make the other person feel good, or at least spare
them from feeling bad. People often find such lies to be even
more ethical than truth telling (Levine and Schweitzer, 2014).
Also, telling such a polite lie is behaving in a socially acceptable
way. A rough truth is socially less acceptable than a prosocial lie
(Levine and Schweitzer, 2014) and social influence mechanisms
indicate that being liked is a powerful tool in social interactions.
It is possible that because other-oriented white lies are so socially
acceptable, they are thought of as less of a lie and therefore they
do not trigger such a strong dilemma as is the case with self-
oriented lying. Namely, it might be that participants do not feel
that there is a problem with giving an over positive feedback, as
it is not so much lying when it serves another person. We thus
limit the generalization of our findings to other-oriented white
lies and indicate that the type of lie that was under study might be
a significant factor that influenced the results.
We did find an unexpected result that indicated higher
deception index in the hand-over-heart to the control group. We
do not find any theoretical support for this result. If anything,
such result points to the fact that the effect of hand-over-heart
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on other-oriented white lies either does not exist, or is extremely
weak and sensitive to delicate contextual changes.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
In recent times several social priming/embodied effects came
under scrutiny, e.g., cleanliness priming (Johnson et al., 2014),
elderly priming (Doyen et al., 2012) or power posing (Garrison
et al., 2016; online databases tracking their recent replications
are PsychFileDrawer.org and CurateScience.org). Overall, we
do not concur with the position that the effects of embodied
cognition are in general doubtful. We are convinced that there
is a significant body of compelling and replicable evidence
(e.g., switching cost paradigm, Pecher et al., 2003) for the
inclusion of sensorimotor system in cognitive processes (see
e.g., Wilson, 2002; Pecher and Zwaan, 2005; Fischer and
Zwaan, 2008; Glenberg, 2010). It has also been argued that
replications of existing effects sometimes produce non-significant
results (Cohen, 1969) and that (mis)replications are sensitive
to contextual factors (see Van Bavela et al., 2016). That said,
we are doubtful of the effect tested within this article – the
tendency to use other-oriented lies is possibly not affected by
honesty activation. To conclude, at least when effects are small,
high methodological standards (e.g., high power, blindness to
hypotheses and probing for hypothesis guessing) are vital in
distinguishing when one is in search of an interesting hypothesis
and when one is chasing noise. Though we cannot be entirely
sure, it is possible that in our case it was the latter.
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A commentary on
Is there any Influence of Variations in Context on Object-Affordance Effects in Schizophrenia?
Perception of Property and Goals of Action
by Sevos, J., Grosselin, A., Brouillet, D., Pellet, J., and Massoubre, C. (2016). Front. Psychol. 7:1551.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01551
In their recent article, Sevos et al. (2016) present data indicating that subjects with schizophrenia
“have an impaired ability to experience an internal simulation of motor action potentialities when
they perceived graspable objects” (p. 12). This lack of sensorimotor facilitation in patients with
schizophrenia aligns broadly with other patient studies, and indicates that such individuals would
require extensive use of higher cognitive processes even for the simplest routine activities in their
daily life. A solid conclusion from this data would be certainly informative to understand the
specific mechanisms behind schizophrenia.
The purpose of this commentary is to raise a point for further discussion. The claim that patients
with schizophrenia lack this sensorimotor facilitation is based upon two non-significant effects
reported in Experiments 1 and 2 of Sevos et al. (2016). This is problematic, though, since the
traditional null-hypothesis testing approach does not allow one to “accept” a null hypothesis. This
is because the p-value represents the probability of obtaining a sample statistic at least as large as
that obtained from a given sample, assuming that the null hypothesis is true. If this p-value is small,
we reject the null hypothesis on the grounds that an obtained sample statistic occurs with such low
probability that the underlying null hypothesis should be considered implausible. If the p-value is
not small, our only decision is to “fail to reject” the null hypothesis. It is important to note that this
procedure only results in a decision to either reject or fail to reject; it does not provide any measure
of evidence in favor of either the null or alternative hypothesis.
One common approach to help mitigate this problem is to report power. Mathematically, a test
with sufficient power is less likely to produce a Type II error, and this allows one to feel somewhat
assured that reported null effects are not simply false negatives. Though better than nothing, this
approach still does not give any direct measure of evidence supporting an obtained null effect.
However, recent methods based on Bayesian inference (Wagenmakers, 2007; Rouder et al., 2009)
provide a relatively easy solution to this problem.
Though the specifics of Bayesian inference are beyond the scope of this short commentary
(see Wagenmakers, 2007 for more details), the basic idea is that one computes a Bayes factor to
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index the preference for one model over another. The larger the
Bayes factor, the more evidence in support of the model. One
particular advantage to this approach is that it allows a researcher
to directly assess evidence in support of the null hypothesis
H0 over another hypothesis H1; such a Bayes factor would be
denoted BF01. This Bayes factor represents the odds in favor
of the null hypothesis over the alternative hypothesis after the
data have been observed. Further, BF01 can be converted into
a posterior probability, which is the probability that the null
hypothesis H0 is true given data D.
To this end, we will describe how to compute BF01 and
the posterior probabilities for the null effects reported in
Experiments 1 and 2 of Sevos et al. (2016).
The first step in the computation is estimating the Bayes factor
BF01. Following Wagenmakers (2007), Masson (2011) describes
one approach to estimating BF01 that is based on the Bayesian
Information Criterion, or BIC. BF01 is estimated as
BF01 ∼ e
(1BIC/2) (1)
where
1BIC = n ln(1− η2p)+ (k1 − k0) ln(n). (2)
In Equation (2), n represents the number of subjects, η2p is the
standard effect size measure in an ANOVA which represents
the proportion of variance accounted for by the independent
variable, and k1 − k0 represents the difference in the number of
free parameters between the two models being compared. Note
that in the case of a comparison between a null and alternative
hypothesis for a single two-level factor (i.e., prime, present vs.
absent), k1 − k0 = 1. Finally, if we assume that the null and
alternative hypothesis are equally likely before collecting data
(that is, equal priors), the Bayes factor B01 can be converted into
a posterior probability estimate via the equation:
p(H0|D) =
BF01
BF01 + 1
. (3)
Now, let us compute Bayes factors for the reported null effects in
Experiment 1 and 2 of Sevos et al. (2016). In Experiment 1, the
authors reported that for the n = 18 patients with schizophrenia,
the critical interaction of response and orientation did not differ
as a function of name prime (present vs. absent), F(1, 17) = 2.584,
p = 0.126, η2p = 0.13. Equation (2) yields
1BIC = n ln(1− η2p)+ (k1 − k0) ln(n)
= 18 ln(1− 0.13)+ (1) ln(18)
= 0.384.
Substituting this into Equation (1) then gives us the estimate
BF01 ∼ e
(1BIC/2)
= e(0.384/2)
= 1.211.
This means that, given the data, a null interaction is only 1.21
times more likely than a true interaction between response and
orientation. According to Jeffreys (1961), Bayes factors falling
between 1 and 3 are considered “anecdotal” evidence, whereas a
Bayes factor between 3 and 10 represents “moderate” evidence,
and a Bayes factor greater than 10 is considered “strong”
evidence. As such, the evidence from Sevos et al. (2016) is
anecdotal.
Additionally, we can use Equation (3) to compute the
posterior probability of the null hypothesis:
p(H0|D) =
BF01
BF01 + 1
=
1.211
1.211+ 1
= 0.55.
According to Masson (2011), probability values falling between
0.50 and 0.75 are taken as weak evidence in favor of the null
hypothesis. As the Bayes factor and posterior probability are
directly related via Equation (3), they both tell the same story; that
is, the null effect of name prime reported in Sevos et al. (2016) is
not well supported.
A similar computation can be carried out for the effect
of action prime in Experiment 2. Sevos et al. (2016) report
that for a group of n = 18 patients with schizophrenia, the
interaction between response and orientation did not differ
as a function of action prime (congruent vs. incongruent),
F(1, 17) = 1.288, p = 0.272, η
2
p = 0.07. Applying Equation
(2) gives 1BIC = 1.584, which implies (via Equation 1) that
BF01 ∼ 2.208, implying that the null interaction is only 2.21 times
more likely than the true interaction. Equation 3 yields a posterior
probability of p(H0|D) = 0.69. As with Experiment 1, evidence
for this null effect is weak.
It is worth noting that this method is not the only approach
to computing Bayes factors to assess null effects. The software
package JASP (available as a free download from www.jasp-
stats.org) contains a Summary Stats module that allows the
user to compute Bayes factors from test statistics for a variety
of common designs, including t-tests and linear regression. At
present, the Summary Stats module does not have an option for
ANOVA designs, in which case themethod ofMasson (2011) that
we have presented provides a good solution. One should also note
that Bayes factors and posterior probabilities can be computed
directly from raw data using JASP or the BayesFactor package
(Morey and Rouder, 2015) in R (R Core Team, 2016).
In summary, a Bayesian analysis of these two results indicates
that at present, there is not much support for the null effects
reported in Experiments 1 and 2. As such, any interpretations
of these null effects should be met with caution. It is important
to note that the points raised in this commentary are not
meant to be unfairly critical of the results obtained by Sevos
et al. (2016). On the contrary, the experiments are well-designed
and informative, both in the context of embodied cognition as
well as in the context of psychopathology. The purpose of this
commentary was (1) to point out the issues that are present when
trying to interpret nonsignificant results in the traditional null
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hypothesis statistical testing framework, and (2) to offer a quick
example of how to use a Bayesian approach to quantify evidence
for object-affordance effects and other action-specific influences
on perception in the study of embodied cognition.
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INTRODUCTION
Today, smart technology in the form of tablets and smartphones is a cherished tool for most people.
Instant online access that allows for extensive interacting on social media, texting, playing video
games and music, checking for news and weather has turned smart technology into “an integral
part of the lives of all ages worldwide” (Samaha and Hawi, 2016, p. 321). The multi-functional
nature of smart technology makes it attractive as a tool for learning and education (Kucirkova,
2014; Schilhab, 2017a) leading, however, to noticeable changes in affordances and embodiment,
and consequently learning (Mangen and Schilhab, 2012)1.
For instance, reading scholars increasingly find that changing the physical reading platform
(from a printed book to a digital screen) leads to marked alterations in comprehension of the
text read. They point to factors related to the affordance of the reading device such as haptics
e.g., perception through touch (Mangen and Kuiken, 2014) and lighting conditions (e.g., Benedetto
et al., 2013) as aspects undergoing a significant change which result in a reduced learning outcome.
This observation is corroborated by studies probing for accompanying metacognitive processing
that show less accurate prediction of performance and more erratic study-time regulation when
reading on screen versus on paper (Ackerman and Goldsmith, 2011).
Such effects on literary reading are not agreed upon unanimously. Some researchers emphasize
our “native biological plasticity” that among other things entails “bodily reconfiguration” Clark
(2007 p. 263) and major “re-embodiment” (Ihde, 2010) when describing human cognition in
relation to smart technology use. The argument asserts that the reduced comprehension when
reading on screen is a novelty effect in the sense that subjects are proficient print-readers while
still lacking in screen expertise (Hayler, 2015). Over time, people will adjust to the affordances of
the new devices and the comprehension issues apparent today will evaporate as screen reading
abilities are simultaneously refined and technology has co-evolved for this specific task.
In so far as screen use is tool-use, the proposed plasticity- and embodiment perspective prevalent
in human-technology interaction studies seems pertinent. The question remains, however, if
prolonged exposure and subsequent development of embodied skills is all it takes for humans to
adapt to the affordances of smart technology. A relevant objection to the novelty claim could be that
the comprehension issues associated with screen reading exemplifies a need to go beyond automatic
embodiment processes and conceptualize the specifics of the mental processes that account for our
adaptation to the environment.
In the following article, I unfold why automatic skill learningmay not be an exhaustive answer to
the affordances provided by smart technology. First, I discuss what characterizes smart technology
1Kiverstein and Rietveld (2015, p. 709), affordances are ”the multiple possibilities for action that stand out as relevant for an
individual in a particular situation because of their needs and concerns”. In this paper I compare those affordances that we
address using’skilled intentionality’ (ibid.) and affordances that attract our conscious attention. See however 1979/1986 for
the original reading of the term.
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tools from the perspective of attention to better determine
significant features of the interaction and what adaptive processes
would entail. I conclude that section by proposing that the
interaction calls for self-regulation. Second, I discuss a socially
mediated mechanism that seems especially supportive in the
building of such capacities necessary for environmental coping
in general and smart technology use in particular.
SMART TECHNOLOGY AND ATTENTION
Part of the controversy over reading performance in literature
studies stems from the inevitable complex relations we form
with the environment (e.g., Jin et al., 2015). On the one hand,
when musicians interact with their instruments like pianos for
instance, or high jumpers with their bars, they adapt to factors
of the interaction that all else being equal manifest little variation
(e.g., Jabusch et al., 2009). Crudely put, to adapt to similarities
of tasks consists among other things in strengthening the overall
connection among neurons in the neural correlate to increase
the signaling efficiency (Draganski et al., 2004; Jäncke, 2009).
A skilled performance partly evolves because of strengthening
of automatic bottom-up processes elicited by the repetition of
particular elements in the task (Maguire et al., 2006).
This may be exemplified by an fMRI study on how processes
underlying imagery differ among novices and experts in a
complex motor skill (the high jump) showing considerable
divergence with respect to the involvement of motor areas such
as the supplementary motor area (SMA) and primary motor
cortex (Olsson et al., 2008). Subjects were asked to imagine the
performance of a full jump, with special emphasis on certain
stages, such as take-off or clearing the bar. Novices who did
not have previous experience of the high jump showed more
activation in areas that suggested that they took an external
view of the task (watching the jumps from without as if out
of the body) possibly, because their previous experiences with
high jumps were primarily as spectators to high jumps. Thus,
the activation of SMA, which is suggested to be responsible
for internally guided actions both while executed and imagined,
was lower in novices than it was in expert high jumpers.
Following the authors, the use of an internal perspective
during motor imagery of a complex skill depends on well-
established motor representations of the skill before these
can translate into a motor/internal pattern of brain activity
(Olsson et al., 2008, p. 5).
On the other hand, we have interactions that are characterized
by intrinsic variability. In the course of evolution, our coping
with such seemingly unstable factors has been optimized by
development of fine-tuned attentional resources to help us focus
on particular aspects of the environment (e.g., Kaplan and
Berman, 2010). Why is this of importance when dealing with
our possibilities for adapting to smart technology? The reason
is that part of our interaction with smart phones and tablets
when for instance reading is defined especially by the erratic
factors that elicit our vigilance (e.g., Chun et al., 2011). In fact, the
multi-functional affordance of the tool may itself drag attentional
resources diminishing the attention we normally allocate to
reading in order to comprehend the text (Wolf and Barzillai,
2009, for a recent discussion on stable and variable affordances
of relevance to the present discussion, see Sakreida et al., 2016).
The appeal for diverse activities such as checking for emails,
surfing the internet, or tapping into social media while reading
is in effect even if notifications and various alerts are deliberately
turned off. The mere awareness of putative distraction may
reallocate attention from comprehension processes (Przybyliski
and Weinstein, 2013; Schilhab et al. submitted).
THE NEED FOR INTENTIONALITY
Besides the smart-tool features, smart technology affords instant
distraction and gratification, such as watching videos, gaming
or establishing social contact online, which drags attention from
other tasks. Thus, those smart technology interactions that drag
attentional resources are not prone to implicate automatized
processes in the procedural sense of the term. Hence, appropriate
adaptation to smart technology as a tool needs to go beyondmere
embodiment and to involve some kind of attention regulation as
suggested by studies emphasizing risks of addiction in connection
to increased smart technology (Wei et al., 2012; Tarafdar et al.,
2013). When people check for messages and updates not because
they need to, but out of habit (Lee et al., 2014) and are deeply
attracted to the device even in the company of others (Radesky
et al., 2014), social relations may become challenged (Turkle,
2015).
But how do we cultivate attention regulation?
Attention regulation is closely connected to executive
functions (EFs), which refer to an assembly of functions in
use when we concentrate and think. The core functions are
inhibition, working memory, and cognitive flexibility and form
the basis for “higher-order” EFs such as reasoning, problem
solving, and planning (Diamond, 2013).
Working memory is the function that holds back information
in mind to be manipulated. It is involved in making sense
of linguistic information, to derive a general principle, and
acknowledge novel relations among old ideas (Diamond and Lee,
2011).
Inhibition refers to control of behavior, such as when
inhibiting habitual responses and resisting short-sighted
temptations such as leaving a task unsolved or incomplete.
Inhibition is exercised in attention regulation to corroborate
focused and directed attention and in emotional self-control.
It is EFs that allow us to perform “offline” tasks (Wilson,
2002), i.e., tasks that do not depend on information from the
environment but on sustained imagery (e.g., Schilhab, 2015a),
while fencing off disturbing stimulations (Vanhaudenhuyse et al.,
2010). During reading for instance, the active construction of
meaning (Wolf and Barzillai, 2009) involves maintenance of
competing interpretations until a final solution to the developing
understanding is found (e.g., Smallwood et al., 2008).
On the other hand, cognitive flexibility manages perspective
change, for instance switching between different aspects, thinking
outside the box, and understanding the perspective of other
people (Schilhab, 2015a).
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Overall, EFs have been linked to better academic skills, better
quality of life, and improved self-assessment and are to some
extent trainable (Diamond, 2012).
THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF THE “INNER”
SYSTEM
An assertion of attention regulation implicitly assumes that there
exist mental operations beyond those evolving as bottom-up
embodiment bound adaptations to the environment (though
kinds of attention regulation may be closely connected to the
action-perception cycle, see for instance Jin and Lee, 2013 and
Jin et al., 2015 for the discussion of how the training of Kih may
lead to affordance-control).
Here, I suggest that, although attention regulation exists as a
potential operation of the mind of the individual, its actualization
depends on social interaction in a certain kind of conversational
exchange (Schilhab, 2015b). Ordinary discourse, in which
participants exchange information on the fly, may happen at a
superficial level without substantial attentional investment on
the part of the interlocutors. Everyday exchanges of words for
instance need not recruit focal thought to satisfy the purpose of
a dialogue. For conversation to result in acquisition of abstract
knowledge, the more knowledgeable (the parent or care taker)
must take responsibility to create mutual comprehensibility in
the conversation by assessing the perspective of the learner
and fill in the gaps to ensure coherence of the emerging
conversation (a condition salient also in Vygotsky’s zone of
proximal development e.g., Hasse, 2014; see also Schilhab, 2015b,
2017b). Learning about abstract referents one has had no direct
experience with places a different stress on the ability to sustain
understanding. To convey abstract knowledge, the interlocutor
will need to establish metaphors or phrases that immediately
capture the concrete meaning of the abstract knowledge. Just
as the adult in ostensive learning furnishes the immediate
environment, for instance holding up a cup, pointing to the cup
and exclaiming “cup” (e.g., Pulvermüller, 2012), the interlocutor
furnishes the world that is off-line. He or she seeks mutual
comprehensibility and makes mental tableaus that are thought
to match the understanding of the child. In concrete language
acquisition, interlocutors merely point to the referent of the
conversation, whereas in abstract language acquisition, the
interlocutor points by using words.
Thus, the mechanisms that lead to understanding
fundamentally change. The cognitive efforts behind this
process are comprehensive and advanced and include mastering
an attentional switch from monitoring external stimulation to
the internal “stream of consciousness” (e.g., Dennett, 1992).
Language elicited imagination depends on a certain degree of
linguistic competence and is therefore likely to emerge relatively
later in language acquisition. Moreover, for the ability to fully
develop it is crucial to have emphatic interlocutors. My assertion
is that a subject’s abilities to acquire abstract knowledge and
with that become trained in monitoring the internal stream of
consciousness evolve most readily through careful guidance and
therefore may in fact vary noticeably as an effect of a “master.”
FINAL REMARKS
Some of the reported side effects of smart technology
employment referred to by contemporary research, such as
novelty effects, will definitely vanish when users become more
proficient. Here, the embodiment processes work in response
to the immediately present environment. However, combating
distractors, which often operate as attention-grabbers, inherent
to the affordances of smart technology calls for cognitive meta-
processes elicited independently of the interaction with smart
technology. As with any addictive “substance” that modern
Western life has admitted almost unrestricted access to, such
as calories, sessile life, alcohol, cholesterol, or on a larger scale
fossil fuels, it is up to the individual to evolve a well-functioning,
albeit cognitively exhausting, self-control. Though many avenues
to achieve this ability are open, I suggest that the individual
may quite effectively be gently nudged in the right direction
by engaging in deep conversations with interlocutors. Mental
mechanisms central to mediating understanding of what may not
be concrete or present, simultaneously enhance the mechanisms
we need in order to appropriately adapt to smart technology.
REFERENCES
Ackerman, R., and Goldsmith, M. (2011). Metacognitive regulation of text
learning: on screen versus on paper. J. Exp. Psychol. Appl. 17, 18–32.
doi: 10.1037/a0022086
Benedetto, S., Drai-Zerbib, V., Pedrotti, M., Tissier, G., and Baccino,
T. (2013). E-readers and visual fatigue. PLoS ONE 8:e83676.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0083676
Chun, M. M., Golomb, J. D., and Turk-Browne, N. B. (2011). A taxonomy
of external and internal attention. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 62, 73–101.
doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.093008.100427
Clark, A. (2007). Re-inventing ourselves: the plasticity of embodiment, sensing and
mind. J. Med. Philosophy 32, 263–282. doi: 10.1080/03605310701397024
Dennett, D. (1992). Consciousness Explained. London: Penguin Books.
Diamond, A. (2012). Activities and programs that improve children’s executive
functions. Psychol. Sci. 21, 335–341. doi: 10.1177/0963721412453722
Diamond, A. (2013). Executive functions. Ann. Rev. Psychol. 64, 135–168.
doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143750
Diamond, A., and Lee, K. (2011). Interventions shown to aid executive
function development in children 4 to 12 years old. Science 333, 959–964.
doi: 10.1126/science.1204529
Draganski, B., Gaser, C., Busch, V., Schuierer, G., Bogdahn, U., and May, A.
(2004). Neuroplasticity: changes in greymatter induced by training.Nature 427,
311–312. doi: 10.1038/427311a
Gibson, J. J. (1979/1986). The Ecological Approach to Perception. Hillsdale, MI:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Hasse, C. (2014). An Anthropology of Learning: On Nested Frictions in Cultural
Ecologies. Dordrecht: Springer.
Hayler, M. (2015). Challenging the Phenomena of Technology. London: Springer.
Ihde, D. (2010). Embodied Technics. New York, NY: Automatic Press/VIP.
Jabusch, H. C., Alpers, H., Kopiez, R., Vauth, H., and Altenmüller, E. (2009).
The influence of practice on the development of motor skills in pianists:
a longitudinal study in a selected motor task. Hum. Mov. Sci. 28, 74–84.
doi: 10.1016/j.humov.2008.08.001
Jäncke, L. (2009). The plastic human brain. Restor. Neurol. Neurosci. 27, 521–538.
doi: 10.3233/RNN-2009-0519
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org March 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 298134
Schilhab Adaptive Smart Technology and Meta-Self-Regulation
Jin, Z., and Lee, Y. (2013). Enlargement of perceived target size: intentional or
natural?. Percept. Mot. Skills 117, 855–867. doi: 10.2466/24.27.PMS.117x26z0
Jin, Z., Lee, Y., and Zhu, J. (2015). Control your mind, make affordance available.
Front. Psychol. 6:1467. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00096
Kaplan, S., and Berman, M. G. (2010). Directed attention as a common ressource
for executive functioning and self-regulation. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 5, 43–57.
doi: 10.1177/1745691609356784
Kiverstein, J., and Rietveld, E. (2015). The primacy of skilled intentionality:
on Hutto & Satne’s the natural origins of content. Philosophia 43, 701–721.
doi: 10.1007/s11406-015-9645-z
Kucirkova, N. (2014). iPads in early education: separating assumptions and
evidence. Front. Psychol. 5:715. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00715
Lee, Y. K., Chang, C. T., Lin, Y., and Cheng, Z. H. (2014). The dark side of
smartphone usage: psychological traits, compulsive behavior and technostress.
Comput. Human Behav. 31, 373–383. doi: 10.1016/j.chb.2013.10.047
Maguire, E. A., Woollett, K., and Spiers, H. J. (2006). London taxi drivers and
bus drivers: a structural MRI and neuropsychological analysis. Hippocampus
16, 1091–1101. doi: 10.1002/hipo.20233
Mangen, A., and Kuiken, D. (2014). Lost in the iPad: narrative engagement on
paper and tablet. Sci. Study Lit. 4, 150–177. doi: 10.1075/ssol.4.2.02man
Mangen, A., and Schilhab, T. (2012). “An embodied view of reading: Theoretical
considérations, empirical findings, and educational implications,” in Skiv !Les !,
eds S. Matre and A. Skaftun (Trondheim: Akademika forlag).
Olsson, C.-J., Jonsson, B., Larsson, A., and Nyberg, L. (2008). Motor
representations and practice affect brain systems underlying imagery: an fMRI
study of internal imagery in novices and active high jumpers.Open Neuroimag.
J. 2, 5–13. doi: 10.2174/1874440000802010005
Przybyliski, A. K., and Weinstein, N. (2013). Can you connect with me
now? How the presence of mobile communication technology influences
face-to-face conversation quality. J. Soc. Pers. Relat. 30, 237–246.
doi: 10.1177/0265407512453827
Pulvermüller, F. (2012). Meaning and the brain: the neurosemantics of referential,
interactive and combinatorial knowledge. J. Neurolinguistics 25, 423–459.
doi: 10.1016/j.jneuroling.2011.03.004
Radesky, J. S., Kistin, C. J., Zuckerman, B., Nitzberg, K., Gross, J., Kaplan-
Sanoff, M., et al. (2014). Patterns of mobile device use by caregivers and
children during meals in fast food restaurants. Pediatrics 133, 843–849.
doi: 10.1542/peds.2013-3703
Sakreida, K., Effnert, I., Thill, S., Menz, M. M., Jirak, D., Eickhoff, C.
R., et al. (2016). Affordance processing in segregated parieto-frontal
dorsal stream sub-pathways. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 69, 89–112.
doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.07.032
Samaha, M., and Hawi, N. S. (2016). Relationships among smartphone addiction,
stress, academic performance, and satisfaction with life. Comput. Human
Behav. 57, 321–325. doi: 10.1016/j.chb.2015.12.045
Schilhab, T. (2015a). Re-live and learn–Interlocutor-induced elicitation of
phenomenal experiences in learning offline. Prog. Biophys. Mol. Biol. 119,
649–660. doi: 10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2015.08.006
Schilhab, T. (2015b). Double Talk–Both Biological and Social Constraints on
Language. Biologically inspired Cognitive Architectures.
Schilhab, T. (2017a). Impact of iPads on Break-Time in Primary Schools-A Danish
context. Oxford Journal of Education.
Schilhab, T. (2017b). Derived Embodiment in Abstract Language. Dordrecht:
Springer.
Smallwood, J., McSpadden, M., and Schooler, J. W. (2008). When attention
matters: the curious incident of the wandering mind. Mem. Cognit. 36,
1144–1150. doi: 10.3758/MC.36.6.1144
Tarafdar, M., Gupta, A., and Turel, O. (2013). The dark side of information
technology use. Infor. Syst. J. 23, 269–275. doi: 10.1111/isj.12015
Turkle, S. (2015). Reclaiming Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital Age.
London: Penguin.
Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Demertzi, A., Schabus, M., Noirhomme, Q., Bredart,
S., Boly, M., et al. (2010). Two distinct neuronal networks mediate the
awareness of environment and of the self. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 23, 570–578.
doi: 10.1162/jocn.2010.21488
Wei, F. Y. F., Wang, Y. K., and Klausner, M. (2012). Rethinking college
students’ self-regulation and sustained attention: does text messaging
during class influence cognitive learning? Commun. Educ. 61, 185–204.
doi: 10.1080/03634523.2012.672755
Wilson, M. (2002). Six views on embodied cognition. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 9,
625–635. doi: 10.3758/BF03196322
Wolf, M., and Barzillai, M. (2009). The importance of deep reading. Literacy 2,
32–37.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2017 Schilhab. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or
reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor
are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance
with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted
which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org March 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 298135
fpsyg-08-00556 April 7, 2017 Time: 17:43 # 1
PERSPECTIVE
published: 11 April 2017
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00556
Edited by:
Tifei Yuan,
Nanjing Normal University, China
Reviewed by:
Jaehong Ko,
Kyungnam University, South Korea
Keonho Shin,
Kangnam University, South Korea
Yang-Gyu Choi,
Daegu University, South Korea
*Correspondence:
Zheng Jin
jinzheng@zznu.edu.cn;
zhjin@ucdavis.edu
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Cognition,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 17 December 2016
Accepted: 27 March 2017
Published: 11 April 2017
Citation:
Lee Y, Shaw RE and Jin Z (2017)
Gih (Qi): Beyond Affordance.
Front. Psychol. 8:556.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00556
Gih (Qi): Beyond Affordance
Yang Lee1, Robert E. Shaw1 and Zheng Jin2*
1 Center for the Ecological Study of Perception and Action, University of Connecticut, Mansfield, CT, USA, 2 Institute of
Educational Sciences, Zhengzhou Normal University, Zhengzhou, China
Ancient Eastern thought posited the ontological integration of the “mind-body world”.
The body-mind syncretism was a foundational precept in Eastern philosophy in which
“Gih” (“Qi”) was considered the basic entity of the universe and the human being.
This study attempts to build a meta-theory and to demonstrate empirical designs
for Gih, discussing the problems of the mind and body, or the subject and object,
compared with the concept of “affordance” proposed by ecological approaches. The
notion of Gih extends beyond that of affordance in that Gih activates a psychosomatic
process between the physical condition and the mental state that facilitates the
bi-directional interactions between subject and object. Therefore, the concept of Gih
integrates mind and body, providing a means of comparing Eastern and Western
philosophical systems.
Keywords: Gih (Qi), affordance, mind–body problem, eastern philosophy, ecological psychology, perception and
action, embodied cognition
INTRODUCTION
The concept of “affordance” proposed by James J. Gibson (1904–1979) pioneered the field of
ecological psychology, defying the conceptual limitations of indirect realism reliant on constructive
processes of representations or ideas in perceptual processes (Gibson, 1968, 1979). Ecological
psychologists after Gibson (e.g., Turvey and Shaw, 1979, 1995; Shaw and Turvey, 1981; Turvey,
1992) further revised the concept of affordance (also see Turvey and Carello, 2012, for further
discussions). They suggested that affordance underlies the coordination of perception and action.
While raising some controversial issues, Lee et al. (2012) conducted experiments that demonstrated
that perceptual scales can be varied to hit-ableness. For example, a shooter can perceive a target
as enlarged when he or she hits it (a similar result is reported in Soccer by Jin and Lee, 2013).
How can this result occur? This question is commonly subsumed under the philosophical issue
of the “natural kind or proper observable” (Millikan, 1999; Ellis, 2001), for which perception
serves as empirical evidence. Focusing on embodied cognition (e.g., Glenberg, 2010; Davis and
Markman, 2012; Glenberg et al., 2013), studies integrating the perspective of subject–object can
promote the concept of affordance. A comparable paradigm from Eastern philosophy explains the
relationship between action adjustment and object estimation in a way that might be independent
of the physical action that makes affordances available.
This study proposes to use the concept of “Gih (Qi)”1 in place of “affordance”. Gih, as
conceptualized in Eastern philosophy, coordinates perception and action (see Lee et al., 2007;
Jin et al., 2015; Lee and Shaw, unpublished, for further discussions). For example, Gih can be
manifested in practicing a martial art, such as sword matching. In this case, an artist activates
Gih, matching his or her opponent to react to attacks and defenses that are concretized where and
1The term is spelled “ ” and pronounced “Gih” in Korean. It is written “ ” and is pronounced “Qi” in Chinese. In this
article, the term Gih corresponds to Qi.
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when he or she catches the other opponent’s break. The artists
are subject to a potential activation, such as Gih, which is
attuned to the situation in which the perception-action occurs.
This paper introduces and refines the concept of Gih to
elaborate how perception is coordinated with action within
this conceptual framework compared with that of affordance.
The terms “Gih” and “affordance” were originally defined as
follows:
Gih is formed ( ) through action for change ( ) to
make heaven ( refers to nature or object) and human (
refers to organism or subject) coordinated (— ). (Choi, 1857:
— ).
Affordance transcends the dichotomy of subjective-objective and
helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is both physical and
psychical yet neither physical nor psychical (Gibson, 1979).
METAPHYSICAL REVIEW
What is real resides in neither only the mind nor only the material
(i.e., the body or matter), but in the relation between the two.
The metaphysics of the mind and body have been controversial
in philosophy since Rene Descartes (1596–1650) proposed the
notion of “dualism”. Philosophical discussions on the limitations
of the dichotomy (for a review, see Kim, 1996; Ravenscroft, 2005)
have been revised to include “parallelism”, which was examined
by Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715), thereafter regressing
into two types of “monism”, namely “materialism”, which
was advocated by David Hume (1711–1776), and “idealism”,
which was advanced by George Berkley (1685–1783). The
metaphysics to integrate these paradigms constituted “the third
paradigm”, proposed by Benedict de Spinoza (1632–1677) and
Gottfried von Leibnitz (1646–1716) in the era of rationalism
and subsequently renewed by existentialists such as Edmund
Husserl (1858–1938) and Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) as well
as analytic philosophers of language, guided by Peter Frederick
Strawson (1919–2006). So-called third paradigms share the
premise that the mind and body form two aspects of experience
that originate from one entity, the third entity.
Given the above trajectory of philosophical thought, meta-
physics engages with the problems of perception between a
subject and an object. Theories of perception have been divided
into empiricist and idealist. Empiricists assert that perceptual
processes are guided by representations, which have been
incorporated into experience. Idealists counter this assertion by
arguing that perception is organized by a priori category in the
mind that does not refer to experience. The third paradigm
proposes to resolve the controversy between empiricists and
idealists. For example, ecological approaches developed the
concept of affordance, embracing certain concepts discussed
in quantum theory to characterize the interaction between
psychology and quantum mechanics either theoretically or
empirically (Turvey, 2012; Shaw and Kinsella-Shaw, 2015).
Similarly, to Western philosophy, Eastern philosophy has
discussed the problems between the person and the environment.
Here, the person is the subject, and the environment is the object.
The subject corresponds to the mind, and the object corresponds
to the material. Thus, Eastern thought, which follows two main
tracks, Taoism and Confucianism, has been concerned with the
problem of how people can live as person–like in the environment
(Pyung, 1934/1999; Feng, 2009; Tang, 2009; also see Yang, 1993,
for further discussions). It is agreed that the environment exhibits
natural laws and fates to which people accordingly try to adapt.
Furthermore, Eastern philosophy is based on a third paradigm.
Confucianism postulates two basic third entities, Gih and Lih
(for a review, see Huh, 2004). Hwoang Lee (1501–1570) proposed
that “Gih activated to implement Lih”. This statement implies
that Gih is a force or a potential that motivates an event,
and Lih is a reason or a purpose to be directed. Daeseung
Gi (1527–1572) revised this understanding of the two entities,
writing: “Gih is manipulated, and Lih is inferred”. Philosophers
thus differentiate between the two basic entities of Gih and
Lih.
Expressed in more scientific terminology, compared with
the classic discussions, Hangi Choi (1803–1877) renewed a
theory of Gih through the discipline of Gih (“Gihology”), which
derives from Confucianism and Taoism but is also influenced
by the Western disciplines, such as the electromagnetic theory
of Newtonian physics (Choi, 1857). First, as the quotation at
the end of the Introduction states, Gih is defined as “action for
change (potential activated)”. Second, Gih is activated before
it is “formed to be observed”. Third, Gih helps coordinate the
human and the environment. According to this discussion and as
elaborated by Lee et al. (2007) and Lee and Shaw (unpublished),
the concept of Gih is comparable with but more advanced than
the concept of affordance developed by ecological approaches
(see Jin and Lee, 2013; Jin et al., 2015; Jin et al., 2016, for further
suggestions).
FROM AFFORDANCE TO GIH
The concept of affordance is well known in ecological approaches
as a concept for explaining the coordination of perception and
action. A refinement of this concept or a substitution with
a new concept is nonetheless more productive for facilitating
further discussions in philosophy and biological processes.
According to Gibson (1979), affordance discloses a relationship
between a subject and an object, or the “psychical and
physical”, respectively. This concept is a higher-level concept.
To explain the concept at a more concrete level, the two
directions must be understood as subject-to-object and object-
to-subject. Later, ecological psychologists questioned whether
this concept adequately explains a subject’s inclinations or an
object’s properties. Whereas some scholars have criticized the
implications of the concept, other scholars have defended it
(for a review, see Michaels, 2003), contending that affordance
connotes the object’s property, directed as object-to-subject, and
the subject’s inclination, directed as subject-to-object. Therefore,
the subject’s “effectivity” or some ability of action has been
proposed (Michaels and Carello, 1981; Shaw et al., 1982). Other
academics have proposed “intentionality” for action (Shaw, 2001)
and “relation” (Chemero, 2003) to define an animal’s ability
to interact with aspects of the environment. Finally, some
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definitions that were extended to include “meaningfulness” were
proposed but criticized for being ambivalent in sensible testing
(Michaels, 2003).
Thus, it remains controversial whether the revisions of
affordance can free the concept from its original limitations.
First, the means by which potential effectivity can be activated
should be determined. Direction indicates what is implied with
a bi-direction relation, such as subject-to-object or object-to-
subject (e.g., Dotov et al., 2012). Second, how can potential
effectivity be activated in a situation? Is effectivity primed
by the mind, matter (or the body) or both? Third, it is
understood that affordance is coextensive with information. Is it
possible that affordance and information are not differentiated
in concept and reality (c.f., Fajen et al., 2009)? In proposing
a third paradigm, it is necessary to specify the entity that
subordinates both the mind and the material and thus affects
both the subject and the object. Therefore, this paper argues
that one such third entity, Gih, as discussed by Choi (1857)
and by Lee and Shaw (unpublished), is defined as potential
activation. The argument is threefold. First, Gih is specified, not
as static potential, but as activation without purpose. Second, Gih
specifies bi-directional interactions between subject and object.
Third, Gih is psychosomatic, thus relating the mind and the
body. These three propositions indicate that when refined, the
concept of Gih extends the understanding of the coordination of
perception and action beyond that proposed by the concept of
affordance.
Gih is demonstrated in the genealogy of the words used
in daily living as “blood-Gih” and “mind-Gih” (Lee and Shaw,
unpublished). Blood-Gih denotes passion and intention and
represents the activation from body (blood) to mind (emotion).
By contrast, mind-Gih corresponds to the health and physical
conditions as instances of activation from mind to body.
Therefore, blood-Gih and mind-Gih possess features that can
be characterized as activation and together represent a bi-
direction of Gih, mind-to-body and body-to-mind. The question
arises regarding how the blood or mind is compounded
with Gih to direct the other. Both the blood and the mind
are hypothesized to attain their relative properties. It is
through psychosomatics that the body (blood) works with the
mind. As the term psychosomatic implies, Gih attempts to
incorporate both the mental and biological processes in terms
of Eastern philosophy and Oriental medical science (Leslie and
Young, 1992; Tateno, 1993). Thus, Gih performs work that
is psychosomatic (see Lee and Shaw, unpublished, for further
discussion).
There is a critical reason to separate Gih from affordance.
As noted, Gih should be differentiated from Lih, which in
contrast implies a kind of reason that serves what is intended
(see Hwoang Lee and Daeseung Gi’s discussion in the above
chapter “Metaphysical Review”). As established by Gibson and
further developed by later ecological psychologists, affordance is
embedded with information, which thus implies directing the
effort of coordinating perception and action for a purpose. By
contrast, Gih is an activation potential and thus is not directed,
as it does not have purpose. Some philosophical perspectives
suggest concepts similar to Gih. For instance, “Elan vital” was
proposed as a “living force of no teleology” by Henri Louis
Bergson (1859–1941) (Papanicolaou and Gunter, 1987).
Consider a hypothetical example to illustrate the differences
between the understandings of perception and action that result
from applying the concepts of Gih and affordance. Suppose a
dog approaches a girl to bite her. The girl runs away from the
dog. Explained with the concepts of affordance and information,
the girl is informed that the dog is about to bite her, and she
is afforded with running away from the situation. However,
modeling the situation in terms of Gih, if the girl’s Gih is not
activated, then she cannot run away and thus cannot prevent
herself from being bitten by the dog. Hence, Gih activation is a
prerequisite to what follows with purpose, such as running away.
Gih is effectively neutral in purpose, though it can be activated.
Consider a more dramatic situation, such as a case in which the
girl’s Gih is highly activated. Suppose she encounters a high wall
while being chased by the dog. She will fight the dog. At this
moment, Gih is activated and is directed in terms of subject-to-
object for the girl and object-to-subject for the dog and the wall,
which also coordinates the mutual directions. Thus, the girl’s Gih
activation is situational because the wall blocks her retreat. Gih
is activated by and construed as a psychosomatic process such as
a fear of biting or the valor of combat, respectively manifested
as running or fighting. What is psychosomatic has the potential
to activate and influence both the mind and the body, and its
function is mediated by the hormonal metabolic and automatic
nervous systems.
GIH AS PSYCHOSOMATIC OPEN TO
EASTERN DISCIPLINES
Sword matching, the example mentioned in the Introduction,
offers a better example than the previous example of the girl and
the dog for comprehending Gih as a psychosomatic process. An
artist (A) performs a more advanced technique, such as a counter-
attack, on his or her opponent (B)’s body part (for example, B’s
wrist), just after (B) starts to attack (A) (for example, A’s head).
When (B) attacks (A)’s head, (B) must open his wrist, which is
performed at a sufficiently slow pace for (A) to counter-attack,
despite the wrist being a small part moving quickly. How can
this counter-attack be explained? Lee et al. (2012) suggested that
(A) could enlarge the small space of (B)’s hidden body part, the
wrist, and lengthen the time of (B)’s wrist movement to succeed
in a counter-attack in a second. Therefore, the perceptual scale
of (A) was enhanced (see Jin and Lee, 2013, for generalized
empirical evidence). Referring to a cognitive explanation, (A) is
more skilled because of repeated practice. However, this model
can explain only A’s skills, which are not specified in time and
space but are evaluated based on average conditions. In terms of
the Gih model, (A) has Gih as the psychosomatic potential that
is attuned to the present situation of perception-action, which
is activated by spiritual intention and coordinated by physical
autonomic processes. Gih can be trained through martial arts
practice and conceptualized as a type of physical and spiritual
learning. However, in the above case of the weak girl who must
fight against the cruel dog when blocked by the high wall, the
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level of Gih activation increases without training. Thus, Gih can
be situationally activated for survival to release psychosomatic
processes between the mind and body, thereby accommodating
the person to the environment.
If Gih is understood in terms of the psychosomatic process, it
makes sense that meditation practices and treatments performed
in Oriental medical science are examples of the principle of
Gih. Meditation practice relies on certain correct postures
and a focused mind. For the technique to integrate the
mind and body, it is advised that respiration should be
controlled (e.g., Schure et al., 2008; Jung et al., 2010). Breathing
is normally processed involuntarily but can be controlled
voluntarily with training. The control of respiration activates
the mediation between physical conditions—such as blood
circulation, hormonal metabolism, and nerve activation—and
mental states—such as consciousness, cognition, and emotion.
Thus, respiratory control is a psychosomatic process. Oriental
medical science can also be theorized as a means of circulating
Gih. Practitioners diagnose patients by touching the blood waves
of the body (ordinary, wrists), checking the strength and rate of
respiration, observing the colors of the face, and noting other vital
signs. The techniques used to treat the psychosomatic variable
of Gih include techniques such as the treatment of natural
medicines, hot steam stimuli (moxibustion), and needle stimuli
(acupuncture). Positive results have been reported in scientific
studies, despite some controversies (see Unschuld, 1985; Leslie
and Young, 1992; Guan and Fan, 2002; Noble, 2009, for further
discussions).
What can the consideration of Gih as a psychosomatic variable
contribute to empirical analysis? With respect to experimental
procedures, Gih must be measured through its effects on
behaviors associated with the mind. The observable phenomena
can then be attributed to certain scales in perception and action,
which are described as the terminal measures. For the measures
of perception and action, studies have analyzed the influences
of only some physical variables. In experimental analyses, Lee
et al. (2012) manipulated the conditions of an archer’s arm
control. The treatment in the study conducted by Jin and Lee
(2013) varied according to soccer players’ running speeds. In
the previous example of the artist sword matching, treatment
can similarly be varied based on patterns of footwork. Physical
manipulation has been understood to be empirical. Despite the
convenience of manipulation; however, such physical variables
are insufficient because they do not account for mental events.
Therefore, the intermediated variable must be manipulated at
the psychosomatic level, which links physical states and mental
processes.
For a psychosomatic design, respiration control can be
proposed in the sword matching example. Martial artists are
adept at catching attack points while the space or time to
attack is enlarged or prolonged. These phenomena occur by
way of the psychosomatic process of Gih enhancement, which is
activated by respiration control. In terms of paradigms, Gih as a
psychosomatic model can be construed as a “hologram” model,
such as that proposed by Pribram (1991), who argues that classic
paradigms have overly relied on analytic dispositions. Because
Gih, which is manipulated by respiration and other available
processes, is a psychosomatic variable, it must be reevaluated
as holographic rather than analytic. Thus, the discussion of Gih
can be extended to arrange the empirical variables in a hierarchy
ranging from the physical variables through the psychosomatic
variables to the mental variables.
Because the psychosomatic variable of Gih is institutionalized,
what is disposed of in popular discussions of psychological
questions should be elaborated and further clarified. Problems
concerning communication in language, aesthetic evaluation,
and social relations represent some instances of mediation
between mind and matter, or subject and object. If what has
been discussed in this paper regarding blood-Gih and mind-Gih
is extended, the terms of speaker-Gih and listener-Gih, artist-
Gih and appreciator-Gih, and social-Gih between the subject
and object could be tentatively proposed, provoking further
discussion.
CONCLUSION
The concept of Gih is compatible with Gibson’s concept of
affordance in some respects. In other respects, though, the two
concepts differ. Gih is a potential activation that possesses not
only physical properties but also a mental disposition, influencing
both subject and object, and thus should be considered a third
entity.
Along with the subsets “mind-Gih” and “body-Gih” (also
called “blood-Gih”), the concept of Gih accounts for the
bi-directional interactions between mind and body. Thus, the
concept advances the understanding of the coordination of
perception and action beyond that enabled by the concept of
affordance as initially proposed (Dotov et al., 2012) and conforms
to revised notions of intentionality and effectivity (Michaels and
Carello, 1981). The role of information in enacting affordances
implies that the latter is teleological. By contrast, Gih refers to
the potential to activate mental and physical states and thus
lacks purpose. Gih activation between the mind and body can be
refined with training through meditation or respiration, which
are known to control psychosomatic processes, thus influencing
an involuntary mechanism through voluntary control. The
possibility of such refinement remains a topic for discussion in
Eastern philosophy and Oriental medical science.
Gih can be considered a psychosomatic variable that is
located at the mid-level in a hierarchy of variables ranging
from physical to mental and thus should be distinguished
from affordance. Hence, Gih also passes the philosophical
test of Occam’s razor, which demands no redundancy when
scientific terms are created. Therefore, the refined term of
Gih is not synonymous with affordance. Nevertheless, further
discussion is required to discern whether the Gih concept could
incorporate elements of physical psychology (Turvey and Carello,
2012), which would mark a theoretical advancement from
the ecological approaches. Looking forward, the Gih concept
accommodates communication processes, aesthetic feelings, and
social relationships and may offer a way to integrate Eastern and
Western traditions of thought concerning the coordination of
perception and action.
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